Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing ...
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Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.Less
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.
Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.
This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.
Ronald de Sousa
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195189858
- eISBN:
- 9780199868377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189858.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the relation between individual and collective rationality. A sketch of some of the better-known models of emergent collective organization on the basis of purely individual ...
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This chapter explores the relation between individual and collective rationality. A sketch of some of the better-known models of emergent collective organization on the basis of purely individual interactions illustrates some of the advantages, problems, and limitations of the move from individual to collective rationality. The chapter considers the debate concerning the units of selection, group selection, and the main explanations that have so far been adduced to explain the paradox of individual altruism: how is the Darwinian hypothesis of a universal “struggle for survival” compatible with the fact that human beings sometimes actually sacrifice themselves for a cause that benefits only others?Less
This chapter explores the relation between individual and collective rationality. A sketch of some of the better-known models of emergent collective organization on the basis of purely individual interactions illustrates some of the advantages, problems, and limitations of the move from individual to collective rationality. The chapter considers the debate concerning the units of selection, group selection, and the main explanations that have so far been adduced to explain the paradox of individual altruism: how is the Darwinian hypothesis of a universal “struggle for survival” compatible with the fact that human beings sometimes actually sacrifice themselves for a cause that benefits only others?
Kaushik Basu
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296713
- eISBN:
- 9780191595943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296711.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter analyses the concept of individual rationality. It covers internal consistency, procrastination and addiction, the Traveler’s Dilemma, the simplified E-Mail Game, the paradox of ...
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This chapter analyses the concept of individual rationality. It covers internal consistency, procrastination and addiction, the Traveler’s Dilemma, the simplified E-Mail Game, the paradox of cognition. It discusses the rejection of the so-called “axiom of transparency”, which states that if a person knows something, then the person knows that he know it.Less
This chapter analyses the concept of individual rationality. It covers internal consistency, procrastination and addiction, the Traveler’s Dilemma, the simplified E-Mail Game, the paradox of cognition. It discusses the rejection of the so-called “axiom of transparency”, which states that if a person knows something, then the person knows that he know it.
Paul. Thagard
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195145397
- eISBN:
- 9780199752393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145399.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Thagard provides a review and assessment of central aspects of rationality in science, dealing first with the traditional question: What is the nature of the reasoning by which individual scientists ...
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Thagard provides a review and assessment of central aspects of rationality in science, dealing first with the traditional question: What is the nature of the reasoning by which individual scientists accept and reject conflicting hypotheses? He also discusses the nature of practical reason in science and then turns to the question of the nature of group rationality in science. In this latter context, Thagard discusses, among other matters, his CCC (for consensus = coherence + communication) model, which shows how epistemic group rationality can arise in agents who communicate with each other while focusing on the explanation of observed phenomena. In the remainder of the chapter he examines whether scientists are in fact rational, that is, whether they conform to normative standards of individual and group rationality. He considers various psychological and sociological factors that have been taken to undermine the rationality of science.Less
Thagard provides a review and assessment of central aspects of rationality in science, dealing first with the traditional question: What is the nature of the reasoning by which individual scientists accept and reject conflicting hypotheses? He also discusses the nature of practical reason in science and then turns to the question of the nature of group rationality in science. In this latter context, Thagard discusses, among other matters, his CCC (for consensus = coherence + communication) model, which shows how epistemic group rationality can arise in agents who communicate with each other while focusing on the explanation of observed phenomena. In the remainder of the chapter he examines whether scientists are in fact rational, that is, whether they conform to normative standards of individual and group rationality. He considers various psychological and sociological factors that have been taken to undermine the rationality of science.
Scott Barrett
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199286096
- eISBN:
- 9780191602832
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286094.003.0007
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Building on the information developed in the previous six chapters, this chapter develops a theoretical model of international cooperation by means of the treaty instrument. The focus is on ...
