Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate ...
More
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.Less
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.
Ian Carter
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294535
- eISBN:
- 9780191598951
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294530.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of ...
More
When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of a liberal theory of distributive justice, and is therefore assumed to be something that individuals can possess in varying degrees. Yet it is rarely clear what is meant by claims about degrees of freedom. To make sense of such claims, we need to clarify the concept of overall freedom and ask whether its measurement is theoretically possible. This concept is important because freedom has, for liberals, non-specific (or content-independent) value–i.e. value that is independent of the value of being free to do specific things. Liberals prescribe not only that individuals have certain specific freedom-types but also that they have a measure of (overall) freedom. Attempts to make sense of the concept of overall freedom by weighting particular options in terms of their values are erroneous, as these do not account for freedom’s non-specific value. On the other hand, a closer examination of the problems of the individuation of actions and of the various types of constraints on freedom shows overall freedom to be measurable in a way that reflects its non-specific value. To this end, actions need to be individuated in spatio-temporal terms and constraints on freedom need to be characterized in terms of the physical compossibility of actions. The comparative judgements about freedom implied by this analysis (with reference both to individuals and to groups) are more coherent with our intuitive judgements than might at first be expected.Less
When liberal political philosophers talk of equalizing, increasing or maximizing freedom (or liberty), they implicitly assume freedom to be a measurable attribute. Freedom is one of the currencies of a liberal theory of distributive justice, and is therefore assumed to be something that individuals can possess in varying degrees. Yet it is rarely clear what is meant by claims about degrees of freedom. To make sense of such claims, we need to clarify the concept of overall freedom and ask whether its measurement is theoretically possible. This concept is important because freedom has, for liberals, non-specific (or content-independent) value–i.e. value that is independent of the value of being free to do specific things. Liberals prescribe not only that individuals have certain specific freedom-types but also that they have a measure of (overall) freedom. Attempts to make sense of the concept of overall freedom by weighting particular options in terms of their values are erroneous, as these do not account for freedom’s non-specific value. On the other hand, a closer examination of the problems of the individuation of actions and of the various types of constraints on freedom shows overall freedom to be measurable in a way that reflects its non-specific value. To this end, actions need to be individuated in spatio-temporal terms and constraints on freedom need to be characterized in terms of the physical compossibility of actions. The comparative judgements about freedom implied by this analysis (with reference both to individuals and to groups) are more coherent with our intuitive judgements than might at first be expected.
David-Hillel Ruben
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235880
- eISBN:
- 9780191679155
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ...
More
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.Less
This book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. It rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what it calls a ‘prolific theory’ of act individuation. It also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist theory unnecessarily reifies causings. The book identifies an assumption that they share, and that most action theorists have assumed to be unproblematic and uncontroversial, that an action is, or entails the existence of, an event. Several different meanings to that claim are disentangled and in the most interesting sense of that claim, the book denies that it is true. The book's own alternative is simple and unpretentious: nothing informative can be said about the nature of action that explicates action in any other terms. The book sketches a theory of causal explanation of action that eschews the requirement for laws or generalizations, and this effectively quashes one argument for the oft-repeated view that no explanations of action can be causal, on the grounds that there are no convincing cases of laws of human action. It addresses a number of questions about the knowledge an agent has of his own actions, looking particularly at examples of pathological cases of action in which, for one reason or another, the agent does not know what he is doing.
Ruben David-Hillel
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235880
- eISBN:
- 9780191679155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235880.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some ...
More
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to articulate a view of action and its explanation that most closely fits the author's conception. It also dismisses some alternatives to the author's view. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The central principles of the four-category ontology are explained, especially its distinction between properties conceived as particulars (modes) and properties conceived as universals (attributes), ...
