Uriah Kriegel
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199570355
- eISBN:
- 9780191721625
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This chapter develops and defends an account of subjective character, according to which a mental state has its subjective character in virtue of representing itself in the appropriate way. First ...
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This chapter develops and defends an account of subjective character, according to which a mental state has its subjective character in virtue of representing itself in the appropriate way. First Kriegel argues that a mental state has subjective character because its subject is aware of it, then that the subject is aware of it in virtue of representing it, and finally that the subject represents its conscious state in virtue of being in that very conscious state, which is thus self‐representing.Less
This chapter develops and defends an account of subjective character, according to which a mental state has its subjective character in virtue of representing itself in the appropriate way. First Kriegel argues that a mental state has subjective character because its subject is aware of it, then that the subject is aware of it in virtue of representing it, and finally that the subject represents its conscious state in virtue of being in that very conscious state, which is thus self‐representing.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199277360
- eISBN:
- 9780191602597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199277362.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of ...
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Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of first-order representational (FOR) theories, of the sort espoused by Dretske and Tye, arguing that they are inferior to higher-order representational (HOR) accounts. Acknowledges as a problem for HOR theories that they might withhold phenomenal consciousness from most other species of animal, but claims that this problem should not be regarded as a serious obstacle to the acceptance of some such theory. Different versions of HOR theory are discussed, and the author’s own account (dual-content theory, here called dispositional higher-order thought theory) is briefly elaborated and defended.Less
Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of first-order representational (FOR) theories, of the sort espoused by Dretske and Tye, arguing that they are inferior to higher-order representational (HOR) accounts. Acknowledges as a problem for HOR theories that they might withhold phenomenal consciousness from most other species of animal, but claims that this problem should not be regarded as a serious obstacle to the acceptance of some such theory. Different versions of HOR theory are discussed, and the author’s own account (dual-content theory, here called dispositional higher-order thought theory) is briefly elaborated and defended.
