Alexander Orakhelashvili
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199546220
- eISBN:
- 9780191720000
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546220.003.0020
- Subject:
- Law, Public International Law
Given that the generalist element of international legal doctrine has been virtually silent on the problem and implications of the effectiveness and determinacy of international legal regulation, ...
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Given that the generalist element of international legal doctrine has been virtually silent on the problem and implications of the effectiveness and determinacy of international legal regulation, this study examined the material accumulated in doctrine and practice for the past several decades, including the relevant jurisprudence of all major international tribunals. Effectiveness in interpretation serves the more general principle of completeness, determinacy and effectiveness of legal regulation. The methods of interpretation are aimed at preserving the original consent, will, and intention behind the relevant legal instruments and thus at ensuring the determinacy of the relevant provision by enabling its application to facts. These methods are consistently aimed at confronting claims as to the indeterminacy of treaty provisions.Less
Given that the generalist element of international legal doctrine has been virtually silent on the problem and implications of the effectiveness and determinacy of international legal regulation, this study examined the material accumulated in doctrine and practice for the past several decades, including the relevant jurisprudence of all major international tribunals. Effectiveness in interpretation serves the more general principle of completeness, determinacy and effectiveness of legal regulation. The methods of interpretation are aimed at preserving the original consent, will, and intention behind the relevant legal instruments and thus at ensuring the determinacy of the relevant provision by enabling its application to facts. These methods are consistently aimed at confronting claims as to the indeterminacy of treaty provisions.
Terence Parsons
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250449
- eISBN:
- 9780191681301
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250449.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
The author presents a lively and original study of philosophical questions about identity, such as: Is a person identical with that person's body? Puzzles of this kind have not been solved. This book ...
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The author presents a lively and original study of philosophical questions about identity, such as: Is a person identical with that person's body? Puzzles of this kind have not been solved. This book argues, controversially, that this is because there is genuine indeterminacy of identity in the world, rather than in the language used to formulate the questions.Less
The author presents a lively and original study of philosophical questions about identity, such as: Is a person identical with that person's body? Puzzles of this kind have not been solved. This book argues, controversially, that this is because there is genuine indeterminacy of identity in the world, rather than in the language used to formulate the questions.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199242894
- eISBN:
- 9780191597381
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199242895.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and ...
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This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.Less
This is a collection of papers, written over many years, with substantial postscripts tying them together and giving an updated perspective on them. The first five are on the notions of truth and truth‐conditions, and their role in a theory of meaning and of the content of our mental states. The next five deal with what I call ‘factually defective discourse’—discourse that gives rise to issues about which, it is tempting to say that, there is no fact of the matter as to the right answer; one particular kind of factually defective discourse is called ‘indeterminacy’, and it gets the bulk of the attention. The final bunch of papers deal with issues about objectivity, closely related to issues about factual defectiveness; two deal with the question of whether the axioms of mathematics are as objective as is often assumed, and one deals with the question of whether our epistemological methods are as objective as they are usually assumed to be.
Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising ...
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Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.Less
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.
Barry Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252145
- eISBN:
- 9780191598487
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252149.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical ...
