Andrew Reynolds
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295105
- eISBN:
- 9780191600128
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295103.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
A comparative analysis is given of both actual and simulated election results of the five country case studies (from Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) presented in the book, along ...
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A comparative analysis is given of both actual and simulated election results of the five country case studies (from Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) presented in the book, along a number of dimensions relating to system inclusiveness: party system dynamics, disproportionality, executive formation, and descriptive representation. Chief among the questions addressed are: what determines the index of disproportionality, how representative are comparative parliaments in terms of the presence of women and ethnic minorities, what are the electoral system implications for voter accessibility, does the chosen system alleviate or accentuate entrenched and geographically concentrated party fiefdoms, how competitive or frozen is the party system, is there an electoral system effect on cabinet formation, and does the type of proportional representation (PR) used matter to the final results? The chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of the Horowitz alternative vote in multi-member districts (AV-MMD) proposal across all five case study countries, and an institutional choice-based analysis of the interaction between negotiated transitions to democracy and the type of electoral system chosen for the new democratic constitution. Overall, the chapter demonstrates that in the context of institutional design in southern Africa, PR systems outperform their plurality–majority alternatives in almost all the categories of analysis.Less
A comparative analysis is given of both actual and simulated election results of the five country case studies (from Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) presented in the book, along a number of dimensions relating to system inclusiveness: party system dynamics, disproportionality, executive formation, and descriptive representation. Chief among the questions addressed are: what determines the index of disproportionality, how representative are comparative parliaments in terms of the presence of women and ethnic minorities, what are the electoral system implications for voter accessibility, does the chosen system alleviate or accentuate entrenched and geographically concentrated party fiefdoms, how competitive or frozen is the party system, is there an electoral system effect on cabinet formation, and does the type of proportional representation (PR) used matter to the final results? The chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of the Horowitz alternative vote in multi-member districts (AV-MMD) proposal across all five case study countries, and an institutional choice-based analysis of the interaction between negotiated transitions to democracy and the type of electoral system chosen for the new democratic constitution. Overall, the chapter demonstrates that in the context of institutional design in southern Africa, PR systems outperform their plurality–majority alternatives in almost all the categories of analysis.
James E. Alt and Alberto Alesina
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294719
- eISBN:
- 9780191599361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294719.003.0028
- Subject:
- Political Science, Reference
Provides an overview of the political economy approach as it relates to the political economy of institutions and the political economy of public policy. The field has developed and the literature ...
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Provides an overview of the political economy approach as it relates to the political economy of institutions and the political economy of public policy. The field has developed and the literature has exploded on the basis of analyses of the transaction costs in the incentives, strategies, and choices of maximizing and strategic behaviour, within interconnected political and economic institutions. These themes are examined as they relate to cooperation, efficiency, game theoretic models and institutional choice in legislatures, bureaucracies, and government formation. Models are elaborated and evidence assessed in the political economy of public policy, specifically in the areas of political business cycles and budget deficits.Less
Provides an overview of the political economy approach as it relates to the political economy of institutions and the political economy of public policy. The field has developed and the literature has exploded on the basis of analyses of the transaction costs in the incentives, strategies, and choices of maximizing and strategic behaviour, within interconnected political and economic institutions. These themes are examined as they relate to cooperation, efficiency, game theoretic models and institutional choice in legislatures, bureaucracies, and government formation. Models are elaborated and evidence assessed in the political economy of public policy, specifically in the areas of political business cycles and budget deficits.
Alec Stone Sweet
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256488
- eISBN:
- 9780191600234
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256489.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The two papers in Ch. 5 examine how lawyers and law professors, operating in private arenas, successfully revived a pre-modern legal system, the Lex Mercatoria – the international body of trade law ...
