Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693818
- eISBN:
- 9780191731907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Facilitative reasons are explained. They are, it is claimed, what are often referred to as instrumental reasons. However, they are both wider and narrower than common accounts of instrumental reasons ...
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Facilitative reasons are explained. They are, it is claimed, what are often referred to as instrumental reasons. However, they are both wider and narrower than common accounts of instrumental reasons allow. On the one hand, they do not depend on anything being the agent’s goal (or intention), and on the other hand having goals or intentions does not generate reasons for the means for their realization. In the course of defending these claims the practical difference that goals may make is examined, and it is also argued that there is no reason to avoid a contradiction as such.Less
Facilitative reasons are explained. They are, it is claimed, what are often referred to as instrumental reasons. However, they are both wider and narrower than common accounts of instrumental reasons allow. On the one hand, they do not depend on anything being the agent’s goal (or intention), and on the other hand having goals or intentions does not generate reasons for the means for their realization. In the course of defending these claims the practical difference that goals may make is examined, and it is also argued that there is no reason to avoid a contradiction as such.
Hugh Grady
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198130048
- eISBN:
- 9780191671906
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198130048.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Shakespeare Studies
William Shakespeare was neither a Royalist defender of order and hierarchy nor a consistently radical champion of social equality, but rather simultaneously radical ...
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William Shakespeare was neither a Royalist defender of order and hierarchy nor a consistently radical champion of social equality, but rather simultaneously radical and conservative as a critic of emerging forms of modernity. This book argues that Shakespeare's social criticism in fact often parallels that of critics of modernity from our own Postmodernist era: that the broad analysis of modernity produced by Karl Marx, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Michel Foucault, and others can serve as a productive enabling representation and critique of the emerging modernity represented by the image in Troilus and Cressida of ‘an universal wolf’ of appetite, power, and will. The readings in this book demonstrate Shakespeare's keen interest in what twentieth-century theory has called ‘reification’ — a term that designates social systems created by human societies, but that confronts those societies as operating beyond human control, according to an autonomous ‘systems’ logic — in nascent mercantile capitalism, in power-oriented Machiavellian politics, and in the scientistic, value-free rationality which Horkheimer and Adorno call ‘instrumental reason’.Less
William Shakespeare was neither a Royalist defender of order and hierarchy nor a consistently radical champion of social equality, but rather simultaneously radical and conservative as a critic of emerging forms of modernity. This book argues that Shakespeare's social criticism in fact often parallels that of critics of modernity from our own Postmodernist era: that the broad analysis of modernity produced by Karl Marx, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Michel Foucault, and others can serve as a productive enabling representation and critique of the emerging modernity represented by the image in Troilus and Cressida of ‘an universal wolf’ of appetite, power, and will. The readings in this book demonstrate Shakespeare's keen interest in what twentieth-century theory has called ‘reification’ — a term that designates social systems created by human societies, but that confronts those societies as operating beyond human control, according to an autonomous ‘systems’ logic — in nascent mercantile capitalism, in power-oriented Machiavellian politics, and in the scientistic, value-free rationality which Horkheimer and Adorno call ‘instrumental reason’.
Anthony Simon Laden
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199606191
- eISBN:
- 9780191741081
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606191.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter discusses the place of instrumental reasons and the basic schema of inference within the social picture. It argues that these principles play a role in reasoning through their capacity to ...
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The chapter discusses the place of instrumental reasons and the basic schema of inference within the social picture. It argues that these principles play a role in reasoning through their capacity to render what we say and do intelligible to one another, and thus are grounded, within the social picture, on the norm of mutual intelligibility governing conversation. It then discusses why these principles can serve a role in rendering what we say and do intelligible and why it is this role and not their connection to the structure of action or the world that makes reference to them reasonable. It concludes with a return to the question of how to make a proposal to a rational creature and the attractions of living together by reasoning.Less
The chapter discusses the place of instrumental reasons and the basic schema of inference within the social picture. It argues that these principles play a role in reasoning through their capacity to render what we say and do intelligible to one another, and thus are grounded, within the social picture, on the norm of mutual intelligibility governing conversation. It then discusses why these principles can serve a role in rendering what we say and do intelligible and why it is this role and not their connection to the structure of action or the world that makes reference to them reasonable. It concludes with a return to the question of how to make a proposal to a rational creature and the attractions of living together by reasoning.
