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Coordinated market economies such as Germany or Sweden do not have appropriate institutional infrastructures to sustain large numbers of radically innovative firms. However, alternative strategies to develop competitiveness in new technology industries might exist. The biotechnology and software industries are each comprised of multiple sub-sectors. While important areas within each industry, such as therapeutics biotechnology or standard software, are associated with radical innovation, other large segments are characterized by incremental innovation. The chapter argues that companies within coordinated market economies could successfully specialize in such sub-segments, creating pockets of national competitiveness for their national industries. Descriptive statistics from the UK, Germany, and Sweden, and case studies from the platform biotechnology and enterprise software industries in Germany are used to empirically substantiate the argument.

This concluding chapter serves as a review of the material covered throughout the book and addresses issues often encountered when implementing the various concepts in practice and in different business settings. The presentation takes on a “Frequently Answered Questions” (FAQ) format, i.e., it outlines each issue as a question readers may be wondering about and then provides a comprehensive answer to it. FAQs are organized as follows: those pertaining to the diffusion of innovations, those dealing with customer lifetime value (CLV), and those related to the innovation equity framework. Examples of diffusion FAQs include: Can I use the various diffusion models covered in the book for any type of innovation? I am ultimately interested in running the analysis for my specific brand; should I start with assessing diffusion at the category level or go directly to the brand level? Is the social force always positive? Examples of CLV FAQs include: How can I obtain reasonable estimates for the CLV parameters? Are some of the CLV parameters likely to change over time? If so, how? The chapter ends with a check list that delineates the key steps to follow, and important issues to be aware of, when crafting innovation equity assessments.

The questions addressed in this volume are motivated by the recognition that engineers play an important role in generating innovation and economic growth. In this chapter, we seek to offer some description of engineering work by looking in detail at a specific manufacturing industry—firms that supply automakers—to gain insight into how engineers create innovation. Autos account for 5% of US GDP and in 2011, 70% of auto suppliers contributed design effort, a task typically performed by engineers, making the auto supply chain an important context in which to study engineering and innovation. Some highlights from our original survey data include a wide range in terms of size and strategies of supply chain companies; a majority was small- to medium-sized, often family-owned. We observed barriers to patenting for manufacturing firms' developing process rather than product innovations. And interviews revealed the importance of customers for the innovative efforts of supplier firms. Certain Japanese customers were preferred because they shared expertise and helped suppliers improve, while other, American, customers were viewed as having unreasonable demands for regular, incremental price reductions and did not offer technical or organizational support.

Facilitated by the National Rural Health Mission, the last decade has witnessed a number of innovations in the delivery of public health services in India. The pathways by which innovations happened are categorised into three groups: (a) identifying ‘best practices’ which are then scaled up; (b) the effort to build viable business models; and (c) driven by policy-level prioritization. Seventeen brief case studies are presented illustrating the variety of innovations and innovation pathways that exist, and an attempt is made to elucidate the general features of successful innovation. Innovations driven by critical problem-solving, dedicated innovators, and developments in technology with ability to manage its social interface do better. We also note that, despite much attention to transformational or disruptive innovations, it is home grown incremental innovations that have held sway.

The software industry really came of age in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a time of technological transformation in the workplace. The computer expanded from the backroom to the front office and evolved from simple data processing to integrated information systems. The growth of the independent software vendor led to an important change in software design. User firms began to purchase large, standard or semicustom systems from thirdparty vendors rather than purchasing software with hardware and having most applications software custom designed by an in-house programming staff. This added another dimension to the software design process: Software became the product of at least two organizations (the vendor and one or more user firms) and its design and production became mediated by the market. The organizational simplicity of software design occurring within one organization, as difficult a process as that may be, became relatively more complex organizationally. This chapter examines one part of the process of technology design and use: the activities internal to the software design firm. It concentrates on the structure and dynamics of the design process rather than on specific design decisions. The findings presented in this chapter are based on a survey of vendor firms and may represent a different perspective than findings on software developed within a user firm. By focusing on dynamics that transcend choices of particular individuals, we show how decisions are shaped and constrained by the structure of the design process itself. The three chapters following this one present case studies that describe specific choices of software features and functions and analyze the impacts of those choices on software users and customers. Taken together, this chapter and the case studies present the dual perspective necessary to appreciate how software is a socially constructed technology. The business applications software industry for mainframes and minicomputers is composed of hardware manufacturers such as IBM and Digital Equipment Corporation, several large vendors, and numbers of small specialty firms.

Software design is enmeshed in the social world of organizations. Software embodies characteristics of the organizations within which and for which it is created. This book has dealt with both of these dimensions; first, the social dimensions of the software design process and, second, the nature of work organizations that the user inhabits and the implications for software design. In this final chapter we develop some general propositions about social dimensions of software design and the implications of software adoption for organizational change. First we draw some concluding observations about two processes. Our research, coupled with related work of others, suggests that crucial to understanding software design (and technology design in general) are the role of history in the long life cycle of software design, especially the redesign of technology by its users, and the politics of software design. Technology design is a process with a life cycle of its own. During this process, design changes occur from the initial stage of determining user requirements through the design and development of the software and then continues during its implementation and use. In retrospect, it is possible to show how different aspects of any particular technology were established at various stages. However, it is not possible to deduce all the attributes of the technology without following the design process through implementation and ultimate use. Understanding the constraints that a technology will impose on the users’ (and the organization’s) “action space” thus requires an examination of the social as well as the technical history of its development. Organizational politics are crucial in the early phases of technology development and provide opportunities for those in positions of power in the user organization to exercise the most explicit influence. Furthermore, past technology and organizational choices form patterns that are institutionalized and form the structure shaping current technology choices (cf. Kling, 1987,1993; Thomas, 1993). Thus, the initial stages of technology definition provide partial constraints on the action of users when the technology is implemented. The late life cycle stages of design are the result of a continual process of actors interpreting and negotiating the technology design and use within structural bounds of hierarchical power, resources, authority and autonomy.

In today’s service-oriented economy, information systems are becoming the lifeblood of many organizations. As part of this trend, applications software is an increasingly important and little understood type of process technology. In this chapter we synthesize many of our findings and explore their implications for procuring software in organizations that deliver services. We will argue that it is during the procurement of software and in the planning processes that precede procurement that managers with insight about software design have the most to offer. This book has provided several extended examples of how mission critical software is used in service organizations by operational personnel to assist them in service delivery and by management for monitoring and control purposes. We have shown how service delivery becomes redefined in terms of the combined capability of workers and the integrative functionality designed into mission critical software. We have also shown how software may affect the structure of a service organization and the scope of individual jobs within it. Mission critical software thus serves important integrative functions, such as job restructuring and service redefinition, for the service delivery organization. Although vital to any company’s production capability, process technology is often viewed as an ancillary concern of top management when it comes to purchasing it. Procurement is thought to be best left to technicians who have both the time and inclination to preoccupy themselves with comparison shopping. Many managers are uncomfortable with technological decisions. In large organizations, decisions about new technology tend to be delegated to groups far removed from senior management. Only when procurement costs rise above a certain threshold will the level for such decisions be escalated in the organization. By then, assessments are usually reduced to some sort of financial payback calculation and the substantive issues associated with the proposed technology become submerged. The crucial shortcoming of this approach is that technology acquisition is an important strategic issue, not just a technical matter. By shaping the capabilities of the organization’s production function, process technologies, can dramatically affect productivity, quality, and the range of possibilities for making goods or delivering services.