Patricia Spacks
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226768601
- eISBN:
- 9780226768618
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226768618.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
Today we consider privacy a right to be protected. But in eighteenth-century England, privacy was seen as a problem, even a threat. Women reading alone and people hiding their true thoughts from one ...
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Today we consider privacy a right to be protected. But in eighteenth-century England, privacy was seen as a problem, even a threat. Women reading alone and people hiding their true thoughts from one another in conversation generated fears of uncontrollable fantasies and profound anxieties about insincerity. This book explores eighteenth-century concerns about privacy and the strategies people developed to avoid public scrutiny and social pressure. The book examines, for instance, the way people hid behind common rules of etiquette to mask their innermost feelings and how, in fact, people were taught to employ such devices. It considers the erotic overtones that privacy aroused in its suppression of deeper desires. And perhaps most important, the book explores the idea of privacy as a societal threat—one that bred pretense and hypocrisy in its practitioners. Through readings of novels by Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, and Sterne, along with a glimpse into diaries, autobiographies, poems, and works of pornography written during the period, the book shows how writers charted the imaginative possibilities of privacy and its social repercussions.Less
Today we consider privacy a right to be protected. But in eighteenth-century England, privacy was seen as a problem, even a threat. Women reading alone and people hiding their true thoughts from one another in conversation generated fears of uncontrollable fantasies and profound anxieties about insincerity. This book explores eighteenth-century concerns about privacy and the strategies people developed to avoid public scrutiny and social pressure. The book examines, for instance, the way people hid behind common rules of etiquette to mask their innermost feelings and how, in fact, people were taught to employ such devices. It considers the erotic overtones that privacy aroused in its suppression of deeper desires. And perhaps most important, the book explores the idea of privacy as a societal threat—one that bred pretense and hypocrisy in its practitioners. Through readings of novels by Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, and Sterne, along with a glimpse into diaries, autobiographies, poems, and works of pornography written during the period, the book shows how writers charted the imaginative possibilities of privacy and its social repercussions.
David Francis Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199642847
- eISBN:
- 9780191738869
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642847.003.0008
- Subject:
- Literature, Drama, 18th-century Literature
In this conclusion, I use graphic satires by the likes of James Gillray, Isaac Cruikshank, and William Dent as a means of both reaffirming and problematizing Sheridan’s ‘theatrical politics’. ...
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In this conclusion, I use graphic satires by the likes of James Gillray, Isaac Cruikshank, and William Dent as a means of both reaffirming and problematizing Sheridan’s ‘theatrical politics’. Sheridan appeared in close to 500 political caricatures during his life, and a survey of these prints—which frequently appropriated the characters and vocabularies of his own plays, of Shakespeare’s works, and of the pantomime—shows how entrenched tensions between the propriety of parliament and the supposed impropriety of the playhouse provided a constant impediment to Sheridan’s political aspirations. The language of drama deployed in caricatures of Sheridan was powerfully charged with particular social and moral values: theatrical politics becomes, in such graphic satire, a lower-class politics of insincerity.Less
In this conclusion, I use graphic satires by the likes of James Gillray, Isaac Cruikshank, and William Dent as a means of both reaffirming and problematizing Sheridan’s ‘theatrical politics’. Sheridan appeared in close to 500 political caricatures during his life, and a survey of these prints—which frequently appropriated the characters and vocabularies of his own plays, of Shakespeare’s works, and of the pantomime—shows how entrenched tensions between the propriety of parliament and the supposed impropriety of the playhouse provided a constant impediment to Sheridan’s political aspirations. The language of drama deployed in caricatures of Sheridan was powerfully charged with particular social and moral values: theatrical politics becomes, in such graphic satire, a lower-class politics of insincerity.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
In a post-factual world in which claims are often held to be true only to the extent that they partisanly confirm one’s preexisting beliefs, this book asks the following crucial questions: How can ...