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Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical questions of meaning, understanding, necessity, and the intentionality of thought, there are some papers devoted to specific questions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as papers on Quine, Searle, Davidson, and David Pears.The tenor of the essays on meaning is critical of reductive attempts to elucidate meaning and understanding ‘from outside’—i.e. without summoning intentional vocabulary referring to what speakers mean and understand in relation to each other. In view of considerations regarding the indispensably semantical nature of explanatory accounts of meaning, an appeal to speakers’ conformity to linguistic practice must satisfy the requirements of a thick, semantical description of the meaning of words in a community. There will be no satisfactory theories of meaning solely in terms of non‐semantic, non‐intentional regularities. In the author's estimation, this idea runs close to Wittgenstein's treatment of ‘inner’ or ‘private’ objects. The first essay in this collection addresses the attribution of a ‘conventionalist’ position to Wittgenstein in summation of his thought on necessity and logical truth. The author looks askance at Michael Dummett's conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein and takes it to task accordingly. ‘Inference, Belief and Understanding’ (essay 2) re‐examines the question of being ‘forced’ to a conclusion in the context of Lewis Carroll's ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. It is argued, here and throughout, that it is important to grasp the implications of the kind of regress besetting Achilles for a theory of understanding and the mind. The threat of regress is a key constraint on philosophical accounts of understanding viewed as a capacity possessed by the speaker. In his third essay ‘Evolution and the Necessity of Thought’, the author asks whether we can hold steadfast to a notion of necessity and an evolutionary or historical story of the acquisition of human knowledge. Wittgenstein's arguments against the existence of a private language are treated in the fifth and again, in more detail, in the final essay in this volume— the author notes his intention to look at the question relatively unencumbered by existing scholarship in the hope of drawing out the very idea of what Wittgenstein was doing in his philosophy. The collection of essays on Wittgenstein includes a study of Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding, and community (essay 6), which partly overlaps with an essay on translation that additionally revisits the problem of regress and its implications for semantic competence (essay 8). It is argued that the indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts has the consequence that meaning is indeterminate tout court only if those facts are the only available facts; but a ‘community practice’ view of meaning has no such consequence. A fuller treatment of some of these topics is given in ‘Mind, Meaning and Practice’ (essay 11), which examines the idea of meaning as use, and ostensive teaching in relation to Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning and distorted conception of the mental.The essays on Quine (essay 7 and 10) consider the doctrine of physicalism and the question of conceptual schemes respectively. Searle's theory of intentionality (‘background’) supposes that there are attitudes that are mental, though pre‐intentional and non‐representational; considerations are brought against Searle in essay 9. The work on Davidson provides the renewed occasion for attacking the idea that linguistic competence or understanding is a matter of applying general rules or conventions to particular utterances (essay 12). A central theme of this book—the threat of regress and the pressure it exerts on semantic theory—is brought out with reference to the theory of understanding, which locates linguistic competence in the application of general knowledge to particular utterances. It is argued that such theories invariably fall foul of regress. A profitable semantic theory should combine the insight that explaining understanding and meaning is aptly fulfilled by invoking speakers’ abilities and knowledge, yet without positing additional mental entities, with a recognition that the abilities and knowledge in question go beyond mere relations between expressions.Less
Contains thirteen essays published by Barry Stroud between 1965 and 2000 on central topics in the philosophy of language and epistemology. In a volume that generally deals with the philosophical questions of meaning, understanding, necessity, and the intentionality of thought, there are some papers devoted to specific questions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as papers on Quine, Searle, Davidson, and David Pears.
The tenor of the essays on meaning is critical of reductive attempts to elucidate meaning and understanding ‘from outside’—i.e. without summoning intentional vocabulary referring to what speakers mean and understand in relation to each other. In view of considerations regarding the indispensably semantical nature of explanatory accounts of meaning, an appeal to speakers’ conformity to linguistic practice must satisfy the requirements of a thick, semantical description of the meaning of words in a community. There will be no satisfactory theories of meaning solely in terms of non‐semantic, non‐intentional regularities. In the author's estimation, this idea runs close to Wittgenstein's treatment of ‘inner’ or ‘private’ objects. The first essay in this collection addresses the attribution of a ‘conventionalist’ position to Wittgenstein in summation of his thought on necessity and logical truth. The author looks askance at Michael Dummett's conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein and takes it to task accordingly. ‘Inference, Belief and Understanding’ (essay 2) re‐examines the question of being ‘forced’ to a conclusion in the context of Lewis Carroll's ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. It is argued, here and throughout, that it is important to grasp the implications of the kind of regress besetting Achilles for a theory of understanding and the mind. The threat of regress is a key constraint on philosophical accounts of understanding viewed as a capacity possessed by the speaker. In his third essay ‘Evolution and the Necessity of Thought’, the author asks whether we can hold steadfast to a notion of necessity and an evolutionary or historical story of the acquisition of human knowledge. Wittgenstein's arguments against the existence of a private language are treated in the fifth and again, in more detail, in the final essay in this volume— the author notes his intention to look at the question relatively unencumbered by existing scholarship in the hope of drawing out the very idea of what Wittgenstein was doing in his philosophy. The collection of essays on Wittgenstein includes a study of Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding, and community (essay 6), which partly overlaps with an essay on translation that additionally revisits the problem of regress and its implications for semantic competence (essay 8). It is argued that the indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts has the consequence that meaning is indeterminate tout court only if those facts are the only available facts; but a ‘community practice’ view of meaning has no such consequence. A fuller treatment of some of these topics is given in ‘Mind, Meaning and Practice’ (essay 11), which examines the idea of meaning as use, and ostensive teaching in relation to Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning and distorted conception of the mental.
