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Begins by pointing out that the concept of institutional engineering was not invented for the latest wave of transitions from dictatorship to democracy, but rather created for evaluating a democratic country at a time when it was in crisis. In Eastern Europe, a peculiar constellation of old and new elites led the way through the process of compromise between old and new forces and old and new institutions. Voters’ increased fickleness and a weaker party system left more room for manoeuver to institutional engineers. This chapter describes and analyses four models of institutional engineering: constitutional engineering; semi‐presidential systems; electoral laws; and decision‐making by plebiscite. These models are then compared with the paths of transition of selected Eastern European countries and contrasted with countries from Western Europe.

Argues that institutional engineering in Bulgaria reflects the enduring legacies of communism, such as inability to solve social problems or to improve the level of economic prosperity. Using Bulgaria as an example, the author delineates the limits of constitutionalism as a tool in the process of democratic consolidation. The chapter views institutional engineering in Bulgaria as a multifaceted social project and suggests a more subtle analysis of the peculiar ways in which a post‐communist context tolerates both elite constraints and elite irresponsibility, the institutionalization of governance, and the endurance of corruption.

Outlines Estonia's path to a new constitution along with an assessment of the new institutions in place since 1992. Because of constant political conflict, Pettai argues that the constitution‐making process was essential for creating the basis for conflict resolution and democratic consolidation. The chapter describes how Estonian leaders grappled with important aspects of their new democracy, including fundamental rights and duties, social welfare rights, judicial and constitutional review, the relationship between the president and the parliament, local government, minorities, and non‐citizens. Special attention is paid to the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate. The author argues that institutional engineering enabled Estonia's leaders to secure its statehood and contributed to its economic development, European integration, and social progress.

Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately leading to the institutionalization of a super‐presidential regime created through brute force. The chapter emphasizes that Russia was the only post‐communist country that experienced a military intervention after democratic elections had taken place. The first part of the chapter focuses on how the process of amending the 1978 Russian Constitution deteriorated into a power struggle between the parliament and the president and describes the institutional structure that resulted from this contentious process. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the Russian Constitution, which set clear rules for the institutional game but without respect for the division of power principle, has contributed to state weakness. It is emphasized that by concentrating power in the presidency, the executive has become overburdened and the state ineffective.

Describes the reasons behind the hastily drafted Constitution of Slovakia and explains why it proved insufficient to provide guidance to political leaders and to foster the consolidation of democracy. The main argument of this chapter is that the preponderance of informal rules has impeded the institutionalization of formal rules and undermined the constitutional government. The chapter focuses on the factors that have contributed to the dominance of informal rules and pushed actors to turn to unconstitutional alternatives. Slovakia's institutional developments are explored in four parts. The first part reviews institutional traditions and the constitution‐making process. The second part examines the electoral system and its impact on the party system and the composition of political power. The third part examines the substance of the Constitution, particularly, the unclear articles regarding the separation of powers, which have led to institutional conflicts. The last section analyses the durability of the constitution and attempts made by political actors to balance power through institutional engineering.

The focus of this chapter is the academic debate on the choice of semi‐presidentialism as an appropriate constitutional arrangement. However, it does not aim to demonstrate that semi‐presidentialism is either a better or worse form of government than presidentialism or parliamentarism, and it has not been written with the intention of establishing a definitive list of the advantages and disadvantages of semi‐presidential regimes. Rather, the chapter is concerned with the terms of the debate. It aims to show that as it currently stands the debate about the pros and cons of the various regime types is fundamentally flawed, and that the assumptions underlying the contemporary debate need to be reconsidered before meaningful conclusions about the true advantages and disadvantages of these regime types can be drawn. Drawing on the country studies in the previous chapters, the first part of this chapter identifies the diverse patterns of leadership to be found in European semi‐presidential regimes; the second part returns to Duverger's framework for the study of semi‐presidentialism and considers the importance of historical, constitutional, party political, and other factors in determining why these leadership patterns should vary so much; and finally, the third part indicates what the experience of European semi‐presidentialism tells us about the issue of comparative institutional engineering.

Describes Ukraine's protracted and discontinued constitution‐making process. Wolczuk explains that the Ukrainian leaders’ initial decision to preserve the Constitution was due to the broad range of contentious issues, going far beyond institutional choices and involving issues of nationhood and territorial integrity. The sheer range of contested issues and the degree of disagreement account for the ad hoc manner in which the final institutional choices were constitutionalized. The chapter analyses the impact of the new constitution on the function of the political system. The result was that institutional rivalry between the parliament and the president continued. Thus, while the passage of the 1996 constitution was a pivotal state‐building document, it failed to bring about political stability.

Describes the transition of the Czech Republic from the federal Constitution of Czechoslovakia to the adoption of a new Constitution of the Czech Republic. The Czech Constitution is widely accepted to be a solid foundation for the country's democratic political system. The chapter focuses on the impact of historical legacies and shows how the nature of bargaining becomes more predictable when the domestic political actors involved in constitution‐drafting provide a stable set of opinions and motivations from which a compromise can be forged. In order to demonstrate this point, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first examines the key elements of the constitution‐making process in the Czechoslovak Federation between 1989 and 1992. It explains the crucial constitutional decisions made during Roundtable Talks and how this particular legacy, combined with the volatile nature of transition politics, resulted in Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce. The second part concentrates on the process of drafting the new Constitution of the Czech Republic at the end of 1992. Finally, Kopecky discusses the effects of the Constitution on the democratic Czech Republic.