Ralph Wedgwood
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199606375
- eISBN:
- 9780191729478
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter offers an account of ‘instrumental rationality’, by clarifying (a) the nature of instrumental reasoning, and (b) what it is to do instrumental reasoning in a rational way. Joseph Raz was ...
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This chapter offers an account of ‘instrumental rationality’, by clarifying (a) the nature of instrumental reasoning, and (b) what it is to do instrumental reasoning in a rational way. Joseph Raz was wrong to claim that instrumental rationality is a ‘myth’ (although some philosophers have been seduced by myths about instrumental rationality); the accounts of John Broome and Kieran Setiya cover only a small fraction of instrumental reasoning; and orthodox decision theory involves idealizing assumptions that prevent it from having anything to say about instrumental reasoning. In fact, instrumental reasoning exemplifies a more general phenomenon: because we make decisions in a piecemeal way, we have to integrate these decisions together. To do this rationally, one’s intentions must make it rational for one to have a certain sort of expectation that one will carry out one’s intentions, and that this will result in one’s acting in a suitably valuable way.Less
This chapter offers an account of ‘instrumental rationality’, by clarifying (a) the nature of instrumental reasoning, and (b) what it is to do instrumental reasoning in a rational way. Joseph Raz was wrong to claim that instrumental rationality is a ‘myth’ (although some philosophers have been seduced by myths about instrumental rationality); the accounts of John Broome and Kieran Setiya cover only a small fraction of instrumental reasoning; and orthodox decision theory involves idealizing assumptions that prevent it from having anything to say about instrumental reasoning. In fact, instrumental reasoning exemplifies a more general phenomenon: because we make decisions in a piecemeal way, we have to integrate these decisions together. To do this rationally, one’s intentions must make it rational for one to have a certain sort of expectation that one will carry out one’s intentions, and that this will result in one’s acting in a suitably valuable way.
Christine M. Korsgaard
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199552795
- eISBN:
- 9780191720550
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552795.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental ...
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This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental reason is interpreted broadly as the general principle of practical judgment or application. Substantive moral principles, identified in terms of their distinctively moral content, are distinguished from formal moral principles, which dictate a certain form of practical deliberation, and some results of confusing the two are examined. The chapter argues that maximizing principles, such as the traditional principle of prudence or self-interest, are substantive rather than formal, and that this creates problems for establishing their normativity. They are set aside, and the book defends the principle of instrumental reason and the categorical imperative, as formal principles governing practical deliberation.Less
This chapter lays out the principles of practical reason whose normativity the book defends, and distinguishes them from other proposed principles of practical reason. The principle of instrumental reason is interpreted broadly as the general principle of practical judgment or application. Substantive moral principles, identified in terms of their distinctively moral content, are distinguished from formal moral principles, which dictate a certain form of practical deliberation, and some results of confusing the two are examined. The chapter argues that maximizing principles, such as the traditional principle of prudence or self-interest, are substantive rather than formal, and that this creates problems for establishing their normativity. They are set aside, and the book defends the principle of instrumental reason and the categorical imperative, as formal principles governing practical deliberation.
Christopher Tilmouth
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212378
- eISBN:
- 9780191707254
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212378.003.0007
- Subject:
- Literature, 17th-century and Restoration Literature
This chapter presents Hobbes as a philosopher who overturned prevailing assumptions about the passions, abandoning, in particular, the ideals on which psychomachia was based. Hobbes casts the ...
