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Skepticism

Peter Klein

in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from ... More

In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can contribute to the discussion between one who claims that we can have knowledge about some epistemically interesting class of propositions and the Academic Skeptic. He outlines the background of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, pointing out that the Pyrrhonist withholds assent concerning our knowledge‐bearing status because reason cannot provide an adequate basis for assent. He assesses three possible patterns of reasoning (foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism), and concludes that the Pyrrhonist view, that reason cannot resolve matters concerning the nonevident, is vindicated.Less

Conclusions

Alexander R. Pruss

in Infinity, Causation, and Paradox

The upshot of the preceding nine chapters is briefly summarized and discussed, offering a view of causal finitism as a via media between finitism and infinitism.

Knowing Better, Cognitive Command, and Epistemic Infinitism

Scott F. Aikin

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

This chapter argues that the various conditions that jointly constitute the relation of one subject knowing something better than another amount to a case for a non-skeptical form of epistemic ... More

This chapter argues that the various conditions that jointly constitute the relation of one subject knowing something better than another amount to a case for a non-skeptical form of epistemic infinitism.Less

Klein and the Regress Argument

Michael Bergmann

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

For years, Peter Klein has taken Aristotle’s regress argument for foundationalism as a point of departure for developing a view the chapter calls “infinitism”. This chapter offers a critique of ... More

For years, Peter Klein has taken Aristotle’s regress argument for foundationalism as a point of departure for developing a view the chapter calls “infinitism”. This chapter offers a critique of Klein’s view. The chapter argues for three main conclusions. First, Klein’s response to the regress argument for foundationalism is neither infinitism nor foundationalism but a distinct position that the chapter calls the “unjustified foundations” view. Second, Klein’s “unjustified foundations” view is subject to some serious problems that make it inferior to foundationalism. Third, Klein’s objections to foundationalism fail to knock it from its place of superiority over the “unjustified foundations” view.Less

Reasons, Reasoning, and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Infinitism and Foundationalism1

Peter D. Klein

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

There is a rapprochement available between infinitism and foundationalism. An infinitist will hold: (a) that any belief is more fully doxastically justified when it is reason-enhanced and (b) that ... More

There is a rapprochement available between infinitism and foundationalism. An infinitist will hold: (a) that any belief is more fully doxastically justified when it is reason-enhanced and (b) that full doxastic justification is required for a belief to rise to the level of knowledge—the most highly prized form of true belief. The foundationalist will claim (c) that there are some epistemically privileged basic beliefs which do not require reasons in order to be doxastically justified. Those three claims might seem incompatible, but once it is recognized that what was taken for granted in one context requires reasons in another context, a rapprochement is possible because it can be seen that foundationalism is correct that there are some privileged basic beliefs and infinitism is correct that the privilege is only conditional.Less

Infinitist Justification and Proper Basing

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

In order to compete well against foundationalism and coherentism, the more popular non-skeptical responses to the regress problem, infinitists need two things. They need accounts of both ... More

In order to compete well against foundationalism and coherentism, the more popular non-skeptical responses to the regress problem, infinitists need two things. They need accounts of both propositional and doxastic justification, where the difference between the two involves the idea of properly basing a belief for the latter. Focusing on the previous chapter’s account of the distinction, this chapter argues that infinitists have difficulties accounting for both propositional and doxastic justification.Less

Klein’s Case for Infinitism

Ram Neta

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

Infinitism is both a theory of epistemic justification and a solution to the regress problem. To specify the content of infinitism more precisely than this requires some stage-setting. Section I if ... More

Infinitism is both a theory of epistemic justification and a solution to the regress problem. To specify the content of infinitism more precisely than this requires some stage-setting. Section I if this chapter is devoted to that stage-setting, and to stating the content of infinitism more precisely. Section II gives a sympathetic rendering of Klein’s argument for infinitism. Section III rebuts what the chapter takes to be the most compelling objections to that argument, and shows how we need to interpret Klein in order to issue those rebuttals. In the concluding section, the chapter briefly sketches what seems to to be a more promising strategy for rebutting Klein’s argument.Less

Can an Infinite Regress Justify Everything?

Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

It has been argued that an infinite regress of entailments cannot justify a proposition, q. For if it could, then it can be shown that any proposition can be justified in that manner, incuding ¬q. ... More

It has been argued that an infinite regress of entailments cannot justify a proposition, q. For if it could, then it can be shown that any proposition can be justified in that manner, incuding ¬q. This chapter shows that this reductio ad absurdum weakens in the face of a so-called probabilistic regress, in which justification is only probabilistic. The reason is that, whereas a regress of entailments offers no entry point for the world, in the probabilistic regress the empirical thrust is carried by an infinite number of conditional probabilities. This chapter explains to what extent these conditional probabilities differ from the basic beliefs that lie at the heart of epistemic foundationalism.Less

Can Perception Halt the Regress of Justifications?

