Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter provides a short summary of Ch. 1–5.
This chapter provides a short summary of Ch. 1–5.
Miranda Fricker
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198237907
- eISBN:
- 9780191706844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on ...
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This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.Less
This chapter presents a diagnostic account of the state of play in the epistemology of testimony, and proposes a virtue epistemological non-inferentialist alternative. This account depends on arguments substantiating a parallel between the moral cognitivist account of virtuous perception, and a proposed account of epistemically virtuous perception that the virtuous hearer possesses owing to a well-trained testimonial sensibility. He perceives his interlocutor as more, or less, credible in what she is telling him.
Jason A. Springs
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195395044
- eISBN:
- 9780199866243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Discontinued
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395044.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that ...
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Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that it seeks understanding within a set of reasons afforded by God's revelatory activity in Scripture-incur charges of "revelational foundationalism." Chapter 6 employs recent treatments of epistemic foundationalism in order to dispel charges of "crypto-foundationalism" as well as answering the equally frequent charge that talk of "rationality intrinsic to faith" implicates Frei's thought in a type of fideism.Less
Frei's appeals to the "givenness" of revelation-the claim, for instance, that all doctrines or theological assertions are directly or indirectly grounded in faith, or that faith is rational in that it seeks understanding within a set of reasons afforded by God's revelatory activity in Scripture-incur charges of "revelational foundationalism." Chapter 6 employs recent treatments of epistemic foundationalism in order to dispel charges of "crypto-foundationalism" as well as answering the equally frequent charge that talk of "rationality intrinsic to faith" implicates Frei's thought in a type of fideism.
Matthew Chrisman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199653492
- eISBN:
- 9780191741661
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653492.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Discussions about the meaning of the word “ought” are pulled in two apparently competing directions. First, in ethical theory this word is used in the paradigmatic statement of ethical principles and ...
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Discussions about the meaning of the word “ought” are pulled in two apparently competing directions. First, in ethical theory this word is used in the paradigmatic statement of ethical principles and conclusions about what some agent is obligated to do. This leads some ethical theorists to claim that the word “ought” describes a real relation, roughly, of being obligated to (realism) or expresses some non-cognitive attitude toward agents acting in certain ways (expressivism). Second, in theoretical linguistics this word is classified as a modal auxiliary verb alongside words like “might,” “may,” “can,” “must,” etc. This leads some theoretical linguists to claim that the word “ought” is a weak necessity modal, which can be modeled with universal quantification over a restricted set of possible worlds. This chapter seeks some resolution of this tension by showing how versions of realism and expressivism can be modified in light of the best semantics of “ought” as a weak necessity modal. In addition, the chapter explains how this semantics might point to a third view—inferentialism—that accounts for the meaning of “ought” not in terms of what relation it describes, nor in terms of what attitude it expresses, but rather in terms of its inferential role.Less
Discussions about the meaning of the word “ought” are pulled in two apparently competing directions. First, in ethical theory this word is used in the paradigmatic statement of ethical principles and conclusions about what some agent is obligated to do. This leads some ethical theorists to claim that the word “ought” describes a real relation, roughly, of being obligated to (realism) or expresses some non-cognitive attitude toward agents acting in certain ways (expressivism). Second, in theoretical linguistics this word is classified as a modal auxiliary verb alongside words like “might,” “may,” “can,” “must,” etc. This leads some theoretical linguists to claim that the word “ought” is a weak necessity modal, which can be modeled with universal quantification over a restricted set of possible worlds. This chapter seeks some resolution of this tension by showing how versions of realism and expressivism can be modified in light of the best semantics of “ought” as a weak necessity modal. In addition, the chapter explains how this semantics might point to a third view—inferentialism—that accounts for the meaning of “ought” not in terms of what relation it describes, nor in terms of what attitude it expresses, but rather in terms of its inferential role.
Matthew Chrisman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577477
- eISBN:
- 9780191595189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Recent philosophical debate about the meaning of knowledge claims has largely centred on the question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The default assumption ...
