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Focuses on the question of whether it is ever justified to intervene in the affairs of another political regime. To answer this question, the chapter begins, in Section I, with an analysis of what is meant by humanitarian intervention, and then goes on, in Section II, to outline a cosmopolitan argument for the right, and indeed duty, of humanitarian intervention. Sections III–VI then consider four counter-arguments for a norm of non-intervention presented by ‘society of states’ theorists, realists, and nationalists; these are that humanitarian intervention is illegitimate because it fails to respect the right to self-government, is presumptuous and arrogant, destroys international stability, and rarely succeeds. Sections VII–VIII argue that there is a moral case for intervention on humanitarian grounds, and analyse the conditions that must be satisfied before intervention is attempted (VII), as well as the principles that should guide the conduct of an intervention (VIII). Section IX examines whether international law should affirm a right to humanitarian intervention, and Section X summarizes and concludes, suggesting that overall, on cosmopolitan grounds, humanitarian intervention is defensible under certain conditions, but pointing out that it is a reactive policy, and that there is a strong case to be made for tackling and preventing problems rather than responding to them after they have arisen.

This chapter sets the scope for the rest of the book. It outlines the problems caused by the lack of clarity surrounding who should intervene and, in doing so, identifies two specific questions that the book is concerned with ‘Who has the right to intervene?’ and ‘Who has the duty to intervene?’. It also examines the changes in the responsibility to protect doctrine from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report to the 2005 UN World Summit agreement. It goes on to consider two central questions in the ethics of humanitarian intervention: (a) Whether humanitarian intervention is a duty or only a right?(b) When can there be just cause for humanitarian intervention? The final section provides definitions of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘legitimacy’.

Explores traditional realist and pluralist objections to the practice of humanitarian intervention in international society. It then develops a solidarist theory of humanitarian intervention that rebuts these criticisms. A key part of the chapter lies in drawing on English School theory, constructivism, and Quentin Skinner's work to develop the claim that legitimacy is constitutive of state actions.

This chapter considers the claim that an intervener's humanitarian credentials—its reason for intervening—are an important determinant of its legitimacy. It distinguishes between three sorts of humanitarian credential: humanitarian intentions, humanitarian motives, and humanitarian outcomes. It largely rejects the importance of all three qualities (although it asserts that an intervener's intentions have definitional and instrumental importance). In doing so, it considers the moral and political relevance of mixed motives and mixed intentions for intervention. The final part of the chapter uses this analysis to consider two more practical issues. First, the chapter asserts that an intervener's selectivity in where it intervenes does not render it an illegitimate intervener. Second, it uses the earlier accounts of motives and intentions to reject the humanitarian credentials of the 2003 war in Iraq.

This chapter begins by bringing together the findings of the previous six chapters to outline the complete conception of legitimacy—the Moderate Instrumentalist Approach. It goes on to use this approach to consider to answer two central questions: (a) ‘Who has the right to intervene?’ and (b) ‘Who has the duty to intervene?’ It first suggests that any agent that has an adequate degree of legitimacy has the right to intervene. Second, it argues that the duty to intervene should fall on the most legitimate intervener. Assigning the duty to intervene raises additional issues, such as that of fairness. The chapter therefore defends the view that the most legitimate agent has the duty to intervene against three leading alternatives and the claims that this is unfair. The third section considers who, out of current agents (the NATO, the states, the UN, the regional organizations, and the private military companies), (a) has an adequate degree of legitimacy, and therefore the right to intervene, and (b) is the most legitimate agent, and therefore has the duty to intervene. It concludes that, although some agents of intervention possess an adequate degree of legitimacy, no current agent is fully legitimate.

It is often claimed that humanitarian intervention should be undertaken only by those interveners whose action would be legal according to current international law. This chapter considers this assertion by assessing the moral importance of an intervener's legal status. It begins by suggesting that, according to the current international law on humanitarian intervention, UN Security Council authorization is required for an intervener's action to be legal. It then critically examines—and largely rejects—a number of possible arguments for the importance of an intervener's legal status. In particular, it considers the arguments that (a) legal interveners derive their authority from morally valuable procedures; (b) illegal humanitarian intervention is itself abusive; (c) illegal humanitarian intervention leads to abusive intervention; and (d) illegal humanitarian intervention undermines international order.

From the discussion in the previous chapters, it is clear that we need to improve the agents and mechanisms of humanitarian intervention so that we can legitimately tackle egregious violations of human rights on a much more frequent basis. This chapter therefore considers five proposals for reform: (a) the codification of criteria for humanitarian intervention in international law; (b) the extension of UN standby arrangements; (c) the creation of a small cosmopolitan UN force; (d) the creation of a large‐sized cosmopolitan UN force under the control of cosmopolitan democratic institutions; and (e) the improvement of the capacity of regional organizations to undertake humanitarian intervention.

This chapter makes the case for the moral importance of two factors that have, to a certain extent, been neglected in the literature on humanitarian intervention. First, it argues that an intervener's legitimacy depends on its ‘internal representativeness’. This requires an intervener's decision‐making on the proposed intervention to have internal support or, more precisely, to reflect the opinions of its citizens. Second, it argues that an intervener's legitimacy depends on its ‘local external representativeness’. This requires an intervener's decision‐making on the proposed intervention to have external support or, more precisely, to reflect the opinions of those subject to its intervention (and particularly the victims of the crisis and burdened bystanders). It presents six arguments for the importance of these two factors, three for the importance of an intervener's internal representativeness and three for the importance of its local external representativeness. The chapter concludes by largely rejecting the importance of a third potential factor—‘global external representativeness’.

