Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Foundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to ...
More
Foundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Two kinds of problems typically arise from the attempt to ground liberal justice in an individualist foundation. The ‘motivation problem’ refers to the difficulty in explaining why the individual would be motivated to act in accordance with liberal justice. The ‘integrity problem’ refers to the tendency to explain the above by presenting an incoherent or divided account of the person, with one part motivated by self‐interest, and the other part, by the impartial rules of justice. The book develops a more plausible account of the relation between self‐interest and morality, which avoids these two problems, and which is more similar to the revisionist liberal accounts of Rawls's Political Liberalism and Raz's The Morality of Freedom.Less
Foundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Two kinds of problems typically arise from the attempt to ground liberal justice in an individualist foundation. The ‘motivation problem’ refers to the difficulty in explaining why the individual would be motivated to act in accordance with liberal justice. The ‘integrity problem’ refers to the tendency to explain the above by presenting an incoherent or divided account of the person, with one part motivated by self‐interest, and the other part, by the impartial rules of justice. The book develops a more plausible account of the relation between self‐interest and morality, which avoids these two problems, and which is more similar to the revisionist liberal accounts of Rawls's Political Liberalism and Raz's The Morality of Freedom.
John E. Roemer
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason ...
More
This essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason about principles of justice without knowing fundamental aspects of themselves — such as talent or family background. It is argued that the veil of ignorance delivers recommendations that are inconsistent with prioritarianism, that is, the view that priority should be given to ameliorating the disadvantage of the worst off. Hence, prioritarianism, which is after all far weaker than strict egalitarianism, cannot be justified by appeal to a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance achieves impartiality, but impartiality needs to be conjoined with a principle of solidarity in order to justify the redistribution of wealth. The resource allocation rules that jointly satisfy impartiality, priority, and solidarity are described.Less
This essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason about principles of justice without knowing fundamental aspects of themselves — such as talent or family background. It is argued that the veil of ignorance delivers recommendations that are inconsistent with prioritarianism, that is, the view that priority should be given to ameliorating the disadvantage of the worst off. Hence, prioritarianism, which is after all far weaker than strict egalitarianism, cannot be justified by appeal to a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance achieves impartiality, but impartiality needs to be conjoined with a principle of solidarity in order to justify the redistribution of wealth. The resource allocation rules that jointly satisfy impartiality, priority, and solidarity are described.
Paul Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559305
- eISBN:
- 9780191721212
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some ...
More
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy. Moreover, its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the striking developments of the last 150 years. It is the thesis of this book that debates concerning the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. An appreciation of the nature of this tension grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. This challenge is developed and sharpened through the first 4 chapters of the book. Development of this challenge to consequentialism in turn reveals the apparent force of the challenge of consequentialism to be largely illusory. Chapter 5 demonstrates that many traditional rationales offered in its support draw upon systematic misappropriations of intuitions linking rightness of actions and goodness of actions, treating them as intuitions concerning rightness of actions and goodness of overall states of affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that one remaining rationale — a rationale grounded in the appeal to the impartiality of morality — does not provide support for the theory; indeed, that attempts to respond to the tension within consequentialism suggest a fundamental role for an alternative to the consequentialist's impersonal conception of impartiality, an interpersonal rather than an impersonal conception of equal concern. Unlike the consequentialist's impersonal conception, such interpersonal impartiality can allow for the ordinary moral convictions that actions that do not promote the best overall state of affairs are often morally permitted, and are sometimes morally required.Less
The focus of this book is consequentialism, the moral theory upon which an action is morally right just in case its performance leads to the best state of affairs. The theory can with some plausibility claim a status as the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy. Moreover, its pervasive deployment in spheres such as economics, public policy, and jurisprudence is one of the striking developments of the last 150 years. It is the thesis of this book that debates concerning the challenge of consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism, an unresolved tension between the theory and many of its most fundamental presuppositions. An appreciation of the nature of this tension grounds the articulation of a fundamental challenge to the theory from within. This challenge is developed and sharpened through the first 4 chapters of the book. Development of this challenge to consequentialism in turn reveals the apparent force of the challenge of consequentialism to be largely illusory. Chapter 5 demonstrates that many traditional rationales offered in its support draw upon systematic misappropriations of intuitions linking rightness of actions and goodness of actions, treating them as intuitions concerning rightness of actions and goodness of overall states of affairs. Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that one remaining rationale — a rationale grounded in the appeal to the impartiality of morality — does not provide support for the theory; indeed, that attempts to respond to the tension within consequentialism suggest a fundamental role for an alternative to the consequentialist's impersonal conception of impartiality, an interpersonal rather than an impersonal conception of equal concern. Unlike the consequentialist's impersonal conception, such interpersonal impartiality can allow for the ordinary moral convictions that actions that do not promote the best overall state of affairs are often morally permitted, and are sometimes morally required.
