Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199258208
- eISBN:
- 9780191603334
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258201.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics
This is the first survey of Unionism, the ideology of most of the rulers of the United Kingdom for the past 300 years. Because it was taken so much for granted, it has never been properly studied. In ...
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This is the first survey of Unionism, the ideology of most of the rulers of the United Kingdom for the past 300 years. Because it was taken so much for granted, it has never been properly studied. In the twilight of Unionism, it is possible to see its long shadow over British and imperial history since 1707. The book studies the crucial time points at which the Union was built up and partly taken down: 1707, 1800, 1886, 1921, 1974, and 1997 to date. Primordial Unionism (the belief that the union is good in and for itself) now survives only in Northern Ireland. Instrumental Unionism supported the Union as a means to other ends, such as the Empire and the Welfare State; but the first is gone and the second is now evolving differently in the four territories of the UK. Representation and finance are the unsolved, and arguably insoluble problems of the post-1997 devolution settlement.Less
This is the first survey of Unionism, the ideology of most of the rulers of the United Kingdom for the past 300 years. Because it was taken so much for granted, it has never been properly studied. In the twilight of Unionism, it is possible to see its long shadow over British and imperial history since 1707. The book studies the crucial time points at which the Union was built up and partly taken down: 1707, 1800, 1886, 1921, 1974, and 1997 to date. Primordial Unionism (the belief that the union is good in and for itself) now survives only in Northern Ireland. Instrumental Unionism supported the Union as a means to other ends, such as the Empire and the Welfare State; but the first is gone and the second is now evolving differently in the four territories of the UK. Representation and finance are the unsolved, and arguably insoluble problems of the post-1997 devolution settlement.
Charles S. Chihara
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239758
- eISBN:
- 9780191597190
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239750.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the ...
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A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.Less
A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.
Terence Irwin
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195086454
- eISBN:
- 9780199833306
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195086457.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection ...
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This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.Less
This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.
P. Kyle Stanford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195174083
- eISBN:
- 9780199786367
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195174089.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter addresses the question of whether there is any sense to be made of science without scientific realism. That is, it will try to identify whether there is any coherent positive view we ...
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This chapter addresses the question of whether there is any sense to be made of science without scientific realism. That is, it will try to identify whether there is any coherent positive view we might take of our successful scientific theories if we abandon the presumption that they must be approximately true descriptions of nature's innermost recesses and secret domains. A long and distinguished minority tradition has embraced a view entitled “instrumentalism,” which instead regards even our best scientific theories merely as effective tools or instruments for achieving our practical goals. It is argued that the problem of unconceived alternatives promises to breathe new life into this instrumentalist tradition: not into its discredited semantic theses, but into its positive conception of the status of scientific theories.Less
This chapter addresses the question of whether there is any sense to be made of science without scientific realism. That is, it will try to identify whether there is any coherent positive view we might take of our successful scientific theories if we abandon the presumption that they must be approximately true descriptions of nature's innermost recesses and secret domains. A long and distinguished minority tradition has embraced a view entitled “instrumentalism,” which instead regards even our best scientific theories merely as effective tools or instruments for achieving our practical goals. It is argued that the problem of unconceived alternatives promises to breathe new life into this instrumentalist tradition: not into its discredited semantic theses, but into its positive conception of the status of scientific theories.
Avner de‐Shalit
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240388
- eISBN:
- 9780191599033
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240388.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Through the examination of Eco‐feminism and Deep Ecology, it is demonstrated how many in these two schools have misused the concept of ‘environment’ and caused a confusion that has been detrimental ...
