John F. Horty
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195134612
- eISBN:
- 9780199833269
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195134613.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Develops deontic logic against the background of a rigorous theory of agency in branching, or indeterministic, time. It is often assumed that the notion of what an agent ought to do can be identified ...
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Develops deontic logic against the background of a rigorous theory of agency in branching, or indeterministic, time. It is often assumed that the notion of what an agent ought to do can be identified with that of what it ought to be that the agent does. The book provides a framework in which this assumption can be formulated precisely and shown to be mistaken. In its place, it offers an alternative account of what agents ought to do that relies on an analogy between action in indeterministic time and choice under uncertainty, as it is studied in decision theory. This alternative account is then related to issues involving conditional obligation, group obligation, act utilitarianism, and rule utilitarianism.Less
Develops deontic logic against the background of a rigorous theory of agency in branching, or indeterministic, time. It is often assumed that the notion of what an agent ought to do can be identified with that of what it ought to be that the agent does. The book provides a framework in which this assumption can be formulated precisely and shown to be mistaken. In its place, it offers an alternative account of what agents ought to do that relies on an analogy between action in indeterministic time and choice under uncertainty, as it is studied in decision theory. This alternative account is then related to issues involving conditional obligation, group obligation, act utilitarianism, and rule utilitarianism.
Amie L. Thomasson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195319910
- eISBN:
- 9780199869602
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Unger's sorites-style argument against ordinary objects relies on the vagueness of the associated terms. While standard solutions to the problems of vagueness are often accused of being ad hoc, this ...
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Unger's sorites-style argument against ordinary objects relies on the vagueness of the associated terms. While standard solutions to the problems of vagueness are often accused of being ad hoc, this chapter argues that the above view of reference provides an understanding of the source of vagueness that suggests that supervaluational solutions and Tye's indeterminist solution are entirely suitable and not ad hoc. Others reject ordinary objects given worries that these objects would have to be vague, since ontic vagueness is often considered incoherent. This chapter also addresses Horgan's and Evans' reasons for rejecting ontic vagueness, arguing that the kind of vagueness in the world that we must posit to accept ordinary objects is a kind of anodyne vagueness that explains the vagueness in the world in terms of vagueness in our representations, but that even serious ontological vagueness does not present the difficulties it is thought to.Less
Unger's sorites-style argument against ordinary objects relies on the vagueness of the associated terms. While standard solutions to the problems of vagueness are often accused of being ad hoc, this chapter argues that the above view of reference provides an understanding of the source of vagueness that suggests that supervaluational solutions and Tye's indeterminist solution are entirely suitable and not ad hoc. Others reject ordinary objects given worries that these objects would have to be vague, since ontic vagueness is often considered incoherent. This chapter also addresses Horgan's and Evans' reasons for rejecting ontic vagueness, arguing that the kind of vagueness in the world that we must posit to accept ordinary objects is a kind of anodyne vagueness that explains the vagueness in the world in terms of vagueness in our representations, but that even serious ontological vagueness does not present the difficulties it is thought to.
Timothy O'Connor
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195153743
- eISBN:
- 9780199867080
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515374X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The author considers versions of two types of indeterminist accounts of free will: simple indeterminism, on which an agent's control over his own action is entirely noncausal, and causal ...
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The author considers versions of two types of indeterminist accounts of free will: simple indeterminism, on which an agent's control over his own action is entirely noncausal, and causal indeterminism, on which control is exercised through the indeterministic causation of one's action by one's reasons. He argues that neither approach gives a plausible account of the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility. The work of Ginet, Nozick, McCall, and Kane are discussed.Less
The author considers versions of two types of indeterminist accounts of free will: simple indeterminism, on which an agent's control over his own action is entirely noncausal, and causal indeterminism, on which control is exercised through the indeterministic causation of one's action by one's reasons. He argues that neither approach gives a plausible account of the kind of freedom that is required for moral responsibility. The work of Ginet, Nozick, McCall, and Kane are discussed.
Nuel Belnap, Thomas Müller, and Tomasz Placek
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- December 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780190884314
- eISBN:
- 9780190884345
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190884314.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book develops a rigorous theory of indeterminism as a local and modal concept. Its crucial insight is that our world contains events or processes with alternative, really possible outcomes. The ...