More
The central principles of the four-category ontology are explained, especially its distinction between properties conceived as particulars (modes) and properties conceived as universals (attributes), and its distinction between substantial universals (kinds) and substantial particulars (objects). Its appeal to universals is defended and its account of the dispositional/occurrent distinction is explained. Some advantages of the four-category ontology over various of its more parsimonious rivals are sketched: its account of the individuation of tropes or modes, its analysis of laws, its analysis of dispositionality, and its account of property-perception.Less
The central principles of the four-category ontology are explained, especially its distinction between properties conceived as particulars (modes) and properties conceived as universals (attributes), and its distinction between substantial universals (kinds) and substantial particulars (objects). Its appeal to universals is defended and its account of the dispositional/occurrent distinction is explained. Some advantages of the four-category ontology over various of its more parsimonious rivals are sketched: its account of the individuation of tropes or modes, its analysis of laws, its analysis of dispositionality, and its account of property-perception.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that ...
More
This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that certain sortals (‘ultimate sortals’) are essential sortals. It argues that the attempt to defend sortal essentialism by appeal to EPI faces a dilemma: either the thesis is vacuous, and lends no support to sortal essentialism, or it is a substantial thesis, but one that we have no good reason to accept. It concludes that even if it is true that, for any given individual, there are some sorts or kinds to which it could not have belonged, there is insufficient reason to believe the sortal essentialist’s explanation that this is because there is some sortal kind to which it belongs essentially.Less
This chapter examines David Wiggins’s version of sortal essentialism, which relies on the EPI thesis, that a thing’s principle of individuation is essential to it in order to derive the result that certain sortals (‘ultimate sortals’) are essential sortals. It argues that the attempt to defend sortal essentialism by appeal to EPI faces a dilemma: either the thesis is vacuous, and lends no support to sortal essentialism, or it is a substantial thesis, but one that we have no good reason to accept. It concludes that even if it is true that, for any given individual, there are some sorts or kinds to which it could not have belonged, there is insufficient reason to believe the sortal essentialist’s explanation that this is because there is some sortal kind to which it belongs essentially.
Neil Websdale
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195315417
- eISBN:
- 9780199777464
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315417.003.006
- Subject:
- Social Work, Children and Families, Crime and Justice
Chapter 6 explores the interrelationships between modern figurations of feeling, familial atmospheres of feeling, and the emotional styles of perpetrators as means of making sense of familicide. One ...
More
Chapter 6 explores the interrelationships between modern figurations of feeling, familial atmospheres of feeling, and the emotional styles of perpetrators as means of making sense of familicide. One of the hallmarks of modern life is the increasing value attached to controlling one's emotions and one's interactions with others. Such self-control was particularly emphasized among the ranks of bourgeois men. The chapter commences with a discussion of these cultural imperatives toward self-control and emotional restraint. The author underscores the prominent place of anxiety, shame and anger among familicidal hearts, using this analysis as segue into a discussion of the relationship between modernity, emotional styles, hegemonic masculinity, and familicide. Of particular importance is the fact that familicide is gendered, reflecting the greater social disconnection and isolation of men in modern times.Less
Chapter 6 explores the interrelationships between modern figurations of feeling, familial atmospheres of feeling, and the emotional styles of perpetrators as means of making sense of familicide. One of the hallmarks of modern life is the increasing value attached to controlling one's emotions and one's interactions with others. Such self-control was particularly emphasized among the ranks of bourgeois men. The chapter commences with a discussion of these cultural imperatives toward self-control and emotional restraint. The author underscores the prominent place of anxiety, shame and anger among familicidal hearts, using this analysis as segue into a discussion of the relationship between modernity, emotional styles, hegemonic masculinity, and familicide. Of particular importance is the fact that familicide is gendered, reflecting the greater social disconnection and isolation of men in modern times.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it ...
More
With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it bears to “common sense”. The book argues that Berkeley's metaphysics is the metaphysics of the “mob” so long as the mob is properly understood to be the mob of professing monotheists. It further argues that core aspects of traditional monotheism inevitably tend toward support for immaterialism. Wilfred Sellars' metaphilosophy from Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man is used to both elucidate and map Berkeley's core metaphysical commitments.Less
With an interpretation of Berkeley's view of spirits in hand, this chapter turns to the task of situating that view of spirits within his overall positive metaphysics and defending the connection it bears to “common sense”. The book argues that Berkeley's metaphysics is the metaphysics of the “mob” so long as the mob is properly understood to be the mob of professing monotheists. It further argues that core aspects of traditional monotheism inevitably tend toward support for immaterialism. Wilfred Sellars' metaphilosophy from Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man is used to both elucidate and map Berkeley's core metaphysical commitments.