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Through the examination of Eco‐feminism and Deep Ecology, it is demonstrated how many in these two schools have misused the concept of ‘environment’ and caused a confusion that has been detrimental to the social and political status of environmental philosophy. It is argued that when putting forward political goals that are legitimate and justified, but not ‘environmental’ at all, they have ‘conceptually exploited’ the ‘environment’. The reasons for environmental philosophy's lack of popularity among politicians and activists are (1) that it fails to distinguish between meta‐ethics and political theory, (2) that it identifies goals that do not necessarily appeal to environmentalists, and (3) that it overextended the use of its main concepts and caused confusion and vagueness.Less
Through the examination of Eco‐feminism and Deep Ecology, it is demonstrated how many in these two schools have misused the concept of ‘environment’ and caused a confusion that has been detrimental to the social and political status of environmental philosophy. It is argued that when putting forward political goals that are legitimate and justified, but not ‘environmental’ at all, they have ‘conceptually exploited’ the ‘environment’. The reasons for environmental philosophy's lack of popularity among politicians and activists are (1) that it fails to distinguish between meta‐ethics and political theory, (2) that it identifies goals that do not necessarily appeal to environmentalists, and (3) that it overextended the use of its main concepts and caused confusion and vagueness.
Eamonn Callan
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242689
- eISBN:
- 9780191598715
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242682.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the ...
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Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the development of capacities for revision of conceptions of the good should be corrected by attention to the value of developing capacities permitting a rational adherence to a conception of the good. Exposing children to a diverse but shallow secular and consumer culture might not facilitate goodness‐enhancing autonomy in a way that is superior to the more insular strategies of religious minorities whose child‐rearing practices are criticized by liberals.Less
Autonomy is important to leading a good life but a common liberal instrumental construal of the way in which it contributes to the leading of a good life is defective. A one‐sided focus on the development of capacities for revision of conceptions of the good should be corrected by attention to the value of developing capacities permitting a rational adherence to a conception of the good. Exposing children to a diverse but shallow secular and consumer culture might not facilitate goodness‐enhancing autonomy in a way that is superior to the more insular strategies of religious minorities whose child‐rearing practices are criticized by liberals.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the explanatory and justificatory roles of theoretical and practice reasons. It then considers the resistance to the idea that a unified ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the explanatory and justificatory roles of theoretical and practice reasons. It then considers the resistance to the idea that a unified comprehensive theory of rationality can be achieved. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the explanatory and justificatory roles of theoretical and practice reasons. It then considers the resistance to the idea that a unified comprehensive theory of rationality can be achieved. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter considers whether practical reason is substantive or only instrumental. It examines egoism, in a normative form, as well as hedonism, for which pleasure and pain are the fundamental ...
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This chapter considers whether practical reason is substantive or only instrumental. It examines egoism, in a normative form, as well as hedonism, for which pleasure and pain are the fundamental sources of practical reasons. The chapter also considers what metaphysical commitments a theory of practical rationality must make if it embraces some apparently irreducible normative notion, such as that of intrinsic value.Less
This chapter considers whether practical reason is substantive or only instrumental. It examines egoism, in a normative form, as well as hedonism, for which pleasure and pain are the fundamental sources of practical reasons. The chapter also considers what metaphysical commitments a theory of practical rationality must make if it embraces some apparently irreducible normative notion, such as that of intrinsic value.
Alvin I. Goldman and Erik J. Olsson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter discusses two possible solutions to the value-of-knowledge problem. It first discusses the conditional probability solution, which was formulated and defended by Erik Olsson. It then ...
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This chapter discusses two possible solutions to the value-of-knowledge problem. It first discusses the conditional probability solution, which was formulated and defended by Erik Olsson. It then considers the “value autonomization”, which has been developed and defended by the author of this book. The chapter then stresses that the swamping problem is equally problematic for many theories of knowledge and internalist theories. The chapter also introduces the concepts of type instrumentalism and token instrumentalism.Less
This chapter discusses two possible solutions to the value-of-knowledge problem. It first discusses the conditional probability solution, which was formulated and defended by Erik Olsson. It then considers the “value autonomization”, which has been developed and defended by the author of this book. The chapter then stresses that the swamping problem is equally problematic for many theories of knowledge and internalist theories. The chapter also introduces the concepts of type instrumentalism and token instrumentalism.
Curtis J. Evans
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195328189
- eISBN:
- 9780199870028
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328189.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Debates about instrumentalism or using the black churches as instruments of social and political reform deepened even as black leaders began emphasizing the drama of black life and religion. Drama ...
