Sir Adam Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199275359
- eISBN:
- 9780191603686
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199275351.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Along with identifying a number of pitfalls to be avoided in this project of conceptualizing a Just Peace, Roberts proposes using the term ‘justifiable force’ rather than Just War. This would move ...
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Along with identifying a number of pitfalls to be avoided in this project of conceptualizing a Just Peace, Roberts proposes using the term ‘justifiable force’ rather than Just War. This would move the tradition away from appearing to approve of war as a whole, and towards recognizing something more conditional and cautious — that the threat and use of military force by a particular state or group of states may, in precise circumstances, be justifiable. Roberts writes about how the development of the European Union has affected the nations of this region, and encourages an idea of ‘induction’ through adherence to human rights law as the way to become a part of this union. It is through processes at the regional level that we can find positive illustrations of how justice can be maximized without the introduction of force. Since a desire to proliferate the ‘good’ has long been what has shaped human relations, this examination of ‘induction’ provides an example of how an internal focus on justice can create an environment that promotes promulgation.Less
Along with identifying a number of pitfalls to be avoided in this project of conceptualizing a Just Peace, Roberts proposes using the term ‘justifiable force’ rather than Just War. This would move the tradition away from appearing to approve of war as a whole, and towards recognizing something more conditional and cautious — that the threat and use of military force by a particular state or group of states may, in precise circumstances, be justifiable. Roberts writes about how the development of the European Union has affected the nations of this region, and encourages an idea of ‘induction’ through adherence to human rights law as the way to become a part of this union. It is through processes at the regional level that we can find positive illustrations of how justice can be maximized without the introduction of force. Since a desire to proliferate the ‘good’ has long been what has shaped human relations, this examination of ‘induction’ provides an example of how an internal focus on justice can create an environment that promotes promulgation.
Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195306880
- eISBN:
- 9780199867950
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the ...
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Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.Less
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. This book argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. The book shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. The book concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification.
Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199604760
- eISBN:
- 9780191741548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysics/Epistemology
At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of ...
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At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of rational inference and decision-making, it is worth remembering that the philosophy of religion has long proven to be an extremely fertile ground for the application of probabilistic thinking to traditional epistemological debates. This book offers a representative sample of the work currently being carried out in this potentially rich field of inquiry. Grouped into five sections, the chapters span a broad range of traditional issues in religious epistemology. The first three sections discuss the evidential impact of various considerations that have been thought to have a bearing on the question of the existence of God. These include witness reports of the occurrence of miraculous events, the existence of complex biological adaptations, the apparent ‘fine-tuning’ for life of various physical constants and the existence of seemingly unnecessary evil. The fourth section addresses a number of issues raised by Pascal’s famous pragmatic argument for theistic belief. A final section offers probabilistic perspectives on the rationality of faith and the epistemic significance of religious disagreement.Less
At a time in which probability theory is exerting an unprecedented influence on epistemology and philosophy of science, promising to deliver an exact and unified foundation for the philosophy of rational inference and decision-making, it is worth remembering that the philosophy of religion has long proven to be an extremely fertile ground for the application of probabilistic thinking to traditional epistemological debates. This book offers a representative sample of the work currently being carried out in this potentially rich field of inquiry. Grouped into five sections, the chapters span a broad range of traditional issues in religious epistemology. The first three sections discuss the evidential impact of various considerations that have been thought to have a bearing on the question of the existence of God. These include witness reports of the occurrence of miraculous events, the existence of complex biological adaptations, the apparent ‘fine-tuning’ for life of various physical constants and the existence of seemingly unnecessary evil. The fourth section addresses a number of issues raised by Pascal’s famous pragmatic argument for theistic belief. A final section offers probabilistic perspectives on the rationality of faith and the epistemic significance of religious disagreement.
Patrick R. Laughlin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691147918
- eISBN:
- 9781400836673
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691147918.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter discusses collective induction, the cooperative search for descriptive, predictive, and explanatory generalizations, rules, and principles. As a psychological process induction begins ...