Jana Matthews and Jeff Dennis
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195168259
- eISBN:
- 9780199849734
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168259.003.0007
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Innovation
For aspiring business owners, this book hopefully has inspired avoidance of “the edge”. For those who are already experiencing the edge, the book contains help for those people to evaluate the ...
More
For aspiring business owners, this book hopefully has inspired avoidance of “the edge”. For those who are already experiencing the edge, the book contains help for those people to evaluate the situation and identify the possible courses of action to be taken. This final chapter encourages entrepreneurs to participate in peer group activities since this may promote growth through sharing experiences with other entrepreneurs, discussing certain issues, and other such activities. Also, the chapter advises that having a mentor outside the peer group is helpful since such people may provide impartial judgment and advice about the business. In sum, one must be able to learn, if not from one's own mistakes, but from the mistakes of others especially in terms of business and avoiding being on the edge.Less
For aspiring business owners, this book hopefully has inspired avoidance of “the edge”. For those who are already experiencing the edge, the book contains help for those people to evaluate the situation and identify the possible courses of action to be taken. This final chapter encourages entrepreneurs to participate in peer group activities since this may promote growth through sharing experiences with other entrepreneurs, discussing certain issues, and other such activities. Also, the chapter advises that having a mentor outside the peer group is helpful since such people may provide impartial judgment and advice about the business. In sum, one must be able to learn, if not from one's own mistakes, but from the mistakes of others especially in terms of business and avoiding being on the edge.
Brian Feltham and John Cottingham (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199579952
- eISBN:
- 9780191595233
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic ...
More
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.Less
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.
Andrew Vincent
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199271252
- eISBN:
- 9780191601101
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199271259.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Focuses on the development of justice‐based theory, predominantly after the publication of John Rawls Theory of Justice in 1971. After an overview of the concept of justice, it provides a critical ...
More
Focuses on the development of justice‐based theory, predominantly after the publication of John Rawls Theory of Justice in 1971. After an overview of the concept of justice, it provides a critical discussion of desert and non‐desert theories, mutual advantage, impartiality, utilitarian, rational choice, and feminist and pluralist accounts of justiceLess
Focuses on the development of justice‐based theory, predominantly after the publication of John Rawls Theory of Justice in 1971. After an overview of the concept of justice, it provides a critical discussion of desert and non‐desert theories, mutual advantage, impartiality, utilitarian, rational choice, and feminist and pluralist accounts of justice
Pierre Rosanvallon
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149486
- eISBN:
- 9781400838745
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149486.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
It's a commonplace occurrence that citizens in Western democracies are disaffected with their political leaders and traditional democratic institutions. But this book argues that this crisis of ...
