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This chapter examines the leading present-day expression of modernist-empiricism: the new institutionalism. First, it challenges the belief of new institutionalists that they have a shared new paradigm. Instead, we suggest it is varied, containing strands that can scarcely be reconciled with one another. Second, it argues that historical institutionalism exists primarily as a counter to rational choice institutionalism but its inductive, modernist-empiricist logic lacks a micro-level theory for explaining historical change and awareness grows that it is not a distinctive approach. Third, it argues that ideational or constructivist institutionalism offers a promising way forward provided it develops a micro-theory that appeals to the beliefs and desires of actors and it breaks with the ahistorical forms of explanation of modernist-empiricism.

During the past three decades, “new institutionalism” has become the main methodological battleground among political scientists. This is because political scientists differ in their preferred “new institutionalist” approach to political science. There are four basic institutionalist approaches: three older new institutionalisms—rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism—plus a fourth newer new institutionalism, called discursive institutionalism. This chapter explores the relationship between ideational and discourse analysis, on one hand, and various forms of new institutionalism, on the other hand. It makes the case for a discursive institutionalism, concerned with ideas and discourse, because it has the greatest potential for reconciling existing institutionalist approaches.

Whereas Chapter 1 reviews general theories of European integration, Chapter 2 contains a review of theories of institutional change with a particular emphasis on a troika of institutionalist theories: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), Historical Institutionalism (HI), and Sociological Institutionalism (SI). RCI is this book's theory of choice, essentially amounting to an assumption that institutions are fairly easy to change and an explanation that actors compete to change them when status quo institutions prevent them from achieving their preferences. The book's RCI‐based argument claims that power‐changing informal accords get created in the EU when constraints on the EU's primary political actors change, the actors being the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. It predicts that the Parliament as the weakest actor succeeds in bargaining for advantageous informal accords with its stronger counterparts when one or more of a serious of specific conditions temporarily empower it.

This chapter discusses existing hypotheses about the reasons for the introduction of state funding to political parties and links them to one of the main new institutionalist approaches. From a rational choice perspective, state funding to political parties is a response to rising costs of political competition. However, these costs have risen in all democracies, no matter whether state funding has been introduced. From a historical institutionalist perspective, the introduction of state funding is, for instance, linked to étatiste traditions. This explanation fails to explain why, in some countries, no state funding exists despite influential étatiste traditions, or why state funding was only introduced when these traditions were actually eroding. Normative institutionalist approaches link the introduction of state funding with a specific logic of appropriateness which, for instance, prompted a perception of parties as ‘public utilities’. In order to avoid such barely falsifiable arguments, the next chapter refers to actor-based institutionalism.

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework used in this book. This consists of three complementary theoretical approaches — the Westminster Model, Historical Institutionalism, and Principal-Agent Theory — which each in their own distinct way allows each chapter to dissect and tease apart the politics of delegation in Britain. Moreover, these approaches also operate at distinct levels, which again deepen our understanding of both the theory and practice of delegation.

The conclusion addresses three areas of theoretical interest posed by empirical and theoretical arguments made in the substantive chapters of Manufacturing Possibilities. First it elaborates more precisely the ways that pragmatist notions of creative action and recomposition are superior to various forms of institutionalism (sociological, rational choice and historical institutionalism). Second it more explicitly elaborates the non-structural, relational and contextual understanding of power that undergirds the analysis of industrial change. Thirdly it points out that pragmatism involves a distinctive approach to social science : It encourages the search for interesting possibilities, rather than determinate forms of causality which tend to place undue attention on constraint. Pragmatist social science, ultimately, is science in the interest of greater democracy

This chapter sets out the analytical framework used in the book. It offers a critique of two major relevant literatures that study internationalisation and domestic institutions, namely the second image reversed approach and comparative institutionalism (historical institutionalism and varieties of capitalism). It argues that while both offer valuable elements, they pay too much attention to economic forms of internationalisation and underestimate the potential for institutional reform. Instead, the chapter offers a policy analysis approach that pays attention to policymaking at both international and domestic levels. It defines and discusses three forms of market internationalisation that are used in the study: transnational technological and economic developments; and two policy forms: reforms in a significant overseas nation (in this case, the US) and supranational regulation (by the EU). It then discusses possible mechanisms whereby these different forms of internationalisation can influence domestic decisions about national institutions.

An unfortunate outcome of the shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ institutionalism is that neo-institutional theory has become ahistorical. In their search for scientific legitimacy, contemporary organizational institutional theory has become overly scientifistic in an effort to make universal knowledge claims that are independent of spatial and temporal context. This has left the field with a flat and mechanistic understanding of institutions that has, largely, obscured the role of history and historical processes in institutional theory. The chapter argues for the adoption of a more critical articulation of the role of history in institutions. It discusses how ‘historical institutionalism’ can help address fundamental challenges within neo-institutional theory.

This chapter submits the historical institutionalist argument that though past legacies of migration regulation leave an important imprint on national approaches, a critical juncture has now been reached, thus, migration policies are in flux and are being recast. The changing nature of the state and the embrace of competition state priorities lead to an economistic approach that divides migrants into desirable and undesirable categories. Therefore, securitization is increasingly defined not only in narrow societal terms but also in terms of economic vitality and competitiveness. Finally, the regulatory legacies in six European countries, namely, Ireland, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, and at the European Union level are then being analyzed.

