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“I”-Ascriptions: The Semantic and the Epistemic

Dorit Bar-On

in Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199276288
eISBN:
9780191602894
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199276285.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

A more promising account of the way ‘I’ refers, which derives from the works of Sidney Shoemaker and Gareth Evans, is discussed in Ch. 3. This account, the ’Reference without Identification’ view, ... More


The Elusiveness Thesis, Immunity to Error through Misidentification, and Privileged Access

José Luis Bermúdez

in The Bodily Self: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780262037501
eISBN:
9780262344661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Two ideas have played a prominent role in philosophical discussions of self-knowledge. The first is the idea that we enjoy introspective ways of finding out about ourselves are fundamentally ... More


Personal Identity and Memory

Sven Bernecker

in Memory: A Philosophical Study

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199577569
eISBN:
9780191722820
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577569.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

When a memory content involves an indexical reference to the rememberer, the veridicality constraint on memory demands that the rememberer is numerically the same as the one who had the original ... More


Toward a Non-Self-Representationalist Account

Kristina Musholt

in Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780262029209
eISBN:
9780262329767
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262029209.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses in more detail the non-self-representationalist approach, according to which the self is part of the mode rather than the content of perception and bodily experience, and ... More


Indexicality and Immunity to Error

Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever

in The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199686742
eISBN:
9780191766824
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues for three theses regarding a proposed epistemic route to Essential Indexicality. First, there is no philosophically interesting phenomenon of immunity to error through ... More


Explaining First Person Phenomena

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199699568
eISBN:
9780191760730
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Epistemic phenomena distinctive of the first person concept should be explained in part by the nature of that concept. This applies to immunity to error through misidentification, which can be ... More


Sense

John Campbell

in Reference and Consciousness

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199243815
eISBN:
9780191597145
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199243816.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We need the notion of sense to characterize which inferences involving demonstratives are valid; the account developed so far suggests that this will be when conscious attention uses the same ... More


Setting the Stage: The Problem of Self-Consciousness

Kristina Musholt

in Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
January 2016
ISBN:
9780262029209
eISBN:
9780262329767
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262029209.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter presents the traditional model of self-consciousness, according to which self-consciousness is a form of object cognition, and explains why this model is misguided. Based on this, it ... More


PRO and the Representation of First-Person Thought

Jason Stanley

in Know How

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780199695362
eISBN:
9780191729768
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695362.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

Sentences that ascribe knowing how contain the unpronounced pronoun PRO, which has a de se, or first-personal meaning, in such sentences. On the account of knowing how defended in the book, then, ... More


Immunity to Error through Misidentification

Jordi Fernández

in Memory: A Self-Referential Account

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780190073008
eISBN:
9780190073039
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190073008.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Chapter 6 offers an account of an epistemic feature of memories; their immunity to error through misidentification. When one judges that one experienced something, based on a full and accurate ... More


Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism

François Recanati

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
January 2008
ISBN:
9780199230532
eISBN:
9780191710919
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Our thought and talk are situated: they do not take place in a vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is ... More


Self-Knowledge and the Sense of “I”

José Luis Bermúdez

in Self-Knowledge

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199590728
eISBN:
9780191725456
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores philosophical accounts of the sense of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ in the light of what is termed the symmetry constraint upon the sense of ‘I’. The symmetry constraint ... More


I and I: Immunity to Error through Misidentification of the Subject

Galen Strawson

in The Subject of Experience

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
March 2017
ISBN:
9780198777885
eISBN:
9780191823350
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777885.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues for the following claims about self-consciousness: [1] all uses of I (i.e. the word ‘I’ or thought-element I) are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to ... More


Self‐Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy

Crispin Wright

in Knowing Our Own Minds

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199241408
eISBN:
9780191598692
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199241406.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The central philosophical problem of self‐knowledge is to account for, why, in an important basic class of cases, a subject's impressions of her own mental states are both groundless and ... More


Perspectival Self-Consciousness

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
April 2014
ISBN:
9780199699568
eISBN:
9780191760730
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699568.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In ethology, perspectival self-consciousness is normally evidence by an animal’s passing the mirror test. There can be perspectival self-consciousness without a subject’s passing the mirror test, and ... More


The Immunity of the Sense of Ownership

Frédérique de Vignemont

in Mind the Body: An Exploration of Bodily Self-Awareness

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
November 2017
ISBN:
9780198735885
eISBN:
9780191799846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198735885.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Are bodily self-ascriptions immune to error through misidentification (IEM)? It is classically assumed that I can be wrong about whose legs are crossed when I have access to them through vision, but ... More


Asymmetries in Subjective Time

Denis Perrin

in Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
June 2016
ISBN:
9780190241537
eISBN:
9780190241551
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0003
Subject:
Psychology, Cognitive Psychology

Chapter 3 tackles the issue of the relationship between backward and forward mental time travel. It first charts the debate between continuism and discontinuism. It then makes a case for a moderate ... More


Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness

José Luis Bermúdez

in The Bodily Self: Selected Essays

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
September 2018
ISBN:
9780262037501
eISBN:
9780262344661
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

We are embodied, and we are aware of our bodies ‘from the inside’ through different forms of bodily awareness. But what is the relation between these two facts? Are these forms of bodily awareness ... More


Explaining Immunity to Error through Misidentification

José Luis Bermúdez

in Understanding I: Language and Thought

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780198796213
eISBN:
9780191837319
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796213.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter proposes a two-pronged strategy for explaining how to understand first person judgments with the IEM property. Many first person judgments with the IEM property involve self-ascribing ... More


Frege and Evans on the Sense of “I”

José Luis Bermúdez

in Understanding I: Language and Thought

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
February 2017
ISBN:
9780198796213
eISBN:
9780191837319
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796213.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

The best developed neo-Fregean account of the sense of “I” was offered by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of Reference. Evans’s account is based on his principle that understanding referring ... More


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