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This book develops a rigorous theory of indeterminism as a local and modal concept. Its crucial insight is that our world contains events or processes with alternative, really possible outcomes. The theory aims at clarifying what this assumption involves, and it does it in two ways. First, it provides a mathematically rigorous framework for local and modal indeterminism. Second, we support that theory by spelling out the philosophically relevant consequences of this formulation and by showing its fruitful applications in metaphysics. To this end, we offer a formal analysis of modal correlations and of causation, which is applicable in indeterministic and non-local contexts as well. We also propose a rigorous theory of objective single-case probabilities, intended to represent degrees of possibility. In a third step, we link our theory to current physics, investigating how local and modal indeterminism relates to issues in the foundations of physics, in particular, quantum non-locality and spatio-temporal relativity. The book also ventures into the philosophy of time, showing how the theory’s resources can be used to explicate the dynamic concept of the past, present, and future based on local indeterminism.Less
This book develops a rigorous theory of indeterminism as a local and modal concept. Its crucial insight is that our world contains events or processes with alternative, really possible outcomes. The theory aims at clarifying what this assumption involves, and it does it in two ways. First, it provides a mathematically rigorous framework for local and modal indeterminism. Second, we support that theory by spelling out the philosophically relevant consequences of this formulation and by showing its fruitful applications in metaphysics. To this end, we offer a formal analysis of modal correlations and of causation, which is applicable in indeterministic and non-local contexts as well. We also propose a rigorous theory of objective single-case probabilities, intended to represent degrees of possibility. In a third step, we link our theory to current physics, investigating how local and modal indeterminism relates to issues in the foundations of physics, in particular, quantum non-locality and spatio-temporal relativity. The book also ventures into the philosophy of time, showing how the theory’s resources can be used to explicate the dynamic concept of the past, present, and future based on local indeterminism.
Tapio Luoma
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195151893
- eISBN:
- 9780199834419
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195151895.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Torrance holds that the scientists James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein remind theology of its ontological basis in the Incarnation and the Trinity, a basis largely neglected in modern theology. ...
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Torrance holds that the scientists James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein remind theology of its ontological basis in the Incarnation and the Trinity, a basis largely neglected in modern theology. Torrance's view of the indeterminism of Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field as well as Einstein's theory of relativity is grounded on his understanding of the tension between causal relations and inherent relations. Torrance sees a deep epistemological integration taking place in the modern natural sciences, e.g., between noumenal and phenomenal as held by Immanuel Kant and between subject and object as entertained in Cartesianism, all features that cannot but have a positive effect on theology. Torrance is detected to use the natural sciences for programmatic purposes, first, to regard theology as an empirical science, whether it deals with Christology and the Trinity or Biblical interpretation, and, second, to provide the ecumenical movement with insights resulting from a major paradigm shift in the Western culture.Less
Torrance holds that the scientists James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein remind theology of its ontological basis in the Incarnation and the Trinity, a basis largely neglected in modern theology. Torrance's view of the indeterminism of Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field as well as Einstein's theory of relativity is grounded on his understanding of the tension between causal relations and inherent relations. Torrance sees a deep epistemological integration taking place in the modern natural sciences, e.g., between noumenal and phenomenal as held by Immanuel Kant and between subject and object as entertained in Cartesianism, all features that cannot but have a positive effect on theology. Torrance is detected to use the natural sciences for programmatic purposes, first, to regard theology as an empirical science, whether it deals with Christology and the Trinity or Biblical interpretation, and, second, to provide the ecumenical movement with insights resulting from a major paradigm shift in the Western culture.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom ...
