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Presents arguments against both first order (FOR) theories and actualist higher-order thought (HOT) theory (of the sort espoused by Rosenthal), and argues for the superiority of higher-order perception (HOP) theories over each of them. But HOP theories come in two very different varieties. One is the ‘inner sense’ theory of Armstrong and Lycan, according to which we have a set of inner sense-organs charged with scanning the outputs of our first-order senses to produce higher-order perceptions of our own experiential states. The other is the author’s own dispositional form of HOT theory, according to which the availability of our first-order perceptions to a faculty of higher-order thought confers on those perceptual states a dual higher-order content. Argues that this latter form of HOP theory is superior to the inner-sense theory, and also defends it against the charge that it is vulnerable to the very same arguments that sink FOR theories and actualist HOT theory.

This chapter asks the questions: Why do emotional states (or any states) feel like something? What is the function of consciousness? Language enables us to work for deferred rewards: an explicit route to action. A theory of consciousness involving higher order thoughts and solving the credit assignment problem in a multi-step plan is given in this chapter. What emotional processes can occur subconsciously or without consciousness? Separate implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) routes to action are described. Finally, the chapter covers the topic of free will and its relation to consciousness, emotion, reward, and punishment.

Argues that all of the behaviours that we share with non-human animals can, and should, be explained in terms of the first-order, non-phenomenal, contents of our experiences. So, although we do have phenomenally conscious experiences when we act, most of the time it is not by virtue of their being phenomenally conscious that they have their role in causing our actions. In consequence, the fact that my dispositional higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness might withhold such consciousness from most non-human animals should have a minimal impact on comparative psychology. The explanations for the behaviours that we have in common with animals can remain shared also, despite the differences in phenomenally conscious status.

The relation of thought to language is discussed and the thesis that a capacity for thought, or for some kinds of thought, requires the possession of a natural language assessed. The thesis, defended by Davidson, that a capacity for thought involves both linguistic competence and a capacity for higher-order thought, and Bermúdez’s contention that higher-order thought is inevitably linguistic are discussed. A conception of conscious thinking as the deployment of imagery is explained and defended. Mental images — verbal or ‘pictorial’ — owe their significance, not to their intrinsic character, but to the use to which they are put by intelligent creatures. Thus the question whether a creature lacking language could entertain a particular kind of thought turns on the question whether the creature has a use for thoughts of that kind. The importance of use is illustrated by reference to what Martin calls proto-language. Non-conscious thinking is explained dispositionally.

Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of first-order representational (FOR) theories, of the sort espoused by Dretske and Tye, arguing that they are inferior to higher-order representational (HOR) accounts. Acknowledges as a problem for HOR theories that they might withhold phenomenal consciousness from most other species of animal, but claims that this problem should not be regarded as a serious obstacle to the acceptance of some such theory. Different versions of HOR theory are discussed, and the author’s own account (dual-content theory, here called dispositional higher-order thought theory) is briefly elaborated and defended.

Consciousness, and especially phenomenal consciousness (why it should feel like something), is a ‘hard’ problem in philosophy. It is not clear that it is amenable to a solution using neuroscience, but neuroscience does have many relevant and potential contributions to understanding phenomenal consciousness. It is argued that one route to action is the goal-directed route, with the goals set by the selfish genes. A second route involves multi-step reasoning involving syntax to keep the different variables and steps in the plan separate and organised (see Chapter 17). This multi-step planning may suffer a credit assignment problem, in that when the plan fails, it is not clear which step or steps were faulty. In this situation it is proposed that a monitoring system with syntactic capability would be useful to work through the steps of the plan, to work out which the faulty step in the plan might be, and to correct the plan. It is suggested, but only as a plausible argument that cannot be proved, that this higher order syntactic monitoring operation might be the type of computation, with adaptive value, that might feel like something. This is Rolls’ higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness. It is a theory of the computations that underlie consciousness, and that type of approach does seem promising. Much processing in humans can be unconscious, and cannot be verbally reported. It may operate without the involvement of the necessarily slow HOST system with its sequential syntax. The brain does not operate as a deterministic system, because of spiking-related neuronal noise in the brain (Chapter 5). However, when the reasoning system is taking the decision, we might wish to use the term ‘free will’ to describe the operation being performed by the cortex. Other approaches to consciousness include Rosenthal’s higher order thought (HOT) theory; that oscillations somehow account for consciousness; that sensing bodily changes is required for consciousness; and that consciousness is related to operations in a global workspace.