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Recent philosophical debate about the meaning of knowledge claims has largely centred on the question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The default assumption has been that sentences that attribute knowledge or justification (or whatever else is epistemic) have stable truth-conditions across different contexts of utterance, once any non-epistemic context sensitivity has been fixed. The contrary view is the contextualist view that such sentences do not have stable truth-conditions but can vary depending on the context of utterance. This debate manifestly presupposes that the meta-epistemological issue of accounting for the meaning of epistemic claims is to be settled by determining the truth-conditions of these claims. This chapter believes that this presupposition is undermotivated in light of two observations. First, many epistemologists see epistemic claims as evaluative or normative, in some sense. Second, in the meta-ethical debate most philosophers take alternatives to truth-conditional semantics, such as expressivism, as live options when it comes to evaluative or normative claims. As it turns out, the chapter proposes that expressivism doesn't provide a plausible account of normative concepts across the board. But considering it as an alternative in the meta-epistemological debate points the way to another alternative to truth-conditional semantics. This is a form of inferentialism. This chapter tries to motivate a move to epistemic inferentialism by showing how it overcomes worries about expressivism and interacts with plausible ideas about the social function epistemic claims play in our commerce with one another and the word.Less
Recent philosophical debate about the meaning of knowledge claims has largely centred on the question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The default assumption has been that sentences that attribute knowledge or justification (or whatever else is epistemic) have stable truth-conditions across different contexts of utterance, once any non-epistemic context sensitivity has been fixed. The contrary view is the contextualist view that such sentences do not have stable truth-conditions but can vary depending on the context of utterance. This debate manifestly presupposes that the meta-epistemological issue of accounting for the meaning of epistemic claims is to be settled by determining the truth-conditions of these claims. This chapter believes that this presupposition is undermotivated in light of two observations. First, many epistemologists see epistemic claims as evaluative or normative, in some sense. Second, in the meta-ethical debate most philosophers take alternatives to truth-conditional semantics, such as expressivism, as live options when it comes to evaluative or normative claims. As it turns out, the chapter proposes that expressivism doesn't provide a plausible account of normative concepts across the board. But considering it as an alternative in the meta-epistemological debate points the way to another alternative to truth-conditional semantics. This is a form of inferentialism. This chapter tries to motivate a move to epistemic inferentialism by showing how it overcomes worries about expressivism and interacts with plausible ideas about the social function epistemic claims play in our commerce with one another and the word.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Discusses Robert Brandom's and John Haugeland's proposals on how to make space for the possibility of objectivity, i.e. for the possibility of community‐wide error and ignorance. It is argued that ...
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Discusses Robert Brandom's and John Haugeland's proposals on how to make space for the possibility of objectivity, i.e. for the possibility of community‐wide error and ignorance. It is argued that both proposals fail. Brandom overlooks that the ’non‐perspectival‐ness’ of objects is itself a relative and perspectival matter. Haugeland's suggestion fails because his notion of incompatibility is ambiguous and individualistic.Less
Discusses Robert Brandom's and John Haugeland's proposals on how to make space for the possibility of objectivity, i.e. for the possibility of community‐wide error and ignorance. It is argued that both proposals fail. Brandom overlooks that the ’non‐perspectival‐ness’ of objects is itself a relative and perspectival matter. Haugeland's suggestion fails because his notion of incompatibility is ambiguous and individualistic.
Martin Kusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199251223
- eISBN:
- 9780191601767
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251223.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Reviews the debate between Elizabeth Fricker and Tony Coady over the role of inferences in testimony reception. It distinguishes between four areas of disagreement in the debate: phenomenology, ...