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According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom are examples of what one may call Constraint Compatibilism (CC). This chapter argues that, properly understood, CC entails not only that we are virtually always able to act freely, but also that virtually all if not all our actual actions are free. The suggestion is not so much that this is a hitherto unnoticed consequence of CC, but, rather, that there is a certain way of conceiving of freedom implicit in CC that has not been taken sufficiently seriously.Less
According to standard compatibilist accounts of freedom, human beings act freely just so long as they are, when they act, free from constraints of certain specified kinds. Such accounts of freedom are examples of what one may call Constraint Compatibilism (CC). This chapter argues that, properly understood, CC entails not only that we are virtually always able to act freely, but also that virtually all if not all our actual actions are free. The suggestion is not so much that this is a hitherto unnoticed consequence of CC, but, rather, that there is a certain way of conceiving of freedom implicit in CC that has not been taken sufficiently seriously.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
If we are to be truly or ultimately morally responsible for what we do, we must be truly or ultimately responsible for how we are, at least in certain mental respects. This is because what we ...
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If we are to be truly or ultimately morally responsible for what we do, we must be truly or ultimately responsible for how we are, at least in certain mental respects. This is because what we intentionally do is a function of how we are, mentally speaking. But we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we are, either mentally speaking or in any other respect. Nothing can be the ultimate cause of itself in any respect. Even if God can be, we can't be. Given the concept of moral responsibility that is culturally fundamental in the West, this argument may be used to show that ultimate moral responsibility is provably impossible.Less
If we are to be truly or ultimately morally responsible for what we do, we must be truly or ultimately responsible for how we are, at least in certain mental respects. This is because what we intentionally do is a function of how we are, mentally speaking. But we cannot be ultimately responsible for how we are, either mentally speaking or in any other respect. Nothing can be the ultimate cause of itself in any respect. Even if God can be, we can't be. Given the concept of moral responsibility that is culturally fundamental in the West, this argument may be used to show that ultimate moral responsibility is provably impossible.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins with some brief reflections on the definition of determinism, on the notion of the subject of experience, and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events. The ...
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This chapter begins with some brief reflections on the definition of determinism, on the notion of the subject of experience, and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events. The main discussion focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book, A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ‘life-hopes’). It is argued that this is half right: the truth of determinism does indeed threaten certain vital parts of our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents. The trouble is that the falsity of determinism does not diminish the threat in any useful way. The old, natural, and recurrent mistake is to think that we would really be better off, so far as free will and moral responsibility (and our ‘life-hopes’) were concerned, if determinism was false. It is argued that there is no important sense in which this is true, and that the question of whether determinism is true or false is therefore of no real importance, so far as the free will debate is concerned.Less
This chapter begins with some brief reflections on the definition of determinism, on the notion of the subject of experience, and on the relation between conscious experience and brain events. The main discussion focuses on the traditional view, endorsed by Honderich in his book, A Theory of Determinism, that the truth of determinism poses some special threat to our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents (and also to our ‘life-hopes’). It is argued that this is half right: the truth of determinism does indeed threaten certain vital parts of our ordinary conception of ourselves as morally responsible free agents. The trouble is that the falsity of determinism does not diminish the threat in any useful way. The old, natural, and recurrent mistake is to think that we would really be better off, so far as free will and moral responsibility (and our ‘life-hopes’) were concerned, if determinism was false. It is argued that there is no important sense in which this is true, and that the question of whether determinism is true or false is therefore of no real importance, so far as the free will debate is concerned.
Galen Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199267422
- eISBN:
- 9780191708343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter tries to give an account of necessary and sufficient conditions of true freedom of action, of true or ultimate responsibility, even while acknowledging that such ultimate responsibility ...
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This chapter tries to give an account of necessary and sufficient conditions of true freedom of action, of true or ultimate responsibility, even while acknowledging that such ultimate responsibility is impossible, because one of the conditions — being causa sui, or absolutely self-originating — is unfulfillable. The chapter considers various forms of the ‘able-to-choose’ condition on freedom, and summarizes the seemingly paradoxical claim that one of the conditions of truly free action is believing that you are free.Less
This chapter tries to give an account of necessary and sufficient conditions of true freedom of action, of true or ultimate responsibility, even while acknowledging that such ultimate responsibility is impossible, because one of the conditions — being causa sui, or absolutely self-originating — is unfulfillable. The chapter considers various forms of the ‘able-to-choose’ condition on freedom, and summarizes the seemingly paradoxical claim that one of the conditions of truly free action is believing that you are free.
