Quentin Smith (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199264933
- eISBN:
- 9780191718472
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics ...
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This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.Less
This book offers a view of the current state of play in epistemology in the form of twelve chapters by some of the philosophers who have most influenced the course of debates in recent years. Topics include epistemic justification, solipsism, scepticism, and modal, moral, naturalistic, and probabilistic epistemology. Such approaches as reliabilism, evidentialism, infinitism, and virtue epistemology are here developed further by the philosophers who pioneered them.
Peter Klein
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130058
- eISBN:
- 9780199833481
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130057.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from ...
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In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can contribute to the discussion between one who claims that we can have knowledge about some epistemically interesting class of propositions and the Academic Skeptic. He outlines the background of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, pointing out that the Pyrrhonist withholds assent concerning our knowledge‐bearing status because reason cannot provide an adequate basis for assent. He assesses three possible patterns of reasoning (foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism), and concludes that the Pyrrhonist view, that reason cannot resolve matters concerning the nonevident, is vindicated.Less
In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can contribute to the discussion between one who claims that we can have knowledge about some epistemically interesting class of propositions and the Academic Skeptic. He outlines the background of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, pointing out that the Pyrrhonist withholds assent concerning our knowledge‐bearing status because reason cannot provide an adequate basis for assent. He assesses three possible patterns of reasoning (foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism), and concludes that the Pyrrhonist view, that reason cannot resolve matters concerning the nonevident, is vindicated.
John Turri and Peter D. Klein (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. Infinitism has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after ...
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Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. Infinitism has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries, it has recently begun a resurgence. This book collects together fourteen chapters of cutting edge research on infinitism. The chapters shed new light on infinitism’s distinctive strengths and weaknesses and address questions, new and old, about infinitism’s account of justification, reasoning, epistemic responsibility, disagreement, and trust, among other important issues. This book clarifies the relationship between infinitism and skepticism, coherentism, foundationalism, and contextualism, and it offers novel perspectives on the metaphysics and epistemology of regresses.Less
Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. Infinitism has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries, it has recently begun a resurgence. This book collects together fourteen chapters of cutting edge research on infinitism. The chapters shed new light on infinitism’s distinctive strengths and weaknesses and address questions, new and old, about infinitism’s account of justification, reasoning, epistemic responsibility, disagreement, and trust, among other important issues. This book clarifies the relationship between infinitism and skepticism, coherentism, foundationalism, and contextualism, and it offers novel perspectives on the metaphysics and epistemology of regresses.
Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198755630
- eISBN:
- 9780191816772
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198755630.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading and emerging scholars that address issues relating to the view that has come to be known as metaphysical foundationalism, and explore ...
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This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading and emerging scholars that address issues relating to the view that has come to be known as metaphysical foundationalism, and explore possibilities regarding its alternatives. According to the foundationalist, reality is hierarchically arranged with chains of entities ordered by metaphysical dependence relations that terminate in a fundamental ground populated by consistent and contingent entities. Each essay in this volume addresses some aspect or other of at least one of these core commitments. Must there be anything fundamental? Is reality hierarchically structured? Why should we be foundationalists? Is metaphysical infinitism possible? Is metaphysical coherentism possible? What does reality look like if we allow inconsistent fundamentalia? These are the sorts of pertinent questions seldom asked in the current literature, and exactly the kinds of questions addressed in this volume. The volume, then, aims to open up a much broader perspective on metaphysical dependence than currently exists, and point to ways of exploring new avenues of thought on the subject.Less
This volume brings together fourteen essays from leading and emerging scholars that address issues relating to the view that has come to be known as metaphysical foundationalism, and explore possibilities regarding its alternatives. According to the foundationalist, reality is hierarchically arranged with chains of entities ordered by metaphysical dependence relations that terminate in a fundamental ground populated by consistent and contingent entities. Each essay in this volume addresses some aspect or other of at least one of these core commitments. Must there be anything fundamental? Is reality hierarchically structured? Why should we be foundationalists? Is metaphysical infinitism possible? Is metaphysical coherentism possible? What does reality look like if we allow inconsistent fundamentalia? These are the sorts of pertinent questions seldom asked in the current literature, and exactly the kinds of questions addressed in this volume. The volume, then, aims to open up a much broader perspective on metaphysical dependence than currently exists, and point to ways of exploring new avenues of thought on the subject.
Alexander R. Pruss
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198810339
- eISBN:
- 9780191847325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198810339.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
The upshot of the preceding nine chapters is briefly summarized and discussed, offering a view of causal finitism as a via media between finitism and infinitism.
