Robert Kirk
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285488
- eISBN:
- 9780191603150
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285489.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception ...
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By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence of the zombie idea with the help of an intuitively appealing argument (the ‘sole-pictures argument’). The other is to develop a fresh approach to understanding phenomenal consciousness by exploiting two key notions: that of a ‘basic package’ of capacities which is necessary and sufficient for perception in the full sense; and that of ‘direct activity’, which, when combined with the basic package, is necessary and sufficient for perceptual consciousness. These definitions may apply to quite humble creatures, and even to suitably constructed artefacts.Less
By definition, zombies would be behaviourally and physically just like us, but not conscious. If a zombie world is possible, then physicalism is false. Just as importantly, the seductive conception of phenomenal consciousness embodied by the zombie idea is fundamentally misconceived. One of this book’s two main aims is to bring out the incoherence of the zombie idea with the help of an intuitively appealing argument (the ‘sole-pictures argument’). The other is to develop a fresh approach to understanding phenomenal consciousness by exploiting two key notions: that of a ‘basic package’ of capacities which is necessary and sufficient for perception in the full sense; and that of ‘direct activity’, which, when combined with the basic package, is necessary and sufficient for perceptual consciousness. These definitions may apply to quite humble creatures, and even to suitably constructed artefacts.
Robert Kirk
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285488
- eISBN:
- 9780191603150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285489.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Considering humbler creatures than ourselves provides a better chance of uncovering what really matters for perceptual consciousness. This chapter discusses a series of broad classes of behaving ...
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Considering humbler creatures than ourselves provides a better chance of uncovering what really matters for perceptual consciousness. This chapter discusses a series of broad classes of behaving systems, starting with ‘pure reflex systems’ and ending with ‘deciders’: systems with the ‘basic package’, capable of choosing between alternative courses of action, if only in a rudimentary sense. The idea of the basic package provides a framework for thinking about behaving systems, which advances the overall project of understanding perceptual consciousness. This framework helps to bridge the gap between descriptions in purely physical or biomechanical terms, and descriptions in psychological terms.Less
Considering humbler creatures than ourselves provides a better chance of uncovering what really matters for perceptual consciousness. This chapter discusses a series of broad classes of behaving systems, starting with ‘pure reflex systems’ and ending with ‘deciders’: systems with the ‘basic package’, capable of choosing between alternative courses of action, if only in a rudimentary sense. The idea of the basic package provides a framework for thinking about behaving systems, which advances the overall project of understanding perceptual consciousness. This framework helps to bridge the gap between descriptions in purely physical or biomechanical terms, and descriptions in psychological terms.
Robert Kirk
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285488
- eISBN:
- 9780191603150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285489.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
A cook was charged with cruelty to animals for putting live prawns on a hot-plate, but the case was dropped for lack of expertise on whether prawns could suffer pain. What matters from the point of ...
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A cook was charged with cruelty to animals for putting live prawns on a hot-plate, but the case was dropped for lack of expertise on whether prawns could suffer pain. What matters from the point of view of an interest in whether a creature is phenomenally conscious: whether there is ‘something it is like’ for it? Even if all the physical facts are known, might it still lack phenomenal consciousness, as ‘zombists’ (those who think zombies are conceivable) claim? The problem is not merely scientific: philosophical explanations are needed. This chapter introduces those and other central topics, and outlines the book.Less
A cook was charged with cruelty to animals for putting live prawns on a hot-plate, but the case was dropped for lack of expertise on whether prawns could suffer pain. What matters from the point of view of an interest in whether a creature is phenomenally conscious: whether there is ‘something it is like’ for it? Even if all the physical facts are known, might it still lack phenomenal consciousness, as ‘zombists’ (those who think zombies are conceivable) claim? The problem is not merely scientific: philosophical explanations are needed. This chapter introduces those and other central topics, and outlines the book.
Robert Kirk
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199285488
- eISBN:
- 9780191603150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199285489.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Some creatures are pretty obviously deciders, others obviously not; and there are indeterminate cases. This chapter considers some examples that are in various ways not straightforward. Discussing ...
More
Some creatures are pretty obviously deciders, others obviously not; and there are indeterminate cases. This chapter considers some examples that are in various ways not straightforward. Discussing them helps to clarify the key notions involved in the basic package, especially those of ‘decision making’, ‘control’, and the ‘integration’ of basic-package capacities; and to sharpen the contrasts between deciders and other behaving systems. It also prepares the ground for the conclusion that the idea of the basic package raises no serious philosophical problems. Examples discussed include protozoa; bees; the human embryo, foetus, and neonate; the artificial giant; some machines described by Block; and the ‘machine-table robot’.Less
Some creatures are pretty obviously deciders, others obviously not; and there are indeterminate cases. This chapter considers some examples that are in various ways not straightforward. Discussing them helps to clarify the key notions involved in the basic package, especially those of ‘decision making’, ‘control’, and the ‘integration’ of basic-package capacities; and to sharpen the contrasts between deciders and other behaving systems. It also prepares the ground for the conclusion that the idea of the basic package raises no serious philosophical problems. Examples discussed include protozoa; bees; the human embryo, foetus, and neonate; the artificial giant; some machines described by Block; and the ‘machine-table robot’.