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This chapter presents Hobbes as a philosopher who overturned prevailing assumptions about the passions, abandoning, in particular, the ideals on which psychomachia was based. Hobbes casts the passions as natural and thus proper determinants of behaviour, measures of self-interest which (rather than eschewing) man should rightfully embrace. These passions are related to a kinetic idea of happiness, the precept that felicity consists in a constant motion from one appetite to the next. Hobbes conceives of reason, not as a transcendent faculty, policing actions in the light of absolute moral principles, but as an instrumental faculty, the function of which is to optimize the fulfilment of as many appetites as possible. The alleviation of fear of others' random aggression is critical to this process, which is why instrumental reason advocates the creation of a civil society headed by a sovereign so terrifying that none will disobey his laws.Less
This chapter presents Hobbes as a philosopher who overturned prevailing assumptions about the passions, abandoning, in particular, the ideals on which psychomachia was based. Hobbes casts the passions as natural and thus proper determinants of behaviour, measures of self-interest which (rather than eschewing) man should rightfully embrace. These passions are related to a kinetic idea of happiness, the precept that felicity consists in a constant motion from one appetite to the next. Hobbes conceives of reason, not as a transcendent faculty, policing actions in the light of absolute moral principles, but as an instrumental faculty, the function of which is to optimize the fulfilment of as many appetites as possible. The alleviation of fear of others' random aggression is critical to this process, which is why instrumental reason advocates the creation of a civil society headed by a sovereign so terrifying that none will disobey his laws.
Hugh Grady
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198130048
- eISBN:
- 9780191671906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198130048.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Shakespeare Studies
In Troilus and Cressida, William Shakespeare presents something like a full thematic development of the complex that forms the basis of an implicit ...
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In Troilus and Cressida, William Shakespeare presents something like a full thematic development of the complex that forms the basis of an implicit notion of Renaissance reification, presenting a complexly organized, mirrors-within-mirrors exploration of mutually metaphoring systems of power, desire, market-value, and instrumental reason. The intricate interplay in this drama between love/lechery and honour/power is an invitation to critical interpretation impossible to resist, impossible to complete. The major organizing duality in the play is not Trojans versus Greeks but the mutual metaphor between love and politics, eros and power, lechery and war. It is a vertiginous space of potential analogies, emblematic of a world of universal equivalences and commodification without any ground or objective basis — the reification of Marx's commodity fetishism, as it were, but without the labour theory of value. Thus, the play should be understood as approaching the problem of value through a strategy of negation.Less
In Troilus and Cressida, William Shakespeare presents something like a full thematic development of the complex that forms the basis of an implicit notion of Renaissance reification, presenting a complexly organized, mirrors-within-mirrors exploration of mutually metaphoring systems of power, desire, market-value, and instrumental reason. The intricate interplay in this drama between love/lechery and honour/power is an invitation to critical interpretation impossible to resist, impossible to complete. The major organizing duality in the play is not Trojans versus Greeks but the mutual metaphor between love and politics, eros and power, lechery and war. It is a vertiginous space of potential analogies, emblematic of a world of universal equivalences and commodification without any ground or objective basis — the reification of Marx's commodity fetishism, as it were, but without the labour theory of value. Thus, the play should be understood as approaching the problem of value through a strategy of negation.
Allen W. Wood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195395686
- eISBN:
- 9780199979295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395686.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Kant’s derivation of the supreme principle of morality in the Second Section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds by way of a philosophical examination of “the practical faculty of ...
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Kant’s derivation of the supreme principle of morality in the Second Section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds by way of a philosophical examination of “the practical faculty of reason” and an “exhibition” of its “rules of determination”. This essay attempts to explicate that account of practical reason, and also to relate it to systematic reflections on the (somewhat different) task of offering practical justifications of actions. Kant’s approach to practical reason is compared and contrasted with some contemporary ideas about “practical rationality”. Three species of practical reason -- instrumental, prudential and moral – are examined and developed. Finally, an attempt is made at relating Kant’s conception of the dignity of rational nature to questions of practical justification, by arguing that it points the way toward an intersubjective conception of practical reason not found explicitly in Kant’s account.Less
Kant’s derivation of the supreme principle of morality in the Second Section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds by way of a philosophical examination of “the practical faculty of reason” and an “exhibition” of its “rules of determination”. This essay attempts to explicate that account of practical reason, and also to relate it to systematic reflections on the (somewhat different) task of offering practical justifications of actions. Kant’s approach to practical reason is compared and contrasted with some contemporary ideas about “practical rationality”. Three species of practical reason -- instrumental, prudential and moral – are examined and developed. Finally, an attempt is made at relating Kant’s conception of the dignity of rational nature to questions of practical justification, by arguing that it points the way toward an intersubjective conception of practical reason not found explicitly in Kant’s account.
