Daniel Karlin
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198112297
- eISBN:
- 9780191670756
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198112297.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature, Poetry
‘Gr-r-r--there go, my heart's abhorrence! Water your damned flower-pots, do! If hate killed men, Brother Lawrence, God's blood, would not mine kill you!’ The bitter and twisted monk of ‘Soliloquy of ...
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‘Gr-r-r--there go, my heart's abhorrence! Water your damned flower-pots, do! If hate killed men, Brother Lawrence, God's blood, would not mine kill you!’ The bitter and twisted monk of ‘Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister’ is Robert Browning's best-known hater, but hatred was a topic to which he returned again and again in both letters and poems. This book is a study of Browning's hatreds, and their influence on his poetry. Browning was himself a ‘good hater’, and the author analyses his hatreds of figures such as Wordsworth (the model for his ‘Lost Leader’), and more generally, tyranny and the abuse of power, and deceit or quackery in personal relationships or intellectual systems. Tracing the subtlest windings and branchings of Browning's idea of hatred through detailed discussion of key poems, the author shows how Browning's work displays an unequalled grasp of hatred as a personal emotion, as an intellectual principle, and as a source of artistic creativity. Particular attention is devoted to Browning's compulsive and compelling exploration of the duality of love and hate.Less
‘Gr-r-r--there go, my heart's abhorrence! Water your damned flower-pots, do! If hate killed men, Brother Lawrence, God's blood, would not mine kill you!’ The bitter and twisted monk of ‘Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister’ is Robert Browning's best-known hater, but hatred was a topic to which he returned again and again in both letters and poems. This book is a study of Browning's hatreds, and their influence on his poetry. Browning was himself a ‘good hater’, and the author analyses his hatreds of figures such as Wordsworth (the model for his ‘Lost Leader’), and more generally, tyranny and the abuse of power, and deceit or quackery in personal relationships or intellectual systems. Tracing the subtlest windings and branchings of Browning's idea of hatred through detailed discussion of key poems, the author shows how Browning's work displays an unequalled grasp of hatred as a personal emotion, as an intellectual principle, and as a source of artistic creativity. Particular attention is devoted to Browning's compulsive and compelling exploration of the duality of love and hate.
Paul Iganski
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9781861349408
- eISBN:
- 9781447302476
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Policy Press
- DOI:
- 10.1332/policypress/9781861349408.001.0001
- Subject:
- Social Work, Crime and Justice
The impression often conveyed by the media about hate crime offenders is that they are hate-fuelled individuals who, in acting out their extremely bigoted views, target their victims in premeditated ...
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The impression often conveyed by the media about hate crime offenders is that they are hate-fuelled individuals who, in acting out their extremely bigoted views, target their victims in premeditated violent attacks. Scholarly research on the perpetrators of hate crimes has begun to provide a more nuanced picture. However, the preoccupation of researchers with convicted offenders neglects the vast majority of hate crime offenders that do not come into contact with the criminal justice system. This book widens understanding of hate crime by demonstrating that many offenders are ordinary people who offend in the context of their everyday lives. The book takes a victim-centred approach to explore and analyse hate crime as a social problem, providing an empirically informed and scholarly perspective. The book draws out the connections between the individual agency of offenders and the background structural context for their actions. It adds a new dimension to the debate about criminalising hate in light of concerns about the rise of punitive and expressive justice, scrutinising the balance struck by hate crime laws between the rights of offenders and the rights of victims.Less
The impression often conveyed by the media about hate crime offenders is that they are hate-fuelled individuals who, in acting out their extremely bigoted views, target their victims in premeditated violent attacks. Scholarly research on the perpetrators of hate crimes has begun to provide a more nuanced picture. However, the preoccupation of researchers with convicted offenders neglects the vast majority of hate crime offenders that do not come into contact with the criminal justice system. This book widens understanding of hate crime by demonstrating that many offenders are ordinary people who offend in the context of their everyday lives. The book takes a victim-centred approach to explore and analyse hate crime as a social problem, providing an empirically informed and scholarly perspective. The book draws out the connections between the individual agency of offenders and the background structural context for their actions. It adds a new dimension to the debate about criminalising hate in light of concerns about the rise of punitive and expressive justice, scrutinising the balance struck by hate crime laws between the rights of offenders and the rights of victims.
Richard Sorabji
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199256600
- eISBN:
- 9780191712609
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256600.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Arguments for eradicating most emotions were the Stoic thesis that one misevaluates indifferents, the approval of serenity, and the point that pleasant emotions are inextricably tied to unpleasant ...