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Reviews the debate between Elizabeth Fricker and Tony Coady over the role of inferences in testimony reception. It distinguishes between four areas of disagreement in the debate: phenomenology, psychology (the question regarding conscious and unconscious mechanisms), normative epistemology, and pragmatics (how do we talk about, and justify, the adoption of testimonial beliefs?). Argues against inferentialism, but it also identifies problems shared by Fricker and Coady: the assumption that testimony reception has a phenomenology, and the assumption that one can give context‐independent rules for the evaluation of testimony.Less
Reviews the debate between Elizabeth Fricker and Tony Coady over the role of inferences in testimony reception. It distinguishes between four areas of disagreement in the debate: phenomenology, psychology (the question regarding conscious and unconscious mechanisms), normative epistemology, and pragmatics (how do we talk about, and justify, the adoption of testimonial beliefs?). Argues against inferentialism, but it also identifies problems shared by Fricker and Coady: the assumption that testimony reception has a phenomenology, and the assumption that one can give context‐independent rules for the evaluation of testimony.
Stewart Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199696529
- eISBN:
- 9780191784866
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696529.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book challenges a longstanding view that logic is absolutely general, and topic neutral, by developing several ways in which one can be a pluralist or relativist about logic. One of these is an ...
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This book challenges a longstanding view that logic is absolutely general, and topic neutral, by developing several ways in which one can be a pluralist or relativist about logic. One of these is an extended argument that words and phrases like “valid” and “logical consequence” are polysemous or, perhaps better, are cluster concepts. The notions can be sharpened in various ways. This explains away some raging “debates” in the literature, such as that between inferentialists and advocates of a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach, and between advocates of higher-order logic and those who limit logic to first-order. This book then shows how different logics are appropriate for different mathematical theories. This immediately raises central questions concerning meaning, both of words and phrases like “valid” and “implies” and of the logical terminology itself, words like “or” and “not,” as they are used in rigorous mathematical deduction. Do those words have the same meaning, in different theories with different logics, or does the meaning shift from theory to theory? This book proposes that this question of meaning shift is itself context-sensitive; it depends on what is salient in a conversation comparing the theories. The result is a kind of contextualism concerning logic. This book also deals with questions concerning the logic of both formal and philosophical foundational studies, especially when the various theories under study do not have the same logic.Less
This book challenges a longstanding view that logic is absolutely general, and topic neutral, by developing several ways in which one can be a pluralist or relativist about logic. One of these is an extended argument that words and phrases like “valid” and “logical consequence” are polysemous or, perhaps better, are cluster concepts. The notions can be sharpened in various ways. This explains away some raging “debates” in the literature, such as that between inferentialists and advocates of a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach, and between advocates of higher-order logic and those who limit logic to first-order. This book then shows how different logics are appropriate for different mathematical theories. This immediately raises central questions concerning meaning, both of words and phrases like “valid” and “implies” and of the logical terminology itself, words like “or” and “not,” as they are used in rigorous mathematical deduction. Do those words have the same meaning, in different theories with different logics, or does the meaning shift from theory to theory? This book proposes that this question of meaning shift is itself context-sensitive; it depends on what is salient in a conversation comparing the theories. The result is a kind of contextualism concerning logic. This book also deals with questions concerning the logic of both formal and philosophical foundational studies, especially when the various theories under study do not have the same logic.
Dean Moyar
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- February 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197532539
- eISBN:
- 9780197532621
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197532539.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
It has long been recognized that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right offers the only systematic alternative to the dominant social contract tradition in modern political philosophy. The difficulty has been ...
