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 Knowing What to Believe

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real: Game Theory

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0015
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter describes John Harsanyi's theory of so-called games of incomplete information using Poker as a motivating example. The chapter begins by analyzing a simplified version of Von Neumann's ... More


 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter shows that in many situations with patient players, the payoffs bounds from Chapter 8 are tight. It then proves various folk theorems for games of public monitoring, including games with ... More


Playing for Real: Game Theory

Ken Binmore

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.001.0001
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This book provides an introduction to game theory that seeks to answer all three questions: what is game theory about? How do I apply game theory? Why is game theory right? The topics covered include ... More


Optimal Constitutional Response to Coalition Formation

Jean‐Jacques Laffont

in Incentives and Political Economy

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199248681
eISBN:
9780191596575
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199248680.003.0008
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter studies horizontal collusion between interest groups in a Bayesian setting. Various models under complete and incomplete information are introduced and the different results are obtained ... More


Directions

Debraj Ray

in A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199207954
eISBN:
9780191709104
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.003.0014
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Financial Economics

This chapter describes several directions of research that are not adequately emphasized in this book. Among the topics discussed are equity within coalitions, coalition formation with deliberate ... More


Repeated Games

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199280292
eISBN:
9780191602498
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199280290.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

Repeated games are considered. The discussion explains issues surrounding randomization, observability, feasibility, and convexity. Games with pay-off averaging and discounting are examined, along ... More


Preliminaries

Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro

in An Introduction to Auction Theory

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
April 2005
ISBN:
9780199275984
eISBN:
9780191602214
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019927598X.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter presents the concept of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium as defined by Harsanyi (1967). His approach was to transform a game of incomplete information into one of imperfect information; any ... More


Mechanism Design

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory: A Concise Course

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199280292
eISBN:
9780191602498
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199280290.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

Mechanism Design is introduced, The key classifications of complete and incomplete information are given and the revelation principle is described. Direct mechanisms and dominant strategy ... More


Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics

Joseph E. Stiglitz

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198287629
eISBN:
9780191595912
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198287623.003.0002
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

Discusses functional but imperfect institutions, peasant rationality, the nature and role of markets, and the role of history.


Computational Decision Support Regret-Based Models for Optimization and Preference Elicitation

Craig Boutilier

in Comparative Decision Making

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199856800
eISBN:
9780199301508
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199856800.003.0041
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience

The goal of decision support is to develop methods that assist decision makers. In this chapter computational methods are brought to bear on a multi-dimensional choice problem with the two-part ... More


Incomplete Information in Literature and History

Steven J. Brams

in Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015226
eISBN:
9780262295932
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015226.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Econometrics

This chapter focuses on the incomplete information that players may have about each other’s preferences, which may induce them to try to seek out additional information, misperceive an opponent’s ... More


Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information

Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta

in Emerging Issues in Economic Development: A Contemporary Theoretical Perspective

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780198099062
eISBN:
9780199084982
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198099062.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

The chapter studies the relationship between bargaining and competition with incomplete information. It considers a model with two uninformed and identical buyers and two sellers. One of the sellers ... More


Incomplete information and irrationality

David M. Kreps

in A Course in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
May 2021
ISBN:
9780691202754
eISBN:
9780691215747
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Discontinued
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691202754.003.0013
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter presents a methodological innovation: the notion of a game of incomplete information. This notion has been extremely useful in the modeling of all sorts of economic phenomena. As an ... More


Market Structure Games: Static Approaches

Benoît Chevalier-Roignant and Lenos Trigeorgis

in Competitive Strategy: Options and Games

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262015998
eISBN:
9780262298711
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262015998.003.0003
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Econometrics

This chapter discusses static market structure games. It begins by describing the benchmark case of a monopolist, developing the basic building blocks for subsequent models. It then introduces static ... More


Implementation Errors and Incomplete Information: Implications for the Effects of Monetary Policy in Low-Income Countries

Rafael Portillo, Filiz Unsal, Stephen O’Connell, and Catherine Pattillo

in Monetary Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
April 2018
ISBN:
9780198785811
eISBN:
9780191827624
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198785811.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics, Behavioural Economics

This chapter shows that limited effects of monetary policy can reflect shortcomings of existing policy frameworks in low-income countries rather than (or in addition to) the structural features often ... More


Game Theory and Diplomatic History

Frank C. Zagare

in Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
February 2019
ISBN:
9780198831587
eISBN:
9780191869525
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0003
Subject:
Mathematics, Logic / Computer Science / Mathematical Philosophy, Applied Mathematics

This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives. First, a causal explanation of the 1936 Rhineland crisis is developed within ... More


Mechanisms of Peacekeeping Effectiveness

Lisa Hultman, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon

in Peacekeeping in the Midst of War

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
January 2020
ISBN:
9780198845577
eISBN:
9780191880735
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198845577.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

This chapter provides the book’s theoretical foundation, establishing that civil war violence results from incomplete information and commitment problems between government and rebel forces. UN ... More


The Causes and Consequences of Bad Strategy and Poor Tactics

Ryan D. Griffiths

in Secession and the Sovereignty Game: Strategy and Tactics for Aspiring Nations

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
September 2021
ISBN:
9781501754746
eISBN:
9781501754760
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Cornell University Press
DOI:
10.7591/cornell/9781501754746.003.0011
Subject:
Political Science, Conflict Politics and Policy

This chapter identifies the causes and consequences of bad strategy and poor tactics. It distinguishes three sources of error: incomplete information, wishful thinking, and mixed objectives. The ... More


Dilemmas of Interaction

Peter Vanderschraaf

in Strategic Justice: Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
November 2018
ISBN:
9780199832194
eISBN:
9780190213336
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199832194.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy

Problems of interaction, which give rise to justice, are structurally problems of game theory, the mathematical theory of interactive decisions. Five problems of interaction are introduced that are ... More


Signaling Principles INGOs, Domestic and International Communities, the State, and Human Security Effectiveness

Amanda Murdie

in Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780804791977
eISBN:
9780804792479
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Stanford University Press
DOI:
10.11126/stanford/9780804791977.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

This chapter begins with the observation that the INGO world is comprised of both principled and non-principled actors. Unfortunately, actors that work with INGOs do not know what type of ... More


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