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The two papers in Ch. 5 examine how lawyers and law professors, operating in private arenas, successfully revived a pre-modern legal system, the Lex Mercatoria – the international body of trade law derived from merchant practice. Stone Sweet’s paper traces the development of a transnational legal system, comprised of a national contract law and a network of arbitration houses that compete to supply third-party dispute resolution to the international commercial world. The paper is divided into two parts. The first discusses, in a theoretical manner, obstacles to the emergence of a stable network of traders engaged in relatively long-range, impersonal exchange, focusing on three generic problems of human community: cooperation and commitment, transaction costs, and institutional choice and governance. The second part examines three quite different regimes that have governed transnational commercial activity: from the mediaeval law merchant, to the Westphalian state system and its institutional failings (including discussion of conflict of laws practices), and – the principal focus of the chapter – the new Lex Mercatoria and its institutionalization.Less
The two papers in Ch. 5 examine how lawyers and law professors, operating in private arenas, successfully revived a pre-modern legal system, the Lex Mercatoria – the international body of trade law derived from merchant practice. Stone Sweet’s paper traces the development of a transnational legal system, comprised of a national contract law and a network of arbitration houses that compete to supply third-party dispute resolution to the international commercial world. The paper is divided into two parts. The first discusses, in a theoretical manner, obstacles to the emergence of a stable network of traders engaged in relatively long-range, impersonal exchange, focusing on three generic problems of human community: cooperation and commitment, transaction costs, and institutional choice and governance. The second part examines three quite different regimes that have governed transnational commercial activity: from the mediaeval law merchant, to the Westphalian state system and its institutional failings (including discussion of conflict of laws practices), and – the principal focus of the chapter – the new Lex Mercatoria and its institutionalization.
Nicole Bolleyer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570607
- eISBN:
- 9780191721953
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570607.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, European Union
Over the past decades, governments have increasingly been confronted with problems that transcend their boundaries. A multitude of policy fields are affected, including environment, trade and ...
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Over the past decades, governments have increasingly been confronted with problems that transcend their boundaries. A multitude of policy fields are affected, including environment, trade and security. Responding to the challenges triggered by Europeanization and globalization, governments increasingly interact across different spheres of authority. Both theoretically and empirically, the puzzle of institutional choice reflected by the variety of arrangements in which intergovernmental cooperation takes place inside individual countries and across their borders remains surprisingly under-explored. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the book tackles the following questions: Why are the intergovernmental arrangements governments set up to deal with boundary-crossing problems so different? To what extent do these institutional differences affect the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation? To address this gap theoretically and empirically, this book adopts a deductive, rationalist approach on institution-building. It argues that internal politics, the type of executive-legislative relations within the interacting governments, explains the nature of institutions set up to channel intergovernmental processes: while power-sharing governments engage in institution-building, power-concentrating governments avoid it. It also shows that these institutional choices matter for the output of intergovernmental cooperation. The approach is applied to Canada, Switzerland, the United States and finally the European Union. Disaggregating individual government units, the theoretical approach reveals how intragovernmental micro-incentives drive macro-dynamics and thereby addresses the neglect of horizontal dynamics in multilevel systems. The willingness and capacity of lower-level governments to solve collective problems on their own and to oppose central encroachment are crucial to understand the power distribution in different systems and their long-term evolutions.Less
Over the past decades, governments have increasingly been confronted with problems that transcend their boundaries. A multitude of policy fields are affected, including environment, trade and security. Responding to the challenges triggered by Europeanization and globalization, governments increasingly interact across different spheres of authority. Both theoretically and empirically, the puzzle of institutional choice reflected by the variety of arrangements in which intergovernmental cooperation takes place inside individual countries and across their borders remains surprisingly under-explored. In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the book tackles the following questions: Why are the intergovernmental arrangements governments set up to deal with boundary-crossing problems so different? To what extent do these institutional differences affect the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation? To address this gap theoretically and empirically, this book adopts a deductive, rationalist approach on institution-building. It argues that internal politics, the type of executive-legislative relations within the interacting governments, explains the nature of institutions set up to channel intergovernmental processes: while power-sharing governments engage in institution-building, power-concentrating governments avoid it. It also shows that these institutional choices matter for the output of intergovernmental cooperation. The approach is applied to Canada, Switzerland, the United States and finally the European Union. Disaggregating individual government units, the theoretical approach reveals how intragovernmental micro-incentives drive macro-dynamics and thereby addresses the neglect of horizontal dynamics in multilevel systems. The willingness and capacity of lower-level governments to solve collective problems on their own and to oppose central encroachment are crucial to understand the power distribution in different systems and their long-term evolutions.
Nicole Bolleyer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570607
- eISBN:
- 9780191721953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570607.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, European Union
This concluding chapter elaborates on the theoretical implications of the study for institutional theory as well as on its practical implications for the likelihood of successful federal reform. In a ...