According to the ‘cold control theory’ of Dienes and Perner (2007) hypnotic responding is intimately linked to metacognition. Specifically, we proposed that what makes a hypnotic response hypnotic is the intentional performance of a (physical or mental) action while having inaccurate higher-order thoughts to the effect that one was not intending the action. That is, the essence of hypnosis is a strategic lack of metacognition. This chapter explores this idea in three ways. First, the chapter argues that individual differences in first-order abilities, e.g. ability to attend to the world or inhibit information, are unrelated to hypnotizability; however, the tendency to be aware of one’s mental states while performing a simple task is related to hypnotizability. Second, the chapter argues that impairing the brain region involved in metacognition (specifically the brain region involved in maintaining accurate higher-order thoughts) enhances hypnotizability. Third, the chapter argues that hypnotized subjects have no abilities they don’t have anyway; the essence of hypnosis is not the existence of any first-order abilities but the fact one‘s actions feel involuntary. Overcoming pain seems a counter-example, but debatably, the only quality that hypnosis adds to one’s ability to overcome pain is the feeling that the pain goes away by itself.

Consciousness researchers commonly rely on their subjects’ verbal reports to determine their conscious states. Is this defensible in the conduct of science? Attempts might be made to rationalize the reliance on verbal reports by appealing to higher‐order thought or functionalist approaches to consciousness, but these are rejected. A third approach is defended, based on subjects’ introspective capacities. Admittedly, the reliability of introspection cannot be independently validated, but an independent validation requirement is too restrictive for an epistemologically “basic” method.

Notwithstanding its phenomenological appeal, physicalists have tended to shun the notion that we are ‘acquainted’ with our mental states in consciousness, due to the fact that the acquaintance relation seems mysterious, irreducible, and consequently unnatural. I propose a model of conscious experience based on the idea of ‘mental quotation’, and argue that this captures what we want from acquaintance but without any threat to naturalism. More generally the chapter embodies a complaint that reductionists seem unable to look past the representation relation to do the implementing of consciousness, and a call for theorists to investigate other relations to model our connection to our conscious states, like the constitution/part-whole relationship. This mundane relation has what it takes to give us natural acquaintance with our conscious-mental states.

What exactly is the connection between consciousness and experiences? The most plausible view is a simple one: a mental state is conscious” if and only if it is an experience—something that it can be said it is like to undergo it. This chapter considers objections to this view from both the higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, which holds that consciousness necessitates an awareness of mental states, as well the phenomenal consciousness / access consciousness distinction, that is, between consciousness that is just experience and consciousness that is available for rational control of speech and action and is inferentially promiscuous. It is argued that neither of these objections are compelling.

An animal is phenomenally conscious if there is something it is like to be that animal. There are excellent scientific reasons for thinking that many animals are phenomenally conscious. In humans, consciousness is strongly correlated with widespread, relatively fast, low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical region of the brain. When the brains of many animals are examined, precisely this sort of activity in these areas is found. The primary philosophical objection to the idea that animals are phenomenally conscious is based on the higher-order thought (HOT) model of consciousness, according to which mental state is conscious when, and only when, the individual who has it is conscious of it. The HOT account suffers from a number of fatal difficulties.

In the past, metacognition has been defined very broadly. On the one hand it has been referred to as an implicit process, where awareness need not be involved. On the other hand — the stronger and more interesting sense — metacognitive processes have been used synonymously with introspection, consciousness, and self-reflection. In this chapter, we categorize the large range of existing metacognitive processes into three formal levels: anoetic metacognition, noetic metacognition, and autonoetic metacognition. Judgements that are bound to the current time, or made in the presence of stimuli, are classified as anoetic. Judgements that refer to or relate to internal representations, and are made in the absence of external stimuli, are classified as noetic. But only autonoetic metacognition requires the individual to make judgements about internal representations, and in addition have awareness that the self is intimately involved. While we can clearly distinguish between the three levels of metacognition, we continue to ponder two questions: first, is there a way to show that a nonhuman animal, or even a machine like Watson, can — autonoetically — reflect? Second, is a judgement without such self-reflection metacognition at all?

This book defends and develops the metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and attempts to apply it to several importantly related problems, including concept acquisition and animal consciousness. The text maintains a higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, which states that a mental state’s consciousness is dependent upon a suitable higher-order thought directed reflexively. HOTs are mental states directed at other mental states, and, therefore, are metapsychological or metacognitive states that are concerned with explaining how conscious mental states differ from unconscious ones. In addition to a defense of HOT theory, this book aims to solve a larger underlying paradox referred to here as the Consciousness Paradox. This paradox and its underlying theses are explained further in the succeeding chapters.

I show how the view on offer resolves Moore’s Paradox. Moorean absurdity does not, as it is generally held, involve an inter-level conflict between first- and second-order beliefs (or the corresponding utterances); it is just a conflict between doxastic stances on the question of a single proposition’s truth. Moore-Paradoxical statements are, in this way, similar to statements of the form “p and not-p.” What makes Moorean absurdity puzzlingly puzzling is that whereas an utterance of “p” expresses the speaker’s stance on the truth of p, the corresponding utterance of “I believe that p” would seem to express the speaker’s stance on the logically unrelated proposition that she believes that p. But this is a mistake. The correct explanation of Moorean absurdity is that both assertion and explicit belief-avowal manifest precisely the same thing: self-conscious knowledge of (first-order) belief.