This chapter considers the importance of an intervener's effectiveness. It outlines and defends the ‘Moderate Instrumentalist Approach’. This holds that an intervener's effectiveness is the primary determinant of its legitimacy. More specifically, it distinguishes between three types of effectiveness—internal effectiveness, global external effectiveness, and local external effectiveness—and goes on to argue that effectiveness is a necessary condition of an intervener's legitimacy. The second part of this chapter fleshes out the Moderate Instrumentalist Approach in more detail. It considers what sort of timescale and comparison should be used to measure an agent's effectiveness (and, consequently, considers the importance of intervention being the last resort), and delineates the qualities that an intervener needs to possess in order to be effective. The end of the chapter considers two alternative approaches. The first, the ‘Non‐instrumentalist Approach’, holds that an intervener's effectiveness is of little moral concern. The second approach gives exclusive weight to an intervener's effectiveness—the ‘Extreme Instrumentalist Approach’.

Analyses how the USA and UN came to intervene militarily in Somalia in 1992–94. It shows how the Security Council in Resolution 794 crossed the threshold on authorizing the use of force to end a humanitarian crisis, albeit in a case where the government of the state had collapsed. It also explores why the Somali mission failed, and what lessons can be learnt from it for future humanitarian interventions.

Three main themes emerge from this edited collection. First, there has been an increased incidence of intervention for humanitarian purposes since the end of the Cold War. In these cases, the alleged conflict between sovereignty and human rights has been addressed in one of two ways: through an evolution in the notion of sovereignty, from ‘sovereignty as authority’ to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’; and through an expanded definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Second, despite this new climate of permissiveness, humanitarian intervention remains a controversial norm in international relations – largely because of continued opposition from certain members of international society, and concerns about its potentially negative consequences. Third, while the post Cold War period has seen some successful cases of intervention to address humanitarian catastrophes, the current capability of international organizations to undertake humanitarian interventions remains limited. Indeed, as the book demonstrates, the issue of humanitarian intervention has the potential to divide international institutions such as the UN and damage their credibility.

This chapter considers how we can achieve legitimate humanitarian intervention in the future. The challenges are threefold. First, there are too many occasions when humanitarian intervention should be undertaken, but is not. How, then, can the general willingness of potential interveners to undertake humanitarian intervention be increased? Second, too often the most legitimate agent fails to act. How can we improve the likelihood of the most legitimate agent intervening? Third, there need to be significant reforms to the agents and mechanisms of humanitarian intervention. How can these reforms be realized? In response to these challenges, the chapter first re‐emphasizes our duties to meet these challenges. Second, it offers some proposals for amending states' perceptions of their national interest. Third, it emphasizes that humanitarian intervention is an important, but limited, part of the responsibility to protect.

Considers the international law controversy provoked by the NATO campaign in Kosovo. The central question addressed is whether the constraints imposed by international law on the non‐defensive use of force are adequate for the maintenance of peace and security. In response, considers the legality of NATO's forceful humanitarian intervention by reference to both jus ad bellum (recourse to war) and jus in bellum (lawfulness of conduct in war), and argues on behalf of legitimacy by way of an emergent framework of principled humanitarian intervention. A pre‐legal proposal is made to move in the direction of establishing a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention that balances the clams to protect peoples against the importance of restricting discretion to use force in international relations.

This chapter defends the moral importance of an intervener's fidelity to the principles to jus in bello (principles of just conduct in war). It begins by outlining the particular principles of ‘external jus in bello’ that an intervener should follow (focusing largely on discrimination and proportionality). It draws on Jeff McMahan's work and the nature of humanitarian intervention to claim that these principles should be highly restrictive. The chapter then asserts two principles of ‘internal jus in bello’. The second section considers more broadly the moral underpinnings of the principles of jus in bello. It claims that consequentialist justifications of these principles cannot fully grasp their moral significance and particularly the difference between doing and allowing. The final section considers the ‘Absolutist Challenge’—that the principles of jus in bello defended are too important and consequently render humanitarian intervention impermissible. After rejecting the doctrine of double effect as a solution to this challenge, the chapter invokes the scalar account of legitimacy to respond to this objection.

This chapter argues that humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan provided much needed legitimacy to US military actions which were undertaken for (at best) partly humanitarian reasons. Operation Enduring Freedom, like most incidents claimed as humanitarian intervention, displayed a range of intentions — some genuine, some asserted, others claimed after the fact. It showed a recognition on the part of the acting state that such intervention cannot be purely military in character to be effective.

Several broad trends provide the context for current refugee policy responses. The debate over national sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, while not new, reached a crescendo over the past decade as refugees and population movements more generally necessarily diminished the exclusive prerogative of state sovereignty relating to border control in the modern world. Europe is a fertile setting for the development of regional capacities that can blend military and civilian responses to humanitarian crises, both within and outside Europe, including at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet, the difficulty of protecting and assisting internally displaced persons, continues to raise basic questions about the competence of the international system and the implementation mechanisms for human rights and humanitarian law. International migration provides the broad context for the evolution of refugee policy.