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Arguments for eradicating most emotions were the Stoic thesis that one misevaluates indifferents, the approval of serenity, and the point that pleasant emotions are inextricably tied to unpleasant ones, and that ordinary love turns to hate. The case against eradication is not always well argued. For Stoic eradication is not suppression or gritting of teeth, but re-evaluation, nor do the Stoics remove all motivation. Freedom from emotional judgements, even if not from non-judgmental shocks, is imaginable from Epictetus' description of his training methods, and it was further pictured by Aristotle, Cicero, and Christians by imagining the situation of God or of the next life. But would such a state be human or humane, or is that not something to be required of a sage? For ordinary people, emotions are of the highest value, even though Romanticism's glorification of all of them should not be shared.Less
Arguments for eradicating most emotions were the Stoic thesis that one misevaluates indifferents, the approval of serenity, and the point that pleasant emotions are inextricably tied to unpleasant ones, and that ordinary love turns to hate. The case against eradication is not always well argued. For Stoic eradication is not suppression or gritting of teeth, but re-evaluation, nor do the Stoics remove all motivation. Freedom from emotional judgements, even if not from non-judgmental shocks, is imaginable from Epictetus' description of his training methods, and it was further pictured by Aristotle, Cicero, and Christians by imagining the situation of God or of the next life. But would such a state be human or humane, or is that not something to be required of a sage? For ordinary people, emotions are of the highest value, even though Romanticism's glorification of all of them should not be shared.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter discusses how political liberals ought to respond to those people the theory labels as ‘unreasonable’. These are people who reject one or more of the fundamental normative assumptions of ...
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This chapter discusses how political liberals ought to respond to those people the theory labels as ‘unreasonable’. These are people who reject one or more of the fundamental normative assumptions of political liberalism. The author argues that while such persons are rightfully excluded from the constituency of justification in liberal theory, such persons still have the same political status as other citizens, and are thus entitled to the same package of rights and benefits. That package of rights and benefits, however, does not include the right to pursue fundamentalist objectives that might threaten the stability of a liberal regime, or threaten the rights of other liberal citizens. The state therefore may permissibly restrict the actions of unreasonable citizens when those citizens act in ways that threaten the basic liberal norms that underpin a well-ordered society.Less
This chapter discusses how political liberals ought to respond to those people the theory labels as ‘unreasonable’. These are people who reject one or more of the fundamental normative assumptions of political liberalism. The author argues that while such persons are rightfully excluded from the constituency of justification in liberal theory, such persons still have the same political status as other citizens, and are thus entitled to the same package of rights and benefits. That package of rights and benefits, however, does not include the right to pursue fundamentalist objectives that might threaten the stability of a liberal regime, or threaten the rights of other liberal citizens. The state therefore may permissibly restrict the actions of unreasonable citizens when those citizens act in ways that threaten the basic liberal norms that underpin a well-ordered society.
Erik Bleich
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199739684
- eISBN:
- 9780199914579
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739684.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
We love freedom. We hate racism. But what do we do when these two values collide? This book explores the policies that the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and other liberal democracies have ...
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We love freedom. We hate racism. But what do we do when these two values collide? This book explores the policies that the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and other liberal democracies have implemented when faced with this challenge. The book's comparative historical approach reveals four central findings: first, most countries have restricted freedom for racist speech, associations, and motives since the end of World War II; second, this trend has more closely resembled a slow creep than a slippery slope; third, the United States has contradicted the overarching pattern by expanding freedom of racist expression and association; but, fourth, the United States has also been at the forefront of contracting freedom of racist opinion when used as a motive to actions. Each country has struggled to balance these core values, and although the outcomes differ significantly, none has violated the fundamental principles of liberal democracy. Drawing on these historical observations, this book asks just how much freedom we should grant to racists. It argues that we must pay close attention to the specific context and to the likely effects of the policies that we implement, and that any response should be proportionate to the level of harm inflicted by the racist speech, group, or act. This bopok concludes that the best way for societies to balance preserving freedom and combating racism is through processes of public deliberation that involve citizens and their representatives.Less
We love freedom. We hate racism. But what do we do when these two values collide? This book explores the policies that the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and other liberal democracies have implemented when faced with this challenge. The book's comparative historical approach reveals four central findings: first, most countries have restricted freedom for racist speech, associations, and motives since the end of World War II; second, this trend has more closely resembled a slow creep than a slippery slope; third, the United States has contradicted the overarching pattern by expanding freedom of racist expression and association; but, fourth, the United States has also been at the forefront of contracting freedom of racist opinion when used as a motive to actions. Each country has struggled to balance these core values, and although the outcomes differ significantly, none has violated the fundamental principles of liberal democracy. Drawing on these historical observations, this book asks just how much freedom we should grant to racists. It argues that we must pay close attention to the specific context and to the likely effects of the policies that we implement, and that any response should be proportionate to the level of harm inflicted by the racist speech, group, or act. This bopok concludes that the best way for societies to balance preserving freedom and combating racism is through processes of public deliberation that involve citizens and their representatives.