Teresa Wilcox and Rebecca Woods
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195301151
- eISBN:
- 9780199894246
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195301151.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Developmental Psychology
Increased attention has been given toward understanding the reasons that infants are more sensitive to some types of information than to others, and how infants come to identify new sources of ...
More
Increased attention has been given toward understanding the reasons that infants are more sensitive to some types of information than to others, and how infants come to identify new sources of information as relevant to the individuation problem. One approach is to identify experiences that can alter infants' sensitivity to surface features. The conditions under which these experiences are most effective can reveal important information about the nature and content of infants' object representations, how infants' use these representations, and the cognitive and/or learning mechanisms that govern changes in infants' individuation capacities. This chapter focuses on this body of research.Less
Increased attention has been given toward understanding the reasons that infants are more sensitive to some types of information than to others, and how infants come to identify new sources of information as relevant to the individuation problem. One approach is to identify experiences that can alter infants' sensitivity to surface features. The conditions under which these experiences are most effective can reveal important information about the nature and content of infants' object representations, how infants' use these representations, and the cognitive and/or learning mechanisms that govern changes in infants' individuation capacities. This chapter focuses on this body of research.
Julian Dodd
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284375
- eISBN:
- 9780191713743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284375.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter both introduces the simple view in the ontology of music and explains its scope. In essence, the simple view consists of an answer to two questions: the categorial question and the ...
More
This chapter both introduces the simple view in the ontology of music and explains its scope. In essence, the simple view consists of an answer to two questions: the categorial question and the individuation question. The categorial question asks which ontological category works of music fall under, and the answer given by the simple view — the type/token theory — is that such works are types whose tokens are sound-sequence-events. The individuation question asks how such works are individuated, and the answer given by the simple view — sonicism — is that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike. The chapter claims that the simple view applies to all works of pure, instrumental music. It states the case defended in subsequent chapters: that the two components of the simple view are both prima facie correct and stand undefeated in the wake of the objections they commonly face.Less
This chapter both introduces the simple view in the ontology of music and explains its scope. In essence, the simple view consists of an answer to two questions: the categorial question and the individuation question. The categorial question asks which ontological category works of music fall under, and the answer given by the simple view — the type/token theory — is that such works are types whose tokens are sound-sequence-events. The individuation question asks how such works are individuated, and the answer given by the simple view — sonicism — is that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike. The chapter claims that the simple view applies to all works of pure, instrumental music. It states the case defended in subsequent chapters: that the two components of the simple view are both prima facie correct and stand undefeated in the wake of the objections they commonly face.
Julian Dodd
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199284375
- eISBN:
- 9780191713743
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284375.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Sonicism holds that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike. This chapter presents a version of this thesis — timbral sonicism — as the face-value way of individuating musical ...
More
Sonicism holds that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike. This chapter presents a version of this thesis — timbral sonicism — as the face-value way of individuating musical works. Timbral sonicism is defended against the putative counter-examples with which it is confronted by instrumentalists: philosophers (such as Levinson and Stephen Davies) who hold that compositions composed for different instruments count as numerically distinct, even if the said works are sonically indistinguishable. The chapter concludes that such putative counter-examples, though ingenious, admit of convincing sonicist replies.Less
Sonicism holds that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike. This chapter presents a version of this thesis — timbral sonicism — as the face-value way of individuating musical works. Timbral sonicism is defended against the putative counter-examples with which it is confronted by instrumentalists: philosophers (such as Levinson and Stephen Davies) who hold that compositions composed for different instruments count as numerically distinct, even if the said works are sonically indistinguishable. The chapter concludes that such putative counter-examples, though ingenious, admit of convincing sonicist replies.
Christopher Janaway
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199279692
- eISBN:
- 9780191707407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199279692.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter summarizes the aspects of Schopenhauer's theory of value and metaphysics that make selflessness a central point of contention, and Nietzsche's response to them. For Schopenhauer, ...