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This chapter discusses collective induction, the cooperative search for descriptive, predictive, and explanatory generalizations, rules, and principles. As a psychological process induction begins with the perception of some pattern, regularity, or relationship. The two basic processes in induction are hypothesis formation and hypothesis evaluation. This inductive process occurs for both single individuals and cooperative groups such as scientific research teams, auditing teams, securities and intelligence analysts, art experts, or air crash investigators. Theoretically, collective induction is a divisible and complementary group task in which groups may perform better than individuals by dividing the task into subtasks and combining the different insights, understandings, strategies, and other cognitive processes of the group members.Less
This chapter discusses collective induction, the cooperative search for descriptive, predictive, and explanatory generalizations, rules, and principles. As a psychological process induction begins with the perception of some pattern, regularity, or relationship. The two basic processes in induction are hypothesis formation and hypothesis evaluation. This inductive process occurs for both single individuals and cooperative groups such as scientific research teams, auditing teams, securities and intelligence analysts, art experts, or air crash investigators. Theoretically, collective induction is a divisible and complementary group task in which groups may perform better than individuals by dividing the task into subtasks and combining the different insights, understandings, strategies, and other cognitive processes of the group members.
John Foster
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199250592
- eISBN:
- 9780191600913
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250596.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
In our experience so far, the universe has worked in remarkably regular ways, and these regularities call for explanation. One way of accounting for them would be to suppose that things have been ...
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In our experience so far, the universe has worked in remarkably regular ways, and these regularities call for explanation. One way of accounting for them would be to suppose that things have been kept regular by laws of nature, construed as forms of natural necessity, and if we can make sense of there being such laws, this mode of explanation is the most plausible one. Another attractive feature of it is that, if it is accepted, it points the way to a solution to the problem of induction; for, assuming that the relevant laws are uniform across space and time, we know that the way things turn out in the unexamined cases, will conform, in the nomologically relevant respects, to the way they have turned out in the examined cases. If nomological explanations are excluded, the only alternative way of accounting for the regularities, with any prospect of acceptability, would be theistic. Can we, then, make sense of there being laws of the relevant sort? Only, I think, by construing a law as what is created by the causal imposing of a regularity on the universe as a regularity. But the only plausible account of such causal imposing would be theistic. So, whatever explanatory role, if any, we assign to laws, there is a strong case for the acceptance of theism. Once theism is accepted, there are further reasons for insisting that the God it postulates imposes regularities on the universe in a law‐creating way.Less
In our experience so far, the universe has worked in remarkably regular ways, and these regularities call for explanation. One way of accounting for them would be to suppose that things have been kept regular by laws of nature, construed as forms of natural necessity, and if we can make sense of there being such laws, this mode of explanation is the most plausible one. Another attractive feature of it is that, if it is accepted, it points the way to a solution to the problem of induction; for, assuming that the relevant laws are uniform across space and time, we know that the way things turn out in the unexamined cases, will conform, in the nomologically relevant respects, to the way they have turned out in the examined cases. If nomological explanations are excluded, the only alternative way of accounting for the regularities, with any prospect of acceptability, would be theistic. Can we, then, make sense of there being laws of the relevant sort? Only, I think, by construing a law as what is created by the causal imposing of a regularity on the universe as a regularity. But the only plausible account of such causal imposing would be theistic. So, whatever explanatory role, if any, we assign to laws, there is a strong case for the acceptance of theism. Once theism is accepted, there are further reasons for insisting that the God it postulates imposes regularities on the universe in a law‐creating way.
Jon Williamson
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198530794
- eISBN:
- 9780191712982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198530794.003.0008
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy
There are two main proposals for discovering causal relationships: a hypothetico-deductive and an inductive approach. Neither account is fully satisfactory. Various specific approaches are discussed, ...
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There are two main proposals for discovering causal relationships: a hypothetico-deductive and an inductive approach. Neither account is fully satisfactory. Various specific approaches are discussed, including constraint-based induction, Bayesian induction, information-theoretic induction, and Shafer's causal conjecturing. These approaches all take the causal Markov condition for granted and so may fail when the condition fails.Less
There are two main proposals for discovering causal relationships: a hypothetico-deductive and an inductive approach. Neither account is fully satisfactory. Various specific approaches are discussed, including constraint-based induction, Bayesian induction, information-theoretic induction, and Shafer's causal conjecturing. These approaches all take the causal Markov condition for granted and so may fail when the condition fails.
Les Gemmell
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199558612
- eISBN:
- 9780191595011
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558612.003.0029
- Subject:
- Public Health and Epidemiology, Public Health
This chapter discusses the importance of induction programmes. The induction programme at the organizational level is an essential constituent of the employment process of every doctor. The programme ...