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In a post-factual world in which claims are often held to be true only to the extent that they partisanly confirm one’s preexisting beliefs, this book asks the following crucial questions: How can one identify the many forms of untruthfulness in discourse? How can one know when their use is ethically wrong? How can one judge untruthfulness in the messiness of situated discourse? Drawing on pragmatics, philosophy, psychology, and law, All Bullshit and Lies? develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing untruthful discourse in situated context. The TRUST (Trust-Related Untruthfulness in Situated Text) framework sees untruthfulness as encompassing not just deliberate manipulations of what you believe to be the truth (the insincerity of withholding, misleading, and lying), but also the distortions that arise pathologically from an irresponsible attitude toward the truth (dogma, distortion, and bullshit). Truth is often not “in play” (as in jokes or fiction), or concealing it can achieve a greater good (as in saving another’s face). Untruthfulness becomes unethical in discourse, though, when it unjustifiably breaches the trust an interlocutor invests in the speaker. In such cases, the speaker becomes willfully insincere or epistemically negligent and thus culpable to a greater or lesser degree. In addition to the theoretical framework, the book provides a clear, practical heuristic for analyzing discursive untruthfulness and applies it to such cases of public discourse as the Brexit “battle bus,” Trump’s tweet about voter fraud, Blair’s and Bush’s claims about weapons of mass destruction, and the multiple forms of untruthfulness associated with the Skripal poisoning case.Less
In a post-factual world in which claims are often held to be true only to the extent that they partisanly confirm one’s preexisting beliefs, this book asks the following crucial questions: How can one identify the many forms of untruthfulness in discourse? How can one know when their use is ethically wrong? How can one judge untruthfulness in the messiness of situated discourse? Drawing on pragmatics, philosophy, psychology, and law, All Bullshit and Lies? develops a comprehensive framework for analyzing untruthful discourse in situated context. The TRUST (Trust-Related Untruthfulness in Situated Text) framework sees untruthfulness as encompassing not just deliberate manipulations of what you believe to be the truth (the insincerity of withholding, misleading, and lying), but also the distortions that arise pathologically from an irresponsible attitude toward the truth (dogma, distortion, and bullshit). Truth is often not “in play” (as in jokes or fiction), or concealing it can achieve a greater good (as in saving another’s face). Untruthfulness becomes unethical in discourse, though, when it unjustifiably breaches the trust an interlocutor invests in the speaker. In such cases, the speaker becomes willfully insincere or epistemically negligent and thus culpable to a greater or lesser degree. In addition to the theoretical framework, the book provides a clear, practical heuristic for analyzing discursive untruthfulness and applies it to such cases of public discourse as the Brexit “battle bus,” Trump’s tweet about voter fraud, Blair’s and Bush’s claims about weapons of mass destruction, and the multiple forms of untruthfulness associated with the Skripal poisoning case.
J. L. Austin
- Published in print:
- 1975
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245537
- eISBN:
- 9780191680861
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers another case of infelicity: insincerities and infractions or breaches. Here, the performance is not void, although it is still unhappy. The chapter considers one's feelings, ...
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This chapter considers another case of infelicity: insincerities and infractions or breaches. Here, the performance is not void, although it is still unhappy. The chapter considers one's feelings, thoughts, and intentions. An example of not having the requisite feeling is: ‘I congratulate you’, said when one did not feel at all pleased, or perhaps was even annoyed. An example of not having the requisite thought is: ‘I advise you to’, said when one did not think it would be the most expedient course. An example of not having the requisite intention is: ‘I promise’, said when one did not intend to keep the promise. The discussion also considers three of the many ways in which a statement implies the truth of certain other statements: entailment, implication, and presupposition.Less
This chapter considers another case of infelicity: insincerities and infractions or breaches. Here, the performance is not void, although it is still unhappy. The chapter considers one's feelings, thoughts, and intentions. An example of not having the requisite feeling is: ‘I congratulate you’, said when one did not feel at all pleased, or perhaps was even annoyed. An example of not having the requisite thought is: ‘I advise you to’, said when one did not think it would be the most expedient course. An example of not having the requisite intention is: ‘I promise’, said when one did not intend to keep the promise. The discussion also considers three of the many ways in which a statement implies the truth of certain other statements: entailment, implication, and presupposition.