More
It's a commonplace occurrence that citizens in Western democracies are disaffected with their political leaders and traditional democratic institutions. But this book argues that this crisis of confidence is partly a crisis of understanding. The book makes the case that the sources of democratic legitimacy have shifted and multiplied over the past thirty years and that we need to comprehend and make better use of these new sources of legitimacy in order to strengthen our political self-belief and commitment to democracy. Drawing on examples from France and the United States, the book notes that there has been a major expansion of independent commissions, NGOs, regulatory authorities, and watchdogs in recent decades. At the same time, constitutional courts have become more willing and able to challenge legislatures. These institutional developments, which serve the democratic values of impartiality and reflexivity, have been accompanied by a new attentiveness to what the book calls the value of proximity, as governing structures have sought to find new spaces for minorities, the particular, and the local. To improve our democracies, we need to use these new sources of legitimacy more effectively and we need to incorporate them into our accounts of democratic government. This book is an original contribution to the vigorous international debate about democratic authority and legitimacy.Less
It's a commonplace occurrence that citizens in Western democracies are disaffected with their political leaders and traditional democratic institutions. But this book argues that this crisis of confidence is partly a crisis of understanding. The book makes the case that the sources of democratic legitimacy have shifted and multiplied over the past thirty years and that we need to comprehend and make better use of these new sources of legitimacy in order to strengthen our political self-belief and commitment to democracy. Drawing on examples from France and the United States, the book notes that there has been a major expansion of independent commissions, NGOs, regulatory authorities, and watchdogs in recent decades. At the same time, constitutional courts have become more willing and able to challenge legislatures. These institutional developments, which serve the democratic values of impartiality and reflexivity, have been accompanied by a new attentiveness to what the book calls the value of proximity, as governing structures have sought to find new spaces for minorities, the particular, and the local. To improve our democracies, we need to use these new sources of legitimacy more effectively and we need to incorporate them into our accounts of democratic government. This book is an original contribution to the vigorous international debate about democratic authority and legitimacy.
Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195098396
- eISBN:
- 9780199870059
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195098390.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Thomas Nagel addresses the conflict between the claims of the group and those of the individual. Nagel attempts to clarify the nature of the conflict – one of the most fundamental problems in moral ...
More
Thomas Nagel addresses the conflict between the claims of the group and those of the individual. Nagel attempts to clarify the nature of the conflict – one of the most fundamental problems in moral and political theory – and argues that its reconciliation is the essential task of any legitimate political system.Less
Thomas Nagel addresses the conflict between the claims of the group and those of the individual. Nagel attempts to clarify the nature of the conflict – one of the most fundamental problems in moral and political theory – and argues that its reconciliation is the essential task of any legitimate political system.
Caroline Johnson Hodge
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195182163
- eISBN:
- 9780199785612
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182163.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
This chapter examines several passages in which Paul links Jews and gentiles (or Greeks) together, establishing a common ground but also maintaining a separation between them. Their connection is ...
More
This chapter examines several passages in which Paul links Jews and gentiles (or Greeks) together, establishing a common ground but also maintaining a separation between them. Their connection is made possible by common ancestry and a shared God: gentiles-in-Christ and Jews are all descendants of Abraham, peoples of the God of Israel. But Paul does not join the two groups into one, nor are the two groups equal. Indeed, Paul maintains a hierarchy between the two, placing Jews at the top (first the Jew and then the Greek). The tension created by this arrangement is crucial to Paul's argument in Romans 9-11, where he outlines his understanding of God's larger plan for salvation of both peoples. The impartiality of God and the olive tree metaphor are critical themes in communicating this plan. Aggregative arguments allow Paul to simultaneously unify and distinguish gentiles and Jews, to rank the latter over the former, and to cultivate a tension between them which propels his version of salvation history, ultimately bringing about the salvation of both peoples.Less
This chapter examines several passages in which Paul links Jews and gentiles (or Greeks) together, establishing a common ground but also maintaining a separation between them. Their connection is made possible by common ancestry and a shared God: gentiles-in-Christ and Jews are all descendants of Abraham, peoples of the God of Israel. But Paul does not join the two groups into one, nor are the two groups equal. Indeed, Paul maintains a hierarchy between the two, placing Jews at the top (first the Jew and then the Greek). The tension created by this arrangement is crucial to Paul's argument in Romans 9-11, where he outlines his understanding of God's larger plan for salvation of both peoples. The impartiality of God and the olive tree metaphor are critical themes in communicating this plan. Aggregative arguments allow Paul to simultaneously unify and distinguish gentiles and Jews, to rank the latter over the former, and to cultivate a tension between them which propels his version of salvation history, ultimately bringing about the salvation of both peoples.
