C. C. W. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199226399
- eISBN:
- 9780191710209
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226399.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines the relation between rationality and happiness in Plato's thought. In some early dialogues a correct conception of what happiness is, is sufficient to achieve it; hence all ...
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This chapter examines the relation between rationality and happiness in Plato's thought. In some early dialogues a correct conception of what happiness is, is sufficient to achieve it; hence all wrong-doing is caused by misconception or miscalculation, which are kinds of irrationality. In some dialogues, miscalculation is itself caused by inappropriate desires, which gives the latter motivational force, albeit not independent of cognitive irrationality. In the Republic and subsequent dialogues, non-rational impulses have independent motivational force, and rationality consists in co-ordinating them under the direction of reason to promote the individual's happiness. In the Republic, Plato is optimistic about the possibility of achieving that co-ordination, but other dialogues show a more pessimistic picture, in which one prominent type of non-rational drive, desire for bodily satisfaction, cannot be genuinely co-ordinated with reason, but can at best be suppressed. That pessimistic picture reflects a heightened insistence on the distinction between the rational soul (which alone is immortal, and which is identified with the real self) and the non-rational parts, which are temporary features of the embodied soul.Less
This chapter examines the relation between rationality and happiness in Plato's thought. In some early dialogues a correct conception of what happiness is, is sufficient to achieve it; hence all wrong-doing is caused by misconception or miscalculation, which are kinds of irrationality. In some dialogues, miscalculation is itself caused by inappropriate desires, which gives the latter motivational force, albeit not independent of cognitive irrationality. In the Republic and subsequent dialogues, non-rational impulses have independent motivational force, and rationality consists in co-ordinating them under the direction of reason to promote the individual's happiness. In the Republic, Plato is optimistic about the possibility of achieving that co-ordination, but other dialogues show a more pessimistic picture, in which one prominent type of non-rational drive, desire for bodily satisfaction, cannot be genuinely co-ordinated with reason, but can at best be suppressed. That pessimistic picture reflects a heightened insistence on the distinction between the rational soul (which alone is immortal, and which is identified with the real self) and the non-rational parts, which are temporary features of the embodied soul.
Stephen G. Miller
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520258334
- eISBN:
- 9780520943599
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520258334.003.0012
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
At the end of the Republic, Plato sets forth his notion of the immortality of the soul. This has something to do with the second quotation on the shaft of the Berkeley Plato which states,“Every soul ...
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At the end of the Republic, Plato sets forth his notion of the immortality of the soul. This has something to do with the second quotation on the shaft of the Berkeley Plato which states,“Every soul is immortal.”.According to that book, soul is, indeed, immortal and that the total number of souls is immutable; each lives in cycles of eleven hundred years, depending upon the justice and virtue of the hundred years just completed. This chapter notes that the image projected by the artifact is clear: if we lead the good, the just, the wise life, at the end of the race, we will be victorious and go on our final victory lap to collect our ribbons. This is the beribboned Plato at Berkeley—a portrait of the good, immortal soul; of the virtuous member of society; of the philosopher and of his philosophy.Less
At the end of the Republic, Plato sets forth his notion of the immortality of the soul. This has something to do with the second quotation on the shaft of the Berkeley Plato which states,“Every soul is immortal.”.According to that book, soul is, indeed, immortal and that the total number of souls is immutable; each lives in cycles of eleven hundred years, depending upon the justice and virtue of the hundred years just completed. This chapter notes that the image projected by the artifact is clear: if we lead the good, the just, the wise life, at the end of the race, we will be victorious and go on our final victory lap to collect our ribbons. This is the beribboned Plato at Berkeley—a portrait of the good, immortal soul; of the virtuous member of society; of the philosopher and of his philosophy.
Anthony Quinton
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199694556
- eISBN:
- 9780191731938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694556.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter addresses the question of how definite and how important the distinction between humans and nonhuman animals is. It begins with a survey of the very varied and often very close relations ...
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This chapter addresses the question of how definite and how important the distinction between humans and nonhuman animals is. It begins with a survey of the very varied and often very close relations between them. It then discusses the ideas that men have souls; that men are, or that most of them, at any rate, sometimes or even often are, truly free agents, moved by will and not merely by instinct, on the one hand morally responsible for what they choose to do and, on the other hand, because of their freedom, not to be made predictable and manipulable by having their conduct explained by their nature and circumstances together with laws of human and social science; and that men alone are the appropriate objects of direct moral consideration, the only bearers of rights, the only moral ends in themselves. The chapter asks whether the actual differences between men and animals give an adequate foothold to the exclusive status accorded to human beings. It argues that in no case is the total exclusion of animals from the respect and consideration men are accustomed to giving themselves justified, although the differences that really exist between men and animals can be reasonably argued to have some qualifying consequences for the morality of our treatment of the latter. If that is right, there are, in the case of each of the interesting ideas involved, two possibilities. Either we can conclude that animals too have immortal souls, free wills, and moral rights. Or we can conclude that since they do not, we also do not.Less
This chapter addresses the question of how definite and how important the distinction between humans and nonhuman animals is. It begins with a survey of the very varied and often very close relations between them. It then discusses the ideas that men have souls; that men are, or that most of them, at any rate, sometimes or even often are, truly free agents, moved by will and not merely by instinct, on the one hand morally responsible for what they choose to do and, on the other hand, because of their freedom, not to be made predictable and manipulable by having their conduct explained by their nature and circumstances together with laws of human and social science; and that men alone are the appropriate objects of direct moral consideration, the only bearers of rights, the only moral ends in themselves. The chapter asks whether the actual differences between men and animals give an adequate foothold to the exclusive status accorded to human beings. It argues that in no case is the total exclusion of animals from the respect and consideration men are accustomed to giving themselves justified, although the differences that really exist between men and animals can be reasonably argued to have some qualifying consequences for the morality of our treatment of the latter. If that is right, there are, in the case of each of the interesting ideas involved, two possibilities. Either we can conclude that animals too have immortal souls, free wills, and moral rights. Or we can conclude that since they do not, we also do not.