More
This chapter summarizes the aspects of Schopenhauer's theory of value and metaphysics that make selflessness a central point of contention, and Nietzsche's response to them. For Schopenhauer, compassion is the basis of ethics. But he takes selflessness into the metaphysical realm by arguing that the individual is an illusion: the good person sees through the principle of individuation, and conscience is an intimation of identity with one's victim. Ultimately total self-abnegation (‘saying no’ to life and oneself, as Nietzsche puts it) is the route to salvation. Nietzsche regards this metaphysics as an embarrassment, but has other arguments against Schopenhauer: that compassion is a complex phenomenon often driven by self-interest, that it detracts from one's life-purpose and capacity to be happy, that it is mistaken to think all human beings matter equally, to consider suffering something to eliminate from existence, and to take a life-denying attitude because of it.Less
This chapter summarizes the aspects of Schopenhauer's theory of value and metaphysics that make selflessness a central point of contention, and Nietzsche's response to them. For Schopenhauer, compassion is the basis of ethics. But he takes selflessness into the metaphysical realm by arguing that the individual is an illusion: the good person sees through the principle of individuation, and conscience is an intimation of identity with one's victim. Ultimately total self-abnegation (‘saying no’ to life and oneself, as Nietzsche puts it) is the route to salvation. Nietzsche regards this metaphysics as an embarrassment, but has other arguments against Schopenhauer: that compassion is a complex phenomenon often driven by self-interest, that it detracts from one's life-purpose and capacity to be happy, that it is mistaken to think all human beings matter equally, to consider suffering something to eliminate from existence, and to take a life-denying attitude because of it.
Marilyn McCord Adams
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199591053
- eISBN:
- 9780191595554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591053.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
Scotus and Ockham both deny that reified quantity can play any role in the individuation of material substances or their accidents. Moreover, they interpret Aristotle as saying, not that only ...
More
Scotus and Ockham both deny that reified quantity can play any role in the individuation of material substances or their accidents. Moreover, they interpret Aristotle as saying, not that only substances are agents properly speaking, but that only individuals are. This chapter analyzes their recalculations of accident-independence and the causal roles that the eucharistic accidents play. Scotus weighs up considerations from the essential orders of dependence and eminence and sees no reason why — by Divine power — qualities as much as quantities could not exist without inhering in a subject. Ockham argues against the reification of quantity on philosophical grounds and so holds that bread-qualities exist independently after consecration. Both invoke Divine power to explain changes issuing in new substances. Scotus makes the same move with respect to condensation and rarefaction of the eucharistic accidents, but Ockham's own view accounts for this easily in terms of the locomotion of quality parts.Less
Scotus and Ockham both deny that reified quantity can play any role in the individuation of material substances or their accidents. Moreover, they interpret Aristotle as saying, not that only substances are agents properly speaking, but that only individuals are. This chapter analyzes their recalculations of accident-independence and the causal roles that the eucharistic accidents play. Scotus weighs up considerations from the essential orders of dependence and eminence and sees no reason why — by Divine power — qualities as much as quantities could not exist without inhering in a subject. Ockham argues against the reification of quantity on philosophical grounds and so holds that bread-qualities exist independently after consecration. Both invoke Divine power to explain changes issuing in new substances. Scotus makes the same move with respect to condensation and rarefaction of the eucharistic accidents, but Ockham's own view accounts for this easily in terms of the locomotion of quality parts.
A. M. Devine and Laurence D. Stephens
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195181685
- eISBN:
- 9780199789146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195181685.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Prose and Writers: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This chapter establishes a default order for arguments and adjuncts in the Latin simple sentence and proposes a syntactic structure with pragmatically defined functional projections. Deviations from ...
More
This chapter establishes a default order for arguments and adjuncts in the Latin simple sentence and proposes a syntactic structure with pragmatically defined functional projections. Deviations from the default order are handled by scrambling, which is a pragmatically conditioned rule. Postverbal constituents include prepositional phrases in Caesar and additionally tail and nonreferential phrases in the historians. The latter are explained in terms of informational individuation, which can be represented typetheoretically.Less
This chapter establishes a default order for arguments and adjuncts in the Latin simple sentence and proposes a syntactic structure with pragmatically defined functional projections. Deviations from the default order are handled by scrambling, which is a pragmatically conditioned rule. Postverbal constituents include prepositional phrases in Caesar and additionally tail and nonreferential phrases in the historians. The latter are explained in terms of informational individuation, which can be represented typetheoretically.
Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231195
- eISBN:
- 9780191710810
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231195.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The chapter introduces an obvious (though surprisingly overlooked) distinction between signs and expressions and invoke this distinction and the Minimal Theory of Chapter 11 to underwrite an account ...
More
The chapter introduces an obvious (though surprisingly overlooked) distinction between signs and expressions and invoke this distinction and the Minimal Theory of Chapter 11 to underwrite an account of quotation expression individuation. It then exploits this account of quotation expression individuation in order to explain (away) the recalcitrant variability data from Chapter 7. The chapter explains why so many authors (and speakers) are misled into thinking a single quotation expression can be used to pick out distinct quotable items on different occasions.Less
The chapter introduces an obvious (though surprisingly overlooked) distinction between signs and expressions and invoke this distinction and the Minimal Theory of Chapter 11 to underwrite an account of quotation expression individuation. It then exploits this account of quotation expression individuation in order to explain (away) the recalcitrant variability data from Chapter 7. The chapter explains why so many authors (and speakers) are misled into thinking a single quotation expression can be used to pick out distinct quotable items on different occasions.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter takes the first person as the subject matter for a case study of the thesis of the preceding chapter — the thesis that the fundamental reference rule for a concept contributes ...
More
This chapter takes the first person as the subject matter for a case study of the thesis of the preceding chapter — the thesis that the fundamental reference rule for a concept contributes essentially to the explanation of the norms distinctive of that concept. There are two aims in this exercise. One is to suggest ways in which the extraordinarily rich and philosophically interesting epistemic phenomena exhibited by such an important concept as that of the first person can be explained by its fundamental reference rule. The other aim is to consider a much more general issue that arises about the individuation of certain concepts — input or output is more fundamental than the other in the individuation of the first-person concept, or is some third position correct, a position that can explain the role of the first person both on the input and on the output sides. It is argued that the reference rule is more fundamental than either the input-oriented or the output-oriented accounts of individuation; and that it can explain phenomena that pose difficulties for those accounts.Less
This chapter takes the first person as the subject matter for a case study of the thesis of the preceding chapter — the thesis that the fundamental reference rule for a concept contributes essentially to the explanation of the norms distinctive of that concept. There are two aims in this exercise. One is to suggest ways in which the extraordinarily rich and philosophically interesting epistemic phenomena exhibited by such an important concept as that of the first person can be explained by its fundamental reference rule. The other aim is to consider a much more general issue that arises about the individuation of certain concepts — input or output is more fundamental than the other in the individuation of the first-person concept, or is some third position correct, a position that can explain the role of the first person both on the input and on the output sides. It is argued that the reference rule is more fundamental than either the input-oriented or the output-oriented accounts of individuation; and that it can explain phenomena that pose difficulties for those accounts.
Casey O'Callaghan
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199215928
- eISBN:
- 9780191706875
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199215928.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Sounds are distally located events that require the presence of a medium. Events in which vibrating objects or interacting bodies disturb a surrounding medium in a wave-like manner best satisfy the ...
More
Sounds are distally located events that require the presence of a medium. Events in which vibrating objects or interacting bodies disturb a surrounding medium in a wave-like manner best satisfy the desiderata for a theory of sounds. Such medium-disturbing events are individuated primarily in terms of spatio-temporal continuity. Worries about the metaphysical status of relational or causal events and about the perceptibility of medium-disturbing events are answered.Less
Sounds are distally located events that require the presence of a medium. Events in which vibrating objects or interacting bodies disturb a surrounding medium in a wave-like manner best satisfy the desiderata for a theory of sounds. Such medium-disturbing events are individuated primarily in terms of spatio-temporal continuity. Worries about the metaphysical status of relational or causal events and about the perceptibility of medium-disturbing events are answered.
Peter Wyss
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199583621
- eISBN:
- 9780191723483
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This chapter explores a striking similarity between the Macdonalds' property exemplification account and S. Alexander's ‘identity doctrine’. Both approaches relate the distinctiveness of emergent ...