The upshot of the preceding nine chapters is briefly summarized and discussed, offering a view of causal finitism as a via media between finitism and infinitism.
Scott F. Aikin
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the various conditions that jointly constitute the relation of one subject knowing something better than another amount to a case for a non-skeptical form of epistemic ...
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This chapter argues that the various conditions that jointly constitute the relation of one subject knowing something better than another amount to a case for a non-skeptical form of epistemic infinitism.Less
This chapter argues that the various conditions that jointly constitute the relation of one subject knowing something better than another amount to a case for a non-skeptical form of epistemic infinitism.
Michael Bergmann
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
For years, Peter Klein has taken Aristotle’s regress argument for foundationalism as a point of departure for developing a view the chapter calls “infinitism”. This chapter offers a critique of ...
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For years, Peter Klein has taken Aristotle’s regress argument for foundationalism as a point of departure for developing a view the chapter calls “infinitism”. This chapter offers a critique of Klein’s view. The chapter argues for three main conclusions. First, Klein’s response to the regress argument for foundationalism is neither infinitism nor foundationalism but a distinct position that the chapter calls the “unjustified foundations” view. Second, Klein’s “unjustified foundations” view is subject to some serious problems that make it inferior to foundationalism. Third, Klein’s objections to foundationalism fail to knock it from its place of superiority over the “unjustified foundations” view.Less
For years, Peter Klein has taken Aristotle’s regress argument for foundationalism as a point of departure for developing a view the chapter calls “infinitism”. This chapter offers a critique of Klein’s view. The chapter argues for three main conclusions. First, Klein’s response to the regress argument for foundationalism is neither infinitism nor foundationalism but a distinct position that the chapter calls the “unjustified foundations” view. Second, Klein’s “unjustified foundations” view is subject to some serious problems that make it inferior to foundationalism. Third, Klein’s objections to foundationalism fail to knock it from its place of superiority over the “unjustified foundations” view.
Peter D. Klein
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
There is a rapprochement available between infinitism and foundationalism. An infinitist will hold: (a) that any belief is more fully doxastically justified when it is reason-enhanced and (b) that ...
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There is a rapprochement available between infinitism and foundationalism. An infinitist will hold: (a) that any belief is more fully doxastically justified when it is reason-enhanced and (b) that full doxastic justification is required for a belief to rise to the level of knowledge—the most highly prized form of true belief. The foundationalist will claim (c) that there are some epistemically privileged basic beliefs which do not require reasons in order to be doxastically justified. Those three claims might seem incompatible, but once it is recognized that what was taken for granted in one context requires reasons in another context, a rapprochement is possible because it can be seen that foundationalism is correct that there are some privileged basic beliefs and infinitism is correct that the privilege is only conditional.Less
There is a rapprochement available between infinitism and foundationalism. An infinitist will hold: (a) that any belief is more fully doxastically justified when it is reason-enhanced and (b) that full doxastic justification is required for a belief to rise to the level of knowledge—the most highly prized form of true belief. The foundationalist will claim (c) that there are some epistemically privileged basic beliefs which do not require reasons in order to be doxastically justified. Those three claims might seem incompatible, but once it is recognized that what was taken for granted in one context requires reasons in another context, a rapprochement is possible because it can be seen that foundationalism is correct that there are some privileged basic beliefs and infinitism is correct that the privilege is only conditional.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In order to compete well against foundationalism and coherentism, the more popular non-skeptical responses to the regress problem, infinitists need two things. They need accounts of both ...
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In order to compete well against foundationalism and coherentism, the more popular non-skeptical responses to the regress problem, infinitists need two things. They need accounts of both propositional and doxastic justification, where the difference between the two involves the idea of properly basing a belief for the latter. Focusing on the previous chapter’s account of the distinction, this chapter argues that infinitists have difficulties accounting for both propositional and doxastic justification.Less
In order to compete well against foundationalism and coherentism, the more popular non-skeptical responses to the regress problem, infinitists need two things. They need accounts of both propositional and doxastic justification, where the difference between the two involves the idea of properly basing a belief for the latter. Focusing on the previous chapter’s account of the distinction, this chapter argues that infinitists have difficulties accounting for both propositional and doxastic justification.
Ram Neta
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Infinitism is both a theory of epistemic justification and a solution to the regress problem. To specify the content of infinitism more precisely than this requires some stage-setting. Section I if ...
