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In view of its variability, the written transmission of the early trope tradition has been characterized as ‘local production for local use’. This chapter presents an attempt to interpret differences in a particular case as motivated, intended, reflective of different ideas of the composers or notators about the emphases of the poetic text, and about the exploitation of the expressive and formal resources of the melodic tradition to bring out those ideas. In other words, it attempts to see whether we can identify individuality in medieval song. Such an interpretation posits musicians who read their poetic texts and took upon themselves the task of manifesting their readings the way they intoned them. This supposition runs counter to the opposite idea that has been abroad in the field of medieval music studies.

This introductory chapter presents an outline of the metaphysics of identity and individuality, which emphasizes the conceptual distinction between individuality and distinguishability. The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles effectively reduces the former to the latter, but notions of haecceity, ‘transcendental individuality’, and ‘space-time’ individuality are also presented, with the aim of laying the groundwork for the subsequent considerations of identity and individuality in the quantum context. In particular, as identity in higher-order logic is defined in terms of indistinguishability and ‘countable’ objects which feature in set theory are typically taken to be those which have well-defined identity conditions, this metaphysical framework will underpin the rest of the discussions in this book.

This chapter presents a summary of the history of classical statistical mechanics, emphasizing the underlying assumptions regarding particle individuality. It is argued that the relevant sense of individuality is articulated within the theory in two different forms: transcendental individuality and space-time individuality. Huggett’s claim that classical statistics is metaphysically neutral is analyzed with regard to individuality, and it is shown that a form of space-time individuality is presupposed. This is articulated in the context of a ‘field theoretic’ re-writing of the theory free of any underlying presupposition of ‘transcendental individuality’. Hence, classical statistical mechanics supports (at least) two different accounts of particle individuality, and hence we have a weak form of underdetermination of the relevant metaphysics by the physics. Talk of ‘space-time’ individuality leads into a discussion of the individuality and identity of the space-time points themselves, covering the debate between Grünbaum and Stein, and the recent work of Hoefer and others.

This chapter explores the neurobiological self. It argues that the emerging neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are unlikely to efface modern human beings' understanding of themselves as persons equipped with a deep interior world of mental states that have a causal relation to their action. Rather, they are likely to add a neurobiological dimension to human beings' self-understanding and their practices of self-management. In this sense, the “somatic individuality” which was once the province of the psy- sciences, is spreading to the neuro- sciences. Yet psy is not being displaced by neuro: neurobiological conceptions of the self are being construed alongside psychological ones.

This chapter examines selection at the level of species and clades. The history of the species selection debate, including its conceptual link to the idea that species are individuals, is outlined. The issue of how to distinguish ‘real’ species selection from ‘species sorting’ (i.e., differential speciation/extinction that is a side effect of causal processes at other levels) is analyzed. It is argued that clade-level selection is conceptually problematic given that clades, being monophyletic by definition, cannot form parent-offspring lineages.

This chapter looks at the ‘major evolutionary transitions’, in particular the idea that multi-level selection theory is crucial for understanding them. These transitions occur when a number of free-living biological individuals, originally capable of surviving and reproducing alone, become integrated into a co-operative whole. The literature on evolutionary transitions is concerned with the origins of hierarchical organization rather than selection and adaptation at pre-existing hierarchical levels. This calls for a ‘diachronic’ rather than a ‘synchronic’ formulation of the levels of selection question. The implications of this change in perspective are examined. The distinction between MLS1 and MLS2 is examined in relation to the major evolutionary transitions.

This chapter presents the history of quantum statistics, from its beginnings in Planck’s work, through the development of Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics, to the more recent work on forms of parastatistics, focusing on the role played by considerations of particle identity and individuality. The new physics was taken to imply that quantum particles are non-individuals in some sense. This provides the framework for a novel account of Bohr’s view of particle individuality, which further illuminates his complementarity interpretation as well as Born and Schrödinger’s broadly structuralist approaches. Schrödinger’s view that identity does not apply to quantum particles is emphasized, as is Weyl’s incorporation of this view into his treatment of aggregates of particles.