More
This chapter explores a striking similarity between the Macdonalds' property exemplification account and S. Alexander's ‘identity doctrine’. Both approaches relate the distinctiveness of emergent properties to their causal and individuative powers. It is then argued that this view of distinctiveness conflicts with the dependence of emergent properties, if the latter is explicated in terms of realization. Outlining four reservations about realization, it concludes that the Macdonalds' physicalism is incompatible with emergence after all.Less
This chapter explores a striking similarity between the Macdonalds' property exemplification account and S. Alexander's ‘identity doctrine’. Both approaches relate the distinctiveness of emergent properties to their causal and individuative powers. It is then argued that this view of distinctiveness conflicts with the dependence of emergent properties, if the latter is explicated in terms of realization. Outlining four reservations about realization, it concludes that the Macdonalds' physicalism is incompatible with emergence after all.
Robert Kraut
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199228126
- eISBN:
- 9780191711053
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228126.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
We can learn something about the ontology of art—and what we are doing when we ponder the ontology of art—by reflecting upon a parallel problem in the philosophy of mathematics. We wish to know what ...
More
We can learn something about the ontology of art—and what we are doing when we ponder the ontology of art—by reflecting upon a parallel problem in the philosophy of mathematics. We wish to know what Duane Hanson's realist sculpture ”House Painter” is: what aesthetic features it does and does not possess; analogously, we wish to know what the number seven is: what mathematical properties it does and does not possess. Against this backdrop, artworld individuative puzzles emerge in a fascinating light, prompting questions about what sort of explanation an ontology of artworks should provide, and how to adjudicate among competing ontologies.Less
We can learn something about the ontology of art—and what we are doing when we ponder the ontology of art—by reflecting upon a parallel problem in the philosophy of mathematics. We wish to know what Duane Hanson's realist sculpture ”House Painter” is: what aesthetic features it does and does not possess; analogously, we wish to know what the number seven is: what mathematical properties it does and does not possess. Against this backdrop, artworld individuative puzzles emerge in a fascinating light, prompting questions about what sort of explanation an ontology of artworks should provide, and how to adjudicate among competing ontologies.
D. Bruce Hindmarsh
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245758
- eISBN:
- 9780191602436
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245754.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Church History
Typically, the early Methodist laity turned not to journals to give voice to their experience, but to oral testimony in band meetings or to familiar letters written to the very Methodist preachers ...
More
Typically, the early Methodist laity turned not to journals to give voice to their experience, but to oral testimony in band meetings or to familiar letters written to the very Methodist preachers whose message had first awakened and converted them. These lay narratives of conversion were written ‘white hot’ in the heat of experience and forged into evangelical shape largely under the oversight of their Methodist pastors. A collection of lay narratives in manuscript at the John Rylands Library, Manchester, addressed for the most part to Charles Wesley, provides superb evidence of the character and formation of early Methodist autobiographical culture and includes a number of examples from women and men with a range of educational backgrounds. These narratives illustrate the charismatic nature of the early revival when early Methodists seemed to walk in a cloud of wonders, and lived very much on the cusp of religious emotion at a time when so much about evangelical experience seemed novel. The experience of these converts was narrated with less structure than, for example, some of the later narratives of the lay preachers and illustrate the bringing of inchoate religious experience into an orderly narrative form through a process of individuation and mimesis.Less
Typically, the early Methodist laity turned not to journals to give voice to their experience, but to oral testimony in band meetings or to familiar letters written to the very Methodist preachers whose message had first awakened and converted them. These lay narratives of conversion were written ‘white hot’ in the heat of experience and forged into evangelical shape largely under the oversight of their Methodist pastors. A collection of lay narratives in manuscript at the John Rylands Library, Manchester, addressed for the most part to Charles Wesley, provides superb evidence of the character and formation of early Methodist autobiographical culture and includes a number of examples from women and men with a range of educational backgrounds. These narratives illustrate the charismatic nature of the early revival when early Methodists seemed to walk in a cloud of wonders, and lived very much on the cusp of religious emotion at a time when so much about evangelical experience seemed novel. The experience of these converts was narrated with less structure than, for example, some of the later narratives of the lay preachers and illustrate the bringing of inchoate religious experience into an orderly narrative form through a process of individuation and mimesis.