The essays on Quine (essay 7 and 10) consider the doctrine of physicalism and the question of conceptual schemes respectively. Searle's theory of intentionality (‘background’) supposes that there are attitudes that are mental, though pre‐intentional and non‐representational; considerations are brought against Searle in essay 9. The work on Davidson provides the renewed occasion for attacking the idea that linguistic competence or understanding is a matter of applying general rules or conventions to particular utterances (essay 12). A central theme of this book—the threat of regress and the pressure it exerts on semantic theory—is brought out with reference to the theory of understanding, which locates linguistic competence in the application of general knowledge to particular utterances. It is argued that such theories invariably fall foul of regress. A profitable semantic theory should combine the insight that explaining understanding and meaning is aptly fulfilled by invoking speakers’ abilities and knowledge, yet without positing additional mental entities, with a recognition that the abilities and knowledge in question go beyond mere relations between expressions.
Stephen Schiffer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199257768
- eISBN:
- 9780191602313
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place ...
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There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the relation between content-involving facts and underlying physical facts; vagueness and indeterminacy; conditionals; normative discourse; and the role of pleonastic propositions in explanation, prediction, and knowledge acquisition.Less
There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature of meanings; knowledge of meaning; the relation between content-involving facts and underlying physical facts; vagueness and indeterminacy; conditionals; normative discourse; and the role of pleonastic propositions in explanation, prediction, and knowledge acquisition.
Gloria L. Schaab
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195329124
- eISBN:
- 9780199785711
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195329124.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
Key concepts in the evolutionary theology provide primary grounding for an affirmation of divine suffering. Chapter 5 explores six elements that factor significantly into a proposal of divine ...
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Key concepts in the evolutionary theology provide primary grounding for an affirmation of divine suffering. Chapter 5 explores six elements that factor significantly into a proposal of divine passibility: the costly process of evolution, the reality of cosmic indeterminacy, God‐world interaction through whole‐part influence, the notion of the anthropic universe, the transcendent and immanent creativity of God, and the panentheistic paradigm of the God‐world relationship. It analyzes each element specifically in terms of its impact on a theology of the creative suffering of the Triune God. It concludes by analyzing the proposal of suffering in God according to the criteria delineated in chapter 4.Less
Key concepts in the evolutionary theology provide primary grounding for an affirmation of divine suffering. Chapter 5 explores six elements that factor significantly into a proposal of divine passibility: the costly process of evolution, the reality of cosmic indeterminacy, God‐world interaction through whole‐part influence, the notion of the anthropic universe, the transcendent and immanent creativity of God, and the panentheistic paradigm of the God‐world relationship. It analyzes each element specifically in terms of its impact on a theology of the creative suffering of the Triune God. It concludes by analyzing the proposal of suffering in God according to the criteria delineated in chapter 4.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate ...