Michael Rescorla

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The ... More

This chapter compares two approaches to perceptual justification: infinitism and dogmatism. It argues that dogmatism is superior and that infinitism mistakenly hyperintellectualizes justfication. The chapter develops the analysis by comparing how dogmatism and infinitism handle the notorious regress of justifications. It distinguishes four different regress problems. In each case, it argues that that the relevant regress provides no support for infinitism over dogmatism.Less

Infinitism

Ernest Sosa

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

After raising some problems for a specific form of infinitism, the chapter identifies a form of infinitism that seems quite defensible. It then argues that this sort of infinitism is compatible with ... More

After raising some problems for a specific form of infinitism, the chapter identifies a form of infinitism that seems quite defensible. It then argues that this sort of infinitism is compatible with a form of foundationalism. This foundationalism is, in turn, most attractive when supplemented by the resources of a bi-level virtue epistemology that acknowledges a potential infinite hierarchy of epistemic ascent.Less

Creative Reasoning

John Turri

in Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism

This chapter defends the unpopular view that inference can create justification. The chapter calls this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who ... More

This chapter defends the unpopular view that inference can create justification. The chapter calls this view inferential creationism. Inferential creationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creationism.Less

Infinitism about Cross-Domain Conflict

David Killoren

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14

Chapter 7 argues that if the overriding view is true, then infinitism about cross-domain conflict is true. The overriding view is the view that (i) there are multiple normative domains (including, ... More

Chapter 7 argues that if the overriding view is true, then infinitism about cross-domain conflict is true. The overriding view is the view that (i) there are multiple normative domains (including, e.g., the domains of morality and prudence), (ii) normative domains can come into conflict with one another, and (iii) in some such conflicts, an obligation belonging to one normative domain overrides an obligation belonging to another normative domain. Infinitism about cross-domain conflict contains two main claims. First claim: There is at least one case in which an agent has an obligation OA that belongs to domain DA, and an obligation OB that belongs to domain DB (where DA and DB are different domains), and OA overrides OB. Second claim: For every such case, there is an infinitely long chain of domains D1, D2, D3,…, such that D1 contains an obligation to act in line with the obligations of DA, and D2 contains an obligation to act in line with the obligations of D1, and D3 contains an obligation to act in line with the obligations of D2, and so on, indefinitely.Less

Inferential Justification

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

The ordinary distinction between being justified and being able to give a justification is described. Being able to give a justification requires metacognition; being justified doesn’t. Animals are ... More

The ordinary distinction between being justified and being able to give a justification is described. Being able to give a justification requires metacognition; being justified doesn’t. Animals are sometimes justified in what they believe; sometimes they’re not. A definition for justification is given by analyzing a justification j of a proposition p in terms of j providing a truth-conducive reason for p. Two forms of justification are revealed along the lines of how propositions are justified, an inferential form and a representational form. Infinitism, the suggestion that infinite chains of justifiers—both deductive and truth-enhancing—are cogent, is then explored. It’s shown both that infinitary chains of justifications can’t function as additional forms of justification and that they can’t be used as provisional justifications either.Less

Ontic Structuralism and Fundamentality

Matteo Morganti

in The Foundation of Reality: Fundamentality, Space, and Time

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is the view that (i) in spite of the discontinuities that characterise the historical development of science, we can be realist about something, i.e., the concrete ... More

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is the view that (i) in spite of the discontinuities that characterise the historical development of science, we can be realist about something, i.e., the concrete counterpart of certain theoretical structures that remain preserved across theory-change; and (ii) such structure is all there is in the actual world, at least at the fundamental level. It is thus a thesis about the fundamental—one whereby relations, not objects, are the basic building blocks of reality. However, there are in fact several dimensions to the structuralism-fundamentality link, and many alternative ways of cashing out the idea that reality is fundamentally structural. Arguably, these require a more systematic and detailed assessment than acknowledged in the literature so far. The chapter provides such an assessment based on considerations coming from both physics and analytic metaphysics, and concludes by pointing to a hitherto quite neglected theoretical option.Less

Mainstream Epistemology

Bredo Johnsen

in Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution

Here the author discusses the relationship between Hume and foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, the three responses to Agrippa’s trilemma. What those theories share is the traditional, ... More

Here the author discusses the relationship between Hume and foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, the three responses to Agrippa’s trilemma. What those theories share is the traditional, commonsense and anti-Humean idea that our theories are justified to the extent that they are probable relative to the fact that they (or we) meet various conditions specified by those theories. The author goes on to discuss Ernest Sosa’s version of virtue theory, and Robert Nozick’s distinctive theory of knowledge. Finally, the author argues that the concept of knowledge is of no epistemological interest. The argument is a simplification and generalization of Gettier’s argument against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief.Less

The Geography of Fundamentality: An Overview

Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest

in Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality

The dominant view amongst contemporary analytic metaphysicians working on notions of metaphysical dependence and the overarching structure of reality is one according to which that reality is ... More

The dominant view amongst contemporary analytic metaphysicians working on notions of metaphysical dependence and the overarching structure of reality is one according to which that reality is hierarchically structured (the hierarchy thesis), well-founded (the fundamentality thesis), populated by merely contingent fundamentalia (the contingency thesis), and consistent (the consistency thesis). The introduction to this volume addresses the reasons commonly offered in defence of these theses and evaluates their merits. If it is correct that these are the core commitments of the metaphysical foundationalist, then it is proposed that the view is not nearly on such firm footing as one might suppose. The chapter also argues that the alternatives to this view—metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical coherentism—ought to be taken more seriously.Less