Brad Hooker
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256570
- eISBN:
- 9780191597701
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256578.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Begins by explaining and arguing for certain criteria for assessing normative moral theories. Then argues that these criteria lead to a rule‐consequentialist moral theory. According to ...
More
Begins by explaining and arguing for certain criteria for assessing normative moral theories. Then argues that these criteria lead to a rule‐consequentialist moral theory. According to rule‐consequentialism, acts should be assessed morally in terms of impartially justified rules, and rules are impartially justified if and only if the expected overall value of their general internalization is at least as great as for any alternative rules. In the course of developing this theory, the book discusses impartiality, well‐being, fairness, equality, and the question of how ‘general internalization’ of rules is to be interpreted. It also considers the main objections to rule‐consequentialism. The book also discusses contractualism, utilitarianism, act‐consequentialism, Ross‐style pluralism, and the question of which moral prohibitions and which duties to aid others rule‐consequentialism endorses. The last part of the book considers the implications of rule‐consequentialism for some current controversies in practical ethics.Less
Begins by explaining and arguing for certain criteria for assessing normative moral theories. Then argues that these criteria lead to a rule‐consequentialist moral theory. According to rule‐consequentialism, acts should be assessed morally in terms of impartially justified rules, and rules are impartially justified if and only if the expected overall value of their general internalization is at least as great as for any alternative rules. In the course of developing this theory, the book discusses impartiality, well‐being, fairness, equality, and the question of how ‘general internalization’ of rules is to be interpreted. It also considers the main objections to rule‐consequentialism. The book also discusses contractualism, utilitarianism, act‐consequentialism, Ross‐style pluralism, and the question of which moral prohibitions and which duties to aid others rule‐consequentialism endorses. The last part of the book considers the implications of rule‐consequentialism for some current controversies in practical ethics.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that there is a distributive, as opposed to aggregative, element in the perspective of impartiality, just as there is in the case of self-interested partiality. The impartial ...
More
This chapter argues that there is a distributive, as opposed to aggregative, element in the perspective of impartiality, just as there is in the case of self-interested partiality. The impartial principle to counter self-interest is act-utilitarianism. But act-utilitarianism ignores the idea that distribution of goods can matter independently of pure aggregation. Two theories of such distribution — egalitarianism and the ‘priority view’ — are rejected. The chapter argues for the view that there is a certain threshold — that at which an individual has ‘enough’ — such that the well-being of those below that threshold grounds reasons of a strength that varies in proportion to the distance from the threshold.Less
This chapter argues that there is a distributive, as opposed to aggregative, element in the perspective of impartiality, just as there is in the case of self-interested partiality. The impartial principle to counter self-interest is act-utilitarianism. But act-utilitarianism ignores the idea that distribution of goods can matter independently of pure aggregation. Two theories of such distribution — egalitarianism and the ‘priority view’ — are rejected. The chapter argues for the view that there is a certain threshold — that at which an individual has ‘enough’ — such that the well-being of those below that threshold grounds reasons of a strength that varies in proportion to the distance from the threshold.
Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195159066
- eISBN:
- 9780199786466
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159063.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter distinguishes between morality, the informal public system that people use when making moral decisions, and a moral theory, which provides an explanation and justification of morality. ...
More
This chapter distinguishes between morality, the informal public system that people use when making moral decisions, and a moral theory, which provides an explanation and justification of morality. It presents some examples of mistaken accounts of morality, shows the relation between morality and rationality, and provides an account of impartiality. It gives an account of moral rules and moral ideals, and of the morally relevant features that are used when justifying a violation of a moral rule.Less
This chapter distinguishes between morality, the informal public system that people use when making moral decisions, and a moral theory, which provides an explanation and justification of morality. It presents some examples of mistaken accounts of morality, shows the relation between morality and rationality, and provides an account of impartiality. It gives an account of moral rules and moral ideals, and of the morally relevant features that are used when justifying a violation of a moral rule.
