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Verity, discussed in Chapter 11, is not the whole story about pictorial realism. Other accounts of realism appeal to the relative informativeness of representations, the way in which perceiving them mimics our perception of their contents, and the extent to which they are of a standard kind. There is something right about each of these approaches, and this chapter sorts that out in light of the new account of depiction presented earlier.

What is it to grow up, within the outlook of Aristotelian ‘practical philosophy’? Both a contrived rationalism and a false non-rationalism should be avoided. Aristotle's view in contrast is intuitive and merits further exploration. To grow up is for us to shift from living by natural prompt to living by rational design, from merely behaving — acting and reacting — in certain ways to taking it that we should so behave, that that is the fine way to go on. This is to develop a sense of values — of what perfects or mars a situation, of what gives proper shape or order to a life — matters involving the human capacities for rule-following. ‘Moulding’, ‘inculcation’, ‘upbringing’, and ‘raising’ each play a role, as does ‘imitation’, but in a distinctively human way, which requires much attention to uncover.

This chapter examines whether faith-based schools contribute to ‘parallel lives’. It begins by describing the provision of state-funded faith-based schooling in the UK and how faith-based schools have been conceptualised within public discourses on cohesion. The chapter then explores the impact of faith-based schools on three key dimensions of social cohesion: the sociospatial segregation; the inculcation of values; and the disparities in educational attainment. By assessing the implication of faith-based schools on the dimensions of social cohesion, the role played by such schools on institutionalising ‘parallel lives’ are illuminated. In addition to discussing the impact of faith-based schools, the chapter also discusses the educational policy challenges related to faith-based schools and provides a summary of issues and policy frameworks in other countries. The chapter ends by recommending that state-funded faith-based schools should be accommodated within a multicultural society; however this requires a greater degree of pragmatism and compromise among faith communities.

This chapter builds on the notion that a close look at laws regulating the various sites of inculcation reveals multiple ways in which social institutions can serve as an impetus and guide for change, furthering the ideals of equality jurisprudence. It examines how the legal system can balance the immense freedom retained by socializing institutions and private individuals with the need to foster civic development that embraces a sense of equality, tolerance, and just opportunities, which brings us closer to the ideal hallmarks of modern civil society. It articulates broad principles grounded in empirical evidence, such as the need to clarify the values of different socializing systems, the need to provide guidance in determining responsibilities and obligations, and the need to focus on local implementation that can support structural change. While doing so, it provides concrete examples to demonstrate how the legal system can fail and how it can succeed in shaping the values that alleviate invidious discrimination.

This chapter offers a critical assessment of Ben Spiecker’s theory of indoctrination, according to which indoctrination involves the suppression of critical dispositions, intellectual virtues, and rational emotions. Spiecker develops his account in part by contrasting the dispositions, virtues, and emotions of the indoctrinated student with those of the critical thinker. While I am in considerable sympathy with Spiecker’s account of indoctrination, I have three reservations concerning it: the limiting of the content of indoctrinated beliefs to “doctrines”, the conceptual impossibility of non-indoctrinating belief inculcation, and the unduly limited domain of indoctrination. The theory is tested by applying it to the song “The Wheel.”

Most contractualist ethical theories have a subjunctivist structure. This means that they attempt to make sense of right and wrong in terms of a set of principles which would be accepted in some idealized, non-actual circumstances. This makes these views vulnerable to the so-called conditional fallacy objection. The moral principles that are appropriate for the idealized circumstances fail to give a correct account of what is right and wrong in the ordinary situations. This chapter uses two versions of contractualism to illustrate this problem: Nicholas Southwood’s and a standard contractualist theory inspired by T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism. It then develops a version of Scanlon’s view that can avoid the problem. This solution is based on the idea that we also need to compare different inculcation elements of moral codes in the contractualist framework. This idea also provides a new solution to the problem of at what level of social acceptance should principles be compared.