Ralph Wedgwood
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257362
- eISBN:
- 9780191601842
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257361.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Argues that internal requirements on rational choice are derived from the ultimate practical ‘aim’ of arriving at correct choices, which depend on which of one's options really are good things to do. ...
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Argues that internal requirements on rational choice are derived from the ultimate practical ‘aim’ of arriving at correct choices, which depend on which of one's options really are good things to do. In order to defend this ‘recognitional’ view of practical reason against the ‘constructivist’ who sees the internal, procedural requirements on rational choice as fundamental, the author argues that the objections which constructivists have raised against the recognitional view in fact apply only to substantive and not to formal versions of the latter. Furthermore, the author urges, objections of the very same kind can be pressed against the constructivist view itself.Less
Argues that internal requirements on rational choice are derived from the ultimate practical ‘aim’ of arriving at correct choices, which depend on which of one's options really are good things to do. In order to defend this ‘recognitional’ view of practical reason against the ‘constructivist’ who sees the internal, procedural requirements on rational choice as fundamental, the author argues that the objections which constructivists have raised against the recognitional view in fact apply only to substantive and not to formal versions of the latter. Furthermore, the author urges, objections of the very same kind can be pressed against the constructivist view itself.
Anthony O'Hear
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250043
- eISBN:
- 9780191598111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250045.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
There is a tension between considering humans as creatures of reason and as creatures of nature subject to Nature's categorical imperatives. While reason may raise sceptical doubts about our beliefs ...
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There is a tension between considering humans as creatures of reason and as creatures of nature subject to Nature's categorical imperatives. While reason may raise sceptical doubts about our beliefs and practices, we cannot live as if these doubts were true. It is plausible that some of these deeply held beliefs and practices are so embedded because they promote survival and this might give rise to a Humean view that Nature is too strong for Reason. However, our nature as transcendently self‐conscious rational agents means that we should not abandon all thought of justifying our most basic beliefs in favour of a purely instrumental account of reason. Reason, for self‐conscious agents, has a vertical aspect enabling us to step outside our beliefs and practices and question their validity.Less
There is a tension between considering humans as creatures of reason and as creatures of nature subject to Nature's categorical imperatives. While reason may raise sceptical doubts about our beliefs and practices, we cannot live as if these doubts were true. It is plausible that some of these deeply held beliefs and practices are so embedded because they promote survival and this might give rise to a Humean view that Nature is too strong for Reason. However, our nature as transcendently self‐conscious rational agents means that we should not abandon all thought of justifying our most basic beliefs in favour of a purely instrumental account of reason. Reason, for self‐conscious agents, has a vertical aspect enabling us to step outside our beliefs and practices and question their validity.
Hazlett Allan
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199674800
- eISBN:
- 9780191761164
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674800.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
“Humean” approaches to epistemic normativity, which explain epistemic normativity as a species of instrumental normativity, are articulated and criticized. A “teleological” conception of belief, on ...
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“Humean” approaches to epistemic normativity, which explain epistemic normativity as a species of instrumental normativity, are articulated and criticized. A “teleological” conception of belief, on which belief requires a desire to believe nothing but the truth, is considered. It is argued that belief is not normally accompanied by the desires required by the Humean’s account. Objections, in defense of Humean approaches, are considered.Less
“Humean” approaches to epistemic normativity, which explain epistemic normativity as a species of instrumental normativity, are articulated and criticized. A “teleological” conception of belief, on which belief requires a desire to believe nothing but the truth, is considered. It is argued that belief is not normally accompanied by the desires required by the Humean’s account. Objections, in defense of Humean approaches, are considered.
John Broome
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199604678
- eISBN:
- 9780191759062
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Practical reasoning is reasoning by means of which you arrive at a new intention. Reasoning in general is an activity through which you arrive at a new attitude by means of a rule-governed operation ...
