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Revisiting classic ethnological theories on the contagious transmission of force, this chapter explores the place of material objects in the performance of divine communication and the practice of faith. Tracking between the devotional specificities of the practice of “standin’-in” within the context of southern Appalachia and the broader mass-mediated performances of healing prayer during the Charismatic Renewal, this section also articulates Oral Roberts’s famous notion of “the point of contact” as a physical conduit for the transmission of healing power.

This chapter elaborates and defends three basic principles of structural equity. A first requires that “losers” be compensated, in light of a proposed general conception of when a person or social class is harmed by trade. The second and third principles concern how the gains of trade are distributed, across and within societies. For reasons of “priority for the worse off,” departures from equality of gain are justifiable when unequal gains flow to developing countries. The chapter also challenges appeals to utilitarianism, economic liberty, legitimate expectations, equality of opportunity, fair-risk imposition, and “cosmopolitan” conceptions of fairness.

This chapter argues for aggressive securities taxation to curb short-term, speculative capital flows that partly cause financial crises. Much as with any potentially beneficial but highly dangerous activity, short-term speculative markets fairly impose heightened risks of financial crises only if they can be embedded within institutions that reliably compensate for the harm that crises do. Because reliable compensatory institutions are not established and in any case are arguably beyond the regulatory powers of governments, the dangerous activity must in fairness be curbed, even at great economic opportunity costs.

This chapter introduces the concept of self-restraint in politics. Since citizens of liberal democracies enjoy wide freedom of choice and expression, inquiry sensibly begins with simple arguments against self-restraint. Citizens in a liberal democracy are free to vote and advocate as they choose. Indeed, these liberties are fundamental aspects of our form of government, and if citizens enjoy them, they should also regard themselves as free to rely upon whatever grounds seem apt, and to make public arguments in those terms. Further, an implicit assumption of democratic government is that outcomes will be best if they reflect the feelings of most citizens. This aspiration will come closer to achievement if citizens regard themselves as free to rely upon all they care about, rather than some restricted subset of what matters to them.

This chapter is structured around two ethical challenges presented by leadership: how to assess the moral desirability of the outcomes towards which leaders lead; and leadership's inherently impositional connotations. The extent to which various leadership commentaries exacerbate or respond to these concerns is considered. It is suggested that each of these moral challenges is two-sided, so that meeting challenges that are offered from one direction opens us up to challenges that are launched from the other direction. The limitations of altruism as a basis for ethicality are noted. The ethical reassurance offered by leadership's consensual, democratic, and benevolent ramifications is also considered. It is suggested that these deliver only a partial vindication of leadership's impositional overtones. The chapter ends by relating various theoretical approaches to leadership ethics to broader currents within organization and management studies.

This chapter is mainly about the efforts of Robert Cecil, as Lord Treasurer, to secure the Great Contract in 1610. It analyses the background of mushrooming royal debt and the introduction of impositions, and then focuses on concessions over wardship which the king was reluctant to agree to because they threatened his regal powers. Cecil's efforts eventually foundered on the Commons’ determination to see impositions abolished, which left both the king and Lord Treasurer contemplating ‘new counsels’: alternatives to parliamentary supply.

This chapter provides a detailed narrative of this short‐lived parliament beset by problems form the outset. It explores the conciliar discussions preceding the parliament and the fear of undertakers which set it off on the wrong foot; then looks at the attempts by the Crown to trade bills for supply. It concludes that impositions were again the main stumbling block to settlement, and investigates the role of Bishop Neile's speech against giving the Commons a hearing on this issue which sabotaged the final stages of the session. It concludes by analysing the consequences of the Crown introducing a new weapon in its dealings with parliament: the threat of dissolution.

This chapter considers how prison technology is especially one-sided and imposed because it is not shared. Philosopher Jacques Ellul has argued that technical mastery (technopoly) can narrow thought and make it less sensitive to human dimensions and needs. Criminologists call this level of total technological imposition “a habitus of subjection.” In “total institutions,” prison theorists agree that current modes of technical use have led to “mortification of the self.” The bad aspects of prison technology are indeed bad. The United States has so many people in prison and jail and many more under legal surveillance because technology has made it possible.

This book examines why liberal democracies have not been able to create an effective and legitimate liberal world order, attributing the failure to major tensions between two strains of liberalism: “Liberalism of Imposition” and “Liberalism of Restraint.” Liberalism of Imposition affirms the universal validity of liberal values, as expressed in the United States's national security strategy of 2002. Liberalism of Restraint stresses a different set of liberal values: pluralism, nonintervention, respect for others, moderation, and peaceful cooperation on equal terms. Classical liberalism embodies a Liberalism of Restraint, which concerns autonomy and the space to act unobstructed by others. Modern liberalism represents a Liberalism of Imposition, which requires active intervention to secure the proper conditions for real freedom. This book discusses the value foundation and the economic dimensions of a liberal world order, along with the challenges posed by weak and failed states to a liberal world order. It argues that neither liberal Restraint nor liberal Imposition contains durable solutions to the world order challenges faced by liberal states.

This chapter examines the many different ways of interpreting the concept of liberty, with particular emphasis on liberal tensions in the international sphere and the diverging opinions among liberal states about how best to promote freedom. It begins with an overview of liberal theory on world order, followed by a discussion of the factors that drive and facilitate liberal progress. It then considers the major elements in a liberal world order, namely democracy, transnational relations between individuals and private groups, cooperation via strong international institutions regulated by common rules of international law, and common moral values. It also explores the liberal notion of liberty, political programs aimed at establishing a liberal world order, the 1997 Liberal International Manifesto, and classical liberal philosophy in relation to the Liberalism of Restraint and the Liberalism of Imposition. Finally, it analyzes dilemmas in liberal internationalism, such as how to pursue liberty in the world.