A. N. Prior
- Published in print:
- 1971
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243540
- eISBN:
- 9780191680694
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This chapter begins with a discussion of the logic of falsehood, error, and insincerity. It then discusses the paradox of the preface, self-reference and particularization, the paradox of the ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the logic of falsehood, error, and insincerity. It then discusses the paradox of the preface, self-reference and particularization, the paradox of the truth-teller, Cohen's treatment of self-reference and intentionality, and further defects in Cohen's treatment.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the logic of falsehood, error, and insincerity. It then discusses the paradox of the preface, self-reference and particularization, the paradox of the truth-teller, Cohen's treatment of self-reference and intentionality, and further defects in Cohen's treatment.
Stephen Weatherill
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695706
- eISBN:
- 9780191741302
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695706.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
This chapter takes a look at the debate surrounding the proper model of harmonization to select with regards to the consumer law field. It first studies consumer protection in the EU's legislation, ...
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This chapter takes a look at the debate surrounding the proper model of harmonization to select with regards to the consumer law field. It first studies consumer protection in the EU's legislation, and then considers the importance of harmonization within the consumer field. The next section addresses the issue of constitutional insincerity related to the story of ‘spillover’ in the EU. It also discusses maximum and minimum harmonization, the Committee's response to minimum harmonization, and the proposed Directive for consumer rights.Less
This chapter takes a look at the debate surrounding the proper model of harmonization to select with regards to the consumer law field. It first studies consumer protection in the EU's legislation, and then considers the importance of harmonization within the consumer field. The next section addresses the issue of constitutional insincerity related to the story of ‘spillover’ in the EU. It also discusses maximum and minimum harmonization, the Committee's response to minimum harmonization, and the proposed Directive for consumer rights.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter teases out some key theoretical issues relating to the scope, ethics, and situated analysis of insincerity, as one of the two faces of untruthfulness. It begins by grounding sincerity in ...
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This chapter teases out some key theoretical issues relating to the scope, ethics, and situated analysis of insincerity, as one of the two faces of untruthfulness. It begins by grounding sincerity in an indispensable human need for trust and cooperation and notes how insincerity can breach trust. It then gives arguments for why the TRUST framework does not focus on deception. Grice’s implicature is considered fundamental to understanding insincerity within a framework of communicative cooperation, but his sincerity maxim unnecessarily narrows its scope. Instead, insincerity is viewed as the disruption of inquiry. By drawing on a psychological account of how untruthfulness works in situated discursive practice, the chapter argues that the concept of insincerity needs to be extended to cases of “editing out” where there is no textual clue to omission. This broadened conception of insincerity, which subsumes misleading and lying under withholding, is termed discursive insincerity.Less
This chapter teases out some key theoretical issues relating to the scope, ethics, and situated analysis of insincerity, as one of the two faces of untruthfulness. It begins by grounding sincerity in an indispensable human need for trust and cooperation and notes how insincerity can breach trust. It then gives arguments for why the TRUST framework does not focus on deception. Grice’s implicature is considered fundamental to understanding insincerity within a framework of communicative cooperation, but his sincerity maxim unnecessarily narrows its scope. Instead, insincerity is viewed as the disruption of inquiry. By drawing on a psychological account of how untruthfulness works in situated discursive practice, the chapter argues that the concept of insincerity needs to be extended to cases of “editing out” where there is no textual clue to omission. This broadened conception of insincerity, which subsumes misleading and lying under withholding, is termed discursive insincerity.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter sets out a framework for analyzing insincere discourse strategies. Though not equivalent, there is sufficient overlap between insincerity and deception to begin by considering typologies ...