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Practical reasoning is reasoning by means of which you arrive at a new intention. Reasoning in general is an activity through which you arrive at a new attitude by means of a rule-governed operation on the contents of your exiting attitudes. Reasoning is correct if it is governed by a correct rule, and a rule is correct if it corresponds to a basing permission of rationality. Rationality permits you to have certain attitudes based on others; for instance it permits you to believe q on the basis of believing p and believing that if p then q—this is an example of a basing permission. Although reasoning is made correct by a permission of rationality rather than a requirement of rationality, it often brings you to satisfy a requirement of rationality.Less
Practical reasoning is reasoning by means of which you arrive at a new intention. Reasoning in general is an activity through which you arrive at a new attitude by means of a rule-governed operation on the contents of your exiting attitudes. Reasoning is correct if it is governed by a correct rule, and a rule is correct if it corresponds to a basing permission of rationality. Rationality permits you to have certain attitudes based on others; for instance it permits you to believe q on the basis of believing p and believing that if p then q—this is an example of a basing permission. Although reasoning is made correct by a permission of rationality rather than a requirement of rationality, it often brings you to satisfy a requirement of rationality.
Liam Shields
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780748691869
- eISBN:
- 9781474427029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748691869.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter argues that we should adopt a sufficientarian view of how autonomy should be promoted. The chapter considers egalitarian and prioritarian principles for promoting autonomy and considers ...
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This chapter argues that we should adopt a sufficientarian view of how autonomy should be promoted. The chapter considers egalitarian and prioritarian principles for promoting autonomy and considers whether our concern with autonomy can be reduced to our concern with welfare. The chapter finds these views to be deficient. The chapter argues that we have non-instrumental reasons to secure a threshold of autonomy for each person so that their choices and decisions can be considered free and so securing enough autonomy is of special importance to justice.Less
This chapter argues that we should adopt a sufficientarian view of how autonomy should be promoted. The chapter considers egalitarian and prioritarian principles for promoting autonomy and considers whether our concern with autonomy can be reduced to our concern with welfare. The chapter finds these views to be deficient. The chapter argues that we have non-instrumental reasons to secure a threshold of autonomy for each person so that their choices and decisions can be considered free and so securing enough autonomy is of special importance to justice.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693818
- eISBN:
- 9780191731907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Explores the ways actual beliefs or knowledge affect what reasons people have, what they ought to do, and when their actions will be justified. It denies that actual beliefs affect what reasons ...
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Explores the ways actual beliefs or knowledge affect what reasons people have, what they ought to do, and when their actions will be justified. It denies that actual beliefs affect what reasons people have or what they ought to do, though they may affect the justification of acting as one did. Epistemic conditions, the availability of evidence, etc., do however affect both what reasons people have, what they ought to do, and the justifiability of their actions.Less
Explores the ways actual beliefs or knowledge affect what reasons people have, what they ought to do, and when their actions will be justified. It denies that actual beliefs affect what reasons people have or what they ought to do, though they may affect the justification of acting as one did. Epistemic conditions, the availability of evidence, etc., do however affect both what reasons people have, what they ought to do, and the justifiability of their actions.
Bryan W. Sokol and Janet E. Kuebli
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199794942
- eISBN:
- 9780199914500
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794942.003.0067
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Building on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s claim that “Intelligence plus character… is the goal of true education,” this chapter explores the parallels between character development and psychological ...
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Building on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s claim that “Intelligence plus character… is the goal of true education,” this chapter explores the parallels between character development and psychological literacy. The chapter argues, in particular, that promoting the skills of psychological literacy must be balanced against principles of citizenship and community in order to avoid the dangers of instrumental reasoning. In this regard, fostering psychologically literate citizens has much in common with moral character. The chapter proposes service-learning as one strategy for building community and channeling the skills of psychological literacy toward the service of a common good.Less
Building on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s claim that “Intelligence plus character… is the goal of true education,” this chapter explores the parallels between character development and psychological literacy. The chapter argues, in particular, that promoting the skills of psychological literacy must be balanced against principles of citizenship and community in order to avoid the dangers of instrumental reasoning. In this regard, fostering psychologically literate citizens has much in common with moral character. The chapter proposes service-learning as one strategy for building community and channeling the skills of psychological literacy toward the service of a common good.
