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In this chapter, the authors focus on one of the more cognitive mediators of behavior, dealing with the extent to which implementation intentions lead to successful execution of an intended behavior. From this viewpoint, automatic processes such as those discussed in the preceding chapters (particularly Chapters 5 and 6) are sometimes an unwanted source of interference that must be dealt with for a desired behavior to transpire. The chapter is framed as a lesson on how to overcome such interferences by creating the most efficacious forms of intentions, though a by-product of such efforts is a better understanding of the “miraculous” translation of intentions into actions. Among the phenomena discussed is the greater effectiveness of intentions that have more specific antecedent conditions (the “if” in intentions couched in “if-then” form).

As highlighted by Kurt Lewin, goal attainment is not yet secured solely by forming strong commitments to highly desirable and feasible goals. There is always the subsequent issue of implementing a set goal, and one wonders what people can do to enhance their chances of being successful at this second phase of goal pursuit. A promising answer seems to be the following: People may plan out in advance how they want to solve the problems of goal implementation. But what are these problems? There are at least four problems that stand out. These problems include getting started with goal striving, staying on track, calling a halt, and not overextending oneself. We will describe research showing that making if–then plans (i.e., form implementation intentions) on how to deal with these problems indeed facilitates solving the crucial problems of goal implementation. Thereafter, we will ask whether implementation intentions foster goal attainment even under conditions that are commonly viewed as not amenable to self-regulation attempts, such as succeeding on an intelligence test or overcoming spider phobia. Finally, we will report research showing that implementation intentions can even foster goal-striving in those samples (e.g., children with ADHD) that are known to suffer from impaired action control.

Procrastination is addressed from the perspective of the psychology of goals, looking at how people may procrastinate with respect to the typical tasks people need to tackle in pursuit of goals. Moreover, a strategy to overcome such procrastination is suggested, namely, the formation of specific if-then plans (implementation intentions): when, where, and how one intends to initiate a goal-directed action that one is at risk of putting off. After explaining how implementation-intention effects come about and examining several moderators that might limit their effectiveness, research on implementation intentions relevant to the problem of procrastination is discussed, including evidence from critical populations and contexts. Finally, interventions to improve motivation are suggested as a way of enhancing the effectiveness of implementation.

This chapter's thesis is that there is powerful evidence that the fact that an agent consciously decided to do something or had a conscious intention to do it sometimes has a place in a causal explanation of a corresponding intentional action. The evidence is drawn from studies of implementation intentions.

Intentions to do more good and less bad are reliably associated with actual efforts in the intended directions. However, the link between intention and behavior is modest, largely due to the fact that people, despite having formed strong intentions, fail to act on them. Given this predicament, one wonders what people can do to facilitate the translation of intentions into behavior. This chapter argues that people should engage in a second act of willing by making if-then plans (implementation intentions) that specify how the (goal) intention is to be realized. It asserts that such plans produce automatic action control by intentionally delegating the control of one's goal-directed thoughts, feelings, and behaviors to specific situational cues. Thus, by forming implementation intentions, people can strategically switch from conscious and effortful control of their goal-directed behaviors to being automatically controlled by selected situational cues. This type of automatic action control is strategic automaticity or instant habits.

This chapter discusses work on self-control in a trio of fields: philosophy, psychiatry, and social psychology. Topics include the range of behavior to which self-control is relevant, theoretical issues surrounding a strategy for self-control of potential use to addicts, the utility of implementation intentions for purposes of self-control, and an energy model of self-control. Work by psychiatrist George Ainslie and social psychologists Roy Baumeister and Peter Gollwitzer is discussed. The chapter takes up the question whether agents who fail to make a successful effort of self-control in the service of their conscious better judgments could ever have done otherwise, and it argues for an affirmative answer.

This chapter explicates the mechanisms of if-then planning (i.e. implementation intentions), namely, how verbal action planning leads to subsequent stimulus-driven action control—a mechanism referred to as strategic automaticity. The chapter first reviews evidence from behavioral studies indicating that action control by if-then planning can exhibit features associated with automatic action initiation; it is fast, effortless, and does not depend on another in situ conscious intent. The chapter explicates underlying mechanisms of if-then planning by integrating current simulation theories of cognition and action control into implementation intention theory. The chapter also focuses on subjective agency: on the basis of currently available evidence on how humans gain a feeling of control, it analyzes how if-then planning may affect one’s sense of agency. The chapter focuses on if-then planning as an ideal type of planning; the mechanisms proposed, however, may be relevant to action planning in a more general sense.

While it is clear that implicit attitudes are malleable, there is much to learn about the most effective techniques for changing them. This chapter examines three general approaches that increasingly appear to be well supported in both lab-based and field studies. The chapter considers the importance of rote practice, pre-commitment, and context regulation. Each represents a different element of adopting the “habit stance,” a way of cultivating more ethical implicit attitudes—and hence better spontaneous decisions and actions—by treating them as if they were habits. The chapter concludes by considering two kinds of objections. The first is empirical, focusing on the broadness and durability of implicit attitude change interventions. The second is not empirical. It is about the nature of praise, in particular whether the reshaping of one’s attitudes and behavior in the ways the chapter describes counts as a genuine form of ethical self-improvement.

How can we cut down on grandstanding and all the damage it causes? Drawing from empirical research in psychology, this chapter explains how individuals can avoid grandstanding and help change social norms so others grandstand less, too. People can reduce their grandstanding by altering their situations, forming implementation intentions about how to talk about morality and politics, and satisfying their desires for moral recognition with activities that are more likely to do good. One tempting and obvious way to get others to stop grandstanding is to call them out and criticize them. But this is a bad idea for moral, epistemic, and practical reasons. A more promising route is to change social norms so that grandstanding becomes embarrassing. This can be done by correcting peoples’ beliefs about grandstanding and moral talk, setting a good example in public discourse, and withholding from suspected grandstanders the praise and attention they seek.