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Debates about instrumentalism or using the black churches as instruments of social and political reform deepened even as black leaders began emphasizing the drama of black life and religion. Drama was turned to because of high hopes that black contributions in the realm of arts, literature, and cultural achievements would help address racial problems in a way that a social scientific approach could not. An aesthetic appreciation of black religion and an emphasis on dramatizing black life proceeded apace even as black leaders continued to engage in scathing critiques of actual black churches in the North and South. The Great Migration heightened expectations and fears about how black churches could more authentically represent what were seen as the unique cultural contributions of blacks to American society. In the end, drama did not substantially solve the problem of contintuing traditional and stereotypical images of black culture, especially in the realm of religion.Less
Debates about instrumentalism or using the black churches as instruments of social and political reform deepened even as black leaders began emphasizing the drama of black life and religion. Drama was turned to because of high hopes that black contributions in the realm of arts, literature, and cultural achievements would help address racial problems in a way that a social scientific approach could not. An aesthetic appreciation of black religion and an emphasis on dramatizing black life proceeded apace even as black leaders continued to engage in scathing critiques of actual black churches in the North and South. The Great Migration heightened expectations and fears about how black churches could more authentically represent what were seen as the unique cultural contributions of blacks to American society. In the end, drama did not substantially solve the problem of contintuing traditional and stereotypical images of black culture, especially in the realm of religion.
Peter A. Alces
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226513362
- eISBN:
- 9780226513676
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226513676.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This book is, essentially, a thought experiment: what should the law be in order to govern the affairs of human agents who do not have free will? Proceeding from the premise that human agents are ...
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This book is, essentially, a thought experiment: what should the law be in order to govern the affairs of human agents who do not have free will? Proceeding from the premise that human agents are determined creatures who lack free will, and therefore lack moral responsibility, this book considers where and how the law fails to appreciate that humans cannot be morally blameworthy and joins the normative conversation, in order to open new avenues of thought. Aspects of criminal law depict the neuroscientific naïveté of the doctrine, such as the inconsistent treatment of those with equally disadvantageous cognitive deficits, congenital or acquired. Further, normative criminal law theory fails to understand authentic human agency from the perspective vindicated by neuroscience, a failure exemplified by retributive theories of punishment, and instead relies on folk psychological concepts. Like criminal law, many concepts of tort law doctrine operate based on an inauthentic view of human agency—including the standard of care, proximate causation, and the compensability as well as monetization of injuries. This inauthentic conception is pervasive in non-instrumental normative theories of tort, which are demonstrated to be incoherent. Contract law doctrine too relies on inaccurate folk psychological concepts, such as consent, that ignore the situationist nature of human agency. And non-instrumental theories of contract rely on dubious assumptions of promise and agreement that conflict with a materialist stance. Finally, after assailing the straw men founding compatibilist views, this book anticipates an “Age of Realization” ushered in by a broader, deeper neuroscientific understanding.Less
This book is, essentially, a thought experiment: what should the law be in order to govern the affairs of human agents who do not have free will? Proceeding from the premise that human agents are determined creatures who lack free will, and therefore lack moral responsibility, this book considers where and how the law fails to appreciate that humans cannot be morally blameworthy and joins the normative conversation, in order to open new avenues of thought. Aspects of criminal law depict the neuroscientific naïveté of the doctrine, such as the inconsistent treatment of those with equally disadvantageous cognitive deficits, congenital or acquired. Further, normative criminal law theory fails to understand authentic human agency from the perspective vindicated by neuroscience, a failure exemplified by retributive theories of punishment, and instead relies on folk psychological concepts. Like criminal law, many concepts of tort law doctrine operate based on an inauthentic view of human agency—including the standard of care, proximate causation, and the compensability as well as monetization of injuries. This inauthentic conception is pervasive in non-instrumental normative theories of tort, which are demonstrated to be incoherent. Contract law doctrine too relies on inaccurate folk psychological concepts, such as consent, that ignore the situationist nature of human agency. And non-instrumental theories of contract rely on dubious assumptions of promise and agreement that conflict with a materialist stance. Finally, after assailing the straw men founding compatibilist views, this book anticipates an “Age of Realization” ushered in by a broader, deeper neuroscientific understanding.
David Brown
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199271986
- eISBN:
- 9780191602801
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271984.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
The first part of the chapter considers non-ecclesial buildings, and uses work by a range of modern architects to argue that their potential role as mediators of the divine is in fact far more deeply ...