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This concluding chapter elaborates on the theoretical implications of the study for institutional theory as well as on its practical implications for the likelihood of successful federal reform. In a final step, it applies the theoretical arguments of the book to the European Union and explores whether the mechanisms through which policies are coordinated within this supranational setting can be accounted for by the proposed 'federalism framework'. Being composed of power-concentrating governments and governments with voluntary power-sharing on the level of the member states and characterized by compulsory power-sharing on the European level, the European Union mixes incentive structure within and across governmental levels. Contrasted with the three federal systems, the framework's application reveals parallels and peculiarities of the European polity in how the governments embedded in it handle demands for intergovernmental cooperation. While only a rough sketch, it indicates the fruitfulness of applying federalism frameworks beyond the national sphere and highlights the importance of avoiding the perception of the European Union as 'sui generic' from the outset.Less
This concluding chapter elaborates on the theoretical implications of the study for institutional theory as well as on its practical implications for the likelihood of successful federal reform. In a final step, it applies the theoretical arguments of the book to the European Union and explores whether the mechanisms through which policies are coordinated within this supranational setting can be accounted for by the proposed 'federalism framework'. Being composed of power-concentrating governments and governments with voluntary power-sharing on the level of the member states and characterized by compulsory power-sharing on the European level, the European Union mixes incentive structure within and across governmental levels. Contrasted with the three federal systems, the framework's application reveals parallels and peculiarities of the European polity in how the governments embedded in it handle demands for intergovernmental cooperation. While only a rough sketch, it indicates the fruitfulness of applying federalism frameworks beyond the national sphere and highlights the importance of avoiding the perception of the European Union as 'sui generic' from the outset.
Jack Knight and James Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151236
- eISBN:
- 9781400840335
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151236.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. This book systematically ...
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Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. This book systematically explores the subject and makes a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics—and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? This book explores how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. It concludes that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made—even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. This book argues that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, the book suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.Less
Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. This book systematically explores the subject and makes a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics—and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? This book explores how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. It concludes that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made—even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. This book argues that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, the book suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.
Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- March 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198744023
- eISBN:
- 9780191804014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744023.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
When do actors USE available institutions, SELECT among alternative forums, CHANGE existing rules, or CREATE new arrangements? In this chapter the authors present their theory of boundedly rational ...
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When do actors USE available institutions, SELECT among alternative forums, CHANGE existing rules, or CREATE new arrangements? In this chapter the authors present their theory of boundedly rational institutional choice (USCC) which connects a wide range of institutional theories in arguing that institutional choice is driven by the interaction of cooperation problems and the institutional status quo. USCC theory accounts for the dynamics of institutional choices by combining agent and structural explanations, capturing the push–pull of boundedly rational action within a set of historically inherited rules. The authors conclude by discussing the implications of USCC theory for understanding international institutions in time.Less
When do actors USE available institutions, SELECT among alternative forums, CHANGE existing rules, or CREATE new arrangements? In this chapter the authors present their theory of boundedly rational institutional choice (USCC) which connects a wide range of institutional theories in arguing that institutional choice is driven by the interaction of cooperation problems and the institutional status quo. USCC theory accounts for the dynamics of institutional choices by combining agent and structural explanations, capturing the push–pull of boundedly rational action within a set of historically inherited rules. The authors conclude by discussing the implications of USCC theory for understanding international institutions in time.
Jie Lu
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199378746
- eISBN:
- 9780199378760
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378746.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
This chapter establishes the theoretical foundation and offers a coherent framework to guide subsequent empirical analyses. After reviewing contemporary literature on the origins of and changes in ...
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This chapter establishes the theoretical foundation and offers a coherent framework to guide subsequent empirical analyses. After reviewing contemporary literature on the origins of and changes in institutions and local governance, this chapter raises the key research questions. Subsequently, both macro- and micro-views of the origins of indigenously developed institutions and externally imposed institutions in local communities are presented. This chapter also shows how indigenous relation-based institutions solve the problems of collective action and accountability in close-knit communities, with the help of powerful social sanctions. Juxtaposing externally imposed rule-based institutions and indigenous relation-based ones, this chapter further demonstrates the advantage of the former in sustaining governance in loosely coupled communities. This chapter then presents a contextualized understanding of institutional choices in local communities confronted with the coexistence of different institutions and unevenly transformed social environments. This chapter concludes with major hypotheses for subsequent empirical examination.Less
This chapter establishes the theoretical foundation and offers a coherent framework to guide subsequent empirical analyses. After reviewing contemporary literature on the origins of and changes in institutions and local governance, this chapter raises the key research questions. Subsequently, both macro- and micro-views of the origins of indigenously developed institutions and externally imposed institutions in local communities are presented. This chapter also shows how indigenous relation-based institutions solve the problems of collective action and accountability in close-knit communities, with the help of powerful social sanctions. Juxtaposing externally imposed rule-based institutions and indigenous relation-based ones, this chapter further demonstrates the advantage of the former in sustaining governance in loosely coupled communities. This chapter then presents a contextualized understanding of institutional choices in local communities confronted with the coexistence of different institutions and unevenly transformed social environments. This chapter concludes with major hypotheses for subsequent empirical examination.