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This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate restitution as a response to wrongdoing argue that such property should be returned to the heirs of the historical victims. This inheritance-based model has often been rejected at a domestic level by theorists who reject the justifiability of inheritance. This response, however, is not available to international libertarians, who endorse backward-looking accounts of distributive justice. The chapter examines Jeremy Waldron's claim that property rights lapse in the absence of sustained possession, and holds that this need not be accepted if one sees international libertarianism as based on historical entitlement. It proceeds to challenge Janna Thompson's claim that the inheritance model is flawed as a result of its indeterminacy, maintaining that it need not rest upon counterfactual reasoning.Less
This chapter focuses on the claim that present day parties have inherited entitlements to property which, owing to historic injustice, is currently in the possession of others. Those who advocate restitution as a response to wrongdoing argue that such property should be returned to the heirs of the historical victims. This inheritance-based model has often been rejected at a domestic level by theorists who reject the justifiability of inheritance. This response, however, is not available to international libertarians, who endorse backward-looking accounts of distributive justice. The chapter examines Jeremy Waldron's claim that property rights lapse in the absence of sustained possession, and holds that this need not be accepted if one sees international libertarianism as based on historical entitlement. It proceeds to challenge Janna Thompson's claim that the inheritance model is flawed as a result of its indeterminacy, maintaining that it need not rest upon counterfactual reasoning.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198295358
- eISBN:
- 9780191600982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295359.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The purpose of this chapter is to articulate an understanding of basic human rights that is sufficiently clear and cogent to serve as the core of a justice‐based moral theory of international law. To ...
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The purpose of this chapter is to articulate an understanding of basic human rights that is sufficiently clear and cogent to serve as the core of a justice‐based moral theory of international law. To accomplish this goal, the concept of human rights is first analysed into its key elements, and the analysis is used to explain how assertions about human rights can be justified, and show that plausible justifications for basic human rights can be grounded in a diversity of moral and religious perspectives. Next, several objections to the claim that there are human rights or that they can play a fundamental role in a moral theory of international law are refuted, and it is argued that the right to minimally democratic governance should be included among the rights that international law ascribes to all persons—whether it is a human right or of instrumental value in securing human rights, or both. It is then shown that the use of coercion to protect basic human rights is compatible with a proper tolerance for the diversity of values, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of how the international legal order can cope with the ineliminable abstractness of human rights norms. The seven parts of the chapter are: I. Clarifying the Idea of Human Rights; II. The Justification of Assertions about the Existence of Human Rights; III. A Plurality of Converging Justifications for Human Rights; IV. Is democracy a Human Right?; V. Critiques of Human Rights; VI. Human Rights and the Bounds of Toleration; and VII. The Inelimable Indeterminacy of Human Rights and its Implications for the Moral Theory of International Law.Less
The purpose of this chapter is to articulate an understanding of basic human rights that is sufficiently clear and cogent to serve as the core of a justice‐based moral theory of international law. To accomplish this goal, the concept of human rights is first analysed into its key elements, and the analysis is used to explain how assertions about human rights can be justified, and show that plausible justifications for basic human rights can be grounded in a diversity of moral and religious perspectives. Next, several objections to the claim that there are human rights or that they can play a fundamental role in a moral theory of international law are refuted, and it is argued that the right to minimally democratic governance should be included among the rights that international law ascribes to all persons—whether it is a human right or of instrumental value in securing human rights, or both. It is then shown that the use of coercion to protect basic human rights is compatible with a proper tolerance for the diversity of values, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of how the international legal order can cope with the ineliminable abstractness of human rights norms. The seven parts of the chapter are: I. Clarifying the Idea of Human Rights; II. The Justification of Assertions about the Existence of Human Rights; III. A Plurality of Converging Justifications for Human Rights; IV. Is democracy a Human Right?; V. Critiques of Human Rights; VI. Human Rights and the Bounds of Toleration; and VII. The Inelimable Indeterminacy of Human Rights and its Implications for the Moral Theory of International Law.
Timothy A. O. Endicott
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198268406
- eISBN:
- 9780191714795
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268406.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Law of Obligations, Philosophy of Law
Vagueness leads to indeterminacies in the application of the law in many cases. This book responds to the challenges that those indeterminacies pose to a theory of law and adjudication. The book puts ...