This chapter examines the debate over liberal values as a central element of liberal world order. It considers a major dilemma facing liberals. The promotion of liberal values, including human rights, must be respectful of other cultures and societies, including their traditions and their values. At the same time, it must maintain that there are universal values valid for all, irrespective of local traditions and customs. There can be no denial of rights to life, liberty, security of the person, and protection against torture and racial discrimination. This chapter first considers liberalism's belief in progress toward an ever more liberal world as well as the link between progress and liberal values. It then explores progress in relation to the principles respected by sovereign states as members of the international society of states. It argues that liberals cannot support a policy of radical Liberalism of Restraint; they must be committed to some form of activism that will frequently come across as hostile Liberalism of Imposition.

This chapter examines the difficulties faced by liberal states in responding appropriately to the challenges of weak and failed states and suggests that such difficulties are connected to the tension between the notions of Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition. It first considers liberal states' emphasis on the principle of Restraint within the context of decolonization and explains why this emphasis held no solution to the problem of weak and failed states. It then explores how the policy of Imposition has been much strengthened since the Cold War in that humanitarian and/or security concerns may lead to intervention, including intervention by force, in weak states. It also discusses the empowerment that sovereignty provides to the elites controlling weak states and concludes with an assessment of the liberal dilemma: neither Restraint nor Imposition is effective in addressing the severe problems in weak states.

This chapter examines the economic dimension of the liberal world order, with particular emphasis on the difficulties of maintaining a stable liberal world economy. It first considers the relationship between liberal states and free markets. It then discusses the meaning of Liberalism of Imposition and Liberalism of Restraint in the economic sphere. More specifically, it explores the Bretton Woods system of embedded liberalism as a Liberalism of Restraint system and argues that, while it was a successful system for the Western countries, it cannot be restored under the current conditions in the globalized economy. It also analyzes economic liberal imposition in the developing world, along with rhetoric versus reality in the promotion of neoliberal principles in developing and transition economies. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on advanced liberal states' rhetorical support of neoliberal imposition economics and their actual deeds.

This chapter examines the role of international institutions in the liberal world order. Liberal states support both a pluralist approach and a nonpluralist approach to international institutions. The universal, pluralist approach is the Liberalism of Restraint attitude toward international institutions. The nonpluralist, selective approach is the Liberalism of Imposition approach. This chapter first considers the relationship between power and international institutions, with particular emphasis on liberal hegemony. It then discusses domestic sources of foreign policy in the leading liberal state and explains why the road to a stable liberal Restraint order with global reach is blocked or severely hindered in various respects, as well as how nondemocratic states such as China will affect the liberal world order. It also explores legitimacy in relation to the larger debate about whether policies are sufficiently legitimate or not, along with the importance of transnational and transgovernmental relations in establishing a more solid basis for liberal order.

Pufendorf’s theory of moral entities imposes a normative grid upon an indifferent world and articulates the positive, non-metaphysical nature of morality. This chapter focuses especially on the function of moral quantities, which set the prices of things and the esteem of persons. It clarifies the moral economy constituted by these values through an examination of Pufendorf’s view of sumptuary laws and their role in the state. The need to calculate particular values within a broader normative context shows also how Pufendorf’s method is both demonstrative and casuistic.

This book concludes by analyzing the sad state of Gubbins’ plaque, and how it speaks to a global phenomenon. For we live today unsure of whether to adore, ignore, or expunge the remnants of old orders. Postcolonialism is a world where colonial and imperial remnants—be they institutions, laws, even land allocations—are tainted understandably and irreparably. At the same time, it is a world in which that which is old, authentic, and in some cases tribal is more exalted than ever. Museums hold a particularly fraught position in this equation. Having arisen from a nineteenth-century worldview, museums are often regarded as little more than outmoded Eurocentric impositions. Yet, a central argument of this book is that museums hold the potential to be reanimated if they are envisioned as archives.

The aim of this chapter and the next is to show how interspersion affects relations between slum and enclave residents. The focus of Chapter 4 is on enclave residents (“villagers” as they are called locally). The argument is that the proximity of slum areas to enclaves fosters a sense of siege among enclave residents. They feel compelled to impose spatial boundaries on slum residents as a means of preventing crime and encroachment and of maintaining social distance. Along with a sense of siege, enclave residents manifest a sense of social responsibility. They feel an obligation to help squatters improve their lot. Charity, however, does not necessarily negate the social boundary distinguishing enclave from slum residents. It may even provide occasion to reinforce it. For enclave residents, the boundary separating them from slum residents is not just spatial but moral.

The previous chapter focused on enclave residents imposing boundaries; this one features slum residents’ (or “squatters’”) experience of boundary imposition. Boundary imposition takes different forms. Slum residents may be excluded outright, their presence within enclaves may be circumscribed or surveilled, or they may feel out of place in exclusive spaces. In any case, the experience of boundary imposition has become more prevalent. Chapter 5 argues that interspersion has “institutionalized” it. That is to say, given the patchwork quality of urban space, slum residents encounter boundaries wherever they turn. As a result, they have become acutely boundary conscious and highly sensitive to discrimination in general.