Describes the process of institutional engineering and the consequences of the absence of a new constitution in Hungary. As a result of the amendments passed by the outgoing communist parliament following the decisions made at the Roundtable Talks, Hungary has a formally old but substantively new constitution. This evolutionary approach has been warped by the formation of a parliamentary super‐majority that can easily amend the Constitution further in order to suit its political goals. The chapter points out the shortcomings of the Hungarian Constitution, such as the lack of protection from majority tyranny and no real progress in the field of human rights protection. The chapter also emphasizes problems in the political environment in Hungary and how it affects the chances for success in adopting a formally new Constitution. Political parties in Hungary are unable to integrate, or even to convey and express the legitimate interests of non‐partisan organizations, movements, and groups.

The concluding chapter concentrates on the importance of institutions in the democratic consolidation of post‐communist Eastern Europe. The chapter is divided into four parts that address issues concerning the importance of institutions in this process. The first section describes the ways in which institutions can affect political life by changing the pattern of incentives for particular behaviour by political actors. The second part shows how constitutions influence national identity by defining state citizenship. The third section refers to the activity of constitution‐making and how this process has taken place in Eastern Europe. The fourth part discusses how constitutions in Eastern Europe are transforming the way political demands, claims, and arguments are made by political actors.

Emphasizes the difficult process of constitutional engineering in Latvia. The author argues that these difficulties stem from two historical legacies: the inter‐war independence period and the Soviet occupation. The quick re‐adoption of the 1922 Latvian constitution after the country's leaders declared independence from the USSR, paradoxically exacerbated the process of institutional engineering and ultimately slowed the pace of democratic consolidation. The chapter indicates several important gaps in the inter‐war constitution, e.g. the absence of basic rights or the provisions for local government administration. Despite the difficulties presented by the 1922 Constitution, the author argues that the high legitimacy achieved through its re‐adoption kept Latvia on the democracy‐building track. Finally, several positive and negative lessons learned from the Latvian transition period are presented.

Describes how the Slovenian transition from communism to democratic consolidation influenced the institutional engineering in Slovenia. Since there was no real tradition of statehood or experience with state‐building in Slovenia, the establishment of a new constitutional structure after its break from Yugoslavia was immensely important both as a foundation for the new political and economic system and as the country's calling card for entry into the international community. The chapter indicates the positive and negative aspects of institutional engineering in Slovenia. Although Slovenian political elites arrived at a consensus on almost all of the pressing issues involved in democracy‐ and state‐building quickly, the result of the quick adoption of the Constitution left important issues unresolved, and ultimately hampered the legislative process. Despite the political turbulence that continues to dominate Slovene politics, democratic consolidation in Slovenia can be regarded as largely achieved.

Describes the constitution‐making process in Poland. The main feature of this process was the ability to reach a compromise in a conflict‐prone political setting. The chapter analyses major stages of the process of democratic consolidation and the constitutionalization, and examines issues such as legitimacy, balance of power, and the role of the state. The first significant breakthrough in the process was the interim constitution of 1992. The chapter emphasizes its importance in the process of institutional engineering despite its numerous shortcomings. The chapter also points out that the adoption of the Polish Constitution by referendum did not resolve the debate on legitimacy. Finally, it shows that despite the contentious adoption of the Constitution, it has had a stabilizing effect on Polish democracy. Overall, the Polish Constitution is described as a constitution of compromise and of political pragmatism.

This chapter notes that all historical experiences of sustained economic growth — starting at least from the English Industrial Revolution — find their enabling conditions in a rich set of complementary institutions, shared behavioral norms, and public policies. Indeed, the paramount importance of institutions and social norms appears to be a rather universal property of every form of collective organization we are aware of. Moreover, much more narrowly, discretionary public policies have been major ingredients of national development strategies, especially in catching-up countries, throughout the history of modern capitalism. Conversely, from a symmetric perspective, there are extremely sound theoretical reasons supporting the notion that institutions and policies always matter in all processes of technological learning and economic coordination and change. This chapter focuses on the latter issue and outlines some theoretical foundations and for industrial policies in a broad sense, and for measures of “institutional engineering” shaping the very nature of the economic actors, the market mechanisms and rules under which they operate, and the boundaries between what is governed by market interactions, and what is not.

Deliberative intergovernmentalism as a novel analytical framework in the field of integration theory focuses on understanding the new intergovernmentalism in EU policy-making and the centrality of the European Council and the Council within it. The shift from community method decision-making to policy coordination as the preferred governance mode within the new areas of EU activity is understood to result in a process of profound institutional change. Deliberation and consensus seeking become crucial at all stages of the policy process, as policy initiation and the enforcement of common rules are no longer delegated to supranational institutions. The dependency on consensus triggers constant attempts at institutional engineering aimed at improving the consensus generation function of the European Council and the Council as the lead forums for policy coordination among member states. This implies that conventional understandings, especially of the Council, which equate collective EU decision-making with law-making, largely fail to explain post-Maastricht institutional change.