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This chapter defends a qualified internalist account of the representationality of Cartesian sensations that differs from both externalist readings and from purely internalist accounts (also discussed in this chapter). Although the chapter argues that sensations represent what they do in virtue of some internal feature, it also argues that a causal relation to bodily states plays a role in the formation of sensory ideas. This account is called “descriptivist‐causal” and it has the advantage, over purely internalist accounts, of acknowledging the texts where Descartes claims that ideas of sense are caused by bodies and of explaining what distinguishes sensory representation from purely intellectual representation. It also provides a straightforward answer to the question of how to explain Descartes' claim that sensory ideas are misrepresentations of their objects within his descriptivist theory of ideas. Sensory ideas mis‐present their objects because they contain confused descriptions of the right object of thought.

This chapter proposes a dilemma: Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas appears to require an acceptance of a Lockean-style ideational semantics. However, such a semantics would seem to undercut the viability of his central religious convictions. It would seem Berkeley can only save the latter by rejecting the former or vice-versa. The dilemma is removed by a careful examination of Berkeley's famous Introduction to the Principles. It is shown that Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas is actually based on a rejection of ideational semantics. Instead, Berkeley advocates a “use theory” of meaning. This semantic theory is then applied to the interpretation of Berkeley's divine language thesis and shown to help support a pragmatic approach to the ontology of the natural world. This interpretation is defended against competing interpretations by Jonathan Bennett and David Berman.

This chapter seeks to reconstruct an important debate over the theory of innate ideas from the writings of Leibniz and Malebranche. It is argued that Malebranche’s critique of Descartes’ version of the theory raises fundamental issues about the ontological status of ideas or concepts. It is argued further that as a nominalist Leibniz is opposed to Malebranche’s Platonic insistence that ideas are ‘third-realm’, abstract entities. In response to Malebranche Leibniz seeks to reclaim ideas for psychology: ideas, for Leibniz, are dispositions to think in certain ways. Leibniz’s defence of mental dispositions against Malebranche’s objections prepares the ground for his positive theory of innate ideas. It is also shown how Leibniz has the resources to answer all Malebranche’s objections to the theory of innate ideas

Examines Descartes's later years through the large volume of correspondence from that period, much of it with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This correspondence was mainly concerned with the passions, mind/body dualism, the nature of the soul, automata, and the doctrine of substantial union. Mind/body dualism is discussed in the usual seventeenth‐century context of the passions, in his work Passions, which also deals at length with the problem of evil. Reviews the work Descartes undertook at the end of his life—unfinished works on botany (no longer extant), anatomy, physiology, and a reply to Regius’ disagreement with him on the need for a metaphysical grounding for natural philosophy that expanded on his doctrine of innate ideas.

This chapter sets out to show, with certain qualifications, that Locke’s theory of abstract ideas is intended to provide a systematic replacement for Descartes’ theory of innate ideas. In the first section it is argued that Locke explains the eternity of the eternal truths, which Descartes considers innate, in terms of relations among abstract ideas. The second section examines the ideas of God, identity, and substance which for Descartes are all innate ideas; it is shown that Locke holds that the idea of substance in general involves an abstract idea as one of its components. The final section addresses the debate between the two philosophers over the status of animals. Here it is shown how Locke’s thesis that animals are distinguished from human beings by their lack of abstract ideas is consistent with the Systematic Replacement Thesis, for on one interpretation Descartes’ claim that animals lack the faculty of thinking is equivalent to the claim that they are lacking in innate ideas

This chapter attempts to untangle the debate surrounding innate ideas and innate knowledge. The controversy is as follows: Some philosophers, as well as linguists, psychologists, and others, allege that human beings have innate knowledge or innate ideas. Others deny it. Advocates of the doctrines of innate ideas and innate knowledge commonly take the notion of innateness itself to be unproblematic. They explain it with a few near synonyms, “inborn” or “unlearned,” or with a metaphor or an allegory, and leave it at that. The doctrine's opponents often begin by puzzling over just what the doctrine could possibly mean. They go on to construct a variety of accounts, arguing against each in turn. The advocate's rejoinder, as often as not, is that he has been misunderstood.