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Vagueness leads to indeterminacies in the application of the law in many cases. This book responds to the challenges that those indeterminacies pose to a theory of law and adjudication. The book puts controversies in legal theory in a new light, using arguments in the philosophy of language to offer an explanation of the unclarities that arise in borderline cases for the application of vague expressions. However, the book also argues that vagueness is a feature of law, and not merely of legal language: the linguistic and non-linguistic resources of the law are commonly vague. These claims have consequences that have seemed unacceptable to many legal theorists. Because law is vague, judges cannot always decide cases by giving effect to the legal rights and obligations of the parties. Judges cannot always treat like cases alike. The ideal of the rule of law seems to be unattainable. The book offers a new articulation of the content of that ideal. It argues that the pursuit of justice and the rule of law do not depend on the idea that the requirements of the law are determinate in all cases. The resolution of unresolved disputes is an important and independent duty of judges — a duty that is itself an essential component of the ideal of the rule of law.Less
Vagueness leads to indeterminacies in the application of the law in many cases. This book responds to the challenges that those indeterminacies pose to a theory of law and adjudication. The book puts controversies in legal theory in a new light, using arguments in the philosophy of language to offer an explanation of the unclarities that arise in borderline cases for the application of vague expressions. However, the book also argues that vagueness is a feature of law, and not merely of legal language: the linguistic and non-linguistic resources of the law are commonly vague. These claims have consequences that have seemed unacceptable to many legal theorists. Because law is vague, judges cannot always decide cases by giving effect to the legal rights and obligations of the parties. Judges cannot always treat like cases alike. The ideal of the rule of law seems to be unattainable. The book offers a new articulation of the content of that ideal. It argues that the pursuit of justice and the rule of law do not depend on the idea that the requirements of the law are determinate in all cases. The resolution of unresolved disputes is an important and independent duty of judges — a duty that is itself an essential component of the ideal of the rule of law.
Beverley J. Glover
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780198565970
- eISBN:
- 9780191714009
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198565970.003.0008
- Subject:
- Biology, Plant Sciences and Forestry
This chapter considers the changes that occur at the shoot apical meristem once the decision to flower has been taken by the plant. These changes involve the expression of a succession of floral ...
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This chapter considers the changes that occur at the shoot apical meristem once the decision to flower has been taken by the plant. These changes involve the expression of a succession of floral meristem identity genes, which convert the meristem to the reproductive state. Floral meristem identity genes can be defined as those genes that specify the floral fate of lateral meristems arising from a reproductive shoot apical meristem. At the same time, it is important that apical meristem indeterminacy is maintained, to allow multiple flowers to be produced. Later chapters in this section will analyse the development of the floral organs from a floral meristem, and the development of the all-important gametes within the reproductive organs themselves.Less
This chapter considers the changes that occur at the shoot apical meristem once the decision to flower has been taken by the plant. These changes involve the expression of a succession of floral meristem identity genes, which convert the meristem to the reproductive state. Floral meristem identity genes can be defined as those genes that specify the floral fate of lateral meristems arising from a reproductive shoot apical meristem. At the same time, it is important that apical meristem indeterminacy is maintained, to allow multiple flowers to be produced. Later chapters in this section will analyse the development of the floral organs from a floral meristem, and the development of the all-important gametes within the reproductive organs themselves.
Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent ...
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Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? Assuming standard logical principles, Sorites' arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? This book presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original chapters on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.Less
Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is; a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? Assuming standard logical principles, Sorites' arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? This book presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original chapters on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.
Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199603039
- eISBN:
- 9780191725418
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this ...
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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the sixth volume in the series. It contains essays by Jason Turner, Ross P. Cameron, Gabriel Uzquiano, Raul Saucedo, Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams, Matti Eklund, Richard Woodward, and Rory Madden.Less
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is dedicated to the timely publication of new work in metaphysics, broadly construed. These volumes provide a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. They offer a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is the sixth volume in the series. It contains essays by Jason Turner, Ross P. Cameron, Gabriel Uzquiano, Raul Saucedo, Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams, Matti Eklund, Richard Woodward, and Rory Madden.
Matti Eklund
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Many theorists of vagueness take vagueness to be bound up with indeterminacy in a way that conflicts with classical logic and bivalence. Others, epistemicists like Timothy Williamson, hold that the ...