Mary Lowe-Evans
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813032856
- eISBN:
- 9780813038643
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University Press of Florida
- DOI:
- 10.5744/florida/9780813032856.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 20th-century Literature and Modernism
Although numerous critics and scholars have considered the influence of Joyce's Catholicism on his works, most seem to have concluded that Joyce's intention was to subvert the church's power. This ...
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Although numerous critics and scholars have considered the influence of Joyce's Catholicism on his works, most seem to have concluded that Joyce's intention was to subvert the church's power. This book argues, on the contrary, that the net result of Joyce's Catholic nostalgia is an entanglement in rather than a liberation from the labyrinthine ways of theological exposition and Catholic ritual and politics, which has inspired in his readers an enduring admiration for institutional Catholicism. The author explores the ways in which specific Catholic rituals and devotions vigorously promoted by the Catholic Church during the “Crisis in Modernism” (1850–1960) caused a nostalgic reaction in Joyce that informs and permeates his work. She also traces the subtle and direct influence Joyce had on the Catholic thinking of a diverse group of subsequent writers. She demonstrates that Joyce and F. Scott Fitzgerald seem to effect this nostalgia in their work in spite of themselves, while Flannery O'Connor and Thomas Merton purposely elicit it. The book also discusses Joyce's enduring belief in the immortal soul and the religious faith and doubt of Merton.Less
Although numerous critics and scholars have considered the influence of Joyce's Catholicism on his works, most seem to have concluded that Joyce's intention was to subvert the church's power. This book argues, on the contrary, that the net result of Joyce's Catholic nostalgia is an entanglement in rather than a liberation from the labyrinthine ways of theological exposition and Catholic ritual and politics, which has inspired in his readers an enduring admiration for institutional Catholicism. The author explores the ways in which specific Catholic rituals and devotions vigorously promoted by the Catholic Church during the “Crisis in Modernism” (1850–1960) caused a nostalgic reaction in Joyce that informs and permeates his work. She also traces the subtle and direct influence Joyce had on the Catholic thinking of a diverse group of subsequent writers. She demonstrates that Joyce and F. Scott Fitzgerald seem to effect this nostalgia in their work in spite of themselves, while Flannery O'Connor and Thomas Merton purposely elicit it. The book also discusses Joyce's enduring belief in the immortal soul and the religious faith and doubt of Merton.
Karmen MacKendrick
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823229499
- eISBN:
- 9780823236961
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823229499.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Philosophers have long and skeptically viewed religion as a source of over easy answers, with a singular, totalizing “God” and the comfort of an immortal soul being the greatest among them. But ...
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Philosophers have long and skeptically viewed religion as a source of over easy answers, with a singular, totalizing “God” and the comfort of an immortal soul being the greatest among them. But religious thought has always been more interesting—indeed, a rich source of endlessly unfolding questions. With questions from the 1885 Baltimore Catechism of the Catholic Church as the starting point for each chapter, this book offers postmodern reflections on many of the central doctrines of the Church: the oneness of God, original sin, forgiveness, love and its connection to mortality, reverence for the relics of saints, and the doctrine of bodily resurrection. It maintains that we begin and end in questions and not in answers, in fragments and not in totalities—more precisely, in a fragmentation paradoxically integral to wholeness. Taking seriously Augustine's idea that we find the divine in memory, the book argues that memory does not lead us back in time to a tidy answer but opens onto a complicated and fragmented time in which we find that the one and the many, before and after and now, even sacred and profane are complexly entangled. Time becomes something lived, corporeal, and sacred, with fragments of eternity interspersed among the stretches of its duration. Our sense of ourselves is correspondingly complex, because theological considerations lead us not to the security of an everlasting, indivisible soul dwelling comfortably in the presence of a paternal deity but to a more complicated, perpetually peculiar and paradoxical life in the flesh.Less
Philosophers have long and skeptically viewed religion as a source of over easy answers, with a singular, totalizing “God” and the comfort of an immortal soul being the greatest among them. But religious thought has always been more interesting—indeed, a rich source of endlessly unfolding questions. With questions from the 1885 Baltimore Catechism of the Catholic Church as the starting point for each chapter, this book offers postmodern reflections on many of the central doctrines of the Church: the oneness of God, original sin, forgiveness, love and its connection to mortality, reverence for the relics of saints, and the doctrine of bodily resurrection. It maintains that we begin and end in questions and not in answers, in fragments and not in totalities—more precisely, in a fragmentation paradoxically integral to wholeness. Taking seriously Augustine's idea that we find the divine in memory, the book argues that memory does not lead us back in time to a tidy answer but opens onto a complicated and fragmented time in which we find that the one and the many, before and after and now, even sacred and profane are complexly entangled. Time becomes something lived, corporeal, and sacred, with fragments of eternity interspersed among the stretches of its duration. Our sense of ourselves is correspondingly complex, because theological considerations lead us not to the security of an everlasting, indivisible soul dwelling comfortably in the presence of a paternal deity but to a more complicated, perpetually peculiar and paradoxical life in the flesh.