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It has long been recognized that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right offers the only systematic alternative to the dominant social contract tradition in modern political philosophy. The difficulty has been to characterize Hegel’s view of justice as having the same kind of intuitive appeal that has made social contract theory, with its voluntary consent and assignment of rights and privileges, such an attractive model. Hegel’s Value argues that Hegelian justice depends on a proper understanding of Hegel’s theory of value and on the model of life through which the overall conception of value, the Good, is operationalized. Through an examination of key episodes in Phenomenology of Spirit and a detailed reading of the entire Philosophy of Right, Hegel’s Value shows how Hegel develops his account of justice through an inferentialist method whereby the content of right unfolds into increasingly thick normative structures. The theory of value that Hegel develops in tandem with the account of right relies on a productive unity of self-consciousness and life, of pure thinking and the natural drives. The book argues that Hegel’s expressive account of the free will enables him to theorize rights not simply as abstract claims, but rather as realizations of value in social contexts of mutual recognition. Hegel’s account of justice is a living system of institutions centered on a close relation of the economic and political spheres and on an understanding of the law as developing through practices of public reason.Less
It has long been recognized that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right offers the only systematic alternative to the dominant social contract tradition in modern political philosophy. The difficulty has been to characterize Hegel’s view of justice as having the same kind of intuitive appeal that has made social contract theory, with its voluntary consent and assignment of rights and privileges, such an attractive model. Hegel’s Value argues that Hegelian justice depends on a proper understanding of Hegel’s theory of value and on the model of life through which the overall conception of value, the Good, is operationalized. Through an examination of key episodes in Phenomenology of Spirit and a detailed reading of the entire Philosophy of Right, Hegel’s Value shows how Hegel develops his account of justice through an inferentialist method whereby the content of right unfolds into increasingly thick normative structures. The theory of value that Hegel develops in tandem with the account of right relies on a productive unity of self-consciousness and life, of pure thinking and the natural drives. The book argues that Hegel’s expressive account of the free will enables him to theorize rights not simply as abstract claims, but rather as realizations of value in social contexts of mutual recognition. Hegel’s account of justice is a living system of institutions centered on a close relation of the economic and political spheres and on an understanding of the law as developing through practices of public reason.
Luciano Floridi
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199232383
- eISBN:
- 9780191594809
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232383.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The chapter applies the informational analysis of knowledge in order to pursue three goals. The first is to introduce the ‘knowledge game’, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some ...
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The chapter applies the informational analysis of knowledge in order to pursue three goals. The first is to introduce the ‘knowledge game’, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske's question ‘how do you know you are not a zombie?’. At the end of the chapter one should have a better view of which agents count as conscious informational organisms (inforgs), that is, the sort of inforgs that can intentionally process relevant semantic information.Less
The chapter applies the informational analysis of knowledge in order to pursue three goals. The first is to introduce the ‘knowledge game’, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske's question ‘how do you know you are not a zombie?’. At the end of the chapter one should have a better view of which agents count as conscious informational organisms (inforgs), that is, the sort of inforgs that can intentionally process relevant semantic information.
Paul Boghossian and Timothy Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198851707
- eISBN:
- 9780191886317
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198851707.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. Its subject matter is the nature and scope of reason. A central ...
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The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. Its subject matter is the nature and scope of reason. A central case at issue is basic logical knowledge, and the justification for basic deductive inferences, but the arguments range far more widely, at stake the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, and between a priori and a posteriori. The discussion naturally involves problems about the conditions for linguistic understanding and competence, and what it might be to grasp a concept or to have an intuition. Since reason is central to philosophical method, there are associated implications for how philosophy itself works, or should work. In particular, the discussion raises fundamental concerns about how to approach epistemology.Less
The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. Its subject matter is the nature and scope of reason. A central case at issue is basic logical knowledge, and the justification for basic deductive inferences, but the arguments range far more widely, at stake the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, and between a priori and a posteriori. The discussion naturally involves problems about the conditions for linguistic understanding and competence, and what it might be to grasp a concept or to have an intuition. Since reason is central to philosophical method, there are associated implications for how philosophy itself works, or should work. In particular, the discussion raises fundamental concerns about how to approach epistemology.
Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199657575
- eISBN:
- 9780191793110
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657575.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Rationalism about self-knowledge, of the kind elaborated and defended by writers such as Moran and Boyle, is an account of self-knowledge for an ideally rational homo philosophicus rather than for ...