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Many theorists of vagueness take vagueness to be bound up with indeterminacy in a way that conflicts with classical logic and bivalence. Others, epistemicists like Timothy Williamson, hold that the only indeterminacy bound up with vagueness is epistemic — vagueness is just bound up with a certain kind of ignorance — and that vagueness does not conflict with classical logic and bivalence. Both types of view face well-known problems. This chapter presents a view on vagueness that sidesteps them. Let a sentence be first-level indeterminate if there are acceptable assignments of semantic values under which it lacks a classical, determinate truth-value; and let a sentence be second-level indeterminate if it has different truth-values under different assignments of semantic values. What this chapter proposes is that vagueness is primarily bound up with second-level indeterminacy, rather than first-level indeterminacy. In the course of defending this proposal, the chapter compares it to supervaluationism, which superficially can appear similar.Less
Many theorists of vagueness take vagueness to be bound up with indeterminacy in a way that conflicts with classical logic and bivalence. Others, epistemicists like Timothy Williamson, hold that the only indeterminacy bound up with vagueness is epistemic — vagueness is just bound up with a certain kind of ignorance — and that vagueness does not conflict with classical logic and bivalence. Both types of view face well-known problems. This chapter presents a view on vagueness that sidesteps them. Let a sentence be first-level indeterminate if there are acceptable assignments of semantic values under which it lacks a classical, determinate truth-value; and let a sentence be second-level indeterminate if it has different truth-values under different assignments of semantic values. What this chapter proposes is that vagueness is primarily bound up with second-level indeterminacy, rather than first-level indeterminacy. In the course of defending this proposal, the chapter compares it to supervaluationism, which superficially can appear similar.
Brian Weatherson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that a term is vague if it is indeterminate. As a special case of this, it argues that a predicate is vague if it has borderline cases. This was until recently the standard ...
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This chapter argues that a term is vague if it is indeterminate. As a special case of this, it argues that a predicate is vague if it has borderline cases. This was until recently the standard account of vagueness, but it has become quickly unpopular. A common objection has been that indeterminate terms with clearly demarcated boundaries of indeterminacy are not vague, and that it is better to identify vagueness in predicates with some kind of Sorites-sensitivity. Proposals of how to do this have been offered by Matti Eklund, Patrick Greenough, and Nicholas J. J. Smith. The chapter argues that this was a step backwards for several reasons. Some vague predicates are not Sorites-sensitive. And non-predicates are not Sorites-sensitive, although they can be vague. Moreover, if we have an epistemic understanding of the Sorites, then we will end up classifying some non-vague terms as vague, unless we assume that speakers know much more about the metaphysics underlying their language than they actually do.Less
This chapter argues that a term is vague if it is indeterminate. As a special case of this, it argues that a predicate is vague if it has borderline cases. This was until recently the standard account of vagueness, but it has become quickly unpopular. A common objection has been that indeterminate terms with clearly demarcated boundaries of indeterminacy are not vague, and that it is better to identify vagueness in predicates with some kind of Sorites-sensitivity. Proposals of how to do this have been offered by Matti Eklund, Patrick Greenough, and Nicholas J. J. Smith. The chapter argues that this was a step backwards for several reasons. Some vague predicates are not Sorites-sensitive. And non-predicates are not Sorites-sensitive, although they can be vague. Moreover, if we have an epistemic understanding of the Sorites, then we will end up classifying some non-vague terms as vague, unless we assume that speakers know much more about the metaphysics underlying their language than they actually do.
Hartry Field
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that the counter-intuitive aspects of the epistemic theory of vagueness run deeper than is sometimes appreciated, and that Horwich's variant of epistemicism does not help with ...
