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This chapter explores the constitutional source of ‘inherent powers’. Firstly it analyzes what is meant by express, implied, and emergency powers. Then it examines closely the 1936 Supreme Court case, Curtiss-Wright, that is most often cited for supporting inherent and extra-constitutional powers for the president. The chapter then moves to discussing the use of inherent powers by President Harry Truman in 1952 to seize steel mills to prosecute the war in Korea, and the reliance on inherent powers by President George W. Bush to accomplish a range of war-related actions. Truman's initiative was repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Youngstown case, but the legal and political limits of Bush's actions are still being played out.

This chapter examines the methods available to international courts to refer to the practice of other international judicial bodies, and to interpret and apply their procedure and remedies in similar ways. It begins by outlining the sources of law relating to procedure and remedies, which are principally the constitutive instruments and rules of procedure of international courts. Such instruments are not drafted in identical terms, and often contain lacunae. It examines what international courts do when faced with lacunae in these sources. It then discusses the concept of inherent powers in detail, argues that the exercise of such powers by international courts is justified, and reviews their relevant practice. The possible sources of inherent powers are examined, and it is concluded that they lie in the need of international courts to fulfil their functions, being, principally, the settlement of international disputes and the proper administration of international justice. These functions also serve as limitations on the exercise of inherent powers.

This chapter focuses on the inherent powers of the Appellate Body, and how the availability and exercise of such powers influences the interpretation and application of procedural rules in WTO dispute settlement. The analysis in this chapter builds on the distinction, made in Chapter 4, between procedural and substantive silences in WTO treaty language and the Appellate Body's interpretation of those silences. The chapter helps to explain how and why the appreciation of the judicial function of the WTO Appellate Body is commonly too narrowly construed on the basis of the DSU.

This chapter examines in detail two post-adjudication powers of international courts and tribunals: the power of interpretation and the power of revision. It first explains the post-adjudication role of international courts, which is limited due to the principle of the finality of adjudication. A variety of procedures have been developed, but this chapter focuses on the powers of interpretation and revision. The chapter then analyses the source of these powers, and it is argued that even if these powers are not expressly conferred in an international court's constitutive instruments, they can be exercised as inherent powers. It then turns to a number of issues which are considered by international courts in exercising the powers of interpretation and revision: the jurisdiction of the international court hearing the request; the composition of the international court; the scope of the powers of interpretation and revision; and other conditions. The chapter concludes that these powers are generally exercised in a consistent manner by different international courts.

This chapter on presidential powers first analyzes three concepts that go beyond powers expressly stated: “implied,” “inherent,” and “prerogative.” It then considers specific presidential powers, such as the power to remove executive officials and to issue pardons. Presidential powers wax and wane depending on who occupies the Oval Office; initiatives urged by advisers and supporters, national, and international pressures; popular support (and lack thereof); and actions taken by the legislative and judicial branches to encourage or curb executive power.

This chapter examines the origins and parameters of the principle of effectiveness in the field of treaty interpretation, and applies it to a number of fields. This is relevant for interpreting treaties in general, for avoiding redundancy of treaty clauses, for interpreting exceptions, and construing the powers of international organisations and tribunals on the basis of the doctrines of implied and inherent powers. The chapter demonstrates that the principle of effectiveness is received in international jurisprudence without any substantial objection, and it negates the principle of restrictive interpretation, which is consistently rejected in jurisprudence.

This chapter discusses the differences between the federal and state judiciary. Many state judges are elected through a variety of mechanisms. The workload of state supreme courts has evolved over the years from a private-law orientation to more constitutional law and public policy kinds of cases. In addition, state courts exercise a number of nonadjudicatory powers such as rulemaking on practice and procedure before the courts and regulation of lawyers. Some state courts have the authority to issue advisory opinions and answer certified questions, and some of them have asserted certain inherent powers such as to require adequate funding levels. State courts also retain the power to develop common law doctrine, as well as to resolve disputes among state and local government officials and agencies in ways that rarely involve the federal judiciary. State courts are also not bound by the rigid federal doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness.

This chapter examines the power of international courts to grant provisional measures and analyses whether there is an emerging common practice. It first describes the purpose of provisional measures in international adjudication. It then considers the source of the power to grant provisional measures. Many international courts have an express power in their constitutive instruments, but several international courts have exercised the power as an inherent power. The chapter then examines the features common in the exercise of the power by a range of international courts — consideration of the question of jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute; the circumstances relevant to the granting of provisional measures; and the binding quality of provisional measures. Finally, the chapter considers the power of international courts to grant provisional measures ultra petita and proprio motu. It concludes that there is substantial commonality in the practice of international courts concerning provisional measures.

This Chapter addresses the Court in its present institutional form, addressing its dual function in relation to the settlement of contentious disputes and its advisory function in relation to the organs of the United Nations. Taking into account the Court's enduring concern for its consensual jurisdiction, this Chapter considers the various powers the Court has claimed for itself on the basis that these are inherent in the function of any judiciary, both in relation to its contentious and advisory functions. It concludes with an extended discussion of the Court's role in the development of international law.

This chapter explores the feasibility of professionalization through the articulation of common ethical standards for counsel. Through analysis of the nascent efforts in professional organizations such as the International Law Association, International Bar Association, and Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe to codify such standards, it assesses the utility of the exercise and the process by which these principles can be applied in practice. It considers the legal powers (eg the ‘inherent jurisdiction’ or ‘inherent powers’ of international courts) and practical ability of international judges to regulate counsel as well as the issues that have arisen in the nascent process of articulating common ethical standards in professional organizations, including the ILA Hague Principles on Ethical Standards for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals. Moreover, the chapter examines the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals concerning regulatory powers for counsel and the legal and practical problems associated with regulation of counsel by the international judiciary.

The Algiers Declarations make no direct reference to interim measures that the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal might order, but Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Claims Settlement Declaration makes an indirect reference by providing that the Tribunal ‘shall conduct its business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by the parties or by the Tribunal to ensure that this agreement can be carried out’. The relevant provision of the UNCITRAL Rules – which is unchanged in the Tribunal Rules – is Article 26. When the Tribunal first addressed a request for interim measures of protection, it based the measures it ordered, not on Article 26, but on its ‘inherent powers’. The Tribunal did not refer to Article 26 in requesting Iran to stay proceedings against E-Systems in an Iranian court that involved the same contract and many of the same issues as E-System’s claims before the Tribunal.

Constitutionalism emerged as a reaction to functionalism to rebut the international nature of the relation between organizations and member states: member states are organs of the organization when they act in the fulfilment of its purposes; the law created by international organizations is purely internal law; the institutional veil is characterized by an impermeable opacity; the autonomy of the organization is maximal; the conduct of a member state acting in the institutional forum is not relevant as a matter of international law. This chapter describes the historical roots of this conceptualization and posits why under this perspective the rules of the organizations are internal law of each particular organization. Afterwards, it describes the flaws of this theory discussing the problems arising in terms of the principle of lex specialis and concerning the attribution of conduct to an international organization.