Jie Lu
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199378746
- eISBN:
- 9780199378760
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199378746.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics, Comparative Politics
This chapter moves beyond the induced changes in social environments and focuses on villagers' choices among institutional solutions for handling issues as well as on their assessment of institutions ...
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This chapter moves beyond the induced changes in social environments and focuses on villagers' choices among institutional solutions for handling issues as well as on their assessment of institutions for monitoring village cadres and holding them accountable. Villagers' evaluations of imposed rule-based institutions for conflict resolution, disaster/crisis relief, modest credit and small loans, and regulating village cadres' behaviors are systematically examined using discrete choice models that combine the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey Mainland China Survey and the 2008 National Village Survey. As expected, in loosely coupled villages characterized by a medium level of outward migration, imposed rule-based institutions are more likely to attract villagers' attention and become their choice for addressing local governance issues. Imposed rule-based institutions are also more likely to be used for supervising village cadres and holding them accountable. These findings highlight the influence of structural features on villagers' choice to use imposed rule-based institutions.Less
This chapter moves beyond the induced changes in social environments and focuses on villagers' choices among institutional solutions for handling issues as well as on their assessment of institutions for monitoring village cadres and holding them accountable. Villagers' evaluations of imposed rule-based institutions for conflict resolution, disaster/crisis relief, modest credit and small loans, and regulating village cadres' behaviors are systematically examined using discrete choice models that combine the 2008 Asian Barometer Survey Mainland China Survey and the 2008 National Village Survey. As expected, in loosely coupled villages characterized by a medium level of outward migration, imposed rule-based institutions are more likely to attract villagers' attention and become their choice for addressing local governance issues. Imposed rule-based institutions are also more likely to be used for supervising village cadres and holding them accountable. These findings highlight the influence of structural features on villagers' choice to use imposed rule-based institutions.
Myrto Tsakatika
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- July 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780719075155
- eISBN:
- 9781781701621
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9780719075155.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This book addresses the question of political legitimacy in the European Union from the much-neglected angle of political responsibility. It develops an original communitarian approach to legitimacy ...
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This book addresses the question of political legitimacy in the European Union from the much-neglected angle of political responsibility. It develops an original communitarian approach to legitimacy based on Alasdair MacIntyre's ethics of virtues and practices, that can be contrasted with prevalent liberal-egalitarian and neo-republican approaches. The book argues that a ‘responsibility deficit’, quite distinct from the often discussed ‘democratic deficit’, can be diagnosed in the EU. This is documented in chapters that provide in-depth analysis of accountability, transparency and the difficulties associated with identifying responsibility in European governance. Closing this gap requires going beyond institutional engineering. It calls for gradual convergence towards certain core social and political practices and for the flourishing of the virtues of political responsibility in Europe's nascent political community. Throughout the book, normative political theory is brought to bear on concrete dilemmas of institutional choice faced by the EU during the recent constitutional debates.Less
This book addresses the question of political legitimacy in the European Union from the much-neglected angle of political responsibility. It develops an original communitarian approach to legitimacy based on Alasdair MacIntyre's ethics of virtues and practices, that can be contrasted with prevalent liberal-egalitarian and neo-republican approaches. The book argues that a ‘responsibility deficit’, quite distinct from the often discussed ‘democratic deficit’, can be diagnosed in the EU. This is documented in chapters that provide in-depth analysis of accountability, transparency and the difficulties associated with identifying responsibility in European governance. Closing this gap requires going beyond institutional engineering. It calls for gradual convergence towards certain core social and political practices and for the flourishing of the virtues of political responsibility in Europe's nascent political community. Throughout the book, normative political theory is brought to bear on concrete dilemmas of institutional choice faced by the EU during the recent constitutional debates.
Alfred Rütten, Peter Gelius, and Karim Abu-Omar
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199658039
- eISBN:
- 9780191765780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658039.003.0009
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health, Epidemiology
This chapter presents the “Analysis of Determinants of Policy Impact” (ADEPT) model, an approach to policy analysis in health promotion that is easy-to-use, parsimonious, and empirically tested. The ...