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The first part of the chapter considers non-ecclesial buildings, and uses work by a range of modern architects to argue that their potential role as mediators of the divine is in fact far more deeply entrenched than the alleged total secularity of modern culture might suggest. The second half of the chapter then explores ‘Church Architecture in Crisis’ and detects a failure of nerve that suggests the reduction of the building to the narrowly instrumental.Less
The first part of the chapter considers non-ecclesial buildings, and uses work by a range of modern architects to argue that their potential role as mediators of the divine is in fact far more deeply entrenched than the alleged total secularity of modern culture might suggest. The second half of the chapter then explores ‘Church Architecture in Crisis’ and detects a failure of nerve that suggests the reduction of the building to the narrowly instrumental.
Elijah Millgram
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195376685
- eISBN:
- 9780199776306
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376685.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
One type of procrastination is a result of the surprising temporal structure of some important human goods, whose benefits cannot be accounted for as the sums of benefits of momentary goods. Virtue ...
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One type of procrastination is a result of the surprising temporal structure of some important human goods, whose benefits cannot be accounted for as the sums of benefits of momentary goods. Virtue for such a procrastinator consists in adopting compensating strategies, one of which is artificially imposing instrumental structure on an activity. If many agents are procrastinators and the device is widespread, then one of the deepest motivations for instrumentalism—the evident pervasiveness of instrumentally structured activity—is misleading.Less
One type of procrastination is a result of the surprising temporal structure of some important human goods, whose benefits cannot be accounted for as the sums of benefits of momentary goods. Virtue for such a procrastinator consists in adopting compensating strategies, one of which is artificially imposing instrumental structure on an activity. If many agents are procrastinators and the device is widespread, then one of the deepest motivations for instrumentalism—the evident pervasiveness of instrumentally structured activity—is misleading.
Alan Weir
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199541492
- eISBN:
- 9780191594915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199541492.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A division is drawn between empirical sentences, pure mathematical sentences, and mixed sentences, including bridge principles. Mixed sentences are made-true relative to a calculus when derivable ...
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A division is drawn between empirical sentences, pure mathematical sentences, and mixed sentences, including bridge principles. Mixed sentences are made-true relative to a calculus when derivable from that calculus plus empirical truths. The metaphysical content of mixed sentences in general has two sources, empirical truths and pure mathematics. Conservative extension results are needed if an applied calculus is to be of any use; such results are pieces of applied mathematics themselves. The regress which ensues is the usual one in semantics (which is not to say it is not objectionable). Two general accounts of theoretical language are contrasted: a Quinean holistic empiricism and a ‘molecular’ position compatible with neo-formalism. The latter insists on an independent grasp of mathematics as part of an explanation of how we can enlarge our conceptual reach beyond the empirical. Quinean platonism and Fieldian fictionalism, in which mathematics is not independently grasped, cannot, it is argued, explain this enlargement; both lead to an instrumentalistic, relativistic, anti-realism.Less
A division is drawn between empirical sentences, pure mathematical sentences, and mixed sentences, including bridge principles. Mixed sentences are made-true relative to a calculus when derivable from that calculus plus empirical truths. The metaphysical content of mixed sentences in general has two sources, empirical truths and pure mathematics. Conservative extension results are needed if an applied calculus is to be of any use; such results are pieces of applied mathematics themselves. The regress which ensues is the usual one in semantics (which is not to say it is not objectionable). Two general accounts of theoretical language are contrasted: a Quinean holistic empiricism and a ‘molecular’ position compatible with neo-formalism. The latter insists on an independent grasp of mathematics as part of an explanation of how we can enlarge our conceptual reach beyond the empirical. Quinean platonism and Fieldian fictionalism, in which mathematics is not independently grasped, cannot, it is argued, explain this enlargement; both lead to an instrumentalistic, relativistic, anti-realism.
Dennis Klimchuk
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567751
- eISBN:
- 9780191705267
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567751.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations, Philosophy of Law
There are two principal accounts of the normative foundations of unjust enrichment. The first holds that the plaintiff's right to restitution for unjust enrichment is a claim in corrective justice. ...
