Uriah Kriegel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199742974
- eISBN:
- 9780199914449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any mental state x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the ...
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Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any mental state x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the experiential-intentional content of x? This chapters discuss tracking accounts of experiential intentionality (Section 2.1), goes on to argue against such accounts (Section 2.2), and then formulates and defends a higher-order tracking theory (Section 2.3), before closing with some objections and replies (Section 2.4). According to the higher-order tracking theory, a property F figures in the experiential-intentional content of a state x just in case x is suitably higher-order tracked to track F. What this exactly means becomes clearer in the course of the chapter. The overall thesis of this chapter is that although the standard tracking theory is rather implausible, the higher-order tracking theory is quite plausible.Less
Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any mental state x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the experiential-intentional content of x? This chapters discuss tracking accounts of experiential intentionality (Section 2.1), goes on to argue against such accounts (Section 2.2), and then formulates and defends a higher-order tracking theory (Section 2.3), before closing with some objections and replies (Section 2.4). According to the higher-order tracking theory, a property F figures in the experiential-intentional content of a state x just in case x is suitably higher-order tracked to track F. What this exactly means becomes clearer in the course of the chapter. The overall thesis of this chapter is that although the standard tracking theory is rather implausible, the higher-order tracking theory is quite plausible.
Nicholas Shea
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- October 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198812883
- eISBN:
- 9780191850677
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198812883.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter offers a breezy introduction to the content question, the question of what determines the content of a mental representation. Existing approaches are outlined: informational semantics, ...
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This chapter offers a breezy introduction to the content question, the question of what determines the content of a mental representation. Existing approaches are outlined: informational semantics, inferential role semantics, correspondence theories, ascriptionism and the intentional stance, and teleosemantics. This discussion highlights the major issues that the book’s positive account must address if it is to succeed.Less
This chapter offers a breezy introduction to the content question, the question of what determines the content of a mental representation. Existing approaches are outlined: informational semantics, inferential role semantics, correspondence theories, ascriptionism and the intentional stance, and teleosemantics. This discussion highlights the major issues that the book’s positive account must address if it is to succeed.
