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Each of the four chapters of Part I of the book synthesizes one aspect that must be specified in the operationalization of the capability approach, then proposes a framework for doing so. The issue of this second chapter is how one ‘specifies’ the dimensions of valuable functioning or capability. Martha Nussbaum's work on central human capabilities and John Finnis's work on basic human reasons for action are both presented, and then alternative accounts of universal human needs and values are briefly considered. The theoretical conception of basic human values that has been developed by Finnis is proposed as being a conception that enables and requires participatory dialogue in application, has objective foundations, and can also coherently engage with and be refined by the large and growing empirical literatures on happiness, subjective well‐being, quality of life indicators, and views of the poor—which have not been well‐integrated with poverty reduction approaches. This conception can also mesh well with methodological literatures on participation, and be used by persons with diverse philosophical approaches and opinions. Ends with a table listing the dimensions of human development from 39 different disciplines.

The idea that a deductive competence theory is central to human cognition both has a long pedigree and is widely held by many leading figures in the psychology of reasoning. This chapter argues against this tradition in the psychology of reasoning. It claims that almost no everyday human reasoning can be characterized deductively, or has any significant deductive component. Although many theorists have argued that deduction is at the core of cognition, it is argued that it is at the periphery. The chapter begins by clarifying the meaning of the claim that human reasoning involves deduction by introducing Marr’s levels of description of a computational process.

This book seeks to convince the reader that the project of developing a rational analysis of human reasoning based on probability theory has been fruitful, and that it has considerable promise in the future. But, in pursuit of a clear presentation of the authors’ main theses, they have left a range of puzzles and concerns outstanding. This final chapter takes the form of a dialogue between a sceptic and an advocate of the approach. The aim is to give an intuitive sense of the thinking underlying this book and its broader intellectual context, as well as stressing challenges for, and assumptions of, the approach. It hopes some readers may be intrigued enough to take part in the ongoing academic dialogue on rational analysis and human reasoning.

Aristotle thought man was a rational animal. From his time to ours, however, there has been a steady stream of writers who have dissented from this sanguine assessment. Recently, however, there have been rumblings of a reaction brewing—a resurgence of Aristotelian optimism. Those defending the sullied name of human reason have been philosophers, and their weapons have been conceptual analysis and epistemological argument. The central thrust of their defense is the claim that empirical evidence could not possibly support the conclusion that people are systematically irrational. And thus the experiments which allegedly show that they are must be either flawed or misinterpreted. This chapter takes a critical look at these philosophical defenses of rationality. The central thesis is that the philosophical arguments aimed at showing irrationality cannot be experimentally demonstrated are mistaken. Before considering these arguments, this chapter sets out a few illustrations of the sort of empirical studies which allegedly show that people depart from normative standards of rationality in systematic ways.

Foot considers an objection to the suggestion that the same normative pattern is to be found in plants, animals, and human beings: i.e. human beings, because they are rational creatures, can question and indeed reject ‘natural goodness’. This is a problem about the rationality of doing what virtue demands. To meet the challenge, Foot embarks on a discussion of practical rationality, or the nature and provenance of human reasoning. Foot argues that an objective theory of morality can establish an intelligible connection between objective moral evaluations and what we have reason to do as individuals. Rational choice is an aspect of human goodness, and at the heart of the virtues, rather than set apart from it as something to which goodness should conform.

One of the central goals of this book is to show how empirical data on human reasoning can be reconciled with the notion that people are rational. This raises two questions: first, the general theoretical question of how the concept of rationality relates to human behaviour; and, second, the methodological question of how to develop ‘rational’ explanations of behaviour. The answer to the first question will provide a starting point for tackling the second; for which John Anderson’s methodology of rational analysis is advocated. This chapter is divided into two parts. First, it discusses formal and everyday rationality, and various possible relationships between them. Second, it outlines how the programme of rational analysis, which is the framework of the research in this book, leads to a new conception of how formal and everyday rationality are related.

This chapter aims to outline the so-called ‘probabilistic turn’: a move from using logic to using probability theory as a framework for understanding human thought. This probabilistic turn has occurred primarily over the last ten to fifteen years across a range of disciplines. The chapter begins by considering the probabilistic turn in the semantics of natural language, i.e. the project of specifying a formal theory of meaning for natural language statements, and thus specifying which inferences follow from such statements. It considers how probabilistic approaches have become prevalent in the three areas that were considered in relation to logic-based methods. In each of these areas — theories of scientific inference, artificial intelligence, and psychology — the discussion will be broadened to consider relevant research across related disciplines. The chapter thus provides historical and technical background for the development of the specific probabilistic theories of performance on the three key areas of human reasoning: conditional reasoning, the selection task, and syllogistic reasoning.

