Alexander Samely
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199296736
- eISBN:
- 9780191712067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296736.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This chapter suggests that the rabbis' large-scale use of the hypothetical legal case endows this format with a special significance. This is taken to imply that the world provides the space for ...
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This chapter suggests that the rabbis' large-scale use of the hypothetical legal case endows this format with a special significance. This is taken to imply that the world provides the space for human action in response to God's commandment. The hypothetical legal case as a mechanism by which (further) discourse on law is generated, and by which fuzzy social practices could be progressively transformed into more sharp-edged verbal norms, are considered. The chapter concludes with a survey of generative-hermeneutic patterns of thought and text composition.Less
This chapter suggests that the rabbis' large-scale use of the hypothetical legal case endows this format with a special significance. This is taken to imply that the world provides the space for human action in response to God's commandment. The hypothetical legal case as a mechanism by which (further) discourse on law is generated, and by which fuzzy social practices could be progressively transformed into more sharp-edged verbal norms, are considered. The chapter concludes with a survey of generative-hermeneutic patterns of thought and text composition.
Alan M. Dershowitz
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195158076
- eISBN:
- 9780199869848
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195158075.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US ...
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Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. The author states that he is convinced that if it had been Bush rather than Gore who needed the Florida recount in order to have any chance of winning the election, that at least some of the five justices who voted to stop the recount would instead have voted to allow it to proceed. The main sections of the chapter are: Judicial Impropriety; Hypothetical Cases Involving a Supreme Court Decision Regarding a Presidential Election; The Difficulty of Proving an Improper Motive; Academic Defenders of the Majority Justices; Ad Hominem Arguments and Analysis of Motive; and Analysing the Justices’ Motives in Bush vs Gore: A Prelude.Less
Aims to demonstrate that, during the (Bush vs Gore) US presidential election of 2000, by any reasonable standard of evaluation, the majority justices of the US Supreme Court failed to test the US constitutional system in ways that it had never been tested before, and did so not because of incompetence, but because of malice aforethought. The author states that he is convinced that if it had been Bush rather than Gore who needed the Florida recount in order to have any chance of winning the election, that at least some of the five justices who voted to stop the recount would instead have voted to allow it to proceed. The main sections of the chapter are: Judicial Impropriety; Hypothetical Cases Involving a Supreme Court Decision Regarding a Presidential Election; The Difficulty of Proving an Improper Motive; Academic Defenders of the Majority Justices; Ad Hominem Arguments and Analysis of Motive; and Analysing the Justices’ Motives in Bush vs Gore: A Prelude.
Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- May 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198843580
- eISBN:
- 9780191925986
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198843580.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, EU Law
Chapter 5 discusses the requirement that an answer to the preliminary question must be relevant for the resolution of the main proceedings. It analyses when a preliminary ruling must be assumed to be ...
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Chapter 5 discusses the requirement that an answer to the preliminary question must be relevant for the resolution of the main proceedings. It analyses when a preliminary ruling must be assumed to be irrelevant to the decision in the main proceedings, and it discusses the so-called Foglia principle according to which the Court declines jurisdiction to reply to questions of interpretation which are submitted to it within the framework of a contrived case. Chapter 5 also examines when a preliminary reference is precluded because the same issue is, has been, or could be subject to a direct action before the Court of Justice. Here it first examines the relationship between, on the one hand, the preliminary procedure and, on the other hand, Articles 258 and 259 TFEU concerning infringement proceedings. Next, it analyses the relationship between the preliminary procedure and Article 263 TFEU concerning actions for annulment before the Court of Justice (TWD-doctrine).Less
Chapter 5 discusses the requirement that an answer to the preliminary question must be relevant for the resolution of the main proceedings. It analyses when a preliminary ruling must be assumed to be irrelevant to the decision in the main proceedings, and it discusses the so-called Foglia principle according to which the Court declines jurisdiction to reply to questions of interpretation which are submitted to it within the framework of a contrived case. Chapter 5 also examines when a preliminary reference is precluded because the same issue is, has been, or could be subject to a direct action before the Court of Justice. Here it first examines the relationship between, on the one hand, the preliminary procedure and, on the other hand, Articles 258 and 259 TFEU concerning infringement proceedings. Next, it analyses the relationship between the preliminary procedure and Article 263 TFEU concerning actions for annulment before the Court of Justice (TWD-doctrine).
Jeff Mcmahan
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226529387
- eISBN:
- 9780226529554
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226529554.003.0010
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This chapter considers whether moral philosophers should accept as part of their moral methodology the study hypothetical cases, such as ticking bomb scenarios, in thinking about torture. In response ...
