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Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence

Thomas Kelly

in Disagreement

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
September 2010
ISBN:
9780199226078
eISBN:
9780191594236
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter distinguishes and assesses a set of views about the rational response to peer disagreement. It raises a series of objections to views according to which one should assign ‘equal weight’ ... More


Higher-Order Evidence

Declan Smithies

in The Epistemic Role of Consciousness

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
August 2019
ISBN:
9780199917662
eISBN:
9780199345588
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199917662.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports, then your total evidence can make it rationally permissible ... More


Evidence of Evidence as Higher-Order Evidence

Anna-Maria A. Eder and Peter Brössel

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE ... More


Can Your Total Evidence Mislead About Itself?

Alex Worsnip

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It’s fairly uncontroversial that you can sometimes get misleading higher-order evidence about what your first-order evidence supports. What is more controversial is whether this can result in a ... More


Predictably Misleading Evidence

Sophie Horowitz

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Evidence can be misleading: it can rationalize raising one’s confidence in false propositions, and lowering one’s confidence in the truth. But can a rational agent know that her total evidence ... More


Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence

Mattias Skipper

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Two attractive theses about epistemic rationality—evidentialism and the enkratic principle—jointly imply that a certain sort of self-misleading evidence is impossible. That is to say, if ... More


Whither Higher-Order Evidence?

Daniel Whiting

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0012
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A widespread view is that higher-order evidence makes a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. This chapter considers in what way higher-order evidence might do ... More


Higher-Order Uncertainty

Kevin Dorst

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. This chapter defends three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed ... More


Higher-Order Defeat and Evincibility

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Does ‘higher-order evidence’ that one’s belief is rationally flawed defeat its status as rational (as justified, as knowledge)? Such a view is committed to two claims. First, it is possible to ... More


Undermining Defeat

Jessica Brown

in Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
May 2018
ISBN:
9780198801771
eISBN:
9780191840364
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198801771.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter examines the challenge posed to undermining defeat by ‘level-splitting’ views according to which it is sometimes rational for one to be in in epistemically akratic combination of states, ... More


Escaping the Akratic Trilemma

Klemens Kappel

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Much of the recent literature on higher-order evidence has revolved around the following three theses. First, one’s credence in any given proposition p should rationally reflect one’s evidence e ... More


Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience

Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that one’s own belief on some matter is rational, this can undermine the rationality of that belief. This is known ... More


Formulating Independence

David Christensen

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

We often get evidence that bears on the reliability of some of our own first-order reasoning. The rational response to such evidence would seem to depend on a rational assessment of how reliable we ... More


Religious Skepticism and Higher-Order Evidence

Nathan L. King

in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 7

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780198757702
eISBN:
9780191818448
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198757702.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter examines two arguments for religious skepticism. Both arguments support skepticism by appeal to higher-order evidence—that is, evidence about our evidence and our capacities for ... More


Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds)

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about ... More


Disagreement-Motivated Religious Skepticism and the Commitment to Impartiality

John Pittard

in Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
October 2019
ISBN:
9780190051815
eISBN:
9780190051846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190051815.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion

This chapter begins by clarifying the focus of the book, which is what may be called the “higher-order argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism.” A key premise of this argument is ... More


Higher-Order Evidence

Brian Weatherson

in Normative Externalism

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
May 2019
ISBN:
9780199696536
eISBN:
9780191876028
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter discusses higher-order evidence, i.e. evidence directly about the propriety of having some first-order belief. The mainstream position on higher-order evidence is that it can rationally ... More


The Puzzles of Easy Knowledge and of Higher-Order Evidence: A Unified Solution

Ram Neta

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The goal of this chapter is to provide a unified solution to two widely discussed epistemological puzzles: the puzzle of easy knowledge and the puzzle of higher-order evidence. The chapter begins by ... More


Return to Reason

Michael G. Titelbaum

in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
November 2019
ISBN:
9780198829775
eISBN:
9780191868276
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198829775.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses responses to the author’s “Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason).” Among other things, the chapter: explains how the author understands rationality; ... More


How to Know Our Limits

Nathan Ballantyne

in Knowing Our Limits

Published in print:
2019
Published Online:
September 2019
ISBN:
9780190847289
eISBN:
9780190847296
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780190847289.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapters 5 through 9 of this book defend a method to think about our opinions concerning controversial questions. The method offers us insights into the epistemic status of our controversial ... More


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