David H. Rakison and Jessica B. Cicchino
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195331059
- eISBN:
- 9780199864072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331059.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This chapter challenges the predominant “top-down” view of early inductive inference. According to this view, induction and categorization by infants as young as 9 to 11 months of age is based on ...
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This chapter challenges the predominant “top-down” view of early inductive inference. According to this view, induction and categorization by infants as young as 9 to 11 months of age is based on abstract knowledge about the properties of things that is acquired through specialized mechanisms, modules, or innate principles. This perspective is contested both on theoretical and empirical grounds. First, it is proposed that infants' concepts for objects and entities are generated via general rather than specific mechanisms. As a corollary of this view, it is argued that early knowledge about the properties of things in the world involves associative links between specific surface features and those properties, and that such representations are not in place until the middle or end of the second year of life. Second, it is argued that care must be taken in interpreting infants' behavior within the inductive generalization procedure. In particular, (1) infants' behavior in the task is not always driven by knowledge acquired prior to arriving at the laboratory; and (2) the basis for induction for any property must be studied before conclusions can be drawn about the nature and content of infants' concepts. In support of these views, data is provided from inductive generalization studies with 14- to 26-month-olds, which show that infants are influenced by the model exemplar used by the experimenter, and that perceptual features—such as legs and wheels— act as the basis for early induction for motion properties.Less
This chapter challenges the predominant “top-down” view of early inductive inference. According to this view, induction and categorization by infants as young as 9 to 11 months of age is based on abstract knowledge about the properties of things that is acquired through specialized mechanisms, modules, or innate principles. This perspective is contested both on theoretical and empirical grounds. First, it is proposed that infants' concepts for objects and entities are generated via general rather than specific mechanisms. As a corollary of this view, it is argued that early knowledge about the properties of things in the world involves associative links between specific surface features and those properties, and that such representations are not in place until the middle or end of the second year of life. Second, it is argued that care must be taken in interpreting infants' behavior within the inductive generalization procedure. In particular, (1) infants' behavior in the task is not always driven by knowledge acquired prior to arriving at the laboratory; and (2) the basis for induction for any property must be studied before conclusions can be drawn about the nature and content of infants' concepts. In support of these views, data is provided from inductive generalization studies with 14- to 26-month-olds, which show that infants are influenced by the model exemplar used by the experimenter, and that perceptual features—such as legs and wheels— act as the basis for early induction for motion properties.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter provides a discussion on the truth and the importance of the fallibilist consequence of Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It starts by addressing the independence of inductive ...
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This chapter provides a discussion on the truth and the importance of the fallibilist consequence of Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It starts by addressing the independence of inductive scepticism and inductive fallibilism. It also explains the currency and importance of inductive fallibilism. It seems at present as though inductive fallibilism has been absorbed into the thought of educated men for good. If this really is so, then there is indeed one sense in which inductive fallibilism has become, or is becoming, trivial: the sense in which any very general, simple, logico-philosophical truth, once perceived as true by all educated men, is trivial. Inductive fallibilism is needed as a standing reminder that even if predictive-inductive inferences are more conclusive than Hume's inductive scepticism says they are, still they are less conclusive.Less
This chapter provides a discussion on the truth and the importance of the fallibilist consequence of Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. It starts by addressing the independence of inductive scepticism and inductive fallibilism. It also explains the currency and importance of inductive fallibilism. It seems at present as though inductive fallibilism has been absorbed into the thought of educated men for good. If this really is so, then there is indeed one sense in which inductive fallibilism has become, or is becoming, trivial: the sense in which any very general, simple, logico-philosophical truth, once perceived as true by all educated men, is trivial. Inductive fallibilism is needed as a standing reminder that even if predictive-inductive inferences are more conclusive than Hume's inductive scepticism says they are, still they are less conclusive.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199270729
- eISBN:
- 9780191600944
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270724.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Argues that the same principles of complexity reduction that he used to explain principles of perceptual entitlement in the preceding chapter can be used to explain the principles of inductive ...