David Hodgson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845309
- eISBN:
- 9780199932269
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845309.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, General
In Chapter 7, I consider whether the general picture of the world suggested by the physical sciences is compatible with my position. I argue that the best contemporary physical theories support two ...
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In Chapter 7, I consider whether the general picture of the world suggested by the physical sciences is compatible with my position. I argue that the best contemporary physical theories support two propositions favourable to my contentions, namely that causation is not local and that the world is not deterministic, and I contend that the Conway/Kochen free will theorem strongly supports rejection of determinism. I also argue that the so-called block universe view, denying reality to the passage of time and suggesting an unchanging (and in that sense deterministic) universe, is not reasonably tenable.Less
In Chapter 7, I consider whether the general picture of the world suggested by the physical sciences is compatible with my position. I argue that the best contemporary physical theories support two propositions favourable to my contentions, namely that causation is not local and that the world is not deterministic, and I contend that the Conway/Kochen free will theorem strongly supports rejection of determinism. I also argue that the so-called block universe view, denying reality to the passage of time and suggesting an unchanging (and in that sense deterministic) universe, is not reasonably tenable.
Ishtiyaque Haji
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199899203
- eISBN:
- 9780199949885
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899203.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter argues for the following claims. First, if one is an incompatibilist who believes the alternatives that the truth of judgments of objective reasons presupposes are ones incompatible with ...
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The chapter argues for the following claims. First, if one is an incompatibilist who believes the alternatives that the truth of judgments of objective reasons presupposes are ones incompatible with determinism, then determinism precludes a significant slate of normative judgments. Second, from such an incompatibilist perspective, determinism threatens the rationality of a range of moral sentiments. Third, if one is a compatibilist who opts for the view that the truth of judgments of objective reasons presupposes one’s having alternatives that are compatible with determinism, then quite a few versions of semi-compatibilism are not sustainable. For instance, semi-compatibilism with respect to moral obligation—the thesis that although determinism may preclude free will, it does not preclude moral obligation because there is no requirement of alternative possibilities for moral obligation—is false.Less
The chapter argues for the following claims. First, if one is an incompatibilist who believes the alternatives that the truth of judgments of objective reasons presupposes are ones incompatible with determinism, then determinism precludes a significant slate of normative judgments. Second, from such an incompatibilist perspective, determinism threatens the rationality of a range of moral sentiments. Third, if one is a compatibilist who opts for the view that the truth of judgments of objective reasons presupposes one’s having alternatives that are compatible with determinism, then quite a few versions of semi-compatibilism are not sustainable. For instance, semi-compatibilism with respect to moral obligation—the thesis that although determinism may preclude free will, it does not preclude moral obligation because there is no requirement of alternative possibilities for moral obligation—is false.
Ruth Glasner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567737
- eISBN:
- 9780191721472
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567737.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
For the first time Averroes' physics is studied on the basis of all available texts and versions of his three commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, including texts that are extant only in Hebrew ...
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For the first time Averroes' physics is studied on the basis of all available texts and versions of his three commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, including texts that are extant only in Hebrew manuscripts and have not been hitherto studied. A comparison of these sources shows that a diachronic study is absolutely essential. Averroes changed his interpretation of the basic notions of physics—the structure of corporeal reality and the definition of motion—more than once. He has repeatedly rewritten and edited several key chapters in all three commentaries. After many hesitations he offers a bold new interpretation of physics to which this book refers as ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Ideas that are usually ascribed to scholastic scholars and others that were traced back to Averroes but only in a very general form, not only originated with him, but were fully developed by him into a comprehensive and systematic physical system. Unlike earlier Greek or Muslim atomistic systems, Averroes' Aristotelian atomism endeavours to be fully scientific, by Aristotelian standards, and still to provide a basis for an indeterministic natural philosophy. Commonly known as ‘the commentator’ and usually considered to be a faithful follower of Aristotle, Averroes is revealed in his commentaries on the Physics to be an original and sophisticated philosopher.Less
For the first time Averroes' physics is studied on the basis of all available texts and versions of his three commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, including texts that are extant only in Hebrew manuscripts and have not been hitherto studied. A comparison of these sources shows that a diachronic study is absolutely essential. Averroes changed his interpretation of the basic notions of physics—the structure of corporeal reality and the definition of motion—more than once. He has repeatedly rewritten and edited several key chapters in all three commentaries. After many hesitations he offers a bold new interpretation of physics to which this book refers as ‘Aristotelian atomism’. Ideas that are usually ascribed to scholastic scholars and others that were traced back to Averroes but only in a very general form, not only originated with him, but were fully developed by him into a comprehensive and systematic physical system. Unlike earlier Greek or Muslim atomistic systems, Averroes' Aristotelian atomism endeavours to be fully scientific, by Aristotelian standards, and still to provide a basis for an indeterministic natural philosophy. Commonly known as ‘the commentator’ and usually considered to be a faithful follower of Aristotle, Averroes is revealed in his commentaries on the Physics to be an original and sophisticated philosopher.