This chapter situates Tocqueville among a set of problems and writers in post-revolutionary France in order to give the reader a sense of both the idiosyncrasy of Tocqueville's project in his own environment and its political relevance. As a theorist and a writer with a cause, Tocqueville aimed to write books that would inspire leaders to direct French political culture along new paths. However, his solitary manner of argument disregarded what is considered the norm of his own time. The chapter places him in the changing patterns of his time: the search for a social science that would save the French from the results of their disastrous experiments in revolutionary politics, the rise of historical consciousness, and the widespread desire to understand a spiritualized version of human reason.

This chapter offers a framework for understanding significance that tolerates our incomplete knowledge of the conditions for human well-being. Topics discussed include the role of significance in Strategic Reliabilism, a reason-based approach to significance, and the potential unavailability of objective reasons. It is argued that a proper understanding of the notion of epistemic significance is a core problem for any epistemological theory that claims to be able to guide reason, and that any epistemological view that gives a central place to the notion of significance is bound to be deeply empirical.

This chapter uses Strategic Reliabilism to resolve two debates about whether certain experimental findings demonstrate deep and systematic failures of human reasoning. It illustrates one of the main benefits of the current approach to epistemology: it can be used to adjudicate disputes that arise in psychology that are, at bottom, normative epistemological disputes about the nature of good reasoning.

The frequent flaws in human reasoning are well documented. This chapter seeks to provide a general explanation based on the role of argumentation both in contemporary society and during the evolutionary emergence of the species. The author invokes the dual process framework that distinguishes between automatic or intuitive mental processes and memory-based, reflective processes, arguing that their functional relationship undermines the effectiveness of classical reasoning. The hyper-communicative social environment of humans has magnified the importance of argumentation, proposed here as the main driving force for the evolutionary development of reasoning. This view leads to new interpretations of phenomena like the confirmation bias—strengthening one’s argument in response to those of rivals—which may prove beneficial in decision making at the group level. Moral reasoning is mainly thought to be post-hoc rationalizing of intuitions, but here too views can be altered through argumentation.

This chapter focuses on the life and work of Anton Wilhelm Amo, who was active in Germany in the period between Leibniz and Kant. It shows how Amo's identity as an African in Europe helped to shape both his philosophy and its reception, and what lessons may have been drawn in the era for thinking about the relationship between human racial diversity, on the one hand, and the universality of human reason, on the other. Finally, the chapter argues that the position occupied by Amo in the philosophical landscape of early eighteenth-century Germany reveals the likely influence of Leibniz, who had provided a model for a nonracial philosophical anthropology for which he has generally not been given much credit.

This chapter shows how a probabilistic perspective can resolve many of the outstanding issues in reasoning research. The goal is to show that many of the errors and biases seen in experiments on human reasoning are the result of people applying probabilistic strategies used for coping with their uncertain world. In the psychology of reasoning it has been standard to take logic as the normative theory against which performance is assessed. However, standard logic has long been known not to provide an adequate account of reasoning. The key logical term where this issue arises is the conditional, if…then. This simple expression is probably the most important to all systems of reasoning. It has long been observed in the philosophy of language and logic that there is a mismatch between how logic treats the conditional and how it is used in natural language and everyday argument. The chapter argues that this mismatch suggests a probabilistic approach to the conditional. It shows that adopting this approach allows us to explain much of the data on conditional inference.

Strategic Reliabilism addresses resource allocation considerations within a cost-benefit framework. However, there are serious reasons to worry about the feasibility of a cost-benefit approach to epistemology. First, there are serious general objections to cost-benefit analyses; and second, it is not clear how we can identify the costs and benefits of reasoning. This chapter addresses these two concerns. It is argued that although many of the deep general concerns about cost-benefit analysis are legitimate, flawed cost-benefit analyses can be very useful, especially if we are clear about the ways in which such analyses are flawed. It is further argued that there are measurable proxies for the costs and benefits of reasoning we can employ in a cost-benefit approach to epistemology.