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Argues that the same principles of complexity reduction that he used to explain principles of perceptual entitlement in the preceding chapter can be used to explain the principles of inductive inference. When we have a sound, non‐conclusive inductive inference from a variety of Fs being G to the conclusion that all Fs are G, this holds because the easiest way for the evidence to hold is one that also makes it the case that all Fs are G. Clarifies and elaborates this thesis and traces out its consequences.Less
Argues that the same principles of complexity reduction that he used to explain principles of perceptual entitlement in the preceding chapter can be used to explain the principles of inductive inference. When we have a sound, non‐conclusive inductive inference from a variety of Fs being G to the conclusion that all Fs are G, this holds because the easiest way for the evidence to hold is one that also makes it the case that all Fs are G. Clarifies and elaborates this thesis and traces out its consequences.
Sandy Zabell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195137316
- eISBN:
- 9780199867912
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195137316.003.0044
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter describes the logic of inductive inference as seen through the eyes of the modern theory of personal probability, including a number of its recent refinements and extensions. The ...
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This chapter describes the logic of inductive inference as seen through the eyes of the modern theory of personal probability, including a number of its recent refinements and extensions. The structure of the chapter is as follows. After a brief discussion of mathematical probability, to establish notation and terminology, it recounts the gradual evolution of the probabilistic explication of induction from Bayes to the present. The focus is not in this history per se (fascinating as it is), but in its use to highlight the key assumptions, criticisms, refinements, and achievements of that theory. Along the way, the structure of the modern theory is presented, and its relation to the problem of induction discussed.Less
This chapter describes the logic of inductive inference as seen through the eyes of the modern theory of personal probability, including a number of its recent refinements and extensions. The structure of the chapter is as follows. After a brief discussion of mathematical probability, to establish notation and terminology, it recounts the gradual evolution of the probabilistic explication of induction from Bayes to the present. The focus is not in this history per se (fascinating as it is), but in its use to highlight the key assumptions, criticisms, refinements, and achievements of that theory. Along the way, the structure of the modern theory is presented, and its relation to the problem of induction discussed.
Isaac Levi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199698134
- eISBN:
- 9780191742323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698134.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
In 1865 and 1866, Peirce appealed to Aristotle’s proposal that an inductive inference be understood as a transformation of a categorical syllogism by permuting the major premise and the conclusion ...
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In 1865 and 1866, Peirce appealed to Aristotle’s proposal that an inductive inference be understood as a transformation of a categorical syllogism by permuting the major premise and the conclusion supported by a conversion of the minor premise to develop his own formal account of induction. He completed his theory by taking hypothetic inference to be the product of permuting the minor premise and the conclusion of the categorical syllogism. Peirce sought to extend the proposal beyond transformations of categorical syllogisms to cover reasoning where the major premise of the categorical syllogism is no longer a categorical proposition but is statistical. This chapter traces the adjustments Peirce made in his theory by the time he published “A Theory of Probable Inference” in 1883. “A Theory of Probable Inference” is rightly understood to contain an anticipation of the suggestion to replace inductive inference by inductive behavior found in the method of significance testing and confidence interval estimation proposed by Neyman and Pearson a half-century later. In 1883, Peirce continued, however, to classify hypothetic inference as a permutation of the premises of statistical syllogisms. In 1902, Peirce acknowledged that the account of hypothetic inference he had been proposing was confused. During this period, he replaced the term “hypothetic inference” by “abduction” and explicitly took the position that abduction has as its conclusion the introduction of a conjecture for testing rather than an inference to the best explanation.Less
In 1865 and 1866, Peirce appealed to Aristotle’s proposal that an inductive inference be understood as a transformation of a categorical syllogism by permuting the major premise and the conclusion supported by a conversion of the minor premise to develop his own formal account of induction. He completed his theory by taking hypothetic inference to be the product of permuting the minor premise and the conclusion of the categorical syllogism. Peirce sought to extend the proposal beyond transformations of categorical syllogisms to cover reasoning where the major premise of the categorical syllogism is no longer a categorical proposition but is statistical. This chapter traces the adjustments Peirce made in his theory by the time he published “A Theory of Probable Inference” in 1883. “A Theory of Probable Inference” is rightly understood to contain an anticipation of the suggestion to replace inductive inference by inductive behavior found in the method of significance testing and confidence interval estimation proposed by Neyman and Pearson a half-century later. In 1883, Peirce continued, however, to classify hypothetic inference as a permutation of the premises of statistical syllogisms. In 1902, Peirce acknowledged that the account of hypothetic inference he had been proposing was confused. During this period, he replaced the term “hypothetic inference” by “abduction” and explicitly took the position that abduction has as its conclusion the introduction of a conjecture for testing rather than an inference to the best explanation.
