Clair Brown, Michael Reich, Lloyd Ulman, and Yoshifumi Nakata
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195115215
- eISBN:
- 9780199854820
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195115215.001.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, International Business
This book provides an integrated and detailed analysis of the components of firm human resources systems in the U.S. and Japan. It examines the relationship between company practices and national ...
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This book provides an integrated and detailed analysis of the components of firm human resources systems in the U.S. and Japan. It examines the relationship between company practices and national economic institutions. The authors address a number of key questions about employer–employee relations. How have major Japanese manufacturing companies been able to convert the assurance of “lifetime” employment security into a source of superior employee efficiency and adaptability, when job and income security have been feared as a source of “shirking” and wage inflation in the U.S.? How have higher economic and real wage growth rates been associated with greater equality in earned income distribution in Japan, when the incentive role of income inequality to worker effort and savings has been stressed in the U.S.? How could the Japanese emphasis on employment security in the firm be reconciled with greater price stability and lower unemployment than in the U.S.? This work analyses elements such as employee training and involvement programs, wage behavior as an incentive system and an alternate channel of savings, and synchronous wage determination (shunto) at work in the Japanese economy, which provide for such successes. It also explores the costs that have been associated with these Japanese accomplishments, as well as who must bear them. Finally, it examines the outlook for these distinctive Japanese institutions and practices in a period of slower growth and economic “maturity.” Based on a research project carried out in both countries, it concludes with the lessons that each country can learn much from the employment practices of the other.Less
This book provides an integrated and detailed analysis of the components of firm human resources systems in the U.S. and Japan. It examines the relationship between company practices and national economic institutions. The authors address a number of key questions about employer–employee relations. How have major Japanese manufacturing companies been able to convert the assurance of “lifetime” employment security into a source of superior employee efficiency and adaptability, when job and income security have been feared as a source of “shirking” and wage inflation in the U.S.? How have higher economic and real wage growth rates been associated with greater equality in earned income distribution in Japan, when the incentive role of income inequality to worker effort and savings has been stressed in the U.S.? How could the Japanese emphasis on employment security in the firm be reconciled with greater price stability and lower unemployment than in the U.S.? This work analyses elements such as employee training and involvement programs, wage behavior as an incentive system and an alternate channel of savings, and synchronous wage determination (shunto) at work in the Japanese economy, which provide for such successes. It also explores the costs that have been associated with these Japanese accomplishments, as well as who must bear them. Finally, it examines the outlook for these distinctive Japanese institutions and practices in a period of slower growth and economic “maturity.” Based on a research project carried out in both countries, it concludes with the lessons that each country can learn much from the employment practices of the other.
Louis Putterman
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195078725
- eISBN:
- 9780199854950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195078725.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
In line with several crop-production enhancement plans, there has been an emerging political and micro-institutional reform: the replacement of team effort by farm households as the basic ...
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In line with several crop-production enhancement plans, there has been an emerging political and micro-institutional reform: the replacement of team effort by farm households as the basic crop-production element. Such an ideological shift is credited from the incompetent incentive system of team contexts, which in turn is caused by regulations produced by egalitarianism. In this regard, statistical evidence about the impacts of agricultural decollectivization and other economic policies on China’s farm production are discussed. To elaborate the subject, different levels (national and provincial) of institutional and other types of reforms, together with the transitions of household contracting and baogan daohu procedure are included. Econometric findings suggest that adaptation to new agricultural policies will be facilitated or will only be made possible when modest productivity gain is present, and when the crop involved is corn.Less
In line with several crop-production enhancement plans, there has been an emerging political and micro-institutional reform: the replacement of team effort by farm households as the basic crop-production element. Such an ideological shift is credited from the incompetent incentive system of team contexts, which in turn is caused by regulations produced by egalitarianism. In this regard, statistical evidence about the impacts of agricultural decollectivization and other economic policies on China’s farm production are discussed. To elaborate the subject, different levels (national and provincial) of institutional and other types of reforms, together with the transitions of household contracting and baogan daohu procedure are included. Econometric findings suggest that adaptation to new agricultural policies will be facilitated or will only be made possible when modest productivity gain is present, and when the crop involved is corn.
Louis Putterman
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195078725
- eISBN:
- 9780199854950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195078725.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
Despite the problems with the representativeness and generalizations of the Dahe data set, such information allows statistical investigations of economic behaviors of teams and team members during ...
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Despite the problems with the representativeness and generalizations of the Dahe data set, such information allows statistical investigations of economic behaviors of teams and team members during the collective period of crop production. Findings suggest that (1) a discretion-oriented, and not a coercive implementation of work codes, significantly adds to the fraction of work days and performance; and (2) the effective incentive system comprises heightened use and improved procedures on contribution-based cash disbursements. Another regime that marked the development of farm productivity and agricultural reforms was the post-collective era, where marginal rewards were viewed as effective compensation so as to achieve optimal performance and where household farming (that is, the baogan daohu, was recognized as a crucial task to the success of agriculture economics.Less
Despite the problems with the representativeness and generalizations of the Dahe data set, such information allows statistical investigations of economic behaviors of teams and team members during the collective period of crop production. Findings suggest that (1) a discretion-oriented, and not a coercive implementation of work codes, significantly adds to the fraction of work days and performance; and (2) the effective incentive system comprises heightened use and improved procedures on contribution-based cash disbursements. Another regime that marked the development of farm productivity and agricultural reforms was the post-collective era, where marginal rewards were viewed as effective compensation so as to achieve optimal performance and where household farming (that is, the baogan daohu, was recognized as a crucial task to the success of agriculture economics.