Mohammed A. Bamyeh
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190280567
- eISBN:
- 9780190280581
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190280567.003.0003
- Subject:
- Sociology, Sociology of Religion, Comparative and Historical Sociology
Surveying the structure of Islamic public philosophy over 100 years, this chapter identifies two major approaches: instrumental reason and hermeneutics. The instrumentalists present Islam as an ...
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Surveying the structure of Islamic public philosophy over 100 years, this chapter identifies two major approaches: instrumental reason and hermeneutics. The instrumentalists present Islam as an instrument to solve problems. The hermeneuts, by contrast, present Islam as an educational project designed to elevate the intellectual capacities of humanity. The instrumentalists argue that humans should be capable of knowing god’s intentions, whereas the hermeneuts argue that this knowledge is not available to humans with certainty. Overall, whereas the instrumentalists see the proper role of the pious person to consist in applying god’s law, the hermeneuts see that role to consist of interpreting god’s intention. One approach sees divinity as external to the self, whereas the other see it as existing in dialectical relation to it. The chapter charts out the genealogies of each school in various countries, and analyzes the relationship of each to competing secular discourses, including anti-colonial nationalism and the debates on the character of the modern state.Less
Surveying the structure of Islamic public philosophy over 100 years, this chapter identifies two major approaches: instrumental reason and hermeneutics. The instrumentalists present Islam as an instrument to solve problems. The hermeneuts, by contrast, present Islam as an educational project designed to elevate the intellectual capacities of humanity. The instrumentalists argue that humans should be capable of knowing god’s intentions, whereas the hermeneuts argue that this knowledge is not available to humans with certainty. Overall, whereas the instrumentalists see the proper role of the pious person to consist in applying god’s law, the hermeneuts see that role to consist of interpreting god’s intention. One approach sees divinity as external to the self, whereas the other see it as existing in dialectical relation to it. The chapter charts out the genealogies of each school in various countries, and analyzes the relationship of each to competing secular discourses, including anti-colonial nationalism and the debates on the character of the modern state.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- July 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198805441
- eISBN:
- 9780191843518
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805441.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers various ways of capturing the nature and force of instrumental reasoning, normally understood as reasoning to a necessary means to an already existing end. It gives a new ...
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This chapter considers various ways of capturing the nature and force of instrumental reasoning, normally understood as reasoning to a necessary means to an already existing end. It gives a new account, which, it argues, is much more flexible than others, to its advantage. It then considers various problems which that account faces in making sense of the appeal to one’s end in such reasoning, and more generally of the role of autobiographical considerations (I believe that p, my aim is to V, I hope/fear that p etc.) in reasoning. It ends by considering the possibility of reasoning from and to hope, doubt, and fear.Less
This chapter considers various ways of capturing the nature and force of instrumental reasoning, normally understood as reasoning to a necessary means to an already existing end. It gives a new account, which, it argues, is much more flexible than others, to its advantage. It then considers various problems which that account faces in making sense of the appeal to one’s end in such reasoning, and more generally of the role of autobiographical considerations (I believe that p, my aim is to V, I hope/fear that p etc.) in reasoning. It ends by considering the possibility of reasoning from and to hope, doubt, and fear.
John Gibbons
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199673391
- eISBN:
- 9780191751684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673391.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Part II, Objectivism, is primarily concerned with the extent to which the objectivist can explain, or explain away, the subjectivist intuitions. Perhaps we can derive the subjective requirement on ...