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Rationalism about self-knowledge, of the kind elaborated and defended by writers such as Moran and Boyle, is an account of self-knowledge for an ideally rational homo philosophicus rather than for homo sapiens. Fast thinking, belief-perseverance, attitude-recalcitrance, and self-ignorance are all respects in which human beings are not homo philosophicus. Rationalism says that what my beliefs and other attitudes are can be determined by reflecting on what they ought rationally to be. This Transparency Method for acquiring self-knowledge is of limited value, and substitutes a harder question for a much easier one. This book defends a form of inferentialism about self-knowledge. Inferences from behavioural and psychological evidence are a basic source of self-knowledge for humans, including substantial self-knowledge and knowledge of our own beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. On this account, the supposed asymmetry between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others is a difference in the kinds of evidence available in the two cases. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge are criticized for neglecting substantial self-knowledge and focusing on relatively trivial self-knowledge. Knowledge of our own character, values, and emotions are all explained in inferentialist terms. Inner sense approaches to self-knowledge are rejected, and an account is given of the scope and sources of self-ignorance. The value of self-knowledge is explained in practical or pragmatic terms, by reference to its contribution to well-being, rather than by reference to ideals such as authenticity and unity.Less
Rationalism about self-knowledge, of the kind elaborated and defended by writers such as Moran and Boyle, is an account of self-knowledge for an ideally rational homo philosophicus rather than for homo sapiens. Fast thinking, belief-perseverance, attitude-recalcitrance, and self-ignorance are all respects in which human beings are not homo philosophicus. Rationalism says that what my beliefs and other attitudes are can be determined by reflecting on what they ought rationally to be. This Transparency Method for acquiring self-knowledge is of limited value, and substitutes a harder question for a much easier one. This book defends a form of inferentialism about self-knowledge. Inferences from behavioural and psychological evidence are a basic source of self-knowledge for humans, including substantial self-knowledge and knowledge of our own beliefs, desires, and other attitudes. On this account, the supposed asymmetry between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others is a difference in the kinds of evidence available in the two cases. Philosophical accounts of self-knowledge are criticized for neglecting substantial self-knowledge and focusing on relatively trivial self-knowledge. Knowledge of our own character, values, and emotions are all explained in inferentialist terms. Inner sense approaches to self-knowledge are rejected, and an account is given of the scope and sources of self-ignorance. The value of self-knowledge is explained in practical or pragmatic terms, by reference to its contribution to well-being, rather than by reference to ideals such as authenticity and unity.
Matthew Chrisman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199363001
- eISBN:
- 9780199363025
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199363001.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The word ‘ought’ is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. This book develops a careful account of the semantics of ‘ought’ as a modal operator and uses this to motivate a ...
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The word ‘ought’ is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. This book develops a careful account of the semantics of ‘ought’ as a modal operator and uses this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. Traditionally, theories that treat normative statements as descriptions of how reality might be have claimed the advantage of continuity with truth-conditional approaches to semantics; and theories that treat normative statements as expressions of nonbelief attitudes have claimed the advantage of explaining their distinctive evaluative and motivational character. The inferentialist theory defended in this book agrees with descriptivist theories in metaethics that specifying the truth conditions of normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of their meaning. However, it is argued (based on the comparison to semantics for modal operators) that this doesn’t settle the question of whether ought-statements describe reality. Moreover, the inferentialist theory defended in this book also agrees with expressivist theories that normative statements have special evaluative potentials. However, it is argued that the standard Humean model of this kind of evaluation in terms of statements expressing desire-like pressures on action is too narrow. Accordingly, the traditional debate leaves unanswered important metasemantic questions about what it is in virtue of which ought-sentences have the meanings they have. The sort of inferentialism about ‘ought’ developed in this book is meant to provide a viable antidescriptivist but also antiexpressivist answer to these questions.Less
The word ‘ought’ is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. This book develops a careful account of the semantics of ‘ought’ as a modal operator and uses this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. Traditionally, theories that treat normative statements as descriptions of how reality might be have claimed the advantage of continuity with truth-conditional approaches to semantics; and theories that treat normative statements as expressions of nonbelief attitudes have claimed the advantage of explaining their distinctive evaluative and motivational character. The inferentialist theory defended in this book agrees with descriptivist theories in metaethics that specifying the truth conditions of normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of their meaning. However, it is argued (based on the comparison to semantics for modal operators) that this doesn’t settle the question of whether ought-statements describe reality. Moreover, the inferentialist theory defended in this book also agrees with expressivist theories that normative statements have special evaluative potentials. However, it is argued that the standard Humean model of this kind of evaluation in terms of statements expressing desire-like pressures on action is too narrow. Accordingly, the traditional debate leaves unanswered important metasemantic questions about what it is in virtue of which ought-sentences have the meanings they have. The sort of inferentialism about ‘ought’ developed in this book is meant to provide a viable antidescriptivist but also antiexpressivist answer to these questions.