Colin Howson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250371
- eISBN:
- 9780191597749
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250371.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this ...
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This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this implies that however stringent the process of experimentation, the data supplied does not in itself support any one general hypothesis over another. There have been many attempts since Hume published this argument to show that it is mistaken, or that it itself begs the question. These attempts, which fall under the various headings of probabilism, reliabilism, deductivism, the No‐Miracles argument, and naturalism, are examined and are all found to be wanting. It is then argued that Hume's argument is sound, but that conceding this does not show that there are no valid inductive inferences. The final sections of the book are devoted to showing that there are such arguments, namely probabilistically valid arguments, whose premises are assignments of prior probability. Such arguments are clearly conditional, like those of deductive logic, their conclusions depending on the premises. Indeed, this book argues that the laws of probability are as authentically logical principles as those of deductive logic, mediating like them non‐ampliative inferences from premises to conclusion. Hume's position, that all inductive arguments depend on assumptions about the likely course of nature, is endorsed, since these assumptions can be identified with the prior probability assignments. Thus, though Hume was correct, there is nevertheless room for a genuine logic of inductive inference, supplied by the laws of probability.Less
This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this implies that however stringent the process of experimentation, the data supplied does not in itself support any one general hypothesis over another. There have been many attempts since Hume published this argument to show that it is mistaken, or that it itself begs the question. These attempts, which fall under the various headings of probabilism, reliabilism, deductivism, the No‐Miracles argument, and naturalism, are examined and are all found to be wanting. It is then argued that Hume's argument is sound, but that conceding this does not show that there are no valid inductive inferences. The final sections of the book are devoted to showing that there are such arguments, namely probabilistically valid arguments, whose premises are assignments of prior probability. Such arguments are clearly conditional, like those of deductive logic, their conclusions depending on the premises. Indeed, this book argues that the laws of probability are as authentically logical principles as those of deductive logic, mediating like them non‐ampliative inferences from premises to conclusion. Hume's position, that all inductive arguments depend on assumptions about the likely course of nature, is endorsed, since these assumptions can be identified with the prior probability assignments. Thus, though Hume was correct, there is nevertheless room for a genuine logic of inductive inference, supplied by the laws of probability.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable ...
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This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable premiss which is false. However, not all of the conclusions are hostile to Hume's argument. Its true premisses suffice to prove an important negative conclusion, though not a sceptical one, about inductive inferences. And what has historically been learnt from Hume's argument is of very great importance, even though it is partly opposite to what Hume intended to teach. The identification of this argument involves the identification of Hume's sceptical conclusion, as well as some of his premisses, as being statements of logical probability. Hume's scepticism about induction is quite interesting enough, even considered in itself, to justify the present inquiry.Less
This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable premiss which is false. However, not all of the conclusions are hostile to Hume's argument. Its true premisses suffice to prove an important negative conclusion, though not a sceptical one, about inductive inferences. And what has historically been learnt from Hume's argument is of very great importance, even though it is partly opposite to what Hume intended to teach. The identification of this argument involves the identification of Hume's sceptical conclusion, as well as some of his premisses, as being statements of logical probability. Hume's scepticism about induction is quite interesting enough, even considered in itself, to justify the present inquiry.
D.C. Stove
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole ...
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This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism.Less
This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter deals with the suppressed premisses of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. If there is anything about this argument of Hume which is more admirable than its content, it is ...