Ruth Glasner
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199567737
- eISBN:
- 9780191721472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567737.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Physics VIII starts with the succession argument: before any motion there must underline have been a previous motion or change. Averroes was intensively occupied by this ...
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Physics VIII starts with the succession argument: before any motion there must underline have been a previous motion or change. Averroes was intensively occupied by this argument, and its possible deterministic implications. He kept coming back to it, and during the years radically changed his interpretation of it. His agenda was to establish indeterminism as a scientific doctrine based on a firm Aristotelian foundation. He attempts a new interpretation of the succession argument that can support an indeterministic philosophy.Less
Physics VIII starts with the succession argument: before any motion there must underline have been a previous motion or change. Averroes was intensively occupied by this argument, and its possible deterministic implications. He kept coming back to it, and during the years radically changed his interpretation of it. His agenda was to establish indeterminism as a scientific doctrine based on a firm Aristotelian foundation. He attempts a new interpretation of the succession argument that can support an indeterministic philosophy.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0035
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter starts by analysing the concept of desert along lines suggested by Joel Feinberg. It then argues that this concept is applicable to us only if we have ultimate responsibility, i.e., ...
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This chapter starts by analysing the concept of desert along lines suggested by Joel Feinberg. It then argues that this concept is applicable to us only if we have ultimate responsibility, i.e., responsibility for all conditions in virtue of which we have direct responsibility, but that we are not ultimately responsible for anything. It rebuts the attempt by Robert Nozick to block this regress argument against desert by an appeal to rights to our own bodily and psychological resources, as they are conceived in the rights-tradition of John Locke. It also contends that it would be of no avail to assume indeterminism: attributions of desert are undermined irrespective of whether determinism or indeterminism is true. Finally, it rejects the idea that we can have ultimate responsibility because we exercise a special sort of causation, agent-causation, which is irreducible to ordinary causation between events.Less
This chapter starts by analysing the concept of desert along lines suggested by Joel Feinberg. It then argues that this concept is applicable to us only if we have ultimate responsibility, i.e., responsibility for all conditions in virtue of which we have direct responsibility, but that we are not ultimately responsible for anything. It rebuts the attempt by Robert Nozick to block this regress argument against desert by an appeal to rights to our own bodily and psychological resources, as they are conceived in the rights-tradition of John Locke. It also contends that it would be of no avail to assume indeterminism: attributions of desert are undermined irrespective of whether determinism or indeterminism is true. Finally, it rejects the idea that we can have ultimate responsibility because we exercise a special sort of causation, agent-causation, which is irreducible to ordinary causation between events.
John Dupré
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199691982
- eISBN:
- 9780191738111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691982.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter reviews the concept of human nature in the light of recent biology, and considers whether this is a concept that should be imported into the social sciences from biology, or whether its ...
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This chapter reviews the concept of human nature in the light of recent biology, and considers whether this is a concept that should be imported into the social sciences from biology, or whether its investigation is part of the agenda of the social sciences. The conclusion defended is that human nature can only be understood properly from multiple perspectives, both social and biological. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the status of free will. Deviating from earlier discussion which advocated a traditional libertarianism, the chapter and an appendix defend what what the author calls compatibilist indeterminism.Less
This chapter reviews the concept of human nature in the light of recent biology, and considers whether this is a concept that should be imported into the social sciences from biology, or whether its investigation is part of the agenda of the social sciences. The conclusion defended is that human nature can only be understood properly from multiple perspectives, both social and biological. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the status of free will. Deviating from earlier discussion which advocated a traditional libertarianism, the chapter and an appendix defend what what the author calls compatibilist indeterminism.