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This chapter discusses the importance of induction programmes. The induction programme at the organizational level is an essential constituent of the employment process of every doctor. The programme can be used to set out the values of the employers' organization. The importance of a patient safety ethos must be a part of all induction programmes. It is also essential to audit this process to ensure the effectiveness of the induction process.Less
This chapter discusses the importance of induction programmes. The induction programme at the organizational level is an essential constituent of the employment process of every doctor. The programme can be used to set out the values of the employers' organization. The importance of a patient safety ethos must be a part of all induction programmes. It is also essential to audit this process to ensure the effectiveness of the induction process.
Patrick R. Laughlin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691147918
- eISBN:
- 9781400836673
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691147918.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Experimental research by social and cognitive psychologists has established that cooperative groups solve a wide range of problems better than individuals. Cooperative problem solving groups of ...
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Experimental research by social and cognitive psychologists has established that cooperative groups solve a wide range of problems better than individuals. Cooperative problem solving groups of scientific researchers, auditors, financial analysts, air crash investigators, and forensic art experts are increasingly important in our complex and interdependent society. This comprehensive textbook presents important theories and experimental research about group problem solving. The book focuses on tasks that have demonstrably correct solutions within mathematical, logical, scientific, or verbal systems, including algebra problems, analogies, vocabulary, and logical reasoning problems. It explores basic concepts in group problem solving, social combination models, group memory, group ability and world knowledge tasks, rule induction problems, letters-to-numbers problems, evidence for positive group-to-individual transfer, and social choice theory. The conclusion proposes ten generalizations that are supported by the theory and research on group problem solving. The book is an essential resource for decision-making research in social and cognitive psychology, but also extremely relevant to multidisciplinary and multicultural problem-solving teams in organizational behavior, business administration, management, and behavioral economics.Less
Experimental research by social and cognitive psychologists has established that cooperative groups solve a wide range of problems better than individuals. Cooperative problem solving groups of scientific researchers, auditors, financial analysts, air crash investigators, and forensic art experts are increasingly important in our complex and interdependent society. This comprehensive textbook presents important theories and experimental research about group problem solving. The book focuses on tasks that have demonstrably correct solutions within mathematical, logical, scientific, or verbal systems, including algebra problems, analogies, vocabulary, and logical reasoning problems. It explores basic concepts in group problem solving, social combination models, group memory, group ability and world knowledge tasks, rule induction problems, letters-to-numbers problems, evidence for positive group-to-individual transfer, and social choice theory. The conclusion proposes ten generalizations that are supported by the theory and research on group problem solving. The book is an essential resource for decision-making research in social and cognitive psychology, but also extremely relevant to multidisciplinary and multicultural problem-solving teams in organizational behavior, business administration, management, and behavioral economics.
Shoutir Kishore Chatterjee
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198525318
- eISBN:
- 9780191711657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198525318.003.0010
- Subject:
- Mathematics, Probability / Statistics
In the modern era, the methods of statistics were further abstracted from particular practical problems and the subject gained a distinct identity. In the first phase, Edgeworth and Karl Pearson ...
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In the modern era, the methods of statistics were further abstracted from particular practical problems and the subject gained a distinct identity. In the first phase, Edgeworth and Karl Pearson worked vigorously on model-selecting induction, leading to the formulation of the famous Pearsonian chi-squared test. In the second phase, ‘Student’ started the small-sample theory for model-specific induction with his pioneering work, and Fisher, following up, developed a variety of sampling theory procedures and laid the foundations of the general theory of estimation, multivariate analysis, and the theory of design of experiments. All these areas were subsequently enriched by the contributions of a galaxy of workers. The logic of the behavioural approach to induction was consolidated by Neyman and E. S. Pearson, and was later extended and generalized by Wald. After the emergence of a rigorous theory of subjective probability, there was a revival of interest in the pro-subjective Bayesian and the purely subjective approach in the second half of the 20th century. Work on model-free induction covering large sample procedures, nonparametric methods, and the theory and practice of finite population sampling also progressed steadily during this period.Less
In the modern era, the methods of statistics were further abstracted from particular practical problems and the subject gained a distinct identity. In the first phase, Edgeworth and Karl Pearson worked vigorously on model-selecting induction, leading to the formulation of the famous Pearsonian chi-squared test. In the second phase, ‘Student’ started the small-sample theory for model-specific induction with his pioneering work, and Fisher, following up, developed a variety of sampling theory procedures and laid the foundations of the general theory of estimation, multivariate analysis, and the theory of design of experiments. All these areas were subsequently enriched by the contributions of a galaxy of workers. The logic of the behavioural approach to induction was consolidated by Neyman and E. S. Pearson, and was later extended and generalized by Wald. After the emergence of a rigorous theory of subjective probability, there was a revival of interest in the pro-subjective Bayesian and the purely subjective approach in the second half of the 20th century. Work on model-free induction covering large sample procedures, nonparametric methods, and the theory and practice of finite population sampling also progressed steadily during this period.