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Building on the information developed in the previous six chapters, this chapter develops a theoretical model of international cooperation by means of the treaty instrument. The focus is on explaining why treaty participation is difficult to enforce. The theory shows that a treaty sustains cooperation by transforming the prisoners’ dilemma. It also shows that there is a limit to how far this approach can improve on non-cooperation. The theory is illustrated by the case study of conserving anadromous fish stocks.Less
Building on the information developed in the previous six chapters, this chapter develops a theoretical model of international cooperation by means of the treaty instrument. The focus is on explaining why treaty participation is difficult to enforce. The theory shows that a treaty sustains cooperation by transforming the prisoners’ dilemma. It also shows that there is a limit to how far this approach can improve on non-cooperation. The theory is illustrated by the case study of conserving anadromous fish stocks.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199936502
- eISBN:
- 9780199362530
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936502.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that group actions are rational if the individual acts that constitute them are rational. It observes that individuals sometimes have conflicting goals and desires when they make ...
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This chapter argues that group actions are rational if the individual acts that constitute them are rational. It observes that individuals sometimes have conflicting goals and desires when they make decisions. The chapter goes on to acknowledge that some of the requirements that individuals can face align well with group efficiency, but that satisfying them can conflict with desires that the individuals may have quaqua individuals. The reverse is also possible. The chapter denies, however, that such cases reveal genuine conflicts between individual and collective rationality. Collective rationality does not demand individual efficiency in conditions that are not ideal for joint action. Furthermore, it is not irrational for individuals to make a trade-off between competing goals. In line with this, it argues that in the context of judgment aggregation, individuals can tolerate occasional inconsistencies without this entailing irrationality. The chapter concludes that individual rationality entails collective rationality.Less
This chapter argues that group actions are rational if the individual acts that constitute them are rational. It observes that individuals sometimes have conflicting goals and desires when they make decisions. The chapter goes on to acknowledge that some of the requirements that individuals can face align well with group efficiency, but that satisfying them can conflict with desires that the individuals may have quaqua individuals. The reverse is also possible. The chapter denies, however, that such cases reveal genuine conflicts between individual and collective rationality. Collective rationality does not demand individual efficiency in conditions that are not ideal for joint action. Furthermore, it is not irrational for individuals to make a trade-off between competing goals. In line with this, it argues that in the context of judgment aggregation, individuals can tolerate occasional inconsistencies without this entailing irrationality. The chapter concludes that individual rationality entails collective rationality.
Abraham Sesshu Roth
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199936502
- eISBN:
- 9780199362530
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936502.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter concerns the rationality of group agents. The chapter challenges List and Pettit’s argument in which group agents have to collectivize reason and apply criteria such as consistency at ...
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This chapter concerns the rationality of group agents. The chapter challenges List and Pettit’s argument in which group agents have to collectivize reason and apply criteria such as consistency at the group level rather than at the individual level. It argues that, in order for a group’s rationality to truly override the rational concerns of the individuals, it must not be rational for the individuals to implement the group judgment. If this were the case, the group’s decision and subsequent action would be straightforwardly rational from the perspective of the individual members. For example, if the members of a committee were to realize that they were on the cusp of a collectively irrational vote, and the members of the committee were each to be penalized for such a vote, then there is no conflict between individual and group level decisions. It would be straightforwardly rational for the individuals to vote in such a way as to avoid those penalties and thereby to safeguard the rationality of the group. In this way, the chapter raises the stakes in the debate about what Pettit has called “group minds.”Less
This chapter concerns the rationality of group agents. The chapter challenges List and Pettit’s argument in which group agents have to collectivize reason and apply criteria such as consistency at the group level rather than at the individual level. It argues that, in order for a group’s rationality to truly override the rational concerns of the individuals, it must not be rational for the individuals to implement the group judgment. If this were the case, the group’s decision and subsequent action would be straightforwardly rational from the perspective of the individual members. For example, if the members of a committee were to realize that they were on the cusp of a collectively irrational vote, and the members of the committee were each to be penalized for such a vote, then there is no conflict between individual and group level decisions. It would be straightforwardly rational for the individuals to vote in such a way as to avoid those penalties and thereby to safeguard the rationality of the group. In this way, the chapter raises the stakes in the debate about what Pettit has called “group minds.”
Jules L. Coleman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199253616
- eISBN:
- 9780191719776
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253616.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations, Philosophy of Law
This chapter shows that rational contractors seek to create mutually advantageous, enforcable agreements. Doing so requires that they satisfy three independent rationality conditions: joint, ...
