Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208319
- eISBN:
- 9780191708992
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In ...
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How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In general, we ask how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible when we encounter obstacles to its existence or acquisition. So the question is: how is knowledge possible given the various factors that make it look impossible? A satisfactory answer to such a question will therefore need to do several different things. In essence, explaining how a particular kind of knowledge is possible is a matter of identifying ways of acquiring it, overcoming or dissipating obstacles to its acquisition, and figuring out what makes it possible to acquire it. To respond to a how-possible question in this way is to go in for what might be called a ‘multi-levels’ approach. The aim of this book is to develop and defend this approach.Less
How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In general, we ask how knowledge, or knowledge of some specific kind, is possible when we encounter obstacles to its existence or acquisition. So the question is: how is knowledge possible given the various factors that make it look impossible? A satisfactory answer to such a question will therefore need to do several different things. In essence, explaining how a particular kind of knowledge is possible is a matter of identifying ways of acquiring it, overcoming or dissipating obstacles to its acquisition, and figuring out what makes it possible to acquire it. To respond to a how-possible question in this way is to go in for what might be called a ‘multi-levels’ approach. The aim of this book is to develop and defend this approach.
Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208319
- eISBN:
- 9780191708992
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
How-possible questions matter in philosophy because, as Nozick points out, ‘many philosophical problems are ones of understanding how something is or can be possible’. A response to a how-possible ...
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How-possible questions matter in philosophy because, as Nozick points out, ‘many philosophical problems are ones of understanding how something is or can be possible’. A response to a how-possible question that operates on all levels is what is called a multi-levels response. This chapter defends this approach to epistemological how-possible questions. A multi-levels response operates at three levels. Level 1 identifies means of acquiring the allegedly problematic knowledge. Level 2 is the obstacle-removing level, the level at which obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge by the proposed means are overcome or dissipated. Level 3 seeks to identify necessary background conditions for the acquisition of the relevant knowledge by the proposed means.Less
How-possible questions matter in philosophy because, as Nozick points out, ‘many philosophical problems are ones of understanding how something is or can be possible’. A response to a how-possible question that operates on all levels is what is called a multi-levels response. This chapter defends this approach to epistemological how-possible questions. A multi-levels response operates at three levels. Level 1 identifies means of acquiring the allegedly problematic knowledge. Level 2 is the obstacle-removing level, the level at which obstacles to the acquisition of knowledge by the proposed means are overcome or dissipated. Level 3 seeks to identify necessary background conditions for the acquisition of the relevant knowledge by the proposed means.
Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208319
- eISBN:
- 9780191708992
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the proposal that the best way to answer an epistemological how-possible question is by means of a transcendental argument. Although it might appear that transcendental ...
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This chapter examines the proposal that the best way to answer an epistemological how-possible question is by means of a transcendental argument. Although it might appear that transcendental arguments are closely related to the multi-levels response to how-possible questions, it is argued that they are different from each other and that the latter response is better. It remains to be seen whether transcendental arguments have any legitimate role in epistemology, but the point is that it is a mistake to think that their role is to explain how knowledge is possible. Transcendental arguments aren't necessary if the object of the exercise is to answer an epistemological how-possible question, and they aren't sufficient either.Less
This chapter examines the proposal that the best way to answer an epistemological how-possible question is by means of a transcendental argument. Although it might appear that transcendental arguments are closely related to the multi-levels response to how-possible questions, it is argued that they are different from each other and that the latter response is better. It remains to be seen whether transcendental arguments have any legitimate role in epistemology, but the point is that it is a mistake to think that their role is to explain how knowledge is possible. Transcendental arguments aren't necessary if the object of the exercise is to answer an epistemological how-possible question, and they aren't sufficient either.
Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208319
- eISBN:
- 9780191708992
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter looks at a third how-possible question, namely: (HPapk). How is a priori knowledge possible? If how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent, the key to making any progress with (HPapk) ...
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This chapter looks at a third how-possible question, namely: (HPapk). How is a priori knowledge possible? If how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent, the key to making any progress with (HPapk) is to identify the obstacles to the acquisition or existence of a priori knowledge which give this question its bite. Having identified these obstacles, the prospect for a multi-levels response to (HPapk) can then be examined. Predictably, the basic idea of this chapter is that such a response promises to cast at least as much light on (HPapk) as on other epistemological how-possible questions. The chapter identifies a means of coming to know things a priori, shows how obstacles to the acquisition of a priori knowledge by the suggested means can be overcome or dissipated, and considers whether it is either possible or necessary to give a substantive account of what makes it possible to come to know things a priori by these means.Less
This chapter looks at a third how-possible question, namely: (HPapk). How is a priori knowledge possible? If how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent, the key to making any progress with (HPapk) is to identify the obstacles to the acquisition or existence of a priori knowledge which give this question its bite. Having identified these obstacles, the prospect for a multi-levels response to (HPapk) can then be examined. Predictably, the basic idea of this chapter is that such a response promises to cast at least as much light on (HPapk) as on other epistemological how-possible questions. The chapter identifies a means of coming to know things a priori, shows how obstacles to the acquisition of a priori knowledge by the suggested means can be overcome or dissipated, and considers whether it is either possible or necessary to give a substantive account of what makes it possible to come to know things a priori by these means.
Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208319
- eISBN:
- 9780191708992
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter applies the multi-levels approach to another epistemological how-possible question, namely: (HPom). How is knowledge of other minds possible? It is argued that this is another ...
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This chapter applies the multi-levels approach to another epistemological how-possible question, namely: (HPom). How is knowledge of other minds possible? It is argued that this is another obstacle-dependent question and that a multi-levels response is as helpful in this context as it is in the context of (HPpk). To make this plausible, the chapter begins by identifying some of the obstacles to knowledge of other minds which might prompt one to ask (HPom). It then outlines a Means Response to this question and suggests that the obstacles to knowing about other minds by the proposed means can be overcome or dissipated. Lastly, it identifies some enabling conditions for knowing about other minds by the proposed means.Less
This chapter applies the multi-levels approach to another epistemological how-possible question, namely: (HPom). How is knowledge of other minds possible? It is argued that this is another obstacle-dependent question and that a multi-levels response is as helpful in this context as it is in the context of (HPpk). To make this plausible, the chapter begins by identifying some of the obstacles to knowledge of other minds which might prompt one to ask (HPom). It then outlines a Means Response to this question and suggests that the obstacles to knowing about other minds by the proposed means can be overcome or dissipated. Lastly, it identifies some enabling conditions for knowing about other minds by the proposed means.
Adam M. Goldstein
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199738625
- eISBN:
- 9780199894642
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738625.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Carl Hempel and many others influenced by him claim that explanations in science require showing why the event to be explained occurred, by showing that it is necessary, given the laws of nature and ...
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Carl Hempel and many others influenced by him claim that explanations in science require showing why the event to be explained occurred, by showing that it is necessary, given the laws of nature and the particular conditions prior to the event's occurrence. Hempel also sometimes uses an alternative formulation of this condition for explanation: the explanation must show that the event ought to have been expected. This rules out explaining chance events, which do not occur necessarily, and whose occurrence is not to be expected. Hempel's view also rules out historical explanations that, some claim, are of explanatory value because they describe, in narrative form, how the event to be explained occurred. Against Hempel's view, this chapter argues for a pluralistic, pragmatic view about explanation. According to this view of explanation, there is clear warrant for regarding narratives as having explanatory value, even in cases in which the event to be explained occurs by chance. The most forceful and well-developed statement of this view is advanced by Peter Achinstein in works such as The Nature of Explanation. Though he presents the view clearly and precisely, Achinstein does not mount a strong defense of it against Hempelians, nor do others who adopt the view.Less
Carl Hempel and many others influenced by him claim that explanations in science require showing why the event to be explained occurred, by showing that it is necessary, given the laws of nature and the particular conditions prior to the event's occurrence. Hempel also sometimes uses an alternative formulation of this condition for explanation: the explanation must show that the event ought to have been expected. This rules out explaining chance events, which do not occur necessarily, and whose occurrence is not to be expected. Hempel's view also rules out historical explanations that, some claim, are of explanatory value because they describe, in narrative form, how the event to be explained occurred. Against Hempel's view, this chapter argues for a pluralistic, pragmatic view about explanation. According to this view of explanation, there is clear warrant for regarding narratives as having explanatory value, even in cases in which the event to be explained occurs by chance. The most forceful and well-developed statement of this view is advanced by Peter Achinstein in works such as The Nature of Explanation. Though he presents the view clearly and precisely, Achinstein does not mount a strong defense of it against Hempelians, nor do others who adopt the view.
John Campbell and Quassim Cassam
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198716259
- eISBN:
- 9780191784989
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter responds to Campbell’s criticisms of representationalism and to the suggestion that this view is in no position to solve Berkeley’s Puzzle. A distinction is drawn between explaining how ...
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This chapter responds to Campbell’s criticisms of representationalism and to the suggestion that this view is in no position to solve Berkeley’s Puzzle. A distinction is drawn between explaining how it is possible for sensory experience to ground our grasp of concepts of mind-independent objects and explaining how sensory experience can be necessary for grasp of concepts of mind-independent objects. It is argued that representationalism can at least explain the first of these things and thereby provide an answer to Berkeley’s question, understood as a ‘how-possible’ question. Against the background of a contrast between reductive and non-reductive representationalism, this chapter defends a non-reductive representationalist approach to Berkeley’s Puzzle. This approach explains the explanatory role of consciousness by drawing on the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT), according to which the intentionality of sensory experience is phenomenal.Less
This chapter responds to Campbell’s criticisms of representationalism and to the suggestion that this view is in no position to solve Berkeley’s Puzzle. A distinction is drawn between explaining how it is possible for sensory experience to ground our grasp of concepts of mind-independent objects and explaining how sensory experience can be necessary for grasp of concepts of mind-independent objects. It is argued that representationalism can at least explain the first of these things and thereby provide an answer to Berkeley’s question, understood as a ‘how-possible’ question. Against the background of a contrast between reductive and non-reductive representationalism, this chapter defends a non-reductive representationalist approach to Berkeley’s Puzzle. This approach explains the explanatory role of consciousness by drawing on the Phenomenal Intentionality Thesis (PIT), according to which the intentionality of sensory experience is phenomenal.