P. Kyle Stanford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195174083
- eISBN:
- 9780199786367
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195174089.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter begins with a discussion of scientific realism. It then looks at some reasons that have been given for doubting that the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of theories by ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of scientific realism. It then looks at some reasons that have been given for doubting that the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of theories by evidence really should lead us to withhold belief in the claims of the best scientific theories. It is argued that the most powerful challenge to scientific realism has yet to be formulated, but emerges naturally from a systematic consideration of the reasons that the much more famous challenges offered by the pessimistic induction, and that the underdetermination of theories by evidence have left scientific realists unconvinced of their significance.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of scientific realism. It then looks at some reasons that have been given for doubting that the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of theories by evidence really should lead us to withhold belief in the claims of the best scientific theories. It is argued that the most powerful challenge to scientific realism has yet to be formulated, but emerges naturally from a systematic consideration of the reasons that the much more famous challenges offered by the pessimistic induction, and that the underdetermination of theories by evidence have left scientific realists unconvinced of their significance.
P. Kyle Stanford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195174083
- eISBN:
- 9780199786367
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195174089.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter examines the most influential recent efforts by scientific realists to blunt or block the pessimistic induction by engaging the details of the history of science itself, including the ...
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This chapter examines the most influential recent efforts by scientific realists to blunt or block the pessimistic induction by engaging the details of the history of science itself, including the first serious efforts to recruit those details to the realist cause. It argues that the most promising and influential realist replies to the historical challenge (including those of Clyde Hardin and Alexander Rosenberg, Philip Kitcher, Stathis Psillos, Jarrett Leplin, and John Worrall) ultimately manage to achieve only Pyrrhic victories for realism, that is, “defences” of scientific realism that are forced to concede to the realist's opponent either just the substantive points that were in dispute between them or everything he/she needs for a convincing historical case against realism itself. Both the problem of unconceived alternatives and the pessimistic induction itself survive even the best recent efforts to defend realism from the specter of the historical record.Less
This chapter examines the most influential recent efforts by scientific realists to blunt or block the pessimistic induction by engaging the details of the history of science itself, including the first serious efforts to recruit those details to the realist cause. It argues that the most promising and influential realist replies to the historical challenge (including those of Clyde Hardin and Alexander Rosenberg, Philip Kitcher, Stathis Psillos, Jarrett Leplin, and John Worrall) ultimately manage to achieve only Pyrrhic victories for realism, that is, “defences” of scientific realism that are forced to concede to the realist's opponent either just the substantive points that were in dispute between them or everything he/she needs for a convincing historical case against realism itself. Both the problem of unconceived alternatives and the pessimistic induction itself survive even the best recent efforts to defend realism from the specter of the historical record.
Colin Howson
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198250371
- eISBN:
- 9780191597749
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250371.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this ...