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This chapter presents the “Analysis of Determinants of Policy Impact” (ADEPT) model, an approach to policy analysis in health promotion that is easy-to-use, parsimonious, and empirically tested. The ADEPT model is based on a theory of action that has been adapted to the organizational and policy level. This chapter discusses the ADEPT model with regards to theories that have been developed specifically to explain the policy process and to the structure/agency debate that is going on in health promotion. It concludes with a discussion of the potential of ADEPT for those engaged in policy development and in policy analysis, emphasizing its versatility and its embedded conception of the process underlying policy development.Less
This chapter presents the “Analysis of Determinants of Policy Impact” (ADEPT) model, an approach to policy analysis in health promotion that is easy-to-use, parsimonious, and empirically tested. The ADEPT model is based on a theory of action that has been adapted to the organizational and policy level. This chapter discusses the ADEPT model with regards to theories that have been developed specifically to explain the policy process and to the structure/agency debate that is going on in health promotion. It concludes with a discussion of the potential of ADEPT for those engaged in policy development and in policy analysis, emphasizing its versatility and its embedded conception of the process underlying policy development.
Tine Hanrieder
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198705833
- eISBN:
- 9780191775246
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198705833.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The concluding chapter discusses how the book’s findings contribute to wider debates in global governance, and which lesson they yield for the reformers of international organizations (IOs). The ...
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The concluding chapter discusses how the book’s findings contribute to wider debates in global governance, and which lesson they yield for the reformers of international organizations (IOs). The chapter first reconsiders the cultures of change that are part of IO reform. Reform technologies are an important but neglected aspect of bureaucratic culture in IOs, which legitimize themselves as reforming organizations despite all obstacles to organizational change. The chapter next discusses how the fragmentation of global governance at large reinforces the fragmentation of individual IOs. It thereby connects the fragmentation trap model to the literatures on trans-organizational networks, regime complexity and institutional choice. Finally, the chapter points out problems that reformers encounter in contemporary IOs. They are faced with the temptation of goal displacement, that is, of making reform an end in itself, and they have to deal with trade-offs between IO-specific and UN-wide reform outcomes.Less
The concluding chapter discusses how the book’s findings contribute to wider debates in global governance, and which lesson they yield for the reformers of international organizations (IOs). The chapter first reconsiders the cultures of change that are part of IO reform. Reform technologies are an important but neglected aspect of bureaucratic culture in IOs, which legitimize themselves as reforming organizations despite all obstacles to organizational change. The chapter next discusses how the fragmentation of global governance at large reinforces the fragmentation of individual IOs. It thereby connects the fragmentation trap model to the literatures on trans-organizational networks, regime complexity and institutional choice. Finally, the chapter points out problems that reformers encounter in contemporary IOs. They are faced with the temptation of goal displacement, that is, of making reform an end in itself, and they have to deal with trade-offs between IO-specific and UN-wide reform outcomes.
Mislav Mataija
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198746652
- eISBN:
- 9780191808937
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746652.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law, Competition Law
The concluding chapter brings together the threads of the preceding discussion. It argues that, instead of classifying conduct as public or private, the real question for both the free movement and ...
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The concluding chapter brings together the threads of the preceding discussion. It argues that, instead of classifying conduct as public or private, the real question for both the free movement and competition rules is how their interpretation should adapt to cases of private regulation. This adaptation is tracked through both free movement and competition law, and the proposed approach to the overlap of the two sets of rules is outlined. Finally, the concluding chapter looks at the broader implications of EU law for private regulators and their measures. It argues that EU internal market law functions as a legal accountability mechanism for private regulators. It also describes how the prevalence of private regulation in certain sectors has enabled the use of free movement and competition law as tools for reform, serving as a launchpad for the development of EU policies.Less
The concluding chapter brings together the threads of the preceding discussion. It argues that, instead of classifying conduct as public or private, the real question for both the free movement and competition rules is how their interpretation should adapt to cases of private regulation. This adaptation is tracked through both free movement and competition law, and the proposed approach to the overlap of the two sets of rules is outlined. Finally, the concluding chapter looks at the broader implications of EU law for private regulators and their measures. It argues that EU internal market law functions as a legal accountability mechanism for private regulators. It also describes how the prevalence of private regulation in certain sectors has enabled the use of free movement and competition law as tools for reform, serving as a launchpad for the development of EU policies.
