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The Evolution of the Rules of the Societal Games

Masahiko Aoki

in Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutional Rules

Based on the recent development of epistemic game theory, this chapter attempts to resolve longstanding contested issues across social science disciplines about the nature and origin of institutions. ... More

Based on the recent development of epistemic game theory, this chapter attempts to resolve longstanding contested issues across social science disciplines about the nature and origin of institutions. These issues include: institutions as a pre-play design vs. spontaneous order, deontic constraints vs. rational choice, regularity of actions vs. shared meanings, endogenous and exogenous views, and so on. It argues that for a societal order to evolve through the recursive play of societal games, some social cognitive categories such as formal laws, norms, rules, and ritual, and organizations need to mediate between physical actions and the behavioral beliefs of individual players. Thus, pure methodological individualism must be laid to rest in institutional analysis. From such perspectives this chapter describes how institutions evolve and what the roles of business corporations can be in that process.Less

Judicial Rulemaking and the Institutionalization of European Union Sex Equality Policy

Rachel A. Cichowski

in The Institutionalization of Europe

An examination is made of the impact of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the institutional evolution of European Union sex equality policy, following the provision in the Treaty of Rome (Art. ... More

An examination is made of the impact of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the institutional evolution of European Union sex equality policy, following the provision in the Treaty of Rome (Art. 119 EEC, now Art. 141) that men and women would receive equal pay for equal work – a provision aimed at protecting businesses from unfair competition. This same provision now bestows a positive right on individuals throughout the Member States, and is a judicially enforceable right that remains the backbone of an ever-expanding European social-justice policy. Over time, strategic action on the part of litigants and their lawyers and the ECJ’s judicial rule-making capacity has constructed a supranational space in which women can not only demand the right to equal pay but can also receive protection as pregnant workers. This dynamic process is the focus of the analysis presented, and involves an examination of three basic mechanisms of institutional evolution: the process by which self-interested private litigants and their lawyers are able to activate the European Union (EU) legal system through the Art. 177 (now Art. 234) procedure (which allows national individuals to invoke EU law before national courts); the ECJ’s authoritative interpretation of Art. 119 (focusing on how it became directly effective in national legal systems); and the feedback effects of this judicial rule-making in terms of how the litigation environment has been changed, and the EU and national-level policy consequence. In particular, the latter are traced through the development of EU pregnancy and maternity rights.Less

Power, Social Conflict, Institutional Formation, and Credible Commitment

William D. Ferguson

in The Political Economy of Collective Action, Inequality, and Development

This chapter develops a social conflict theory of institutions. The third hypothesis posits that unequal distributions of power shape the creation, evolution, and demise of economic and political ... More

This chapter develops a social conflict theory of institutions. The third hypothesis posits that unequal distributions of power shape the creation, evolution, and demise of economic and political institutions. A background discussion defines power—a slightly slippery concept—and addresses key sources and manifestations of power. Unequal distributions of power then generate a series of CAPs associated with asymmetric influence on institutional construction and evolution. A flowchart model illustrates. To complicate matters, the fourth hypothesis posits that powerful parties cannot, left to themselves, credibly promise to refrain from using their power for their own future gain—often at the expense of others. Specifically, without institutional and motivational constraint, powerful parties may seize the gains from others’ investments in potentially fruitful economic and political activities. Functional development thus requires resolving multiple, largely second-order, CAPs related to credibly restraining powerful actors—when such actors, simultaneously, exert disproportionate influence over institution building.Less

The Emergence and Evolution of Field-Level Logics

Patricia H. Thornton, William Ocasio, and Michael Lounsbury

in The Institutional Logics Perspective: A New Approach to Culture, Structure and Process

This chapter examines the emergence and evolution of institutional logics at the institutional field level of analysis. It integrates the practice literature with research on theories, narratives, ... More

This chapter examines the emergence and evolution of institutional logics at the institutional field level of analysis. It integrates the practice literature with research on theories, narratives, and vocabularies of practice. It develops a typology of change in field-level institutions logics that distinguishes transformational changes from replacement, blending, and segregation, from developmental changes such as assimilation, elaboration, expansion, and contractions of logics. The chapter illustrates how institutional field-level logics are both embedded in societal-level logics and subject to institutional field-level change processes that generate distinct instantiations of societal-level institutional logics.Less

The New Institutional Economics and Pipeline Transport

in The Political Economy of Pipelines: A Century of Comparative Institutional Development

This book explores how and why competition arose in the pipeline transport industry, specifically addressing transaction costs and asset specificity, institutional evolution, intangible property ... More

This book explores how and why competition arose in the pipeline transport industry, specifically addressing transaction costs and asset specificity, institutional evolution, intangible property rights, and collective action. Pipelines showed great asset specificity. Douglass North determined the creation of institutions to define and ensure property rights as the basis for new forms of financing and trade. Pipeline systems were uniquely suited to the creation of the bundles of legal entitlements that form the basis of Coasian bargaining. Throughout this book, pipelines illustrate an interdisciplinary approach to economic theory. The analysis turns to the oil pipeline system in the United States or gas pipeline systems in various countries to demonstrate the cause and effect of varied institutional environments. This chapter provides an overview of the chapters that follow.Less

The Evolution of International Law and Courts

Karen J. Alter

in International Politics and Institutions in Time

The creation and increased usage of permanent international courts to deal with a broad range of issues is a relatively new phenomenon. The founding dates of international courts suggest that three ... More

The creation and increased usage of permanent international courts to deal with a broad range of issues is a relatively new phenomenon. The founding dates of international courts suggest that three critical junctures were important in the creation of the contemporary international courts: the Hague Peace Conferences and with them the larger movement to regulate inter-state relations through international legal conventions (1899–1927); the post-World War II explosion of international institutions (1945–52); and the end of the Cold War (1990–2005). Examining the effects of these junctures and gradual changes in the practice of international jurisprudence, this chapter argues that the best way to understand the creation, spread, and increased use of “new-style” international courts is by paying close attention to the major changes brought about through long-lasting, slow processes of international institutional evolution.Less