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This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this implies that however stringent the process of experimentation, the data supplied does not in itself support any one general hypothesis over another. There have been many attempts since Hume published this argument to show that it is mistaken, or that it itself begs the question. These attempts, which fall under the various headings of probabilism, reliabilism, deductivism, the No‐Miracles argument, and naturalism, are examined and are all found to be wanting. It is then argued that Hume's argument is sound, but that conceding this does not show that there are no valid inductive inferences. The final sections of the book are devoted to showing that there are such arguments, namely probabilistically valid arguments, whose premises are assignments of prior probability. Such arguments are clearly conditional, like those of deductive logic, their conclusions depending on the premises. Indeed, this book argues that the laws of probability are as authentically logical principles as those of deductive logic, mediating like them non‐ampliative inferences from premises to conclusion. Hume's position, that all inductive arguments depend on assumptions about the likely course of nature, is endorsed, since these assumptions can be identified with the prior probability assignments. Thus, though Hume was correct, there is nevertheless room for a genuine logic of inductive inference, supplied by the laws of probability.Less
This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this implies that however stringent the process of experimentation, the data supplied does not in itself support any one general hypothesis over another. There have been many attempts since Hume published this argument to show that it is mistaken, or that it itself begs the question. These attempts, which fall under the various headings of probabilism, reliabilism, deductivism, the No‐Miracles argument, and naturalism, are examined and are all found to be wanting. It is then argued that Hume's argument is sound, but that conceding this does not show that there are no valid inductive inferences. The final sections of the book are devoted to showing that there are such arguments, namely probabilistically valid arguments, whose premises are assignments of prior probability. Such arguments are clearly conditional, like those of deductive logic, their conclusions depending on the premises. Indeed, this book argues that the laws of probability are as authentically logical principles as those of deductive logic, mediating like them non‐ampliative inferences from premises to conclusion. Hume's position, that all inductive arguments depend on assumptions about the likely course of nature, is endorsed, since these assumptions can be identified with the prior probability assignments. Thus, though Hume was correct, there is nevertheless room for a genuine logic of inductive inference, supplied by the laws of probability.
Alvin Plantinga
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195078640
- eISBN:
- 9780199872213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195078640.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge ...
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In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.Less
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
D. C. STOVE
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198245018
- eISBN:
- 9780191680823
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable ...
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This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable premiss which is false. However, not all of the conclusions are hostile to Hume's argument. Its true premisses suffice to prove an important negative conclusion, though not a sceptical one, about inductive inferences. And what has historically been learnt from Hume's argument is of very great importance, even though it is partly opposite to what Hume intended to teach. The identification of this argument involves the identification of Hume's sceptical conclusion, as well as some of his premisses, as being statements of logical probability. Hume's scepticism about induction is quite interesting enough, even considered in itself, to justify the present inquiry.Less
This chapter presents the main results of the evaluation of David Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. The sceptical conclusion of Hume's argument is false. It rests on a certain identifiable premiss which is false. However, not all of the conclusions are hostile to Hume's argument. Its true premisses suffice to prove an important negative conclusion, though not a sceptical one, about inductive inferences. And what has historically been learnt from Hume's argument is of very great importance, even though it is partly opposite to what Hume intended to teach. The identification of this argument involves the identification of Hume's sceptical conclusion, as well as some of his premisses, as being statements of logical probability. Hume's scepticism about induction is quite interesting enough, even considered in itself, to justify the present inquiry.
David Owen
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252602
- eISBN:
- 9780191598159
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252602.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Reason plays a central role in Hume's account of human understanding but just what that role is is a matter of continuing controversy. Many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses, and many ...
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Reason plays a central role in Hume's account of human understanding but just what that role is is a matter of continuing controversy. Many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses, and many of the positions he advocates, are expressed in terms of reason. It is central to his arguments about induction, belief, scepticism, the passions, and moral distinctions. Hume's Reason provides a new look at Hume's account of reason and discusses the first three of the aforementioned issues. Hume's theory is introduced by looking at the logic of ideas developed by Descartes and Locke. Hume followed them in rejecting a formal, deductive account of the workings of the inferential faculty of reason. His account of demonstration is similar to their treatment. But he went farther, in what we now call the argument concerning induction, by showing that no account of reason as a separate faculty could explain our inferences to beliefs in the unobserved. Hume offers instead an associationist account of probable reasoning and a new account of belief. In the process, the picture of reason as an independent faculty is replaced by an explanation of reasoning in terms of properties of the imagination.Less
Reason plays a central role in Hume's account of human understanding but just what that role is is a matter of continuing controversy. Many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses, and many of the positions he advocates, are expressed in terms of reason. It is central to his arguments about induction, belief, scepticism, the passions, and moral distinctions. Hume's Reason provides a new look at Hume's account of reason and discusses the first three of the aforementioned issues. Hume's theory is introduced by looking at the logic of ideas developed by Descartes and Locke. Hume followed them in rejecting a formal, deductive account of the workings of the inferential faculty of reason. His account of demonstration is similar to their treatment. But he went farther, in what we now call the argument concerning induction, by showing that no account of reason as a separate faculty could explain our inferences to beliefs in the unobserved. Hume offers instead an associationist account of probable reasoning and a new account of belief. In the process, the picture of reason as an independent faculty is replaced by an explanation of reasoning in terms of properties of the imagination.
