Search Results

Bayes' theorem is a tool for assessing how probable evidence makes some hypothesis. The papers in this book consider the worth and applicability of the theorem. The book sets out the philosophical issues: Elliott Sober argues that there are other criteria for assessing hypotheses; Colin Howson, Philip Dawid, and John Earman consider how the theorem can be used in statistical science, in weighing evidence in criminal trials, and in assessing evidence for the occurrence of miracles; and David Miller argues for the worth of the probability calculus as a tool for measuring propensities in nature rather than the strength of evidence. The book ends with the original paper containing the theorem, presented to the Royal Society in 1763.

This is the third edition of a well-known graduate textbook on Boolean-valued models of set theory. The aim of the first and second editions was to provide a systematic and adequately motivated exposition of the theory of Boolean-valued models as developed by Scott and Solovay in the 1960s, deriving along the way the central set theoretic independence proofs of Cohen and others in the particularly elegant form that the Boolean-valued approach enables them to assume. In this edition, the background material has been augmented to include an introduction to Heyting algebras. It includes chapters on Boolean-valued analysis and Heyting-algebra-valued models of intuitionistic set theory.

This book assesses the worth of arguments for and against the existence of God. Evidence confirms (makes more probable) an explanatory hypothesis in so far as (1) given the hypothesis the evidence is to be expected, that is the hypothesis makes the evidence probable, (2) the evidence is not otherwise to be expected, (3) the hypothesis is simple, and (4) it fits with background knowledge (i.e., knowledge about how things behave in neighbouring fields of enquiry). When we are assessing hypotheses (such as theism, the hypothesis that there is a God) purporting to explain everything, there will be no background knowledge. Theism is a very simple hypothesis. If there is a God, there is some reason to expect that he will create a universe, with laws of nature, leading to the evolution of humans (bodies connected to souls), who often have experiences which seem to them experiences of God. It is most improbable that all this evidence would exist if there was no God. Taken together therefore all this evidence makes it probable that there is a God. The occurrence of evil, whether produced by humans or natural processes, does not significantly diminish that probability.

This book discusses a general problem in biology: the lack of an adequate language for formulating biologically specific problems. This book describes recent progress in the control and coordination of human movement. It begins with a brief history of movement studies and reviews the current central controversies in the area of control of movements with an emphasis on the equilibrium-point hypothesis. An operational definition of synergy is introduced and a method of analysis of synergies is described based on the uncontrolled manifold hypothesis. This method is further used to characterize synergies in a variety of tasks including such common motor tasks as standing, pointing, reaching, standing-up, and manipulation of hand-held objects. Applications of this method to movements by persons with neurological disorders, persons with atypical development, and healthy elderly persons are illustrated, as well as changes in motor synergies with practice. Possible neurophysiological mechanisms of synergies are also discussed, focusing on such conspicuous structures as the spinal cord, the cerebellum, the basal ganglia, and the cortex of the large hemispheres. A variety of models are discussed based on different computational and neurophysiological principles. Possible applications of the introduced definition of synergies to other areas such as perception and language are discussed.

This book is based on the Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002. The book suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. It discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. The book’s framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to which they converge. The book also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence.

This book reconsiders the influential nativist position toward the mind. Nativists assert that some concepts, beliefs, or capacities are innate or inborn: “native” to the mind rather than acquired. The author argues that this view is mistaken, demonstrating that nativism is an unstable amalgam of two quite different—and probably inconsistent—theses about the mind. Unlike empiricists, who postulate domain-neutral learning strategies, nativists insist that some learning tasks require special kinds of skills, and that these skills are hard-wired into our brains at birth. This “faculties hypothesis” finds its modern expression in the views of Noam Chomsky. The author, marshalling recent empirical evidence from developmental psychology, psycholinguistics, computer science, and linguistics, provides a critique of Chomsky's nativism and defends in its place a moderately nativist approach to language acquisition. Also, in contrast to empiricists, who view the mind as simply another natural phenomenon susceptible to scientific explanation, nativists suspect that the mental is inelectably mysterious. The author addresses this second strand in nativist thought, taking on the view articulated by Jerry Fodor and other nativists that learning, particularly concept acquisition, is a fundamentally inexplicable process. She challenges this explanatory pessimism, and argues that concept acquisition is psychologically explicable.

This book develops a theory of musical meter based on psychological research in temporal perception, cognition, and motor behavior. Meter is regarded as a kind of entrainment, a synchronization of attention and actions to the rhythms of the environment. Drawing on research on the ability to make durational discriminations and categorizations at various tempos, the “speed limits” for meter are given: the inter-onset interval for metric elements must be greater than 100ms (10 per second) and less than 1.5-2.00 seconds. Care is taken to distinguish rhythms or patterns of duration from meters, the listener/performer's complex patterns of expectation and attention. It is thus shown that metric behaviors are highly tempo-dependent. Ambiguities may arise when a rhythmic pattern may be regarded under more than one meter, and conflicts may arise when a pattern of durations contradicts the ongoing meter. The theoretical core of the book is its development of a set of metric well-formedness constraints, which limit the temporal range and organization of patterns of metric entrainment. A consideration of the rhythmic practices of various non-western cultures, including some African and Indian music, leads to an additional well-formedness constraint, that of maximal evenness. This allows for meters that involve uneven (i.e., non-isochronous) beats. The book concludes with the many meters hypothesis, which proposes that a large number of expressively timed temporal templates are acquired, which are readily used when listening in familiar musical contexts.

The nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present in epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, philosophers have thought of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic. For instance, facts about the reliability of cognitive processes, principles determining which possibilities must be ruled out in order to have knowledge, and principles regarding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In this research monograph, Bryan Frances presents a new argument template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes such as contextualism, relevant alternatives theory, and reliabilism defeat the traditional sceptic. However, the new sceptical conclusions are quite different from traditional scepticism. Although the new sceptic concludes that people don’t know that fire engines are red, that people sometimes have pains in their knees, or even that people believe that fire engines are red or that knees sometimes throb, people admit that they know millions of exotic truths, such as the fact that black holes exist. One can know about the existence of black holes, but not about the colour of one’s shirt or even about what one believes regarding the colour of one’s shirt. The new sceptical arguments proceed in the usual way (here’s a sceptical hypothesis; one can’t neutralize it, one has to be able to neutralize it to know P; so one doesn’t know P), but the sceptical hypotheses plugged into it are “real, live” scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, such as error theories about belief, colour, pain location, and character traits. Frances investigates the questions, ‘Under what conditions do we need to rule out these error theories in order to know things inconsistent with them?’ and ‘Can we rule them out?’

Despite innumerable studies from at least the time of the Reformation, it was not until little more than a century ago that one hypothesis concerning the origin of the Pentateuch, the so-called ‘Documentary Theory’ formulated by Julius Wellhausen, established itself as the point of departure for all subsequent study of this topic. This has remained so until recently, but during the past twenty-five years the study of the Pentateuch has been once more in turmoil, and new theories have proliferated. This book arises from the conviction that much in current Pentateuchal research needs to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny and that much, indeed, is radically mistaken. The author argues that the work of Wellhausen, for all that it needs revision and development in detail, remains the securest basis for understanding the Pentateuch. The book is not a mere call to go ‘back to Wellhausen’, however, for the author also shows that much in the intervening debate has significantly modified his conclusions, as well as asking questions that were not on Wellhausen's agenda. But the Documentary Hypothesis should remain our primary point of reference, and it alone provides the most dependable perspective from which to approach this most difficult of areas in the study of the Old Testament.