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Infinitism is both a theory of epistemic justification and a solution to the regress problem. To specify the content of infinitism more precisely than this requires some stage-setting. Section I if this chapter is devoted to that stage-setting, and to stating the content of infinitism more precisely. Section II gives a sympathetic rendering of Klein’s argument for infinitism. Section III rebuts what the chapter takes to be the most compelling objections to that argument, and shows how we need to interpret Klein in order to issue those rebuttals. In the concluding section, the chapter briefly sketches what seems to to be a more promising strategy for rebutting Klein’s argument.Less
Infinitism is both a theory of epistemic justification and a solution to the regress problem. To specify the content of infinitism more precisely than this requires some stage-setting. Section I if this chapter is devoted to that stage-setting, and to stating the content of infinitism more precisely. Section II gives a sympathetic rendering of Klein’s argument for infinitism. Section III rebuts what the chapter takes to be the most compelling objections to that argument, and shows how we need to interpret Klein in order to issue those rebuttals. In the concluding section, the chapter briefly sketches what seems to to be a more promising strategy for rebutting Klein’s argument.
Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
It has been argued that an infinite regress of entailments cannot justify a proposition, q. For if it could, then it can be shown that any proposition can be justified in that manner, incuding ¬q. ...
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It has been argued that an infinite regress of entailments cannot justify a proposition, q. For if it could, then it can be shown that any proposition can be justified in that manner, incuding ¬q. This chapter shows that this reductio ad absurdum weakens in the face of a so-called probabilistic regress, in which justification is only probabilistic. The reason is that, whereas a regress of entailments offers no entry point for the world, in the probabilistic regress the empirical thrust is carried by an infinite number of conditional probabilities. This chapter explains to what extent these conditional probabilities differ from the basic beliefs that lie at the heart of epistemic foundationalism.Less
It has been argued that an infinite regress of entailments cannot justify a proposition, q. For if it could, then it can be shown that any proposition can be justified in that manner, incuding ¬q. This chapter shows that this reductio ad absurdum weakens in the face of a so-called probabilistic regress, in which justification is only probabilistic. The reason is that, whereas a regress of entailments offers no entry point for the world, in the probabilistic regress the empirical thrust is carried by an infinite number of conditional probabilities. This chapter explains to what extent these conditional probabilities differ from the basic beliefs that lie at the heart of epistemic foundationalism.
Michael Rescorla
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The ...
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This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The chapter develops the analysis by comparing how dogmatism and infinitism handle the notorious regress of justifications. It distinguishes four different regress problems. In each case, it argues that that the relevant regress provides no support for infinitism over dogmatism.Less
This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The chapter develops the analysis by comparing how dogmatism and infinitism handle the notorious regress of justifications. It distinguishes four different regress problems. In each case, it argues that that the relevant regress provides no support for infinitism over dogmatism.
Ernest Sosa
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
After raising some problems for a specific form of infinitism, the chapter identifies a form of infinitism that seems quite defensible. It then argues that this sort of infinitism is compatible with ...
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After raising some problems for a specific form of infinitism, the chapter identifies a form of infinitism that seems quite defensible. It then argues that this sort of infinitism is compatible with a form of foundationalism. This foundationalism is, in turn, most attractive when supplemented by the resources of a bi-level virtue epistemology that acknowledges a potential infinite hierarchy of epistemic ascent.Less
After raising some problems for a specific form of infinitism, the chapter identifies a form of infinitism that seems quite defensible. It then argues that this sort of infinitism is compatible with a form of foundationalism. This foundationalism is, in turn, most attractive when supplemented by the resources of a bi-level virtue epistemology that acknowledges a potential infinite hierarchy of epistemic ascent.
John Turri
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199609598
- eISBN:
- 9780191779374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609598.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends the unpopular view that inference can create justification. The chapter calls this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who ...
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This chapter defends the unpopular view that inference can create justification. The chapter calls this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creationism.Less
This chapter defends the unpopular view that inference can create justification. The chapter calls this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creationism.
Bredo Johnsen
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190662776
- eISBN:
- 9780190662806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190662776.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Here the author discusses the relationship between Hume and foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, the three responses to Agrippa’s trilemma. What those theories share is the traditional, ...
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Here the author discusses the relationship between Hume and foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, the three responses to Agrippa’s trilemma. What those theories share is the traditional, commonsense and anti-Humean idea that our theories are justified to the extent that they are probable relative to the fact that they (or we) meet various conditions specified by those theories. The author goes on to discuss Ernest Sosa’s version of virtue theory, and Robert Nozick’s distinctive theory of knowledge. Finally, the author argues that the concept of knowledge is of no epistemological interest. The argument is a simplification and generalization of Gettier’s argument against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief.Less
Here the author discusses the relationship between Hume and foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, the three responses to Agrippa’s trilemma. What those theories share is the traditional, commonsense and anti-Humean idea that our theories are justified to the extent that they are probable relative to the fact that they (or we) meet various conditions specified by those theories. The author goes on to discuss Ernest Sosa’s version of virtue theory, and Robert Nozick’s distinctive theory of knowledge. Finally, the author argues that the concept of knowledge is of no epistemological interest. The argument is a simplification and generalization of Gettier’s argument against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief.
Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198755630
- eISBN:
- 9780191816772
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198755630.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The dominant view amongst contemporary analytic metaphysicians working on notions of metaphysical dependence and the overarching structure of reality is one according to which that reality is ...
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The dominant view amongst contemporary analytic metaphysicians working on notions of metaphysical dependence and the overarching structure of reality is one according to which that reality is hierarchically structured (the hierarchy thesis), well-founded (the fundamentality thesis), populated by merely contingent fundamentalia (the contingency thesis), and consistent (the consistency thesis). The introduction to this volume addresses the reasons commonly offered in defence of these theses and evaluates their merits. If it is correct that these are the core commitments of the metaphysical foundationalist, then it is proposed that the view is not nearly on such firm footing as one might suppose. The chapter also argues that the alternatives to this view—metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical coherentism—ought to be taken more seriously.Less
The dominant view amongst contemporary analytic metaphysicians working on notions of metaphysical dependence and the overarching structure of reality is one according to which that reality is hierarchically structured (the hierarchy thesis), well-founded (the fundamentality thesis), populated by merely contingent fundamentalia (the contingency thesis), and consistent (the consistency thesis). The introduction to this volume addresses the reasons commonly offered in defence of these theses and evaluates their merits. If it is correct that these are the core commitments of the metaphysical foundationalist, then it is proposed that the view is not nearly on such firm footing as one might suppose. The chapter also argues that the alternatives to this view—metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical coherentism—ought to be taken more seriously.
Tuomas E. Tahko
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198755630
- eISBN:
- 9780191816772
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198755630.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter, a generic definition of fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis is sought and its applicability examined. Many discussions of fundamentality are focused on a mereological ...
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In this chapter, a generic definition of fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis is sought and its applicability examined. Many discussions of fundamentality are focused on a mereological understanding of the hierarchical structure of reality, which may be combined with an atomistic, object-oriented metaphysics. But recent work in structuralism, for instance, calls for an alternative understanding and it is not immediately clear that the conception of fundamentality at work in structuralism is commensurable with the mereological conception. However, it is proposed that once we understand fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis, these two as well as further conceptions of fundamentality can all be treated on a par, including metaphysical infinitism of the ‘boring’ type, where the same structure repeats infinitely.Less
In this chapter, a generic definition of fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis is sought and its applicability examined. Many discussions of fundamentality are focused on a mereological understanding of the hierarchical structure of reality, which may be combined with an atomistic, object-oriented metaphysics. But recent work in structuralism, for instance, calls for an alternative understanding and it is not immediately clear that the conception of fundamentality at work in structuralism is commensurable with the mereological conception. However, it is proposed that once we understand fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis, these two as well as further conceptions of fundamentality can all be treated on a par, including metaphysical infinitism of the ‘boring’ type, where the same structure repeats infinitely.
Matteo Morganti
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198755630
- eISBN:
- 9780191816772
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198755630.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This paper explores alternatives to metaphysical foundationalism, the view that grounding relations determine vertical chains that terminate in something fundamental and ungrounded. Rather than ...
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This paper explores alternatives to metaphysical foundationalism, the view that grounding relations determine vertical chains that terminate in something fundamental and ungrounded. Rather than offering an exhaustive taxonomy or wide-ranging claims about metaphysical structure per se, the goal is to offer an initial investigation of non-conventional models of the metaphysical architecture of reality. Examples are provided with a view to illustrating that, and how, physics may avail itself of both ‘infinitist’ and ‘coherentist’ models—the former dropping the idea of a fundamental level, the latter abandoning the view that the world must have a hierarchical structure.Less
This paper explores alternatives to metaphysical foundationalism, the view that grounding relations determine vertical chains that terminate in something fundamental and ungrounded. Rather than offering an exhaustive taxonomy or wide-ranging claims about metaphysical structure per se, the goal is to offer an initial investigation of non-conventional models of the metaphysical architecture of reality. Examples are provided with a view to illustrating that, and how, physics may avail itself of both ‘infinitist’ and ‘coherentist’ models—the former dropping the idea of a fundamental level, the latter abandoning the view that the world must have a hierarchical structure.