This chapter discusses the concepts of indistinguishability, individuality, and non-individuality in the quantum context. It is argued that the above view of particles as non-individuals is not a necessary consequence of the physics, and that quantum particles can be taken to be individuals, subject to certain constraints. However, the sense of individuality here cannot be understood in terms of the Identity of Indiscernibles, since on a standard interpretation of quantum theory, Leibniz’s Principle is violated by both fermions and bosons. Criticisms of this argument are reviewed, as is Saunders’ recent attempt to defend a Quinean form of the Principle. The consequences of regarding quantum particles as individuals are considered in detail, and Teller’s account of entanglement in terms of non-supervenient relations is developed in this context. The conclusion is reached that quantum physics supports two alternative metaphysical packages of individuality and non-individuality, yielding a stronger form of underdetermination, which can be used to support a form of structuralism.

This chapter discusses the special, philosophical notion of an experience. It was referred to as involving a form of the following general idea: that a visual experience is ‘inner’ independently of the extent to which it is given meaning by the subject's experience of life. There is truth in this general idea, if only because one's individuality is not a function of experience alone. The relevant philosophical notion, however, is a form of the general idea that the experience had by each of two people would still be ‘inner’; however, many tests or observations, of a kind which might have revealed a difference in the giving of meaning, failed to do so; and not at all because the next test or observation might have revealed such a difference.

The formal ontological concept of an object is explicated and contrasted with that of a property. F. P. Ramsey’s objections to this distinction are challenged. The sense in which objects possess an individuality not exhibited by entities of certain other types is discussed. The object/property distinction is distinguished from that between universals and particulars. The ontological status of events and processes, and that of abstract entities such as numbers, are examined. Gottlob Frege’s treatment of number and his object/concept distinction are criticized, and an alternative account of the ontological status of concepts is advanced.

The ideas of liberation and emancipation were integral to the Continentalist socialist tradition, while within the British socialist tradition, as well as in non‐Marxist Continental socialism, both liberty and individuality were desirable values. The impact of British liberal ideas on socialism was also greatly amplified by J. S. Mill in remarks where he welcomed a cautious move to collective ownership, although he also cast doubt on the compatibility of socialism with the free and spontaneous development of individuals. This chapter looks at socialism in relation to liberty and choice in six sections: (a) The pursuit of liberalism by other means; (b) Equality and liberty: a partnership of equals?; (c) The fundamental nature of revisionism; (d) Continental comparisons; (e) The perimeter problem of market socialism; and (f) A note on other socialisms.

This chapter examines Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) and its relationship with the philosophy of physics. OSR is the view that the world has an objective modal structure that is ontologically fundamental, in the sense of not supervening on the intrinsic properties of a set of individuals. According to OSR, even the identity and individuality of objects depends on the relational structure of the world. In keeping with the principle of naturalistic closure (PNC), this account must not imply revision of special sciences for the sake of metaphysical comfort. The purpose of this chapter is to motivate OSR from contemporary fundamental physics, as the PNC requires. This chapter argues for a position that consists in the conjunction of eliminativism about self-subsistent individuals, the view that relational structure is ontologically fundamental, and structural realism (interpreted as the claim that science describes the objective modal structure of the world).

The introduction defines the Greek love novel, or ‘ideal’ novel, and considers its relation to other strains of Graeco‐Roman prose fiction. It reviews the history and the current relevance of enquiries into the origins of the Greek love novel and suggests a generic model based on individual emulations and variations as an alternative to the predominant idea of an abstract novelistic matrix. A description of the methodological approach of the book is provided, which consists of the combination of arguments from literary history on the one hand and from Chariton's poetics, implied in his metaliterary self‐references, on the other. A preview of the course of the investigation gives readers an idea of the main points to follow and helps them navigate through the following chapters.