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There are two principal accounts of the normative foundations of unjust enrichment. The first holds that the plaintiff's right to restitution for unjust enrichment is a claim in corrective justice. The second holds that the plaintiff's right vindicates a set of values to which our legal system is committed. This chapter unpacks what is at issue in the debate between these two accounts, and the chapter sets that debate in two contexts. The first is the main justificatory puzzle posed by the claim in unjust enrichment, which puzzle is brought into relief by asking whether the right to restitution for unjust enrichment is primary or secondary. The second context is a set of linked foundational issues in political philosophy and private law theory, issues that it is argued are engaged by the question: What justifies liability in unjust enrichment?Less
There are two principal accounts of the normative foundations of unjust enrichment. The first holds that the plaintiff's right to restitution for unjust enrichment is a claim in corrective justice. The second holds that the plaintiff's right vindicates a set of values to which our legal system is committed. This chapter unpacks what is at issue in the debate between these two accounts, and the chapter sets that debate in two contexts. The first is the main justificatory puzzle posed by the claim in unjust enrichment, which puzzle is brought into relief by asking whether the right to restitution for unjust enrichment is primary or secondary. The second context is a set of linked foundational issues in political philosophy and private law theory, issues that it is argued are engaged by the question: What justifies liability in unjust enrichment?
Ekkehart Schlicht
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292241
- eISBN:
- 9780191596865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292244.003.0013
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics, History of Economic Thought
The law is closely related to custom. It may be understood as brought about by the same tendencies that bring about custom. The tension between natural law and legal positivism may be understood in ...
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The law is closely related to custom. It may be understood as brought about by the same tendencies that bring about custom. The tension between natural law and legal positivism may be understood in terms of these tendencies. The view is contrasted with the evolutionary view of the law that overemphasizes instrumental concerns and largely neglects the ‘organic’ aspects of the system of law.Less
The law is closely related to custom. It may be understood as brought about by the same tendencies that bring about custom. The tension between natural law and legal positivism may be understood in terms of these tendencies. The view is contrasted with the evolutionary view of the law that overemphasizes instrumental concerns and largely neglects the ‘organic’ aspects of the system of law.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199266487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter distinguishes several grades of fictionalism about an area of discourse. Instrumentalists think we assert nothing with a sentence S of the relevant type. Meta-fictionalists have us ...
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This chapter distinguishes several grades of fictionalism about an area of discourse. Instrumentalists think we assert nothing with a sentence S of the relevant type. Meta-fictionalists have us asserting that S is true in the story or pretendable in the game. Object-fictionalists think we assert that F, where F is the real-world fact that makes (or would make) S pretendable in the game. Relative fictionalists think we assert either the real-world fact already mentioned or an as-if fact about the world we pretend we're in when playing the game, or possibly a different game. Figuralists think we assert S's metaphorical content, which may be a relative content as just described. Arguments for the figuralist approach are adduced, among them the light it sheds on a famous objection to modal fictionalism posed by Brock and Rosen and made general by O'Leary–Hawthorne and Nolan.Less
This chapter distinguishes several grades of fictionalism about an area of discourse. Instrumentalists think we assert nothing with a sentence S of the relevant type. Meta-fictionalists have us asserting that S is true in the story or pretendable in the game. Object-fictionalists think we assert that F, where F is the real-world fact that makes (or would make) S pretendable in the game. Relative fictionalists think we assert either the real-world fact already mentioned or an as-if fact about the world we pretend we're in when playing the game, or possibly a different game. Figuralists think we assert S's metaphorical content, which may be a relative content as just described. Arguments for the figuralist approach are adduced, among them the light it sheds on a famous objection to modal fictionalism posed by Brock and Rosen and made general by O'Leary–Hawthorne and Nolan.
Nicholas Southwood
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199539659
- eISBN:
- 9780191594908
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539659.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter addresses the task of explicating the normativity of deliberative contractualist principles – how and why deliberative contractualist agreements are supposed to be capable of providing ...