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This chapter argues that the counter-intuitive aspects of the epistemic theory of vagueness run deeper than is sometimes appreciated, and that Horwich's variant of epistemicism does not help with them. It considers the suggestion that we escape the problems with the epistemic theory by weakening the law of excluded middle as applied to vague language. It argues that standard ‘fuzzy logics’ are ultimately of no help with vagueness because they generate operators that draw sharp lines. But there are alternative ‘fuzzy logics’ that avoid these problems. Moreover, there are intuitive connections between the semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness, and the fuzzy logics that avoid sharp lines seem to be just the ones that are compatible with making True() equivalent to p even in face of the semantic paradoxes. This chapter tentatively recommends treating vagueness and the semantic paradoxes together, using the same non-classical logic for both.Less
This chapter argues that the counter-intuitive aspects of the epistemic theory of vagueness run deeper than is sometimes appreciated, and that Horwich's variant of epistemicism does not help with them. It considers the suggestion that we escape the problems with the epistemic theory by weakening the law of excluded middle as applied to vague language. It argues that standard ‘fuzzy logics’ are ultimately of no help with vagueness because they generate operators that draw sharp lines. But there are alternative ‘fuzzy logics’ that avoid these problems. Moreover, there are intuitive connections between the semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness, and the fuzzy logics that avoid sharp lines seem to be just the ones that are compatible with making True() equivalent to p even in face of the semantic paradoxes. This chapter tentatively recommends treating vagueness and the semantic paradoxes together, using the same non-classical logic for both.
Max Kölbel
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0018
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues that vagueness, understood as a semantic phenomenon, can be accommodated within standard semantics by assimilating it to contingency in standard modal semantics and suitably ...
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This chapter argues that vagueness, understood as a semantic phenomenon, can be accommodated within standard semantics by assimilating it to contingency in standard modal semantics and suitably modifying the pragmatics. It claims that vague predicates are not defective, assumes that their vagueness involves at least extensional indeterminacy, and then considers the three ways in which standard semantics allows for extensional indeterminacy: ambiguity, indexicality, and relativity to circumstances of evaluation (e.g. contingency). The third of these is found to be most promising, and is outlined in more detail. It involves treating assertability, but not truth, supervaluationally. This explains the seductiveness of Sorites arguments and yields a fine account of borderline cases. The chapter concludes with a brief consideration of higher-order vagueness and a comparison of the view outlined with other views.Less
This chapter argues that vagueness, understood as a semantic phenomenon, can be accommodated within standard semantics by assimilating it to contingency in standard modal semantics and suitably modifying the pragmatics. It claims that vague predicates are not defective, assumes that their vagueness involves at least extensional indeterminacy, and then considers the three ways in which standard semantics allows for extensional indeterminacy: ambiguity, indexicality, and relativity to circumstances of evaluation (e.g. contingency). The third of these is found to be most promising, and is outlined in more detail. It involves treating assertability, but not truth, supervaluationally. This explains the seductiveness of Sorites arguments and yields a fine account of borderline cases. The chapter concludes with a brief consideration of higher-order vagueness and a comparison of the view outlined with other views.
Mark Richard
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570386
- eISBN:
- 9780191722134
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.003.0027
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being ...
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This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being gappy. Many arguments against the coherence of truth value gaps depend on a very narrow picture of saying, which ignores the possibility of such things as sui generis denial. Frege/Geach objections to things like sui generis denial dissolve once we observe that ‘not’ and other sentence compounding devices lead a double life, sometimes contributing to sense, sometimes to force. There is a simple compositional story about how (for instance) embedding a denial operator within a ‘force conditional’ makes if not A, then B fit to perform a sort of speech act which, when combined with B's denial, commits one to the aptness of asserting A. The trisection thesis — predicates trisect their domains into three groups, those they are true of, those they are false of, and the rest — is correct. The objection to the trisection thesis —that it is inconsistent with the idea that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series — is not compelling: there is no conception of a ‘sharp boundary’ on which it's plausible, both that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series, and that trisection involves the creation of sharp boundaries. Once we recognize that talk of indeterminacy is contrastive, we also recognize that higher order vagueness is not inconsistent with trisection. We also, once we think of indeterminacy as contrastive, come to see that indeterminacy itself is indeterminate: if it is indeterminate whether p, that indeterminacy itself is not something that is settled, but is itself indeterminate.Less
This chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being gappy. Many arguments against the coherence of truth value gaps depend on a very narrow picture of saying, which ignores the possibility of such things as sui generis denial. Frege/Geach objections to things like sui generis denial dissolve once we observe that ‘not’ and other sentence compounding devices lead a double life, sometimes contributing to sense, sometimes to force. There is a simple compositional story about how (for instance) embedding a denial operator within a ‘force conditional’ makes if not A, then B fit to perform a sort of speech act which, when combined with B's denial, commits one to the aptness of asserting A. The trisection thesis — predicates trisect their domains into three groups, those they are true of, those they are false of, and the rest — is correct. The objection to the trisection thesis —that it is inconsistent with the idea that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series — is not compelling: there is no conception of a ‘sharp boundary’ on which it's plausible, both that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series, and that trisection involves the creation of sharp boundaries. Once we recognize that talk of indeterminacy is contrastive, we also recognize that higher order vagueness is not inconsistent with trisection. We also, once we think of indeterminacy as contrastive, come to see that indeterminacy itself is indeterminate: if it is indeterminate whether p, that indeterminacy itself is not something that is settled, but is itself indeterminate.