Helen Steward
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199552054
- eISBN:
- 9780191738838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552054.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter confronts the ‘Challenge from Chance’, which has always been the main difficulty faced by libertarianism. The problem is that it is difficult to see how the mere truth of indeterminism ...
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This chapter confronts the ‘Challenge from Chance’, which has always been the main difficulty faced by libertarianism. The problem is that it is difficult to see how the mere truth of indeterminism might make room for the kind of control over the future we feel we might not have if determinism is true—in some ways, indeed, indeterminism appears to make things even worse. In this chapter, it is argued, focusing in detail on Mele’s formulation of the problem of luck, that the libertarian should make an important concession to the compatibilist, and that having made it, the way is clear for a better understanding of the sorts of alternative possibilities which really are required for agency, and therefore, for freedom. The incompatibilism which results, it is argued, can meet the Challenge from Chance.Less
This chapter confronts the ‘Challenge from Chance’, which has always been the main difficulty faced by libertarianism. The problem is that it is difficult to see how the mere truth of indeterminism might make room for the kind of control over the future we feel we might not have if determinism is true—in some ways, indeed, indeterminism appears to make things even worse. In this chapter, it is argued, focusing in detail on Mele’s formulation of the problem of luck, that the libertarian should make an important concession to the compatibilist, and that having made it, the way is clear for a better understanding of the sorts of alternative possibilities which really are required for agency, and therefore, for freedom. The incompatibilism which results, it is argued, can meet the Challenge from Chance.
Robert Kane
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195126563
- eISBN:
- 9780199868506
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195126564.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The first of two goals of this book is to provide a critical survey of the major debates about free will and determinism of the past quarter century, a period during which there have been many new ...
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The first of two goals of this book is to provide a critical survey of the major debates about free will and determinism of the past quarter century, a period during which there have been many new developments in the study of this ancient philosophical problem. The book seeks to acquaint readers with current debates and new developments on free will, showing their relevance to broad contemporary concerns in ethics, politics, science, religion, and humanities. The second goal of the book is to defend a traditional view of free will and moral responsibility, according to which both are incompatible with determinism. In response to claims that such a traditional view of free will (often nowadays called an “incompatibilist” or “libertarian” view) has no place in the modern scientific picture of the world, the book argues that a nondeterminist conception of free will can be defended without the usual appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency and can be reconciled with recent developments in the sciences – physical, biological, neurological, cognitive, and behavioral. The book also discusses the relation of free will to other important topics, such as morality, dignity, rationality, creativity, autonomy, desert, causation, consciousness, alternative possibilities, explanations of action, reasons for action, practical reason, weakness of will, incommensurability of values, and others.Less
The first of two goals of this book is to provide a critical survey of the major debates about free will and determinism of the past quarter century, a period during which there have been many new developments in the study of this ancient philosophical problem. The book seeks to acquaint readers with current debates and new developments on free will, showing their relevance to broad contemporary concerns in ethics, politics, science, religion, and humanities. The second goal of the book is to defend a traditional view of free will and moral responsibility, according to which both are incompatible with determinism. In response to claims that such a traditional view of free will (often nowadays called an “incompatibilist” or “libertarian” view) has no place in the modern scientific picture of the world, the book argues that a nondeterminist conception of free will can be defended without the usual appeals to obscure or mysterious forms of agency and can be reconciled with recent developments in the sciences – physical, biological, neurological, cognitive, and behavioral. The book also discusses the relation of free will to other important topics, such as morality, dignity, rationality, creativity, autonomy, desert, causation, consciousness, alternative possibilities, explanations of action, reasons for action, practical reason, weakness of will, incommensurability of values, and others.
Wesley C. Salmon
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195108644
- eISBN:
- 9780199833627
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195108647.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Brings together 26 of Salmon's essays, including 7 that have never before been published and others that are difficult to find. Part I (Introductory Essays: Causality, Determinism, and Explanation) ...