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Part II, Objectivism, is primarily concerned with the extent to which the objectivist can explain, or explain away, the subjectivist intuitions. Perhaps we can derive the subjective requirement on beliefs, that you need evidence for them, from the objective requirement on beliefs, that they’re supposed to be true. This is easier said than done. Chapter 4 looks at two attempts to provide such a derivation, one inspired by Timothy Williamson’s analogous discussion of the norm of assertion, and one from Ralph Wedgwood, which was originally about belief.Less
Part II, Objectivism, is primarily concerned with the extent to which the objectivist can explain, or explain away, the subjectivist intuitions. Perhaps we can derive the subjective requirement on beliefs, that you need evidence for them, from the objective requirement on beliefs, that they’re supposed to be true. This is easier said than done. Chapter 4 looks at two attempts to provide such a derivation, one inspired by Timothy Williamson’s analogous discussion of the norm of assertion, and one from Ralph Wedgwood, which was originally about belief.
Sunil M. Agnani
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780823251803
- eISBN:
- 9780823253050
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823251803.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, World Literature
Chapter 3 considers links between Burke's writings and anticolonial thought (and Raynal), arguing that Burke's writings on India and France are related and even deeply intertwined concerns, rather ...
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Chapter 3 considers links between Burke's writings and anticolonial thought (and Raynal), arguing that Burke's writings on India and France are related and even deeply intertwined concerns, rather than merely chronologically contemporary. Burke's underlying disquiet had to do with the question of societies undergoing a complete transformation and whether this was an upheaval to be desired or dreaded. It argues that in both the Indian and the French cases, Burke's response was one of fear: fear of the emergence of class mobility, unfettered by the regulating social customs of Europe and enabled by the space of the colonies. Burke views France and India as having suffered from a “conquest”: he views the Jacobins as treating France as a country of conquest virtually indistinguishable from a colonial occupation. Conceptually, there is a surprising link between Burke's critique of French Enlightenment thought, expressed in such terms as “arithmetic reason” (used disparagingly), and his image of the colony. Modernity involves estrangement, and relates to Burke's argument against defining the notion of the citizen in the abstract. Burke argues against an emerging colonial modernity in India being created by the East India Company and the estranged, placeless modernity the Jacobins were establishing in France.Less
Chapter 3 considers links between Burke's writings and anticolonial thought (and Raynal), arguing that Burke's writings on India and France are related and even deeply intertwined concerns, rather than merely chronologically contemporary. Burke's underlying disquiet had to do with the question of societies undergoing a complete transformation and whether this was an upheaval to be desired or dreaded. It argues that in both the Indian and the French cases, Burke's response was one of fear: fear of the emergence of class mobility, unfettered by the regulating social customs of Europe and enabled by the space of the colonies. Burke views France and India as having suffered from a “conquest”: he views the Jacobins as treating France as a country of conquest virtually indistinguishable from a colonial occupation. Conceptually, there is a surprising link between Burke's critique of French Enlightenment thought, expressed in such terms as “arithmetic reason” (used disparagingly), and his image of the colony. Modernity involves estrangement, and relates to Burke's argument against defining the notion of the citizen in the abstract. Burke argues against an emerging colonial modernity in India being created by the East India Company and the estranged, placeless modernity the Jacobins were establishing in France.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- July 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198805441
- eISBN:
- 9780191843518
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198805441.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers John Broome’s account of instrumental reasoning. It argues that his account is far too restrictive. Broome fails to allow for various perfectly good forms of reasoning, such as ...
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This chapter considers John Broome’s account of instrumental reasoning. It argues that his account is far too restrictive. Broome fails to allow for various perfectly good forms of reasoning, such as reasoning to a sufficient but not necessary means and reasoning to a partial means. This failure is not an accident; it derives from an unnecessarily limited conception of what reasoning could be. The chapter offers a different account of instrumental reasoning, consistent with the position developed in earlier chapters. This account is far more flexible and makes good sense of the various forms of instrumental reasoning that we actually engage in.Less
This chapter considers John Broome’s account of instrumental reasoning. It argues that his account is far too restrictive. Broome fails to allow for various perfectly good forms of reasoning, such as reasoning to a sufficient but not necessary means and reasoning to a partial means. This failure is not an accident; it derives from an unnecessarily limited conception of what reasoning could be. The chapter offers a different account of instrumental reasoning, consistent with the position developed in earlier chapters. This account is far more flexible and makes good sense of the various forms of instrumental reasoning that we actually engage in.