Martin Krzywdzinski
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- March 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198806486
- eISBN:
- 9780191844096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198806486.003.0005
- Subject:
- Business and Management, HRM / IR, Organization Studies
This chapter examines incentive systems in automotive plants in Russia and China. The point of departure here is the distinction between job-based systems, where the associated tasks are determined ...
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This chapter examines incentive systems in automotive plants in Russia and China. The point of departure here is the distinction between job-based systems, where the associated tasks are determined as precisely as possible for each job, and person-based systems, which assign tasks not to certain jobs but to certain competence or performance levels. While job-based systems are more typical for Russia, person-based systems prevail in China. The chapter then turns to variable compensation elements and performance reviews and examines how supervisors deal with performance appraisals. It reveals considerable differences between Russian and Chinese sites. The most notable difference concerns the use of performance appraisals. The Russian plants are characterized by a punishment culture that undermines the motivational effects of the incentive systems.Less
This chapter examines incentive systems in automotive plants in Russia and China. The point of departure here is the distinction between job-based systems, where the associated tasks are determined as precisely as possible for each job, and person-based systems, which assign tasks not to certain jobs but to certain competence or performance levels. While job-based systems are more typical for Russia, person-based systems prevail in China. The chapter then turns to variable compensation elements and performance reviews and examines how supervisors deal with performance appraisals. It reveals considerable differences between Russian and Chinese sites. The most notable difference concerns the use of performance appraisals. The Russian plants are characterized by a punishment culture that undermines the motivational effects of the incentive systems.
Alex Bryson, Richard Freeman, Claudio Lucifora, Michele Pellizzari, and Virginie Pérotin
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199669806
- eISBN:
- 9780191749407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669806.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Macro- and Monetary Economics
The case for government intervention in incentive pay systems is not obvious. The authors argue that it makes little sense to undertake any reforms without detailed simulations of what they may do to ...
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The case for government intervention in incentive pay systems is not obvious. The authors argue that it makes little sense to undertake any reforms without detailed simulations of what they may do to the economy under alternative economic scenarios based on sound analysis and extensive discussion with labour, management, and government decision-makers.Less
The case for government intervention in incentive pay systems is not obvious. The authors argue that it makes little sense to undertake any reforms without detailed simulations of what they may do to the economy under alternative economic scenarios based on sound analysis and extensive discussion with labour, management, and government decision-makers.
Rob Cross and Laurence Prusak
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780195159509
- eISBN:
- 9780197562017
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780195159509.003.0017
- Subject:
- Computer Science, Computer Architecture and Logic Design
We’re all familiar with the truism “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know.” Managers invariably use their personal contacts when they need to, say, meet an impossible deadline, get advice on a ...
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We’re all familiar with the truism “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know.” Managers invariably use their personal contacts when they need to, say, meet an impossible deadline, get advice on a strategic decision, or learn the truth about a new boss. Increasingly, it’s through these informal networks—not just through traditional organizational hierarchies— that information is found and work gets done. Social networks can be powerful political tools as well; few managers can resist the temptation to use their connections to discredit business initiatives they dislike or to support proposals they favor. Most corporations, however, treat informal networks as an invisible enemy—one that keeps decisions from being made and work from getting done. To many senior executives, these intricate webs of communication are unobservable and ungovernable—and, therefore, not amenable to the tools of scientific management. As a result, executives tend to work around informal networks or, worse, try to ignore them. When they do acknowledge the networks’ existence, executives fall back on intuition— scarcely a dependable tool—to guide them in nurturing this social capital. It doesn’t have to be that way. It is entirely possible to develop informal networks systematically. In fact, our research suggests that if senior managers focus their attention on a handful of key role-players in the group, the effectiveness of any informal network can be enhanced. After analyzing informal networks at more than 50 large organizations over the past five years, we’ve identified four common role-players whose performance is critical to the productivity of any organization. First, there are central connectors, who link most people in an informal network with one another. They aren’t usually the formal leaders within a unit or department, but they know who can provide critical information or expertise that the entire network draws on to get work done. Then there are boundary spanners, who connect an informal network with other parts of the company or with similar networks in other organizations. They take the time to consult with and advise individuals from many different departments—marketing, production, or R&D, for instance—regardless of their own affiliations.
Less
We’re all familiar with the truism “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know.” Managers invariably use their personal contacts when they need to, say, meet an impossible deadline, get advice on a strategic decision, or learn the truth about a new boss. Increasingly, it’s through these informal networks—not just through traditional organizational hierarchies— that information is found and work gets done. Social networks can be powerful political tools as well; few managers can resist the temptation to use their connections to discredit business initiatives they dislike or to support proposals they favor. Most corporations, however, treat informal networks as an invisible enemy—one that keeps decisions from being made and work from getting done. To many senior executives, these intricate webs of communication are unobservable and ungovernable—and, therefore, not amenable to the tools of scientific management. As a result, executives tend to work around informal networks or, worse, try to ignore them. When they do acknowledge the networks’ existence, executives fall back on intuition— scarcely a dependable tool—to guide them in nurturing this social capital. It doesn’t have to be that way. It is entirely possible to develop informal networks systematically. In fact, our research suggests that if senior managers focus their attention on a handful of key role-players in the group, the effectiveness of any informal network can be enhanced. After analyzing informal networks at more than 50 large organizations over the past five years, we’ve identified four common role-players whose performance is critical to the productivity of any organization. First, there are central connectors, who link most people in an informal network with one another. They aren’t usually the formal leaders within a unit or department, but they know who can provide critical information or expertise that the entire network draws on to get work done. Then there are boundary spanners, who connect an informal network with other parts of the company or with similar networks in other organizations. They take the time to consult with and advise individuals from many different departments—marketing, production, or R&D, for instance—regardless of their own affiliations.