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This chapter sets out a framework for analyzing insincere discourse strategies. Though not equivalent, there is sufficient overlap between insincerity and deception to begin by considering typologies of deception based on Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the speaker’s communicative intentions and goals. However, the chapter argues for an approach to insincere discourse based on a number of communicative variables relating to pursuit of inquiry. Accordingly, the underlying insincere discourse strategy is considered to be withholding (failing to disclose what you believe you should disclose), while misleading involves linguistically leading the interlocutor astray with regard to that concealed knowledge either by suggestion (misleading without lying) or explicit assertion (lying). The insincere discourse strategies may be realized through sub-strategies (e.g., omitting, evading, and blocking) or more general pragmatic tactics (e.g., equivocating and falsely implicating). Insincere discourse becomes unethical or wrong when it is willful (i.e., it breaches trust and is not justifiably suspended).Less
This chapter sets out a framework for analyzing insincere discourse strategies. Though not equivalent, there is sufficient overlap between insincerity and deception to begin by considering typologies of deception based on Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the speaker’s communicative intentions and goals. However, the chapter argues for an approach to insincere discourse based on a number of communicative variables relating to pursuit of inquiry. Accordingly, the underlying insincere discourse strategy is considered to be withholding (failing to disclose what you believe you should disclose), while misleading involves linguistically leading the interlocutor astray with regard to that concealed knowledge either by suggestion (misleading without lying) or explicit assertion (lying). The insincere discourse strategies may be realized through sub-strategies (e.g., omitting, evading, and blocking) or more general pragmatic tactics (e.g., equivocating and falsely implicating). Insincere discourse becomes unethical or wrong when it is willful (i.e., it breaches trust and is not justifiably suspended).
Andreas Stokke
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198825968
- eISBN:
- 9780191865022
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198825968.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book is a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. Part I is dedicated to developing an account of insincerity qua linguistic phenomenon. It provides a detailed theory of the ...
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This book is a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. Part I is dedicated to developing an account of insincerity qua linguistic phenomenon. It provides a detailed theory of the distinction between lying and ways of speaking insincerely without lying, as well as accounting for the relation between lying and deceiving. A novel theory of assertion in terms of a notion of what is said defined relative to questions under discussion is used to underpin the analysis of lying and insincerity throughout the book. The framework is applied to various kinds of insincere speech, including false implicature, bullshitting, and forms of misleading with presuppositions, prosodic focus, and different types of semantic incompleteness. Part II discusses the relation between what is communicated and the speaker’s attitudes involved in insincere language use. It develops a view on which insincerity is a shallow phenomenon in the sense that whether or not a speaker is being insincere depends on the speaker’s conscious attitudes, rather than on deeper, unconscious attitudes or motivations. An account of a range of ways of speaking while being indifferent toward what one communicates is developed, and the phenomenon of bullshitting is distinguished from lying and other forms of insincerity. This includes insincere uses of language beyond the realm of declarative sentences. The book gives an account of insincere uses of interrogative, imperative, and exclamative utterances.Less
This book is a comprehensive study of lying and insincere language use. Part I is dedicated to developing an account of insincerity qua linguistic phenomenon. It provides a detailed theory of the distinction between lying and ways of speaking insincerely without lying, as well as accounting for the relation between lying and deceiving. A novel theory of assertion in terms of a notion of what is said defined relative to questions under discussion is used to underpin the analysis of lying and insincerity throughout the book. The framework is applied to various kinds of insincere speech, including false implicature, bullshitting, and forms of misleading with presuppositions, prosodic focus, and different types of semantic incompleteness. Part II discusses the relation between what is communicated and the speaker’s attitudes involved in insincere language use. It develops a view on which insincerity is a shallow phenomenon in the sense that whether or not a speaker is being insincere depends on the speaker’s conscious attitudes, rather than on deeper, unconscious attitudes or motivations. An account of a range of ways of speaking while being indifferent toward what one communicates is developed, and the phenomenon of bullshitting is distinguished from lying and other forms of insincerity. This includes insincere uses of language beyond the realm of declarative sentences. The book gives an account of insincere uses of interrogative, imperative, and exclamative utterances.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
Chapter 3 focuses on the first two steps of the TRUST untruthfulness heuristic: CLAIM and EVIDENCE. It begins by noting four principal rational motives for calling out lies and bullshit (confession, ...