Jr. Henry E. Kyburg
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195062533
- eISBN:
- 9780199853038
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195062533.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Induction is the inference from a sample to a population, regardless of the possible existence of exceptions. Induction is used in the practice of science and engineering based on knowledge that can ...
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Induction is the inference from a sample to a population, regardless of the possible existence of exceptions. Induction is used in the practice of science and engineering based on knowledge that can be accepted as evidence. There are two bodies of knowledge: evidential corpus, a set of propositions acceptable as evidence in a certain context; and practical corpus, a set of propositions counting as “practically certain” in that context. There are five kinds of induction described: statistical, universal, nomic, theoretical, and instantial.Less
Induction is the inference from a sample to a population, regardless of the possible existence of exceptions. Induction is used in the practice of science and engineering based on knowledge that can be accepted as evidence. There are two bodies of knowledge: evidential corpus, a set of propositions acceptable as evidence in a certain context; and practical corpus, a set of propositions counting as “practically certain” in that context. There are five kinds of induction described: statistical, universal, nomic, theoretical, and instantial.
Beverley Glover
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198565970
- eISBN:
- 9780191714009
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198565970.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Plant Sciences and Forestry
Flowers are the beautiful and complex reproductive structures of the angiosperms, one of the most diverse and successful groups of living organisms. The underlying thesis of this book is that to ...
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Flowers are the beautiful and complex reproductive structures of the angiosperms, one of the most diverse and successful groups of living organisms. The underlying thesis of this book is that to understand fully plant development (and why flowers differ in shape, structure, and colour), it is necessary to understand why it is advantageous for them to look like they do. Conversely, in order to fully understand plant ecology, it is necessary to appreciate how floral structures have adapted and evolved. Uniquely, this book addresses flowers and flowering from both a molecular genetic perspective (considering flower induction, development, and self-incompatibility) and an ecological perspective (looking at the selective pressures placed on plants by pollinators, and the consequences for animal-plant co-evolution). This book first considers the evolution of flowers and the history of research into their development. This is followed by a detailed description of the processes which lead to flower production in model plants. The book then examines how flowers differ in shape, structure, and colour, and how these differences are generated. Finally, it assesses the role of these various aspects of floral biology in attracting pollinators and ensuring successful reproduction. In so doing, it provides the first truly integrated study of the topic — one that discusses both the how and why of flowering plant reproductive biology.Less
Flowers are the beautiful and complex reproductive structures of the angiosperms, one of the most diverse and successful groups of living organisms. The underlying thesis of this book is that to understand fully plant development (and why flowers differ in shape, structure, and colour), it is necessary to understand why it is advantageous for them to look like they do. Conversely, in order to fully understand plant ecology, it is necessary to appreciate how floral structures have adapted and evolved. Uniquely, this book addresses flowers and flowering from both a molecular genetic perspective (considering flower induction, development, and self-incompatibility) and an ecological perspective (looking at the selective pressures placed on plants by pollinators, and the consequences for animal-plant co-evolution). This book first considers the evolution of flowers and the history of research into their development. This is followed by a detailed description of the processes which lead to flower production in model plants. The book then examines how flowers differ in shape, structure, and colour, and how these differences are generated. Finally, it assesses the role of these various aspects of floral biology in attracting pollinators and ensuring successful reproduction. In so doing, it provides the first truly integrated study of the topic — one that discusses both the how and why of flowering plant reproductive biology.
Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160849
- eISBN:
- 9781400851348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0005
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
The extensive form of a game is informationally richer than the normal form since players gather information that allows them to update their subjective priors as the game progresses. For this ...