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This chapter deals with the suppressed premisses of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. If there is anything about this argument of Hume which is more admirable than its content, it is the explicitness of it. For the conclusion (j), then, Hume's argument has just three premisses: the two premisses he states, (e) and (f), and the unstated one just mentioned. The whole proposition stated reduces to this: that all predictive-inductive inferences are invalid, and that all the inferences, which result from supplementing the premisses of a predictive-inductive inference by further observational premisses, are also invalid. The essence of Hume's argument is explained. Hume's argument in stage 2 may be summed up in the following way: from premisses which prove at most the invalidity of predictive-inductive inferences, along with the unstated premiss that an inference is unreasonable if it is invalid, Hume concluded that predictive-inductive inferences are unreasonable.Less
This chapter deals with the suppressed premisses of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. If there is anything about this argument of Hume which is more admirable than its content, it is the explicitness of it. For the conclusion (j), then, Hume's argument has just three premisses: the two premisses he states, (e) and (f), and the unstated one just mentioned. The whole proposition stated reduces to this: that all predictive-inductive inferences are invalid, and that all the inferences, which result from supplementing the premisses of a predictive-inductive inference by further observational premisses, are also invalid. The essence of Hume's argument is explained. Hume's argument in stage 2 may be summed up in the following way: from premisses which prove at most the invalidity of predictive-inductive inferences, along with the unstated premiss that an inference is unreasonable if it is invalid, Hume concluded that predictive-inductive inferences are unreasonable.
Peter Lipton
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199256525
- eISBN:
- 9780191719707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256525.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Why, given the ancient pedigree of scepticism, did we have to wait until Hume for the problem of induction? This chapter begins by considering whether the problem in fact antedates Hume: there is ...
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Why, given the ancient pedigree of scepticism, did we have to wait until Hume for the problem of induction? This chapter begins by considering whether the problem in fact antedates Hume: there is earlier discussion of non-demonstrative reasoning, e.g., in Sextus and in Bacon, and there is, in various forms, sceptical concern about induction, but Hume's negative proof that there is no possible justification of induction, either demonstrative or non-demonstrative, is something new. After canvassing various unsatisfactory answers, the chapter offers its own, showing that Hume's philosophical orientation provided him with both the motive and the opportunity to generate his great sceptical argument: his naturalism provided the motive to construct a ‘method of doubt’ that would wean us from the picture of ourselves as creatures of reason and replace it with the picture of creatures governed by natural instincts, and his radical empiricism and atheism provided him with a way of revealing the pervasiveness of inductive inference, from which his argument naturally follows.Less
Why, given the ancient pedigree of scepticism, did we have to wait until Hume for the problem of induction? This chapter begins by considering whether the problem in fact antedates Hume: there is earlier discussion of non-demonstrative reasoning, e.g., in Sextus and in Bacon, and there is, in various forms, sceptical concern about induction, but Hume's negative proof that there is no possible justification of induction, either demonstrative or non-demonstrative, is something new. After canvassing various unsatisfactory answers, the chapter offers its own, showing that Hume's philosophical orientation provided him with both the motive and the opportunity to generate his great sceptical argument: his naturalism provided the motive to construct a ‘method of doubt’ that would wean us from the picture of ourselves as creatures of reason and replace it with the picture of creatures governed by natural instincts, and his radical empiricism and atheism provided him with a way of revealing the pervasiveness of inductive inference, from which his argument naturally follows.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter discusses the statements of logical probability. It first introduces the principles and statements of probability. The relation which exists between statements, and the principles, of ...
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This chapter discusses the statements of logical probability. It first introduces the principles and statements of probability. The relation which exists between statements, and the principles, of probability can best be made clear by an analogy with two kinds of propositions in geometry. There are two different senses of ‘probability’, a factual one and a logical one. These two probabilities are described here. In addition, the chapter outlines the kinds of statements of logical probability. The statements of logical probability which generally receive most attention from writers on probability are the ‘numerical equalities’. Moreover, the greater and less generality among statements of logical probability is shown. Furthermore, the chapter deals with the commonness of statements of logical probability, ‘initial’ logical probabilities and ‘regularity’, and the non-factual character of statements of logical probability. It also considers the logical probability and inductive inference.Less
This chapter discusses the statements of logical probability. It first introduces the principles and statements of probability. The relation which exists between statements, and the principles, of probability can best be made clear by an analogy with two kinds of propositions in geometry. There are two different senses of ‘probability’, a factual one and a logical one. These two probabilities are described here. In addition, the chapter outlines the kinds of statements of logical probability. The statements of logical probability which generally receive most attention from writers on probability are the ‘numerical equalities’. Moreover, the greater and less generality among statements of logical probability is shown. Furthermore, the chapter deals with the commonness of statements of logical probability, ‘initial’ logical probabilities and ‘regularity’, and the non-factual character of statements of logical probability. It also considers the logical probability and inductive inference.