Chapter 3 argues that Descartes’ views about mind–body interaction are internally consistent, and compatible with his more general views about causation; thus neither Descartes nor his followers were forced to reject interactionism to maintain mind–body dualism. In some later works, Descartes says that corporeal motions “give occasion” to the mind to form ideas, which are innate to the mind. Section 3.3 argues that these remarks are consistent with his claims in earlier texts that corporeal motions produce or bring about ideas in the mind. This causal theory of sensation seems to be inconsistent with general causal principles that Descartes endorses elsewhere—such as the principle that a cause must contain, “formally or eminently,” whatever it brings about in its effect. But sections 3.3 and 3.4 show that Descartes’ general statements about efficient causation are compatible with the view that bodily motions have the power to elicit sensations in the mind.

Innate knowledge—the possibility that certain notions might be inborn in us simply because we are humans—has been the topic of endless controversy throughout our intellectual history. This chapter reviews some of these exchanges in philosophy and in modern cognitive and brain sciences. But these discussions are not the sole purview of academia. Laypeople also have some strong opinions on such matters. This chapter thus begins by describing some of our nativist intuitions. We next contrast these views with science. While laypeople maintain that knowledge cannot be innate, the results emerging from science suggest that innateness is a viable possibility. What is the source of our antinativist intuitions? We explore several explanations, and in short order, the conclusions point back right at innate knowledge itself. We see that the very principles that make the human mind tick (principles that are likely innate) can explain why people are reluctant to accept that knowledge can be innate.

Having shown that innate knowledge is a viable scientific hypothesis with considerable evidence in its support, the next three chapters examine laypeople’s intuitions about innate knowledge. We describe a series of experiments that contrasts people’s intuitions about the origins of cognitive traits (those that capture knowledge) and noncognitive traits (either sensory, motor, or emotive capacities). Results show that people believe that cognitive traits are not innate. People maintain these convictions even when they are provided with detailed descriptions of experiments from infant research (those reviewed in previous chapters), complete with an explanation of the rationale and method; while science clearly suggests these principles are present in newborns, people insist that they aren’t. Other results demonstrate that our antinativist intuitions are a bias, as people maintain these intuitions despite explicit evidence to the contrary, and even when they are presented with innate knowledge of nonhuman species. These results show that people are systematically and selectively biased against innate ideas.

What are ideas for Spinoza? Through a discussion of the definition of “idea” in 2def3, it is shown, first, that Spinoza is reacting here to both Hobbes’ objections to the Meditations and Descartes’ replies. While he agrees with Hobbes that ideas are conceptions that are formed, rather than merely perceived, by the human mind, he sides with Descartes regarding the irreducibly mental character of ideas. With respect to the issue of mental content, the chapter next argues that Spinoza not only distinguishes between formal and objective reality but also assumes that objective reality comprises two aspects, representational content and epistemic value. This is one reason why Spinozistic ideas have proved notoriously difficult to clearly individuate. Lastly, through an examination of how Spinoza employs Descartes’ Pegasus example, the case is made that, far from simply elaborating on Descartes’ approach, Spinoza dismisses Cartesian nativism as a basis for his rationalism.

This chapter presents an account of the important Aristotelian distinction concerning ‘act and potency’, which suggests how this paradigm is important in moving beyond the limits of representationalism. Aquinas begins his discussion of act and potency by considering two propositions: ‘To sense is to be moved or acted upon in some way, for the act of sensation involves a certain alteration of the subject’; and ‘It was the view of some inquiries that the passivity of sensation was an instance of “like being acted upon by like”.’ Additionally, this chapter proposes an account of cognitive dispositions differing from innate ideas, as well as a rejection of physicalism as an adequate account of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind.

Remy, the Harvard Humanities cat, spends his days amidst Harvard’s academic towers, blissfully oblivious to his intellectual surroundings. It is obvious to us that Remy suffers certain cognitive limitations of which he is entirely unaware. After all, we are humans, whereas Remy was born a cat. That a pet might experience a certain level of cognitive blindness is an idea we accept with equanimity. But we are far less comfortable with the thought that we might suffer from similar cognitive limitations ourselves. Logic, however, compels us to entertain this as a distinct possibility. Having recognized that biology can innately limit other species’ cognitions and that we too are biological kinds, blindness could very well obscure human minds. Fear of blindness goes throughout our intellectual history all the way to the ancient Greeks. In this book, we see that, just as the Greek feared, we are oblivion to our own human nature, and our blindness is in our fate. It emanates from human nature itself.