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The Incentive‐Compatibility Desideratum

Christian List and Philip Pettit

in Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199591565
eISBN:
9780191725494
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A second desideratum of good organizational design is incentive compatibility. This is satisfied to the extent that group members are given incentives to act in a way that supports an expected mode ... More


Collusion and Decentralization

Jean‐Jacques Laffont

in Incentives and Political Economy

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199248681
eISBN:
9780191596575
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199248680.003.0009
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter models the optimal degree of delegation and centralization of government as the degree of availability of communication between periphery and centre in a hierarchy. Under bounded ... More


The Theory and Measurement of Passive‐Use Value

Richard T. Carson, Nicholas E. Flores, and Robert C. Mitchell

in Valuing Environmental Preferences: Theory and Practice of the Contingent Valuation Method in the US, EU , and developing Countries

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199248919
eISBN:
9780191595950
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199248915.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

An attempt is made to disentangle passive‐use value and contingent valuation and present them in a useful perspective as regards environmental goods. The first part of the chapter provides a ... More


Public Goods and Contingent Valuation

Robert Sugden

in Valuing Environmental Preferences: Theory and Practice of the Contingent Valuation Method in the US, EU , and developing Countries

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199248919
eISBN:
9780191595950
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199248915.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

Some of the special problems involved in eliciting preferences for public goods (with which many applications of contingent valuation are concerned) are considered. The defining characteristic of a ... More


Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area

Charles M. Kahn and João A. C. Santos

in Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development, and Stability

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199271405
eISBN:
9780191601200
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199271402.003.0017
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Economic Systems

The Maastricht Treaty created the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank (ECB) to head the system. The treaty entrusts the ECB with the responsibility for monetary policy, but ... More


On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts

T. N. Srinivasan

in The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Published in print:
1991
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780198287629
eISBN:
9780191595912
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198287623.003.0010
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental

In this chapter, the author looks into the conditions under which borrowing under a voluntary ‘bonded labour’ contract (whereby one may repay loans by providing labour services at less than one's ... More


Incentive Compatibility in Computationally Feasible Combinatorial Auctions

Amir Ronen

in Combinatorial Auctions

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262033428
eISBN:
9780262302920
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0016
Subject:
Society and Culture, Technology and Society

This chapter presents modifications of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism of combinatorial auctions (CAs) that are computationally easy, and which restore individual rationality and incentive ... More


Incentive Compatibility

Börgers Tilman, Krähmer Daniel, and Strausz Roland

in An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734023
eISBN:
9780190244699
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.003.0005
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

In a single agent context a characterization of all mechanisms that induce agents to truthfully reveal their private information are characterized. The results obtained are surprisingly strong and ... More


The Hukou Reform and Unification of Rural–Urban Social Welfare

Cai Fang

in Law and Economics with Chinese Characteristics: Institutions for Promoting Development in the Twenty-First Century

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199698547
eISBN:
9780191745522
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698547.003.0017
Subject:
Economics and Finance, South and East Asia, Macro- and Monetary Economics

Under a political economy analytical framework, this paper intends to help understand hukou system reform from perspective of unifying social welfare system of rural and urban areas. It reviews the ... More


Bayesian Mechanism Design

Börgers Tilman, Krähmer Daniel, and Strausz Roland

in An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
May 2015
ISBN:
9780199734023
eISBN:
9780190244699
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.003.0006
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter begins by applying general insights from the theory of incentive compatibility to the design of Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms when private signals are independent. It then ... More


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