Richard Healey
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198714057
- eISBN:
- 9780191782503
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198714057.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Quantum theory launched a revolution in twentieth-century physics. But we have yet to appreciate the revolution’s significance for philosophy. Most studies of the conceptual foundations of quantum ...
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Quantum theory launched a revolution in twentieth-century physics. But we have yet to appreciate the revolution’s significance for philosophy. Most studies of the conceptual foundations of quantum theory first try to interpret the theory—to say how the world could possibly be the way the theory says it is. But, though fundamental, quantum theory is enormously successful without describing the world in its own terms. When properly applied, models of quantum theory offer good advice on the significance and credibility of claims about the world expressed in other terms. This first of several philosophical lessons of the quantum revolution dissolves the quantum measurement problem. Pragmatist treatments of probability and causation show how quantum theory may be used to explain the non-localized correlations that have been thought to involve ‘spooky’ instantaneous action at a distance. Given environmental decoherence, a pragmatist inferentialist approach to content shows when talk of quantum probabilities is licensed, resolves any residual worries about whether a quantum measurement has a determinate outcome, and solves a dilemma about the ontology of a quantum field theory. This approach to meaning and reference also reveals the nature and limits of objective description in the light of quantum theory. While these pragmatist approaches to probability, causation, explanation, and content may be independently motivated by philosophical argument, their successful application here illustrates their practical importance in helping philosophers come to terms with the quantum revolution.Less
Quantum theory launched a revolution in twentieth-century physics. But we have yet to appreciate the revolution’s significance for philosophy. Most studies of the conceptual foundations of quantum theory first try to interpret the theory—to say how the world could possibly be the way the theory says it is. But, though fundamental, quantum theory is enormously successful without describing the world in its own terms. When properly applied, models of quantum theory offer good advice on the significance and credibility of claims about the world expressed in other terms. This first of several philosophical lessons of the quantum revolution dissolves the quantum measurement problem. Pragmatist treatments of probability and causation show how quantum theory may be used to explain the non-localized correlations that have been thought to involve ‘spooky’ instantaneous action at a distance. Given environmental decoherence, a pragmatist inferentialist approach to content shows when talk of quantum probabilities is licensed, resolves any residual worries about whether a quantum measurement has a determinate outcome, and solves a dilemma about the ontology of a quantum field theory. This approach to meaning and reference also reveals the nature and limits of objective description in the light of quantum theory. While these pragmatist approaches to probability, causation, explanation, and content may be independently motivated by philosophical argument, their successful application here illustrates their practical importance in helping philosophers come to terms with the quantum revolution.
Paul Boghossian and Timothy Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198851707
- eISBN:
- 9780191886317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the ...
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In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.Less
In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.
Jared Warren
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- December 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190086152
- eISBN:
- 9780190086183
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190086152.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter develops and defends an unrestricted inferentialist theory of the meanings of logical constants. Unlike restricted inferentialism, unrestricted inferentialism puts no constraints on ...