EYAL ZAMIR and BARAK MEDINA
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195372168
- eISBN:
- 9780199776078
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195372168.003.07
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses freedom of speech. It briefly describes current constitutional protection of this freedom and surveys its standard economic analysis. It then introduces the deontological ...
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This chapter discusses freedom of speech. It briefly describes current constitutional protection of this freedom and surveys its standard economic analysis. It then introduces the deontological constraint against curtailing free speech and analyzes in some detail the normative judgments involved in conducting a constrained cost-benefit analysis of speech regulation. As to calculating the benefit of speech regulation — which is tantamount to calculating the speech's expected harm — it examines the desirability of excluding, or radically discounting, various types of harms, such as chronologically-remote and low-probability harms, small harms, harms brought about through rational persuasion, and mere offensiveness. Various ways of formalizing such excluders and combining them are examined. The chapter then analyzes the threshold that has to be met to justify speech regulation, including its shape, the setting of different thresholds for content-based and for content-neutral regulation, and different thresholds for different categories of speech.Less
This chapter discusses freedom of speech. It briefly describes current constitutional protection of this freedom and surveys its standard economic analysis. It then introduces the deontological constraint against curtailing free speech and analyzes in some detail the normative judgments involved in conducting a constrained cost-benefit analysis of speech regulation. As to calculating the benefit of speech regulation — which is tantamount to calculating the speech's expected harm — it examines the desirability of excluding, or radically discounting, various types of harms, such as chronologically-remote and low-probability harms, small harms, harms brought about through rational persuasion, and mere offensiveness. Various ways of formalizing such excluders and combining them are examined. The chapter then analyzes the threshold that has to be met to justify speech regulation, including its shape, the setting of different thresholds for content-based and for content-neutral regulation, and different thresholds for different categories of speech.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195314311
- eISBN:
- 9780199871780
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314311.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The schoolyard wisdom about “sticks and stones” does not take one very far: insults do not take the form only of words, in truth even words have effects, and in the end the popular as well as the ...
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The schoolyard wisdom about “sticks and stones” does not take one very far: insults do not take the form only of words, in truth even words have effects, and in the end the popular as well as the standard legal distinctions between speech and conduct are at least as problematic as they are helpful. To think clearly about how much we should put up with those who would put us down, it is necessary to explore the nature and place of insult in our lives. What kind of injury is an insult? Is its infliction determined by the insulter or the insulted? What does it reveal of the character of each and of the character of society and its conventions? What is its role in social and legal life (from play to jokes to ritual to war and from blasphemy to defamation to hate speech)? Philosophical, anthropological, psychoanalytic, and legal approaches to the questions are emphasized. Whether intentional or unintentional, the assertions and assumptions of dominance in insults make them a serious and essential form of power play. Is to understand all to forgive all?Less
The schoolyard wisdom about “sticks and stones” does not take one very far: insults do not take the form only of words, in truth even words have effects, and in the end the popular as well as the standard legal distinctions between speech and conduct are at least as problematic as they are helpful. To think clearly about how much we should put up with those who would put us down, it is necessary to explore the nature and place of insult in our lives. What kind of injury is an insult? Is its infliction determined by the insulter or the insulted? What does it reveal of the character of each and of the character of society and its conventions? What is its role in social and legal life (from play to jokes to ritual to war and from blasphemy to defamation to hate speech)? Philosophical, anthropological, psychoanalytic, and legal approaches to the questions are emphasized. Whether intentional or unintentional, the assertions and assumptions of dominance in insults make them a serious and essential form of power play. Is to understand all to forgive all?
Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199236282
- eISBN:
- 9780191741357
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236282.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Most liberal societies are deeply committed to a principle of free speech. At the same time, however, there is evidence that some kinds of speech are harmful in ways that are detrimental to important ...