Kumaraswamy Velupillai
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295273
- eISBN:
- 9780191596988
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295278.003.0005
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
A theory of induction, based on the formalism of algorithmic complexity theory, is introduced in this chapter. This is then used to underpin a theory of learning and a computable basis for inductive ...
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A theory of induction, based on the formalism of algorithmic complexity theory, is introduced in this chapter. This is then used to underpin a theory of learning and a computable basis for inductive inference. The historical and philosophical backdrops against which these theories developed are also given, albeit concisely.Less
A theory of induction, based on the formalism of algorithmic complexity theory, is introduced in this chapter. This is then used to underpin a theory of learning and a computable basis for inductive inference. The historical and philosophical backdrops against which these theories developed are also given, albeit concisely.
Keith Lehrer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248507
- eISBN:
- 9780191681141
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Induction proceeds from the certain to the uncertain, or so it is commonplace to say. On the contrary, induction is inference from uncertain evidence to uncertain conclusions. This conception of ...
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Induction proceeds from the certain to the uncertain, or so it is commonplace to say. On the contrary, induction is inference from uncertain evidence to uncertain conclusions. This conception of induction is articulated in this chapter. Philosophers have argued that the acceptance of statements in science and other epistemically virtuous enterprises should not be explicated as inductive inference from evidence to hypothesis. It would be misleading to construe the acceptance of theories based on inductive inference from observational evidence to theoretical conclusions. These and other contentions suggest the most fundamental reason philosophers have for rejecting the model of scientific acceptance based on inductive inference: that rejection and acceptance is influenced by conceptual change, by radical shifts in the way people conceive of the world rather than being based simply upon inference from evidence to hypothesis.Less
Induction proceeds from the certain to the uncertain, or so it is commonplace to say. On the contrary, induction is inference from uncertain evidence to uncertain conclusions. This conception of induction is articulated in this chapter. Philosophers have argued that the acceptance of statements in science and other epistemically virtuous enterprises should not be explicated as inductive inference from evidence to hypothesis. It would be misleading to construe the acceptance of theories based on inductive inference from observational evidence to theoretical conclusions. These and other contentions suggest the most fundamental reason philosophers have for rejecting the model of scientific acceptance based on inductive inference: that rejection and acceptance is influenced by conceptual change, by radical shifts in the way people conceive of the world rather than being based simply upon inference from evidence to hypothesis.
Keith Lehrer
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198248507
- eISBN:
- 9780191681141
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198248507.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter presents a theory of inductive inference and rational acceptance in scientific enquiry. A concept of relevant deduction is defined as a concept in which the truth of each and every ...
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This chapter presents a theory of inductive inference and rational acceptance in scientific enquiry. A concept of relevant deduction is defined as a concept in which the truth of each and every premise of a deductive argument is essential to establishing the truth of the conclusion by deduction from the premises. This definition is based on the completely abstact notion of a minimally inconsistent sets of statements. In terms of this same abstract logical concept and the relation of probability, this chapter designs a concept of inductive inference that is a principle of rationality. This concept of inductive reference is shown to form the basis of a principle of acceptance in which two important epistemic utilities are maximised.Less
This chapter presents a theory of inductive inference and rational acceptance in scientific enquiry. A concept of relevant deduction is defined as a concept in which the truth of each and every premise of a deductive argument is essential to establishing the truth of the conclusion by deduction from the premises. This definition is based on the completely abstact notion of a minimally inconsistent sets of statements. In terms of this same abstract logical concept and the relation of probability, this chapter designs a concept of inductive inference that is a principle of rationality. This concept of inductive reference is shown to form the basis of a principle of acceptance in which two important epistemic utilities are maximised.
Colin Howson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250371
- eISBN:
- 9780191597749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250371.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is presented, and some ‘quick’ rejoinders to it are considered. Two of the most popular are (1) that it begs the question that only deductive arguments are ...