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This chapter addresses the task of explicating the normativity of deliberative contractualist principles – how and why deliberative contractualist agreements are supposed to be capable of providing us with normative reasons. It begins by discussing three familiar approaches, instrumentalism, substantivism, rational formalism, and argues that none of these appears to be successful. It then proposes a different account, relational formalism. This holds that to have the capacities constitutive of deliberative agency presupposes that we have the capacity to adopt what this chapter calls the interpersonal point of view, which in turn presupposes that we stand in a certain normatively significant relation to others, what this chapter calls deliberative citizenship. The reasons that deliberative contractualist agreements give us are reasons of this kind, reasons of deliberative citizenship.Less
This chapter addresses the task of explicating the normativity of deliberative contractualist principles – how and why deliberative contractualist agreements are supposed to be capable of providing us with normative reasons. It begins by discussing three familiar approaches, instrumentalism, substantivism, rational formalism, and argues that none of these appears to be successful. It then proposes a different account, relational formalism. This holds that to have the capacities constitutive of deliberative agency presupposes that we have the capacity to adopt what this chapter calls the interpersonal point of view, which in turn presupposes that we stand in a certain normatively significant relation to others, what this chapter calls deliberative citizenship. The reasons that deliberative contractualist agreements give us are reasons of this kind, reasons of deliberative citizenship.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The aim of Chapter 10 is to describe the form of ‘rational explanations’, i.e. explanations in terms of recognised warrant, and to show that exactly the same form of rational explanation applies to ...
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The aim of Chapter 10 is to describe the form of ‘rational explanations’, i.e. explanations in terms of recognised warrant, and to show that exactly the same form of rational explanation applies to beliefs, actions, and feelings. In all three cases a cognitive account applies: the explanans in a rational explanation consists of the actor's factual and normative beliefs.Less
The aim of Chapter 10 is to describe the form of ‘rational explanations’, i.e. explanations in terms of recognised warrant, and to show that exactly the same form of rational explanation applies to beliefs, actions, and feelings. In all three cases a cognitive account applies: the explanans in a rational explanation consists of the actor's factual and normative beliefs.
Robin Jeshion
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567881
- eISBN:
- 9780191722783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567881.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
What are the conditions on singular thought and what are the mechanisms of singular thought generation? The reigning view is that singular thinking is limited to objects of acquaintance. The ...
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What are the conditions on singular thought and what are the mechanisms of singular thought generation? The reigning view is that singular thinking is limited to objects of acquaintance. The alternative position, Semantic Instrumentalism, is that singular thoughts can be manufactured at will by manipulating semantics, that is, by introducing, and fixing the reference of a referential term with a description that the object uniquely satisfies. This chapter presents arguements that neither account will do, and offers a new theory, Cognitivism, that remedies certain problems. Like acquaintance views, Cognitivism limits singular thought, but the limitations are not strictly epistemic, but rather, cognitive, associated with the goals, interests, plans, and affective states of the thinker. Like Semantic Instrumentalism, it accounts for how semantics affects the origination of singular thought, while denying that agents control singular thought production. This chapter draws on findings in vision science and object perception to explain how Cognitvism supports a mental file analysis of singular thought, one that is rooted in the interplay between our evolutionarily develped cognitive goals, object perception, and the liguistic and cognitive functions of directly referential terms.Less
What are the conditions on singular thought and what are the mechanisms of singular thought generation? The reigning view is that singular thinking is limited to objects of acquaintance. The alternative position, Semantic Instrumentalism, is that singular thoughts can be manufactured at will by manipulating semantics, that is, by introducing, and fixing the reference of a referential term with a description that the object uniquely satisfies. This chapter presents arguements that neither account will do, and offers a new theory, Cognitivism, that remedies certain problems. Like acquaintance views, Cognitivism limits singular thought, but the limitations are not strictly epistemic, but rather, cognitive, associated with the goals, interests, plans, and affective states of the thinker. Like Semantic Instrumentalism, it accounts for how semantics affects the origination of singular thought, while denying that agents control singular thought production. This chapter draws on findings in vision science and object perception to explain how Cognitvism supports a mental file analysis of singular thought, one that is rooted in the interplay between our evolutionarily develped cognitive goals, object perception, and the liguistic and cognitive functions of directly referential terms.
