Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199263288
- eISBN:
- 9780191603631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199263280.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding ...
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This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.Less
This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.
Anjan Chakravartty
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- July 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190651459
- eISBN:
- 9780190651480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190651459.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The first of two forms of ontological uncertainty arising in previous chapters is examined in detail. This first form stems from situations in which our best scientific theorizing or modeling with ...
More
The first of two forms of ontological uncertainty arising in previous chapters is examined in detail. This first form stems from situations in which our best scientific theorizing or modeling with respect to one and the same target system or phenomenon in the world generates what appear to be mutually inconsistent descriptions. A recent, popular response to the challenge this represents—for anyone hoping for a coherent conception of scientific ontology—is to invoke a form of “perspectivism” regarding these descriptions. However, while certain forms of pluralism may be apt in such cases, perspectivism is not one of them. It is argued that perspectival accounts of ontology are subject to a fatal trilemma. Two forms of non-perspectival pluralism are described, supporting the introduction of a novel, contrastive theory of ontological explanation.Less
The first of two forms of ontological uncertainty arising in previous chapters is examined in detail. This first form stems from situations in which our best scientific theorizing or modeling with respect to one and the same target system or phenomenon in the world generates what appear to be mutually inconsistent descriptions. A recent, popular response to the challenge this represents—for anyone hoping for a coherent conception of scientific ontology—is to invoke a form of “perspectivism” regarding these descriptions. However, while certain forms of pluralism may be apt in such cases, perspectivism is not one of them. It is argued that perspectival accounts of ontology are subject to a fatal trilemma. Two forms of non-perspectival pluralism are described, supporting the introduction of a novel, contrastive theory of ontological explanation.