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This chapter shows that rational contractors seek to create mutually advantageous, enforcable agreements. Doing so requires that they satisfy three independent rationality conditions: joint, concession, and individual rationality. A process of rational bargaining can satisfy these conditions but still fail to reach fruition because of uncertainty deriving from incomplete or imperfect information, or from potential defection. Creating safeguards requires parties to incur three distinct kinds of cost corresponding to the phases in contracting: search costs (pre-phase), decision costs (negotiation phase), and monitoring costs (post-phase). The ways in which the social environment can be altered to reduce uncertainty thereby increasing the possibility of rational cooperation, are discussed.Less
This chapter shows that rational contractors seek to create mutually advantageous, enforcable agreements. Doing so requires that they satisfy three independent rationality conditions: joint, concession, and individual rationality. A process of rational bargaining can satisfy these conditions but still fail to reach fruition because of uncertainty deriving from incomplete or imperfect information, or from potential defection. Creating safeguards requires parties to incur three distinct kinds of cost corresponding to the phases in contracting: search costs (pre-phase), decision costs (negotiation phase), and monitoring costs (post-phase). The ways in which the social environment can be altered to reduce uncertainty thereby increasing the possibility of rational cooperation, are discussed.
Paul De Grauwe
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198784289
- eISBN:
- 9780191826856
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784289.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
The market system is an extraordinarily effective mechanism for creating material prosperity. Countries which have renounced the market system, as in the case of many previously communist regimes, ...
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The market system is an extraordinarily effective mechanism for creating material prosperity. Countries which have renounced the market system, as in the case of many previously communist regimes, have learned the hard way that it leads to stagnation and collective poverty. Capitalism, by contrast, is successful thanks to its decentralized character, whereby everyone strives for his or her own interests. The market system, however, also comes up against its limits, which arise because individual and collective rationality do not coincide. Firms which pollute the air and water may maximize their individual profit, but not the prosperity of society as a whole. The market system also awakens the cold, calculating System II in individuals, without taking into account our emotional side, System I, thus leading to internal conflict in individuals.Less
The market system is an extraordinarily effective mechanism for creating material prosperity. Countries which have renounced the market system, as in the case of many previously communist regimes, have learned the hard way that it leads to stagnation and collective poverty. Capitalism, by contrast, is successful thanks to its decentralized character, whereby everyone strives for his or her own interests. The market system, however, also comes up against its limits, which arise because individual and collective rationality do not coincide. Firms which pollute the air and water may maximize their individual profit, but not the prosperity of society as a whole. The market system also awakens the cold, calculating System II in individuals, without taking into account our emotional side, System I, thus leading to internal conflict in individuals.
Alan Kirman and Louis‐André Gérard‐Varet
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292111
- eISBN:
- 9780191596537
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292112.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, Microeconomics
The author suggests that the problem of aggregation in economics has been treated in too extreme a way. Economists want to deal with all individuals as in the General Equilibrium approach, or to ...
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The author suggests that the problem of aggregation in economics has been treated in too extreme a way. Economists want to deal with all individuals as in the General Equilibrium approach, or to model a representative agent, or to deal with the relation between aggregate variables. Philippe Michel argues in favour of a partial disaggregation into several categories of representative agents. He suggests that this would be a more fruitful approach to macroeconomics.Less
The author suggests that the problem of aggregation in economics has been treated in too extreme a way. Economists want to deal with all individuals as in the General Equilibrium approach, or to model a representative agent, or to deal with the relation between aggregate variables. Philippe Michel argues in favour of a partial disaggregation into several categories of representative agents. He suggests that this would be a more fruitful approach to macroeconomics.
Mark Kelman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199755608
- eISBN:
- 9780199895236
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755608.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The chapter considers H&B and F&F attitudes towards market failure and information disclosure, highlighting first that policymakers influenced by the H&B school have worried about internal as well as ...
