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The Possibility of Knowledge

Quassim Cassam

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199208319
eISBN:
9780191708992
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

How is knowledge of the external world possible? How is knowledge of other minds possible? How is a priori knowledge possible? These are all examples of ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology. In ... More


The Possibility of Knowledge

Quassim Cassam

in The Possibility of Knowledge

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199208319
eISBN:
9780191708992
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

How-possible questions matter in philosophy because, as Nozick points out, ‘many philosophical problems are ones of understanding how something is or can be possible’. A response to a how-possible ... More


Transcendental Arguments

Quassim Cassam

in The Possibility of Knowledge

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199208319
eISBN:
9780191708992
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines the proposal that the best way to answer an epistemological how-possible question is by means of a transcendental argument. Although it might appear that transcendental ... More


A Priori Knowledge

Quassim Cassam

in The Possibility of Knowledge

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199208319
eISBN:
9780191708992
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter looks at a third how-possible question, namely: (HPapk). How is a priori knowledge possible? If how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent, the key to making any progress with (HPapk) ... More


Other Minds

Quassim Cassam

in The Possibility of Knowledge

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
September 2007
ISBN:
9780199208319
eISBN:
9780191708992
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter applies the multi-levels approach to another epistemological how-possible question, namely: (HPom). How is knowledge of other minds possible? It is argued that this is another ... More


A Defense of Achinstein's Pragmatism about Explanation

Adam M. Goldstein

in Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
May 2011
ISBN:
9780199738625
eISBN:
9780199894642
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738625.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Science

Carl Hempel and many others influenced by him claim that explanations in science require showing why the event to be explained occurred, by showing that it is necessary, given the laws of nature and ... More


Cassam’s Epilogue

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

in Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2014
ISBN:
9780198716259
eISBN:
9780191784989
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter responds to Campbell’s criticisms of representationalism and to the suggestion that this view is in no position to solve Berkeley’s Puzzle. A distinction is drawn between explaining how ... More


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