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This chapter considers whether moral philosophers should accept as part of their moral methodology the study hypothetical cases, such as ticking bomb scenarios, in thinking about torture. In response to the criticism of such scenarios by Albie Sachs, this chapter argues that such cases are useful for thinking about the ethics of torture if their function is properly understood. Such thought experiments are quite typical of moral philosophy in general, and do not necessarily generate objections. Moreover, those who engage in evil actions render themselves liable to torture as a means of prevention or self-defense. Hence this chapter rejects any absolute moral prohibition on torture. Nonetheless, there are pragmatic, consequentialist considerations that can justify an absolute legal prohibition on torture. Such a legal rule would help prevent mistakes and help prevent the torture of the innocent and others not liable to attack on just war theory. An absolute legal prohibition on torture is justified because on balance no more flexible stricture on its use is likely to be as productive of good outcomes.Less
This chapter considers whether moral philosophers should accept as part of their moral methodology the study hypothetical cases, such as ticking bomb scenarios, in thinking about torture. In response to the criticism of such scenarios by Albie Sachs, this chapter argues that such cases are useful for thinking about the ethics of torture if their function is properly understood. Such thought experiments are quite typical of moral philosophy in general, and do not necessarily generate objections. Moreover, those who engage in evil actions render themselves liable to torture as a means of prevention or self-defense. Hence this chapter rejects any absolute moral prohibition on torture. Nonetheless, there are pragmatic, consequentialist considerations that can justify an absolute legal prohibition on torture. Such a legal rule would help prevent mistakes and help prevent the torture of the innocent and others not liable to attack on just war theory. An absolute legal prohibition on torture is justified because on balance no more flexible stricture on its use is likely to be as productive of good outcomes.
Antoinette Y. Farmer and G. Lawrence Farmer
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199914364
- eISBN:
- 9780190208967
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199914364.003.0004
- Subject:
- Social Work, Research and Evaluation
This chapter provides a hypothetical case to illustrate how to develop a research project while establishing equivalence at each phase of the research process.
This chapter provides a hypothetical case to illustrate how to develop a research project while establishing equivalence at each phase of the research process.
F. M. Kamm
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- June 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199971985
- eISBN:
- 9780199346141
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199971985.003.0027
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter attempts to explain some ways in which we can come to know about ourselves, in particular about what we think. It also tries to distinguish what we are and think from what we ought to be ...
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This chapter attempts to explain some ways in which we can come to know about ourselves, in particular about what we think. It also tries to distinguish what we are and think from what we ought to be and think.Less
This chapter attempts to explain some ways in which we can come to know about ourselves, in particular about what we think. It also tries to distinguish what we are and think from what we ought to be and think.
F. M. Kamm
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190247157
- eISBN:
- 9780190247188
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190247157.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The author of the lectures in this book responds to the commentaries given. Firstly, the response discusses the view presented in the first comment of what the Trolley Problem is, its understanding ...
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The author of the lectures in this book responds to the commentaries given. Firstly, the response discusses the view presented in the first comment of what the Trolley Problem is, its understanding of and objections to the Principle of Permissible Harm, its analysis of Foot’s views, and its claims about the relative role of cases and theory in explaining a moral issue. Intricacies not brought up in Lecture II are considered here and variations on the Principle of Permissible Harm, including the Principle of Productive Purity, are described. There follows a reaction to the second comment’s stated views on the relevance of the Principle of Permissible Harm to conduct in war and its views about the ability of the principle to explain intuitive responses to the Trolley Problem. The third comment’s presented views on resolving moral disagreement and the importance of providing theories that justify intuitive judgments are considered as well.Less
The author of the lectures in this book responds to the commentaries given. Firstly, the response discusses the view presented in the first comment of what the Trolley Problem is, its understanding of and objections to the Principle of Permissible Harm, its analysis of Foot’s views, and its claims about the relative role of cases and theory in explaining a moral issue. Intricacies not brought up in Lecture II are considered here and variations on the Principle of Permissible Harm, including the Principle of Productive Purity, are described. There follows a reaction to the second comment’s stated views on the relevance of the Principle of Permissible Harm to conduct in war and its views about the ability of the principle to explain intuitive responses to the Trolley Problem. The third comment’s presented views on resolving moral disagreement and the importance of providing theories that justify intuitive judgments are considered as well.
Alexander Brown
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198812753
- eISBN:
- 9780191851926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198812753.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Section I underscores the differences between the Justice-Based Account and the Responsibility-Based Account of the legitimacy of expectations, and tries to motivate the Responsibility-Based Account ...
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Section I underscores the differences between the Justice-Based Account and the Responsibility-Based Account of the legitimacy of expectations, and tries to motivate the Responsibility-Based Account as being the superior account based on intuitions about hypothetical cases. Likewise, Section II sets out the important differences between the Legitimate Authority-Based Account and the Responsibility-Based Account, and once again attempts to motivate the Responsibility-Based Account as being the superior account by appealing to intuitions about hypothetical cases. All of the cases I shall discuss abstract from any particular legal doctrines of legitimate expectations that currently exist. The aim here is to get at what is the best theory of the general concept of legitimate expectations. This theory can then be used to critically assess actual legal doctrines.Less
Section I underscores the differences between the Justice-Based Account and the Responsibility-Based Account of the legitimacy of expectations, and tries to motivate the Responsibility-Based Account as being the superior account based on intuitions about hypothetical cases. Likewise, Section II sets out the important differences between the Legitimate Authority-Based Account and the Responsibility-Based Account, and once again attempts to motivate the Responsibility-Based Account as being the superior account by appealing to intuitions about hypothetical cases. All of the cases I shall discuss abstract from any particular legal doctrines of legitimate expectations that currently exist. The aim here is to get at what is the best theory of the general concept of legitimate expectations. This theory can then be used to critically assess actual legal doctrines.