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Brings together 26 of Salmon's essays, including 7 that have never before been published and others that are difficult to find. Part I (Introductory Essays: Causality, Determinism, and Explanation) comprises five essays that presuppose no formal training in philosophy of science and form a background for subsequent essays. Parts II (Scientific Explanation) and III (Causality) contain Salmon's seminal work on these topics. The essays in Part II present aspects of the evolution of the author's thought about scientific explanation, and include critical examination of the claim that explanations are arguments and a carefully reasoned defense of explanatory asymmetry. Those in Part III develop the details of the theory sketched in Ch. 1. This theory identifies causal connections with physical processes that transmit causal influence from one space‐time location to another, and it incorporates probabilistic features of causality, keeping open the possibility that causality operates in indeterministic contexts. Part IV (Concise Overviews) offers survey articles that discuss advanced material but remain accessible to those outside philosophy of science. Essays in Part V (Applications to Other Disciplines: Archaeology and Anthropology, Astrophysics and Cosmology, and Physics) address specific issues, in particular, scientific disciplines, including the applicability of various models of explanation.Less
Brings together 26 of Salmon's essays, including 7 that have never before been published and others that are difficult to find. Part I (Introductory Essays: Causality, Determinism, and Explanation) comprises five essays that presuppose no formal training in philosophy of science and form a background for subsequent essays. Parts II (Scientific Explanation) and III (Causality) contain Salmon's seminal work on these topics. The essays in Part II present aspects of the evolution of the author's thought about scientific explanation, and include critical examination of the claim that explanations are arguments and a carefully reasoned defense of explanatory asymmetry. Those in Part III develop the details of the theory sketched in Ch. 1. This theory identifies causal connections with physical processes that transmit causal influence from one space‐time location to another, and it incorporates probabilistic features of causality, keeping open the possibility that causality operates in indeterministic contexts. Part IV (Concise Overviews) offers survey articles that discuss advanced material but remain accessible to those outside philosophy of science. Essays in Part V (Applications to Other Disciplines: Archaeology and Anthropology, Astrophysics and Cosmology, and Physics) address specific issues, in particular, scientific disciplines, including the applicability of various models of explanation.
Randolph Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195159875
- eISBN:
- 9780199835010
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515987X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Libertarian accounts of free will face objections that the indeterminism they require would leave behavior random, inexplicable, and beyond agents’ control. This book examines three main types of ...
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Libertarian accounts of free will face objections that the indeterminism they require would leave behavior random, inexplicable, and beyond agents’ control. This book examines three main types of libertarian views—noncausal, event-causal, and agent-causal—to see how well they can meet such challenges. Noncausal accounts are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation. Event-causal and agent-causal accounts are defended against a number of objections. But if both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, then there is no adequate account of free will.Less
Libertarian accounts of free will face objections that the indeterminism they require would leave behavior random, inexplicable, and beyond agents’ control. This book examines three main types of libertarian views—noncausal, event-causal, and agent-causal—to see how well they can meet such challenges. Noncausal accounts are found not to offer satisfactory views of action and reason-explanation. Event-causal and agent-causal accounts are defended against a number of objections. But if both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, then there is no adequate account of free will.
Arthur Prior
- Published in print:
- 1967
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243113
- eISBN:
- 9780191680632
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243113.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter covers the following topics: arguments for the incompatibility of foreknowledge (and fore-truth) and indeterminism, formalization of these arguments, the classical answers to these ...
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This chapter covers the following topics: arguments for the incompatibility of foreknowledge (and fore-truth) and indeterminism, formalization of these arguments, the classical answers to these arguments, formalization of the Ockhamist answer, ultimately converging time, formalization of the Peircean answer and comparison with the Ockhamist, the Peircean senses of ‘will’, and propositions that are neither true nor false.Less
This chapter covers the following topics: arguments for the incompatibility of foreknowledge (and fore-truth) and indeterminism, formalization of these arguments, the classical answers to these arguments, formalization of the Ockhamist answer, ultimately converging time, formalization of the Peircean answer and comparison with the Ockhamist, the Peircean senses of ‘will’, and propositions that are neither true nor false.