Andrew Dobson
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294955
- eISBN:
- 9780191599071
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294956.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Examines the third conception of sustainability, involving the maintenance of ‘natural value’ into the future, for its compatibility with social justice. Substitutability is wholly rejected, as the ...
More
Examines the third conception of sustainability, involving the maintenance of ‘natural value’ into the future, for its compatibility with social justice. Substitutability is wholly rejected, as the original is to be preferred to any substitute, procedural justice is likely to be only very contingently compatible with the objective of sustaining natural value, and views of justice that are impartial as to views of the human good may often be at odds with sustaining natural value, as this objective is driven by a view of the good. All this explains why environmental activists and justice activists seem sometimes to speak past—rather than to—each other.Less
Examines the third conception of sustainability, involving the maintenance of ‘natural value’ into the future, for its compatibility with social justice. Substitutability is wholly rejected, as the original is to be preferred to any substitute, procedural justice is likely to be only very contingently compatible with the objective of sustaining natural value, and views of justice that are impartial as to views of the human good may often be at odds with sustaining natural value, as this objective is driven by a view of the good. All this explains why environmental activists and justice activists seem sometimes to speak past—rather than to—each other.
Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195098396
- eISBN:
- 9780199870059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195098390.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The central problem of political theory is to reconcile the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual. The problem is not approached as a question about the relation ...
More
The central problem of political theory is to reconcile the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual. The problem is not approached as a question about the relation between the individual and society; in essence and origin it is a question about each individual's relation to himself. The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements, which present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals.Less
The central problem of political theory is to reconcile the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual. The problem is not approached as a question about the relation between the individual and society; in essence and origin it is a question about each individual's relation to himself. The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements, which present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals.
David O. Brink
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266401
- eISBN:
- 9780191600906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266409.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines whether Green's conception of the common good is impartial in the sense that it demands an equal weighting of everyone's good. Green's views on the philosophical and political ...
More
This chapter examines whether Green's conception of the common good is impartial in the sense that it demands an equal weighting of everyone's good. Green's views on the philosophical and political influence of utilitarian and Kantian conceptions of impartiality are considered. It is argued that partiality of variable weight is consistent with impartiality of universal scope. Moreover, it fits the common view that even if morality has universal scope, the demands that it imposes are a function not simply of the amount of benefit that one can confer but also of the nature of the relationship in which one stands to potential beneficiaries. If we fill in the details of Green's claims about the role of the common good in self-realization with the help of Aristotle's eudaimonist justification of virtues that aim at the common good, then it is hard to see how Green can avoid endorsing this sort of partiality.Less
This chapter examines whether Green's conception of the common good is impartial in the sense that it demands an equal weighting of everyone's good. Green's views on the philosophical and political influence of utilitarian and Kantian conceptions of impartiality are considered. It is argued that partiality of variable weight is consistent with impartiality of universal scope. Moreover, it fits the common view that even if morality has universal scope, the demands that it imposes are a function not simply of the amount of benefit that one can confer but also of the nature of the relationship in which one stands to potential beneficiaries. If we fill in the details of Green's claims about the role of the common good in self-realization with the help of Aristotle's eudaimonist justification of virtues that aim at the common good, then it is hard to see how Green can avoid endorsing this sort of partiality.
Melissa S. Williams
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198297703
- eISBN:
- 9780191602948
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829770X.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
One of the central aims of deliberative theory is to redeem the ideal of impartiality by defining political processes in a manner that avoids bias against valid social interests. The first section of ...