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The extensive form of a game is informationally richer than the normal form since players gather information that allows them to update their subjective priors as the game progresses. For this reason, the study of rationalizability in extensive form games is more complex than the corresponding study in normal form games. There are two ways to use the added information to eliminate strategies that would not be chosen by a rational agent: backward induction and forward induction. The latter is relatively exotic (although more defensible). Backward induction, by far the most popular technique, employs the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, arriving at the subgame perfect Nash equilibria—the equilibria that remain Nash equilibria in all subgames. An extensive form game is considered generic if it has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This chapter develops the tools of modal logic and presents Robert Aumann's famous proof that common knowledge of rationality (CKR) implies backward induction. It concludes that Aumann is perfectly correct, and the real culprit is CKR itself. CKR is in fact self-contradictory when applied to extensive form games.Less
The extensive form of a game is informationally richer than the normal form since players gather information that allows them to update their subjective priors as the game progresses. For this reason, the study of rationalizability in extensive form games is more complex than the corresponding study in normal form games. There are two ways to use the added information to eliminate strategies that would not be chosen by a rational agent: backward induction and forward induction. The latter is relatively exotic (although more defensible). Backward induction, by far the most popular technique, employs the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, arriving at the subgame perfect Nash equilibria—the equilibria that remain Nash equilibria in all subgames. An extensive form game is considered generic if it has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This chapter develops the tools of modal logic and presents Robert Aumann's famous proof that common knowledge of rationality (CKR) implies backward induction. It concludes that Aumann is perfectly correct, and the real culprit is CKR itself. CKR is in fact self-contradictory when applied to extensive form games.
Stephen Handel
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195169645
- eISBN:
- 9780199786732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195169645.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
Multiple stimulus dimensions and multiple perceptual processes affect the perception of motion and the dominant one is a function of the overall context. In apparent motion configurations, the first ...
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Multiple stimulus dimensions and multiple perceptual processes affect the perception of motion and the dominant one is a function of the overall context. In apparent motion configurations, the first step is to parse the “somethings” in each image, and the second is to find the correspondence between the “somethings” in each image. The perceptions reflect the physical properties of objects, yielding slow continuous motions of rigid objects that do cross paths. For the simplest one-dot configurations, the perception is multistable, alternating between plausible motions. Two kinds of visual motion have been found: first order (Fourier) motion is based on changes in illumination or color, while second order (non-Fourier) motion is based on changes in contrast. Many visual phenomena have auditory equivalents, including induction and space-time and frequency-time stream segregation trading relationships.Less
Multiple stimulus dimensions and multiple perceptual processes affect the perception of motion and the dominant one is a function of the overall context. In apparent motion configurations, the first step is to parse the “somethings” in each image, and the second is to find the correspondence between the “somethings” in each image. The perceptions reflect the physical properties of objects, yielding slow continuous motions of rigid objects that do cross paths. For the simplest one-dot configurations, the perception is multistable, alternating between plausible motions. Two kinds of visual motion have been found: first order (Fourier) motion is based on changes in illumination or color, while second order (non-Fourier) motion is based on changes in contrast. Many visual phenomena have auditory equivalents, including induction and space-time and frequency-time stream segregation trading relationships.
Beverley J. Glover
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198565970
- eISBN:
- 9780191714009
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198565970.003.0003
- Subject:
- Biology, Plant Sciences and Forestry
Research into flower development is conducted through a molecular genetic approach. Such an approach uses the backwards-seeming logic of searching for a plant with a mutation which prevents a process ...
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Research into flower development is conducted through a molecular genetic approach. Such an approach uses the backwards-seeming logic of searching for a plant with a mutation which prevents a process occurring properly. By analysing the process in the mutant plant, and by identifying and analysing the mutated gene, it is possible to build up a picture of how a normal plant and a normal gene work. When molecular genetic analysis becomes the usual way of exploring a biological process, there is a tendency for the majority of work to focus on one or a few species. The weedy annual plant Arabidopsis thaliana has become the most extensively studied plant species. This chapter introduces Arabidopsis and the reasons why it has become the model of choice for the study of floral induction. It then goes on to look at the description and characterization of mutants with perturbations in floral induction.Less
Research into flower development is conducted through a molecular genetic approach. Such an approach uses the backwards-seeming logic of searching for a plant with a mutation which prevents a process occurring properly. By analysing the process in the mutant plant, and by identifying and analysing the mutated gene, it is possible to build up a picture of how a normal plant and a normal gene work. When molecular genetic analysis becomes the usual way of exploring a biological process, there is a tendency for the majority of work to focus on one or a few species. The weedy annual plant Arabidopsis thaliana has become the most extensively studied plant species. This chapter introduces Arabidopsis and the reasons why it has become the model of choice for the study of floral induction. It then goes on to look at the description and characterization of mutants with perturbations in floral induction.