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Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is presented, and some ‘quick’ rejoinders to it are considered. Two of the most popular are (1) that it begs the question that only deductive arguments are valid, and omits consideration of probabilistic arguments, and (2) that inductive reasoning is partly constitutive of what we mean by valid inference, and so needs no independent justification. Both these rejoinders are rejected (1) because an examination of Hume's text clearly shows that he was talking about any sort of putatively sound argumentation, including probabilistic arguments; and (2) because it misses the point, which is to show why we can reliably expect the course of nature to continue in the way predicted on the basis of past evidence.Less
Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is presented, and some ‘quick’ rejoinders to it are considered. Two of the most popular are (1) that it begs the question that only deductive arguments are valid, and omits consideration of probabilistic arguments, and (2) that inductive reasoning is partly constitutive of what we mean by valid inference, and so needs no independent justification. Both these rejoinders are rejected (1) because an examination of Hume's text clearly shows that he was talking about any sort of putatively sound argumentation, including probabilistic arguments; and (2) because it misses the point, which is to show why we can reliably expect the course of nature to continue in the way predicted on the basis of past evidence.
Colin Howson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250371
- eISBN:
- 9780191597749
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250371.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Considers the popular doctrine of reliabilism, the thesis that distinguishing between internal and external guarantees of reliability dissolves Hume's problem, since there may well be an external ...
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Considers the popular doctrine of reliabilism, the thesis that distinguishing between internal and external guarantees of reliability dissolves Hume's problem, since there may well be an external guarantee, in the way the world actually is, of the reliability of standard inductive practice. Indeed, we have good evidence that the world is so constituted to favour these practices. Furthermore, regarding the past predictive success of inductive inferences as good evidence of the reliability of the procedure of inductive inference itself is no less circular than using deductive arguments to justify deductive inference. These claims are examined and rejected.Less
Considers the popular doctrine of reliabilism, the thesis that distinguishing between internal and external guarantees of reliability dissolves Hume's problem, since there may well be an external guarantee, in the way the world actually is, of the reliability of standard inductive practice. Indeed, we have good evidence that the world is so constituted to favour these practices. Furthermore, regarding the past predictive success of inductive inferences as good evidence of the reliability of the procedure of inductive inference itself is no less circular than using deductive arguments to justify deductive inference. These claims are examined and rejected.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
In this book refutations have been offered both of David Hume's conclusion about induction and of one of the premisses from which he inferred that conclusion. By their extreme simplicity, as well as ...
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In this book refutations have been offered both of David Hume's conclusion about induction and of one of the premisses from which he inferred that conclusion. By their extreme simplicity, as well as some of their other features, these attempted refutations are likely to excite a suspicion that in this book, too, Hume has been ‘refuted’ only after the manner of Diogenes and Dr. Johnson. If Hume's inductive scepticism were a proposition about the relative frequency with which inductive inferences from true premisses have true conclusions, then no proof of a statement of logical probability could be equal to the task of refuting it. The critic of Hume incurs special opprobrium, mixed with condescension, if he proposes to draw those non-factual premisses from the theory of logical probability in particular. It may also be useful to draw attention again to the limitedness of what is aimed at in the critical part of this book.Less
In this book refutations have been offered both of David Hume's conclusion about induction and of one of the premisses from which he inferred that conclusion. By their extreme simplicity, as well as some of their other features, these attempted refutations are likely to excite a suspicion that in this book, too, Hume has been ‘refuted’ only after the manner of Diogenes and Dr. Johnson. If Hume's inductive scepticism were a proposition about the relative frequency with which inductive inferences from true premisses have true conclusions, then no proof of a statement of logical probability could be equal to the task of refuting it. The critic of Hume incurs special opprobrium, mixed with condescension, if he proposes to draw those non-factual premisses from the theory of logical probability in particular. It may also be useful to draw attention again to the limitedness of what is aimed at in the critical part of this book.
Peter Godfrey-Smith
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015936
- eISBN:
- 9780262298780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015936.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter criticizes a familiar group of ideas about “inductive” inference, and uses that criticism to promote a different group. Many hold on to the position that induction is rational because, ...