More
One of the central aims of deliberative theory is to redeem the ideal of impartiality by defining political processes in a manner that avoids bias against valid social interests. The first section of this chapter presents the broad outlines of theories of deliberative democracy and explores the place of the concept of impartiality within them. In the next section, the different kinds of contributions that marginalized group perspectives make to democratic deliberation are explored. Next, drawing on and extending the recent feminist critiques of deliberative democracy, two interrelated challenges to deliberative theory are examined: one focused on the standard of reasonableness and the idea of reason‐giving, and the other on the contingent social and political circumstances under which marginalized‐group perspectives may sway the judgement of other citizens. Finally, the implications of these changes for our more general notions of the virtues and responsibilities of citizenship are examined.Less
One of the central aims of deliberative theory is to redeem the ideal of impartiality by defining political processes in a manner that avoids bias against valid social interests. The first section of this chapter presents the broad outlines of theories of deliberative democracy and explores the place of the concept of impartiality within them. In the next section, the different kinds of contributions that marginalized group perspectives make to democratic deliberation are explored. Next, drawing on and extending the recent feminist critiques of deliberative democracy, two interrelated challenges to deliberative theory are examined: one focused on the standard of reasonableness and the idea of reason‐giving, and the other on the contingent social and political circumstances under which marginalized‐group perspectives may sway the judgement of other citizens. Finally, the implications of these changes for our more general notions of the virtues and responsibilities of citizenship are examined.
Pierre Rosanvallon
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149486
- eISBN:
- 9781400838745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149486.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines conceptions of impartiality and looks at how impartiality itself is approached in a political context. In doing so the chapter asks if the shift from positive to negative ...
More
This chapter examines conceptions of impartiality and looks at how impartiality itself is approached in a political context. In doing so the chapter asks if the shift from positive to negative generality reflects a decline in the democratic–republican ideal and a greater role for law. From here, the chapter turns to the idea of a democratic impartiality—an active impartiality whose intervention helps to build a political community. Impartiality has established itself in the political order as the vector of aspirations to construct a more deliberative and transparent public space. It is also a key to understanding new ways of thinking about the social.Less
This chapter examines conceptions of impartiality and looks at how impartiality itself is approached in a political context. In doing so the chapter asks if the shift from positive to negative generality reflects a decline in the democratic–republican ideal and a greater role for law. From here, the chapter turns to the idea of a democratic impartiality—an active impartiality whose intervention helps to build a political community. Impartiality has established itself in the political order as the vector of aspirations to construct a more deliberative and transparent public space. It is also a key to understanding new ways of thinking about the social.
David M. Beatty
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269808
- eISBN:
- 9780191710063
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This book addresses the age-old tension between law and politics by examining whether the personal beliefs of judges come into play in adjudicating on issues of religious freedom, sex discrimination, ...
More
This book addresses the age-old tension between law and politics by examining whether the personal beliefs of judges come into play in adjudicating on issues of religious freedom, sex discrimination, and social and economic rights. Decisions by the Supreme Courts of India, Japan, Canada, the United States, Ireland, Israel, the Constitutional Courts of Germany, Hungary, South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights on such controversial issues as government funding of religious schools, abortion, same-sex marriages, women in the military, and rights to basic shelter and life-saving medical treatment are evaluated and compared. The book develops a radical alternative to the conventional view that judges decide these cases by engaging in an essentially interpretative, and thus subjective, act, relying ultimately on their personal beliefs and political opinions. The book shows that it is possible to exercise impartiality and objectivity in judicial review, based on the principle of proportionality, which acts as an ultimate rule of law and is fully compatible with the ideals of democracy and popular sovereignty. Controversially, the book concludes that although this method of judicial review originated in the United States, American judges generally appear to be far less inclined to this conception of constitutional adjudication than their counterparts in Europe, Africa, and Asia.Less
This book addresses the age-old tension between law and politics by examining whether the personal beliefs of judges come into play in adjudicating on issues of religious freedom, sex discrimination, and social and economic rights. Decisions by the Supreme Courts of India, Japan, Canada, the United States, Ireland, Israel, the Constitutional Courts of Germany, Hungary, South Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights on such controversial issues as government funding of religious schools, abortion, same-sex marriages, women in the military, and rights to basic shelter and life-saving medical treatment are evaluated and compared. The book develops a radical alternative to the conventional view that judges decide these cases by engaging in an essentially interpretative, and thus subjective, act, relying ultimately on their personal beliefs and political opinions. The book shows that it is possible to exercise impartiality and objectivity in judicial review, based on the principle of proportionality, which acts as an ultimate rule of law and is fully compatible with the ideals of democracy and popular sovereignty. Controversially, the book concludes that although this method of judicial review originated in the United States, American judges generally appear to be far less inclined to this conception of constitutional adjudication than their counterparts in Europe, Africa, and Asia.
