Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693818
- eISBN:
- 9780191731907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that ...
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The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that establish that the action has some value; and that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An examination of the nature of intentions and intentional actions leads to successive modification of the theses, concluding with a new position, a recognizable variant of the Guise of the Good Thesis, and true to its ambition of being a key to the explanation of intentions, and of actions for intentions.Less
The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that establish that the action has some value; and that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An examination of the nature of intentions and intentional actions leads to successive modification of the theses, concluding with a new position, a recognizable variant of the Guise of the Good Thesis, and true to its ambition of being a key to the explanation of intentions, and of actions for intentions.