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The chapter considers H&B and F&F attitudes towards market failure and information disclosure, highlighting first that policymakers influenced by the H&B school have worried about internal as well as external impediments to making self-regarding choices and the misevaluation of the performance of members of “outsider” groups. It further emphasizes the H&B commitment to programs best described as “libertarian paternalist” or “asymmetrically paternalist,” intended to interfere with a subject’s immediate “liberty” but not her autonomy and also meant to permit subjects who have atypical tastes to manifest those tastes in ways that mandates would not. Policymakers influenced by F&F theory have emphasized, to a much greater extent, that typical disclosure policies are misguided: while it is desirable to improve the form in which information is presented, increasing the amount of information that consumers receive is generally counterproductive because information might “crowd out” the search for a single best lexical cue. The chapter questions the viability of each approach, arguing that neither truly works absent a separate theory of what substantive choices are ideal.Less
The chapter considers H&B and F&F attitudes towards market failure and information disclosure, highlighting first that policymakers influenced by the H&B school have worried about internal as well as external impediments to making self-regarding choices and the misevaluation of the performance of members of “outsider” groups. It further emphasizes the H&B commitment to programs best described as “libertarian paternalist” or “asymmetrically paternalist,” intended to interfere with a subject’s immediate “liberty” but not her autonomy and also meant to permit subjects who have atypical tastes to manifest those tastes in ways that mandates would not. Policymakers influenced by F&F theory have emphasized, to a much greater extent, that typical disclosure policies are misguided: while it is desirable to improve the form in which information is presented, increasing the amount of information that consumers receive is generally counterproductive because information might “crowd out” the search for a single best lexical cue. The chapter questions the viability of each approach, arguing that neither truly works absent a separate theory of what substantive choices are ideal.
Amir Ronen
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262033428
- eISBN:
- 9780262302920
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0016
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Technology and Society
This chapter presents modifications of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism of combinatorial auctions (CAs) that are computationally easy, and which restore individual rationality and incentive ...
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This chapter presents modifications of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism of combinatorial auctions (CAs) that are computationally easy, and which restore individual rationality and incentive compatibility. These modifications are second-chance mechanisms, which satisfy individual rationality and can be applied whenever other mechanisms such as VCG, weighted VCG, or compensation and bonus mechanisms are applicable. The chapter discusses the game theoretic properties of non-optimal incentive compatible VCG mechanisms, which are individually rational and, as a result, lead to poor economic efficiency. It further describes the effects of limited computation but unlimited communication in VCG mechanisms, along with a discussion of various non-VCG approximation mechanisms for restricted CAs. The chapter also discusses all three categories of alternative approaches to the intractability of VCG mechanisms for CAs.Less
This chapter presents modifications of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism of combinatorial auctions (CAs) that are computationally easy, and which restore individual rationality and incentive compatibility. These modifications are second-chance mechanisms, which satisfy individual rationality and can be applied whenever other mechanisms such as VCG, weighted VCG, or compensation and bonus mechanisms are applicable. The chapter discusses the game theoretic properties of non-optimal incentive compatible VCG mechanisms, which are individually rational and, as a result, lead to poor economic efficiency. It further describes the effects of limited computation but unlimited communication in VCG mechanisms, along with a discussion of various non-VCG approximation mechanisms for restricted CAs. The chapter also discusses all three categories of alternative approaches to the intractability of VCG mechanisms for CAs.
Howard Stein
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226771670
- eISBN:
- 9780226771656
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226771656.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
Despite massive investment of money and research aimed at ameliorating third-world poverty, the development strategies of the international financial institutions over the past few decades have been ...
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Despite massive investment of money and research aimed at ameliorating third-world poverty, the development strategies of the international financial institutions over the past few decades have been a profound failure. Under the tutelage of the World Bank, developing countries have experienced lower growth and rising inequality compared to previous periods. This book argues that the controversial institution is plagued by a myopic, neoclassical mindset that wrongly focuses on individual rationality and downplays the social and political contexts that can either facilitate or impede development. Drawing on the examples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and transitional European economies, this volume proposes an alternative vision of institutional development with chapter-length applications to finance, state formation, and health care to provide a holistic, contextualized solution to the problems of developing nations.Less
Despite massive investment of money and research aimed at ameliorating third-world poverty, the development strategies of the international financial institutions over the past few decades have been a profound failure. Under the tutelage of the World Bank, developing countries have experienced lower growth and rising inequality compared to previous periods. This book argues that the controversial institution is plagued by a myopic, neoclassical mindset that wrongly focuses on individual rationality and downplays the social and political contexts that can either facilitate or impede development. Drawing on the examples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and transitional European economies, this volume proposes an alternative vision of institutional development with chapter-length applications to finance, state formation, and health care to provide a holistic, contextualized solution to the problems of developing nations.