Monika Baár
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199581184
- eISBN:
- 9780191722806
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199581184.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
Chapter 2, ‘Romantic Historiography in the Service of Nation‐Building’, discusses the historians' expectations of historical writing and explores how their ambitions related to those of the ...
More
Chapter 2, ‘Romantic Historiography in the Service of Nation‐Building’, discusses the historians' expectations of historical writing and explores how their ambitions related to those of the representatives of Enlightenment‐style general history and representatives of Romantic national history elsewhere. These goals included the democratization of the content, the democratization of the medium and the democratization of the audience. They sought to write histories in a pragmatic, impartial manner and believed that history was magistra vitae. Relating the five scholars'goals to mainstream developments, the chapter demonstrates that there existed a general blueprint of national history‐writing in this period, one which emphasized the ancient, continuous, unified and unique nature of national history. Lastly, a comparison is undertaken between self‐congratulatory accounts in mainstream historiography and the historians' change‐oriented emancipatory rhetoric.Less
Chapter 2, ‘Romantic Historiography in the Service of Nation‐Building’, discusses the historians' expectations of historical writing and explores how their ambitions related to those of the representatives of Enlightenment‐style general history and representatives of Romantic national history elsewhere. These goals included the democratization of the content, the democratization of the medium and the democratization of the audience. They sought to write histories in a pragmatic, impartial manner and believed that history was magistra vitae. Relating the five scholars'goals to mainstream developments, the chapter demonstrates that there existed a general blueprint of national history‐writing in this period, one which emphasized the ancient, continuous, unified and unique nature of national history. Lastly, a comparison is undertaken between self‐congratulatory accounts in mainstream historiography and the historians' change‐oriented emancipatory rhetoric.
Geoffrey Blest
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206996
- eISBN:
- 9780191677427
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206996.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Military History
This chapter discusses the law of armed conflict or the doctrine of ‘belligerent equality’ which applies equally to all parties to an armed conflict, whether or not the international community ...
More
This chapter discusses the law of armed conflict or the doctrine of ‘belligerent equality’ which applies equally to all parties to an armed conflict, whether or not the international community regards any participant as the ‘aggressor’ or ‘victim’. It explains that the individual victims of conflict, notably civilians, POWs, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and all military members of nations involved are the beneficiaries of much of the law of armed conflict. It notes that the immediate humanitarian advantages of this doctrine are nowhere more evident than in the value which the ICRC places on it. It further notes that the fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent — humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence — rely upon it. It emphasizes that humanity is the ark of the movement's covenant: the Red Cross's calling and duty to succour, assist, and protect war's victims and sufferers.Less
This chapter discusses the law of armed conflict or the doctrine of ‘belligerent equality’ which applies equally to all parties to an armed conflict, whether or not the international community regards any participant as the ‘aggressor’ or ‘victim’. It explains that the individual victims of conflict, notably civilians, POWs, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and all military members of nations involved are the beneficiaries of much of the law of armed conflict. It notes that the immediate humanitarian advantages of this doctrine are nowhere more evident than in the value which the ICRC places on it. It further notes that the fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent — humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence — rely upon it. It emphasizes that humanity is the ark of the movement's covenant: the Red Cross's calling and duty to succour, assist, and protect war's victims and sufferers.
