C. Daniel Batson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195341065
- eISBN:
- 9780199894222
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341065.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter considers the liabilities of empathy-induced altruism following roughly the same sequence as in Chapter 7—first, liabilities for individuals in need, then for groups in need, and ...
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This chapter considers the liabilities of empathy-induced altruism following roughly the same sequence as in Chapter 7—first, liabilities for individuals in need, then for groups in need, and finally, for the person experiencing altruistic motivation. The potential liabilities are: empathy-induced altruism can hurt those in need, especially when the helper needs a cool head; it may also produce maternalism and paternalism; empathy-induced altruism can be overridden by self-concern; it can produce empathy avoidance; empathy-induced altruism is less likely to be evoked by non-personal, abstract, and chronic needs; empathy-induced altruism can be a source of immoral action; it can also pose a threat to the common good in social dilemmas. Finally, empathy-induced altruism can pose a threat to the mental and physical health—and even to the life—of the altruistically motivated individual.Less
This chapter considers the liabilities of empathy-induced altruism following roughly the same sequence as in Chapter 7—first, liabilities for individuals in need, then for groups in need, and finally, for the person experiencing altruistic motivation. The potential liabilities are: empathy-induced altruism can hurt those in need, especially when the helper needs a cool head; it may also produce maternalism and paternalism; empathy-induced altruism can be overridden by self-concern; it can produce empathy avoidance; empathy-induced altruism is less likely to be evoked by non-personal, abstract, and chronic needs; empathy-induced altruism can be a source of immoral action; it can also pose a threat to the common good in social dilemmas. Finally, empathy-induced altruism can pose a threat to the mental and physical health—and even to the life—of the altruistically motivated individual.
Scott Sehon
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198758495
- eISBN:
- 9780191818394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
On the teleological view, actions that are less than fully rational are therefore less than fully free, which might initially seem implausible. This chapter responds to this objection as it might ...
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On the teleological view, actions that are less than fully rational are therefore less than fully free, which might initially seem implausible. This chapter responds to this objection as it might arise in three sorts of cases: actions involving false judgments, immoral actions, and weak-willed actions. In all three instances the agent typically is still generally quite rationalizable, and thus the behaviors fall comfortably on the free side of the spectrum. However, there can be extreme versions of weakness of will, for example, strong addiction or compulsion, where the rationalizability of the agent is considerably diminished, implying that the agent’s freedom is diminished. But this likewise seems to be the right result. The chapter also considers the related class of cases described by Gary Watson as “perverse cases” and claims that the teleological account gets the right answers here as well.Less
On the teleological view, actions that are less than fully rational are therefore less than fully free, which might initially seem implausible. This chapter responds to this objection as it might arise in three sorts of cases: actions involving false judgments, immoral actions, and weak-willed actions. In all three instances the agent typically is still generally quite rationalizable, and thus the behaviors fall comfortably on the free side of the spectrum. However, there can be extreme versions of weakness of will, for example, strong addiction or compulsion, where the rationalizability of the agent is considerably diminished, implying that the agent’s freedom is diminished. But this likewise seems to be the right result. The chapter also considers the related class of cases described by Gary Watson as “perverse cases” and claims that the teleological account gets the right answers here as well.