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Chapter 3 focuses on the first two steps of the TRUST untruthfulness heuristic: CLAIM and EVIDENCE. It begins by noting four principal rational motives for calling out lies and bullshit (confession, detection, self-contradiction, and falsification), but stresses that in the majority of cases one relies primarily on falsification. This is problematic because Chapters 1 and 2 stress that both discursive insincerity and epistemic irresponsibility are subjective rather than objective notions. The reliance on falsification as a starting point for analysis restricts the application of the framework primarily to “factually significant” and “falsifiable” claims. A distinction is made between “salty-type” statements that invite further investigation and “tasty-type” statements that invite agreement or disagreement but not further investigation. Only “salty-type” claims are open to a TRUST analysis. Finally, the challenge of anti-realism is taken up, and it is argued that there is more consensus about evidence than the “truth wars” would suggest.Less
Chapter 3 focuses on the first two steps of the TRUST untruthfulness heuristic: CLAIM and EVIDENCE. It begins by noting four principal rational motives for calling out lies and bullshit (confession, detection, self-contradiction, and falsification), but stresses that in the majority of cases one relies primarily on falsification. This is problematic because Chapters 1 and 2 stress that both discursive insincerity and epistemic irresponsibility are subjective rather than objective notions. The reliance on falsification as a starting point for analysis restricts the application of the framework primarily to “factually significant” and “falsifiable” claims. A distinction is made between “salty-type” statements that invite further investigation and “tasty-type” statements that invite agreement or disagreement but not further investigation. Only “salty-type” claims are open to a TRUST analysis. Finally, the challenge of anti-realism is taken up, and it is argued that there is more consensus about evidence than the “truth wars” would suggest.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: ...
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This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: Trump’s tweet about large-scale voter fraud just before the 2016 presidential elections; the “Brexit Battle Bus” claim that the United Kingdom sent £350 million per week to the European Union; and Tony Blair’s 2002 statement to Parliament about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction. The cases share a common theme: the capacity of untruthful public discourse to undermine democratic legitimacy by, respectively, questioning the integrity of electoral procedures, harming the capacity of voters to make a rational choice, and undermining faith in the rational and responsible deliberation of one’s leaders. The chapter troubles the simple attribution of lying in these cases and shows how a TRUST analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of the types and ethical value of untruthfulness.Less
This chapter summarizes the main analytical moves in the TRUST heuristic for analyzing untruthfulness. It then applies the heuristic to three short texts that have been widely called out as lies: Trump’s tweet about large-scale voter fraud just before the 2016 presidential elections; the “Brexit Battle Bus” claim that the United Kingdom sent £350 million per week to the European Union; and Tony Blair’s 2002 statement to Parliament about Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction. The cases share a common theme: the capacity of untruthful public discourse to undermine democratic legitimacy by, respectively, questioning the integrity of electoral procedures, harming the capacity of voters to make a rational choice, and undermining faith in the rational and responsible deliberation of one’s leaders. The chapter troubles the simple attribution of lying in these cases and shows how a TRUST analysis can lead to a deeper understanding of the types and ethical value of untruthfulness.
Chris Heffer
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190923280
- eISBN:
- 9780190923327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190923280.003.0010
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics
This chapter demonstrates an alternative “holistic” method of TRUST analysis in which the focus is not on individual claims or short sections of text with a few related claims, but on the general ...
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This chapter demonstrates an alternative “holistic” method of TRUST analysis in which the focus is not on individual claims or short sections of text with a few related claims, but on the general manifestation of untruthfulness with respect to a particular case. The chapter provides an extensive analysis of multiple claims regarding the poisoning of the Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England, in March 2018. It opens with the prime minister’s short statement to Parliament just after the attack, which superficially but confusingly reminds us of Blair’s Preface, but this is used as a springboard for exploring various types of untruthful discourse that have emerged in relation to this international crisis. The framework thus becomes a way of structuring a much broader analysis of untruthfulness in international discourse. The study also demonstrates very clearly the role of social media in promoting epistemic partisanship.Less
This chapter demonstrates an alternative “holistic” method of TRUST analysis in which the focus is not on individual claims or short sections of text with a few related claims, but on the general manifestation of untruthfulness with respect to a particular case. The chapter provides an extensive analysis of multiple claims regarding the poisoning of the Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England, in March 2018. It opens with the prime minister’s short statement to Parliament just after the attack, which superficially but confusingly reminds us of Blair’s Preface, but this is used as a springboard for exploring various types of untruthful discourse that have emerged in relation to this international crisis. The framework thus becomes a way of structuring a much broader analysis of untruthfulness in international discourse. The study also demonstrates very clearly the role of social media in promoting epistemic partisanship.