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This chapter develops and defends an unrestricted inferentialist theory of the meanings of logical constants. Unlike restricted inferentialism, unrestricted inferentialism puts no constraints on which rules can determine meanings. The foundations of inferentialism are also discussed, including various types of holism and the distinction between basic and derivative rules. In order to develop and defend a detailed inferentialist theory of logic, this chapter provides an inferentialist account of the “logical” constants, solves Carnap’s categoricity problem for the meanings of logical constants, and provides inferentialist approaches to both the psychology and metaphysics of logic. Finally, the chapter briefly discusses the challenge to unrestricted inferentialism posed by tonk and related types of bad company. Building on the foundation provided by Part I (chapters 1-2) of the book, this chapter provides a freestanding development and defense of logical inferentialism.Less
This chapter develops and defends an unrestricted inferentialist theory of the meanings of logical constants. Unlike restricted inferentialism, unrestricted inferentialism puts no constraints on which rules can determine meanings. The foundations of inferentialism are also discussed, including various types of holism and the distinction between basic and derivative rules. In order to develop and defend a detailed inferentialist theory of logic, this chapter provides an inferentialist account of the “logical” constants, solves Carnap’s categoricity problem for the meanings of logical constants, and provides inferentialist approaches to both the psychology and metaphysics of logic. Finally, the chapter briefly discusses the challenge to unrestricted inferentialism posed by tonk and related types of bad company. Building on the foundation provided by Part I (chapters 1-2) of the book, this chapter provides a freestanding development and defense of logical inferentialism.
Paul Boghossian and Timothy Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198851707
- eISBN:
- 9780191886317
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198851707.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter replies to Boghossian’s defence of the a priori–a posteriori distinction against the arguments for its shallowness in?The Philosophy of Philosophy. In particular, it shows how to ...
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This chapter replies to Boghossian’s defence of the a priori–a posteriori distinction against the arguments for its shallowness in?The Philosophy of Philosophy. In particular, it shows how to understand the example of an unorthodox thinker who is linguistically competent with conjunction but refuses to treat the rule of conjunction elimination as logically valid. It also rebuts Boghossian’s charge of circularity against the account of knowledge of metaphysical modality in terms of the cognitive capacities required to assess ordinary counterfactual conditionals. For the explanation of knowledge of logic and mathematics, the key significance is emphasized of the distinction between knowing the truth of what is in fact a necessary truth and knowing that it is necessary.Less
This chapter replies to Boghossian’s defence of the a priori–a posteriori distinction against the arguments for its shallowness in?The Philosophy of Philosophy. In particular, it shows how to understand the example of an unorthodox thinker who is linguistically competent with conjunction but refuses to treat the rule of conjunction elimination as logically valid. It also rebuts Boghossian’s charge of circularity against the account of knowledge of metaphysical modality in terms of the cognitive capacities required to assess ordinary counterfactual conditionals. For the explanation of knowledge of logic and mathematics, the key significance is emphasized of the distinction between knowing the truth of what is in fact a necessary truth and knowing that it is necessary.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- August 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780199278343
- eISBN:
- 9780191881442
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199278343.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Inferentialism is explained as an attempt to provide an account of meaning that is more sensitive (than the tradition of truth-conditional theorizing deriving from Tarski and Davidson) to what is ...
