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Chapter 4 explores the processes through which institutions struggle for a place in the democratic order and how they achieve and lose primacy and autonomy. It attends to why it is difficult to find a form of political organization that is perceived as normatively best and also sustainable, securing a stable equilibrium between central government and partly autonomous institutions. The analytical value of ‘autonomy’ as detachment from politics and the apolitical dynamics of change assumed by many New Public Management reforms are questioned, and the interplay between central authority and institutional autonomy is interpreted as an artefact of partly decoupled inter-institutional processes involving the struggle for power among interdependent and co-evolving institutions that are carriers of competing yet legitimate values, interests, behavioural logics, and resources. The issues are illustrated by the cases of public administration and the public university.

This chapter examines the principle of autonomy — its nature and rationale — the prohibition against State intervention in the internal affairs of religious organizations, and the limits of religious autonomy. It then goes on to examine the institutional autonomy of religious organizations in terms of their legislative, administrative, and judicial competence. It explores the status of religious law under State law (and the degree to which religious groups are free to administer this freely), administrative and ministerial autonomy (including the appointment of ministers of religion, their civil law status, and functions), and the functions of religious judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly in the field of ministerial discipline). The chapter ends with a section on autonomy and confidentiality (with particular reference to religious secrets and confession). One theme explored is the difficulty of identifying what constitutes the internal affairs of a religious organization for the purpose of defining its autonomy.

Devolution was expected to redistribute power within each ‘home country’ of the UK as well as between each country and the UK centre. It would bring government closer to public institutions such as universities, and help these institutions to contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of their host societies. Devolution thus presented both opportunities and threats for universities. In this chapter I review tensions as they have played out in the years since devolution, with a primary focus on Scotland. The chapter starts with a narrative of the governance of Scottish higher education following administrative devolution in 1992 and especially parliamentary devolution in 1999. The chapter then adopts a more analytical perspective, and asks to what extent the trends described earlier can be attributed to devolution. It suggests three ways in which devolution has created additional threats to the institutional autonomy of universities, and three factors that have helped to minimise such threats. The analysis focuses on Scotland but the analytical framework can be applied to the devolved administrations in Wales and Northern Ireland and it explains some of the differences across the home nations.

This chapter examines the deferential approach, regarded as orthodox. It is divided into two sections. The first explains the main arguments upon which this cautious approach, based on the Wednesbury case, is founded. In particular, these arguments point towards two important features of modern administration—expertise and institutional autonomy--which indicate that regulators are far better equipped than the courts to deal fairly and impartially with technical issues arising from the relevant context. Moreover, it is argued that a less strict standard of review would be consistent with the notion of regulatory effectiveness, which demands decisiveness and certainty on the part of executive bodies. The second section provides an account of the relevant cases. These cases consider different aspects of the contended order which have required the supervision of the courts: factual findings, substantive choices, and interpretation of vague or self-regulatory rules.

This chapter argues that EU mandates in the electronic communications sector have had an accountability-enhancing effect at the member-state level, an effect that can be better appreciated if considered in the context of the decentralized EU regulatory structure. The chapter begins by providing some context and outlining certain substantive EU regulatory initiatives. The focus then moves to institutional and procedural EU mandates, which, as the case studies will further demonstrate, generate the “democratic surplus.” I argue that the enhancement of democratic accountability was a side effect of the EU advancing the substantive goal of an internal telecommunications market. The chapter further assesses the impact of these procedural provisions against the backdrop of the decentralized EU regime. It considers traditional theoretical arguments in favor of decentralization (regulatory competition, experimentation/innovation, and democratic participation) and applies them to the novel context of regulatory processes. Last, the chapter explains the case selection.