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190865269
- eISBN:
- 9780190865290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190865269.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter addresses consent and estoppel, raising questions about their meaning, implications, and justification. It disentangles various bases on which one could lose the right to redress for a ...
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This chapter addresses consent and estoppel, raising questions about their meaning, implications, and justification. It disentangles various bases on which one could lose the right to redress for a civil wrong. One such basis is that an individual actually or apparently consented to conduct an act that would, but for consent, be wrongful. But this chapter cautions that it is important to recognize that apparent consent is not a form of consent. Another basis upon which a right to redress can be lost is where an underlying primary right is deemed forfeited though the right-holder’s insincere act, as where duty-holders are duped into committing a wrong because the “victim” seeks a valued remedy. Finally, this chapter explains that the overbroad rubric of estoppel conceals at least three other distinct bases on which the exercise of a right to redress may be varied or suspended.Less
This chapter addresses consent and estoppel, raising questions about their meaning, implications, and justification. It disentangles various bases on which one could lose the right to redress for a civil wrong. One such basis is that an individual actually or apparently consented to conduct an act that would, but for consent, be wrongful. But this chapter cautions that it is important to recognize that apparent consent is not a form of consent. Another basis upon which a right to redress can be lost is where an underlying primary right is deemed forfeited though the right-holder’s insincere act, as where duty-holders are duped into committing a wrong because the “victim” seeks a valued remedy. Finally, this chapter explains that the overbroad rubric of estoppel conceals at least three other distinct bases on which the exercise of a right to redress may be varied or suspended.
Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198743965
- eISBN:
- 9780191866791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This introductory chapter first offers a sketch of the history of philosophical thinking about lying and insincerity. It traces some of the themes in this literature in the works of Plato, Aristotle, ...
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This introductory chapter first offers a sketch of the history of philosophical thinking about lying and insincerity. It traces some of the themes in this literature in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, early modern casuists, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, through to twentieth-century philosophy. The chapter highlights some of the issues discussed in the contemporary literature, as represented in this collection of essays. It then presents an overview of the essays included in this volume. Some comments on the connections between them are offered, as well as on their relation to the historical debate.Less
This introductory chapter first offers a sketch of the history of philosophical thinking about lying and insincerity. It traces some of the themes in this literature in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, early modern casuists, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, through to twentieth-century philosophy. The chapter highlights some of the issues discussed in the contemporary literature, as represented in this collection of essays. It then presents an overview of the essays included in this volume. Some comments on the connections between them are offered, as well as on their relation to the historical debate.
Jessica Pepp
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198743965
- eISBN:
- 9780191866791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying: the conflict of saying what you think is false. Traditionally, this is analyzed in terms of saying ...
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This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying: the conflict of saying what you think is false. Traditionally, this is analyzed in terms of saying something and believing that it is false. But cases of unconscious or divided belief challenge these analyses. Amendments involving assent instead of belief fare no better. Attempts to save these analyses by appeal to guises or modes of presentation will also run into trouble. Alternative approaches to untruthfulness are considered. Two new kinds of case are introduced, “truth serum” and “liar serum” cases. Consideration of these cases reveals structural problems with intention- and expectation-based approaches also. The cases suggest that saying what you think is false, or being untruthful, is no less difficult and interesting a subject for analysis than lying itself. The discussion illuminates how the study of lying intertwines with issues in the nature of intentional action.Less
This chapter investigates the conflict between thought and speech that is inherent in lying: the conflict of saying what you think is false. Traditionally, this is analyzed in terms of saying something and believing that it is false. But cases of unconscious or divided belief challenge these analyses. Amendments involving assent instead of belief fare no better. Attempts to save these analyses by appeal to guises or modes of presentation will also run into trouble. Alternative approaches to untruthfulness are considered. Two new kinds of case are introduced, “truth serum” and “liar serum” cases. Consideration of these cases reveals structural problems with intention- and expectation-based approaches also. The cases suggest that saying what you think is false, or being untruthful, is no less difficult and interesting a subject for analysis than lying itself. The discussion illuminates how the study of lying intertwines with issues in the nature of intentional action.