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Inferentialism is explained as an attempt to provide an account of meaning that is more sensitive (than the tradition of truth-conditional theorizing deriving from Tarski and Davidson) to what is learned when one masters meanings. The logically reformist inferentialism of Dummett and Prawitz is contrasted with the more recent quietist inferentialism of Brandom. Various other issues are highlighted for inferentialism in general, by reference to which different kinds of inferentialism can be characterized. Inferentialism for the logical operators is explained, with special reference to the Principle of Harmony. The statement of that principle in the author’s book Natural Logic is fine-tuned here in the way obviously required in order to bar an interesting would-be counterexample furnished by Crispin Wright, and to stave off any more of the same.Less
Inferentialism is explained as an attempt to provide an account of meaning that is more sensitive (than the tradition of truth-conditional theorizing deriving from Tarski and Davidson) to what is learned when one masters meanings. The logically reformist inferentialism of Dummett and Prawitz is contrasted with the more recent quietist inferentialism of Brandom. Various other issues are highlighted for inferentialism in general, by reference to which different kinds of inferentialism can be characterized. Inferentialism for the logical operators is explained, with special reference to the Principle of Harmony. The statement of that principle in the author’s book Natural Logic is fine-tuned here in the way obviously required in order to bar an interesting would-be counterexample furnished by Crispin Wright, and to stave off any more of the same.
Dean Moyar
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- February 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197532539
- eISBN:
- 9780197532621
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197532539.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The Introduction situates Hegel’s theory of justice in relation to the political moralism of ideal theory and the critical realism of those who hold that theories of morality and politics should be ...
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The Introduction situates Hegel’s theory of justice in relation to the political moralism of ideal theory and the critical realism of those who hold that theories of morality and politics should be sharply separated. The Introduction argues that the unification of morality and right in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right depends on an overlooked theory of value. The various forms of value in Hegel are listed and it is shown that they can be conceived as unified through his conception of purposiveness. Spelling out the rationality in the account as a version of inferentialism, the Introduction distinguishes Hegel’s teleological inferentialism from pragmatist inferentialism. It is shown how inferential rationality in the practical domain can underwrite a theory of justice through Hegel’s conception of the rationality of life. Finally, a Basic Argument is given as the template for the development of the content of right.Less
The Introduction situates Hegel’s theory of justice in relation to the political moralism of ideal theory and the critical realism of those who hold that theories of morality and politics should be sharply separated. The Introduction argues that the unification of morality and right in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right depends on an overlooked theory of value. The various forms of value in Hegel are listed and it is shown that they can be conceived as unified through his conception of purposiveness. Spelling out the rationality in the account as a version of inferentialism, the Introduction distinguishes Hegel’s teleological inferentialism from pragmatist inferentialism. It is shown how inferential rationality in the practical domain can underwrite a theory of justice through Hegel’s conception of the rationality of life. Finally, a Basic Argument is given as the template for the development of the content of right.
Stewart Shapiro
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199696529
- eISBN:
- 9780191784866
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696529.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a number of different ways in which one can be a folk-relativist or pluralist about logic. One is an extended argument that phrases like “validity” and ...
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The purpose of this chapter is to develop a number of different ways in which one can be a folk-relativist or pluralist about logic. One is an extended argument that phrases like “validity” and “logical consequence” are either polysemous or else they express cluster concepts. There are a number of distinct notions going by those names. This usefully explains away some of the ongoing debates in philosophical logic, such as that between inferentialists and advocates of a model-theoretic approach. A closely-related sort of pluralism arises from a perspective sometimes called “logic-as-model.” A third sort of pluralism emerges from an argument that logical consequence and validity are relative to a choice of logical terms. Another sort of pluralism concerns the possibility that the notion of logical consequence, or one of its articulations, is vague. On some accounts, vague expressions are relative to something, such as a sharpening or a conversational context.Less
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a number of different ways in which one can be a folk-relativist or pluralist about logic. One is an extended argument that phrases like “validity” and “logical consequence” are either polysemous or else they express cluster concepts. There are a number of distinct notions going by those names. This usefully explains away some of the ongoing debates in philosophical logic, such as that between inferentialists and advocates of a model-theoretic approach. A closely-related sort of pluralism arises from a perspective sometimes called “logic-as-model.” A third sort of pluralism emerges from an argument that logical consequence and validity are relative to a choice of logical terms. Another sort of pluralism concerns the possibility that the notion of logical consequence, or one of its articulations, is vague. On some accounts, vague expressions are relative to something, such as a sharpening or a conversational context.