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This chapter criticizes a familiar group of ideas about “inductive” inference, and uses that criticism to promote a different group. Many hold on to the position that induction is rational because, if not, factual knowledge will collapse. For the purposes of this chapter, induction is regarded as a pattern of arguments used to answer questions of proportion or frequency, e.g. “how many Fs are G?” “what is the rate of G in the Fs?” “Are all Fs G?” Nelson Goodman suggests, however, that the F and the G in a good inductive argument cannot simply be anything. Some kind of “naturalness” constraint is required on the involved predicates. Most philosophers would agree with Goodman even if they do not agree regarding what the constraint is or from where it comes.Less
This chapter criticizes a familiar group of ideas about “inductive” inference, and uses that criticism to promote a different group. Many hold on to the position that induction is rational because, if not, factual knowledge will collapse. For the purposes of this chapter, induction is regarded as a pattern of arguments used to answer questions of proportion or frequency, e.g. “how many Fs are G?” “what is the rate of G in the Fs?” “Are all Fs G?” Nelson Goodman suggests, however, that the F and the G in a good inductive argument cannot simply be anything. Some kind of “naturalness” constraint is required on the involved predicates. Most philosophers would agree with Goodman even if they do not agree regarding what the constraint is or from where it comes.
Dare A. Baldwin and Megan M. Saylor
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195159912
- eISBN:
- 9780199847150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195159912.003.0007
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter suggests that language may facilitate children's acquisition of mentalistic concepts by serving as an aid to analogical reasoning and inductive inference. That is, language invites ...
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This chapter suggests that language may facilitate children's acquisition of mentalistic concepts by serving as an aid to analogical reasoning and inductive inference. That is, language invites children to compare different behaviors that otherwise they would not attempt to align, thus promoting inferences about non-obvious commonalities across distinct expressions of mental states, such as belief, desire, attention, and intention. A large body of research suggests that, in the realm of physical objects, infants use information provided in language to draw inferences about non-obvious commonalities. In the realm of mental states, language may function similarly to facilitate children's abstraction of mentalistic concepts. The chapter considers two different aspects of this process. First, it argues that language in general, used in conversation, is intricately linked to mentalistic concerns as it embodies communicative intent and intentional focus, taking into account and attempting to influence the beliefs and desires of the conversational participant. Second, mental terms may act as labels that invite recognition across different behaviors and situations, leading to the development of mentalistic concepts by the abstraction of commonalities across behaviors.Less
This chapter suggests that language may facilitate children's acquisition of mentalistic concepts by serving as an aid to analogical reasoning and inductive inference. That is, language invites children to compare different behaviors that otherwise they would not attempt to align, thus promoting inferences about non-obvious commonalities across distinct expressions of mental states, such as belief, desire, attention, and intention. A large body of research suggests that, in the realm of physical objects, infants use information provided in language to draw inferences about non-obvious commonalities. In the realm of mental states, language may function similarly to facilitate children's abstraction of mentalistic concepts. The chapter considers two different aspects of this process. First, it argues that language in general, used in conversation, is intricately linked to mentalistic concerns as it embodies communicative intent and intentional focus, taking into account and attempting to influence the beliefs and desires of the conversational participant. Second, mental terms may act as labels that invite recognition across different behaviors and situations, leading to the development of mentalistic concepts by the abstraction of commonalities across behaviors.
C. A. J. Coady
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198235514
- eISBN:
- 9780191597220
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235518.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Examines Hume's influential treatment of testimony in his essay ‘On Miracles’. Hume admits the importance of testimonial knowledge but argues that we are justified in relying on testimony as an ...
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Examines Hume's influential treatment of testimony in his essay ‘On Miracles’. Hume admits the importance of testimonial knowledge but argues that we are justified in relying on testimony as an epistemic ground because we can defend this reliance in terms of more basic recourse to observation and inductive inference. Coady argues that this reductive approach is flawed because, (1) it relies for its plausibility upon a communal understanding of observation that is already testimony loaded, (2) where observation is taken as individual observation the task of justifying the extent of our reliance is impossibly difficult, and (3) the very language in which the reductive project is framed already presupposes the broad reliability of testimony.Less
Examines Hume's influential treatment of testimony in his essay ‘On Miracles’. Hume admits the importance of testimonial knowledge but argues that we are justified in relying on testimony as an epistemic ground because we can defend this reliance in terms of more basic recourse to observation and inductive inference. Coady argues that this reductive approach is flawed because, (1) it relies for its plausibility upon a communal understanding of observation that is already testimony loaded, (2) where observation is taken as individual observation the task of justifying the extent of our reliance is impossibly difficult, and (3) the very language in which the reductive project is framed already presupposes the broad reliability of testimony.