Andreas Stokke
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- November 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198743965
- eISBN:
- 9780191866791
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198743965.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter is concerned with the question, what are the conditions under which insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge and what are the conditions under which testimonial knowledge may be acquired ...
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This chapter is concerned with the question, what are the conditions under which insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge and what are the conditions under which testimonial knowledge may be acquired in the face of insincere testimony? The chapter argues that when insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge, the insincerity involved is a kind of unreliability. In particular, insincere testimony—in particular, lying—is seen to involve fabrication, that is, making something up. It is argued that acquiring testimonial knowledge requires that the testimony be given on a reliable basis. Yet fabrication is not a reliable basis for testimony, and hence this explains why lying testimony typically does not yield testimonial knowledge. By contrast, the chapter shows that, in cases where listeners acquire testimonial knowledge from insincere testifiers, the testimony is given on a reliable basis.Less
This chapter is concerned with the question, what are the conditions under which insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge and what are the conditions under which testimonial knowledge may be acquired in the face of insincere testimony? The chapter argues that when insincerity blocks testimonial knowledge, the insincerity involved is a kind of unreliability. In particular, insincere testimony—in particular, lying—is seen to involve fabrication, that is, making something up. It is argued that acquiring testimonial knowledge requires that the testimony be given on a reliable basis. Yet fabrication is not a reliable basis for testimony, and hence this explains why lying testimony typically does not yield testimonial knowledge. By contrast, the chapter shows that, in cases where listeners acquire testimonial knowledge from insincere testifiers, the testimony is given on a reliable basis.
Andreas Stokke
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198825968
- eISBN:
- 9780191865022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198825968.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter discusses insincerity in light of the fact that many beliefs and intentions are non-transparent. First, for some mental states, one may be in such states without believing that one is. ...
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This chapter discusses insincerity in light of the fact that many beliefs and intentions are non-transparent. First, for some mental states, one may be in such states without believing that one is. Second, for some mental states, one may believe that one is in such states without being in them. The chapter introduces the difference between deep and shallow conceptions of insincerity. On deep views, insincerity depends on attitudes that may be unconscious, while on shallow views, insincerity depends on one’s conscious mental attitudes. By considering examples involving conflict between what is said and the speaker’s beliefs about her beliefs, the chapter argues that the appropriate attitude to focus on is mental assent, which is an act of conscious judging as the result of consideration.Less
This chapter discusses insincerity in light of the fact that many beliefs and intentions are non-transparent. First, for some mental states, one may be in such states without believing that one is. Second, for some mental states, one may believe that one is in such states without being in them. The chapter introduces the difference between deep and shallow conceptions of insincerity. On deep views, insincerity depends on attitudes that may be unconscious, while on shallow views, insincerity depends on one’s conscious mental attitudes. By considering examples involving conflict between what is said and the speaker’s beliefs about her beliefs, the chapter argues that the appropriate attitude to focus on is mental assent, which is an act of conscious judging as the result of consideration.
Andreas Stokke
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- August 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198825968
- eISBN:
- 9780191865022
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198825968.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter argues for a shallow conception of insincerity. It argues that whether an utterance is insincere depends on the speaker’s conscious attitudes toward what is communicated as well as on ...