Robert E. Ulanowicz
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198564836
- eISBN:
- 9780191713828
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198564836.003.0016
- Subject:
- Biology, Aquatic Biology
Recent advances in the theory of complexity have engendered a shift away from ‘physicalism’, where all nature is reducible to fundamental physical laws towards ‘naturalism’, where natural phenomena ...
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Recent advances in the theory of complexity have engendered a shift away from ‘physicalism’, where all nature is reducible to fundamental physical laws towards ‘naturalism’, where natural phenomena are considered within a circumscribed domain of time and space. The study of ecological networks has led the way in this shift, because it can be demonstrated that ecological dynamics are incompatible with the fundamental assumptions that have supported science since Newton. The direction in which causality operates in ecosystems proves more likely to come from the larger configurations of processes (networks) towards their more ephemeral and complicated constituents and their attendant mechanisms. This focus on the macroscopic makes possible a self-consistent description of ecosystem dynamics based solely on the attributes of the network of processes.Less
Recent advances in the theory of complexity have engendered a shift away from ‘physicalism’, where all nature is reducible to fundamental physical laws towards ‘naturalism’, where natural phenomena are considered within a circumscribed domain of time and space. The study of ecological networks has led the way in this shift, because it can be demonstrated that ecological dynamics are incompatible with the fundamental assumptions that have supported science since Newton. The direction in which causality operates in ecosystems proves more likely to come from the larger configurations of processes (networks) towards their more ephemeral and complicated constituents and their attendant mechanisms. This focus on the macroscopic makes possible a self-consistent description of ecosystem dynamics based solely on the attributes of the network of processes.
KEITH CULVER and MICHAEL GIUDICE
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195370751
- eISBN:
- 9780199775903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370751.003.001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter analyzes the limits to Hart's account of an official-operated rule of recognition as an account of the existence and borders of legal systems. The argument is developed via assessment of ...
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This chapter analyzes the limits to Hart's account of an official-operated rule of recognition as an account of the existence and borders of legal systems. The argument is developed via assessment of the success of the account's solutions to problems of circularity and indeterminacy in the identification of a distinct class of legal officials whose practices constitute the rule of recognition. It is shown that while the problem of circularity may have been adequately addressed in explanation of state legal systems, its solutions leave intact the problem of indeterminacy and reveal a strong presumption of hierarchy which threatens to run past rather than solve issues at the borders of legality. This is true in explanation of state legal systems, but the difficulties are particularly troubling in explanation of international law, as analysis of Hart's view of international law makes plain.Less
This chapter analyzes the limits to Hart's account of an official-operated rule of recognition as an account of the existence and borders of legal systems. The argument is developed via assessment of the success of the account's solutions to problems of circularity and indeterminacy in the identification of a distinct class of legal officials whose practices constitute the rule of recognition. It is shown that while the problem of circularity may have been adequately addressed in explanation of state legal systems, its solutions leave intact the problem of indeterminacy and reveal a strong presumption of hierarchy which threatens to run past rather than solve issues at the borders of legality. This is true in explanation of state legal systems, but the difficulties are particularly troubling in explanation of international law, as analysis of Hart's view of international law makes plain.