The chapter introduces the book conceptualisation of s framework for the causal analysis of welfare state reform. It introduces relevant actors and their interests in the two welfare states, institutional structures, as well as changing socio-economic contexts within which actors have operated since the late 1970s. Three sets of different institutional contexts are discussed: formal policy making structures, programme-specific features of unemployment and pension and family policy, and institutional complementarities linking social protection programmes to national political economy structures. The chapter concludes with a historical account of socio-economic trends in the two countries, covering about 25 years.

Historical institutionalism makes important contributions to the study of International Relations, including providing more complete and nuanced explanations of the factors that contribute to the origins of and sources behind diverse patterns of stability and change in international institutions. As a tradition of political analysis exploring how temporal phenomena such as path dependence, critical junctures, and endogenous feedback effects impact the structure and political impact of institutions over time, historical institutionalism contributes to several disciplinary goals in IR, including empirical discovery and analytical refinement. As a relatively discrete tradition of analysis, or as a counterpoint to and in collaboration with other traditions, historical institutionalism facilitates greater understanding of developments in the densely layered institutional landscape that characterizes the modern international system.

This chapter develops a conceptual framework for analyzing federal dynamics inspired by different strands of historical institutionalism. Putting particular emphasis on timing and sequencing, a historical-institutionalist approach suggests a strong causal link between the origins of federal systems and the way they evolve dynamically over time through path dependence and gradual adaption. Dynamics result from the ongoing push and pull between status quo defending and status quo challenging actors who always operate within a historically constructed institutional setting. However, depending on how federal systems reproduce power-concentrating and power-sharing institutional mechanisms, their transformative capacity varies significantly. The path-dependent institutional “grammar”, therefore, has important consequences for the prospects of different types of gradual change within federal systems.

Historical institutionalism has not yet grappled with the deeper intellectual challenges of “going global.” Understanding international, particularly global, institutions, requires attention to and theorizing of a global social context, one that does not rely on a national government in the background, ready to enforce laws and rules. It also requires theories about the global organizations themselves. In this chapter, the authors argue that a historical institutionalism that engages with the many varieties of sociological institutionalism would be a richer tradition that could more systematically examine the role of norms and ideas, thereby expanding its analytic range to institutional contexts beyond the state.

To understand why parliamentary reform does or does not take place requires a prior understanding of the context in which it does or does not occur. The characteristics of the institution of parliament are a product of its historical development, and that development has fostered the emergence of particular norms and values that continue to shape its functioning and capabilities. Crucially, parliament cannot be understood in isolation from government and, consequently, parliamentary reform cannot be understood separately from its likely impact on government. Parliamentary reform can most usefully be analysed with reference to the norms and values that structure the institutional context in which parliament exists. It is necessary, therefore, to explore those norms and values, and the specific ways that they regulate and restrict parliamentary capabilities. This chapter discusses institutional theory and historical institutionalism with respect to parliamentary reform in Britain, along with ministerial responsibility, parliamentary sovereignty, strong party government, the power of the executive at Westminster, role of parliament and individual MPs within the political system, and approaches to parliamentary reform.

This chapter presents a new theoretical framework for understanding the development of Asia’s regional architecture. Drawing on historical institutionalism, the chapter discusses how endogenous processes of change, as well as mechanisms of continuity, have produced a layering of bilateral, trilateral, mini-lateral, and multilateral institutions in Asia. The chapter also discusses the limitations of theories of rational institutional design, and the role ideas and institutions play in shaping actors’ choices.

The quality of political competition at the moment of regime change determined whether East European states embarked on a liberal or an illiberal pattern of political change after 1989. It was initially determined by the presence or absence of an opposition to communism strong enough to take power in 1989, and secondarily by the presence or absence of a reforming communist party. This chapter makes the theoretical case for why political competition is central to understanding variation in the domestic trajectories of post-communist states. It also presents a model of the causal mechanisms that translate different levels of political competition into liberal and illiberal political outcomes.

Historical institutionalism has made significant contributions to the study of international relations, especially in explaining “anomalies of institutional persistence”: situations in which international institutions remain relatively stable despite major changes in inter-state relations. Path dependency, a concept borrowed from economic history, is the most important concept of historical institutionalism because it provides a clear causal mechanism to explain institutional persistence. To fully realize its promise for the study of international relations, historical institutionalism must devote greater attention to explaining patterns of institutional change, work in collaboration with choice-based and sociological varieties of institutional analysis, and more strongly embrace a falsificationist mindset to guide hypothesis-testing.

This chapter examines historical institutionalism (HI) and the role that time and institutions play in societal transformations. HI thereby provides analytical depth to the study of time, realizing that the duration, tempo, timing, and sequencing of historical processes and events affect the onset of societal transformations. Institutions subsequently narrow the range of paths that societal transformations could potentially take, by enabling distinct forms of cooperation between various actors, (re)distributing power and resources, and proscribing and prescribing appropriate behaviour. In the wake of radical and incremental institutional changes, caused by exogenous shocks and endogenous dynamics, societies might embark on new paths. With its analytical focus on the meso level and the nature of time, HI has contributed to the development of middle-range theories that often bridge the traditional actor-structure divide.