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This chapter argues for a shallow conception of insincerity. It argues that whether an utterance is insincere depends on the speaker’s conscious attitudes toward what is communicated as well as on his or her conscious intentions in making the utterance. Various ways of speaking spontaneously and of speaking without thinking are considered. A broad characterization of insincerity for declarative utterances is set out, according to which a declarative utterance is when it is made without a conscious intention to contribute an answer to a question under discussion that corresponds to one’s conscious attitudes, while avoiding communicating false information in the process.Less
This chapter argues for a shallow conception of insincerity. It argues that whether an utterance is insincere depends on the speaker’s conscious attitudes toward what is communicated as well as on his or her conscious intentions in making the utterance. Various ways of speaking spontaneously and of speaking without thinking are considered. A broad characterization of insincerity for declarative utterances is set out, according to which a declarative utterance is when it is made without a conscious intention to contribute an answer to a question under discussion that corresponds to one’s conscious attitudes, while avoiding communicating false information in the process.
Amy Olberding
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- August 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190880965
- eISBN:
- 9780190880996
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190880965.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines why ordinary forms of social rudeness can be appealing. Having ordinary good manners largely consists in developing good habits rather than deciding in individual cases to be ...
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This chapter examines why ordinary forms of social rudeness can be appealing. Having ordinary good manners largely consists in developing good habits rather than deciding in individual cases to be polite. This chapter considers why we are resistant to developing such habits. It considers common and historical complaints against good manners, most especially the criticism that manners involve fakery and the sense that manners are dreary and joyless. These complaints represent useful forms of skepticism but can also, the chapter argues, seed self-deception. For we are far more likely to find joyful honesty in our own bad manners than in the bad manners of others. So too, the world of honesty and fun we associate with slack in manners is not the world we are likely to get. Instead, bad manners will fall hardest on those with the least.Less
This chapter examines why ordinary forms of social rudeness can be appealing. Having ordinary good manners largely consists in developing good habits rather than deciding in individual cases to be polite. This chapter considers why we are resistant to developing such habits. It considers common and historical complaints against good manners, most especially the criticism that manners involve fakery and the sense that manners are dreary and joyless. These complaints represent useful forms of skepticism but can also, the chapter argues, seed self-deception. For we are far more likely to find joyful honesty in our own bad manners than in the bad manners of others. So too, the world of honesty and fun we associate with slack in manners is not the world we are likely to get. Instead, bad manners will fall hardest on those with the least.
John W. Garver
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190261054
- eISBN:
- 9780190261085
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190261054.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
In 1979, China invaded Vietnam’s northern border area, then after a month unilaterally withdrew. This was the opening blow of a decade-long effort to punish Vietnam for a series of moves unacceptable ...
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In 1979, China invaded Vietnam’s northern border area, then after a month unilaterally withdrew. This was the opening blow of a decade-long effort to punish Vietnam for a series of moves unacceptable to Beijing. After defeating the Americans in 1975, Communist-ruled united Vietnam allied with the Soviet Union. Vietnam invaded Cambodia to oust the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge communist regime, ignoring China’s role as protector of Cambodia. Hanoi violated agreements with Beijing regarding the status of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, eventually forcing many to flee the country. In the South China Sea, Hanoi asserted ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands—claims it had not voiced during the long struggle against the Americans, when Hanoi needed Chinese support. For Beijing, Hanoi’s policies involved insincerity, ingratitude, and duplicity. Beijing’s goal was to teach Hanoi that it could not continually trample on China’s interests.Less
In 1979, China invaded Vietnam’s northern border area, then after a month unilaterally withdrew. This was the opening blow of a decade-long effort to punish Vietnam for a series of moves unacceptable to Beijing. After defeating the Americans in 1975, Communist-ruled united Vietnam allied with the Soviet Union. Vietnam invaded Cambodia to oust the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge communist regime, ignoring China’s role as protector of Cambodia. Hanoi violated agreements with Beijing regarding the status of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, eventually forcing many to flee the country. In the South China Sea, Hanoi asserted ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands—claims it had not voiced during the long struggle against the Americans, when Hanoi needed Chinese support. For Beijing, Hanoi’s policies involved insincerity, ingratitude, and duplicity. Beijing’s goal was to teach Hanoi that it could not continually trample on China’s interests.