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Most liberal societies are deeply committed to a principle of free speech. At the same time, however, there is evidence that some kinds of speech are harmful in ways that are detrimental to important liberal values, such as social equality. Might a genuine commitment to free speech require that we legally permit speech even when it is harmful, and even when doing so is in conflict with our commitment to values like equality? Even if such speech is to be legally permitted, does our commitment to free speech allow us to provide material and institutional support to those who would contest such harmful speech? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, which kinds of speech are harmful in ways that merit response, either in the form of legal regulation or in some other form? This book explores these and related questions. Drawing on expertise in philosophy, sociology, political science, feminist theory, and legal theory, the chapters in this book investigate these themes and questions. By exploring various categories of speech (including pornography, hate speech, Holocaust denial literature, ‘Whites Only’ signs), and attending to the precise functioning of speech, the chapters shed light on these questions by clarifying the relationship between speech and harm. Understanding how speech functions can help us work out which kinds of speech are harmful, what those harms are, and how the speech in question brings them about. All of these issues are crucially important when it comes to deciding what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech.Less
Most liberal societies are deeply committed to a principle of free speech. At the same time, however, there is evidence that some kinds of speech are harmful in ways that are detrimental to important liberal values, such as social equality. Might a genuine commitment to free speech require that we legally permit speech even when it is harmful, and even when doing so is in conflict with our commitment to values like equality? Even if such speech is to be legally permitted, does our commitment to free speech allow us to provide material and institutional support to those who would contest such harmful speech? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, which kinds of speech are harmful in ways that merit response, either in the form of legal regulation or in some other form? This book explores these and related questions. Drawing on expertise in philosophy, sociology, political science, feminist theory, and legal theory, the chapters in this book investigate these themes and questions. By exploring various categories of speech (including pornography, hate speech, Holocaust denial literature, ‘Whites Only’ signs), and attending to the precise functioning of speech, the chapters shed light on these questions by clarifying the relationship between speech and harm. Understanding how speech functions can help us work out which kinds of speech are harmful, what those harms are, and how the speech in question brings them about. All of these issues are crucially important when it comes to deciding what ought to be done about allegedly harmful speech.
Erik Bleich
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199739684
- eISBN:
- 9780199914579
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199739684.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
It is tempting to assume that liberal democracies have always targeted racial discrimination and hate crimes for specific punishment. But meaningful laws only materialized starting in the 1960s and ...
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It is tempting to assume that liberal democracies have always targeted racial discrimination and hate crimes for specific punishment. But meaningful laws only materialized starting in the 1960s and 1980s respectively. This chapter focuses first on the development of American anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s and hate crime laws in the 1980s and 1990s. Looking closely at this history shows how the country most committed to freedom in some domains was the quickest to forego it in others, and just how extensive its laws against racist opinion-as-motive have become. It then turns to developments in Europe. Many European governments have followed in the United States’ footsteps by establishing laws against racial discrimination and hate crimes, although seldom with similar vigor. Looking in depth at the United States, Britain, and Germany demonstrates the origins, spread, and limits of penalizing racist opinion-as-motive in liberal democracies. Ultimately, this chapter also reveals the internal tensions and transnational differences among countries that attempt to balance upholding freedom and fighting racism in a variety of domains.Less
It is tempting to assume that liberal democracies have always targeted racial discrimination and hate crimes for specific punishment. But meaningful laws only materialized starting in the 1960s and 1980s respectively. This chapter focuses first on the development of American anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s and hate crime laws in the 1980s and 1990s. Looking closely at this history shows how the country most committed to freedom in some domains was the quickest to forego it in others, and just how extensive its laws against racist opinion-as-motive have become. It then turns to developments in Europe. Many European governments have followed in the United States’ footsteps by establishing laws against racial discrimination and hate crimes, although seldom with similar vigor. Looking in depth at the United States, Britain, and Germany demonstrates the origins, spread, and limits of penalizing racist opinion-as-motive in liberal democracies. Ultimately, this chapter also reveals the internal tensions and transnational differences among countries that attempt to balance upholding freedom and fighting racism in a variety of domains.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195314311
- eISBN:
- 9780199871780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314311.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative ...
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Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.Less
Because speech can also be conduct, words deeds, the First Amendment cannot provide blanket protection for all offensive speech. This is especially true for what J.L. Austin calls “performative utterances.” We must try to be clear on the principles at stake‐‐as claims to freedom of speech meet claims of self‐defense and provocation‐‐as we seek to draw legal boundaries to control fighting words, obscenity, and hate speech.
Robert C. Fuller
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195109795
- eISBN:
- 9780199853281
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195109795.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, History of Christianity
No form of hatred is as cruel or unmitigating as religious hate. The middle decades of the 20th century experienced more than their fair share of religious strife. The period roughly between World ...
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No form of hatred is as cruel or unmitigating as religious hate. The middle decades of the 20th century experienced more than their fair share of religious strife. The period roughly between World War I and the start of the Cold War spawned a number of pious crusades designed to exterminate the enemies of Christ. New threats to fundamentalist Christianity's claim to the nation's cultural center kept coming from every possible direction. In the eyes of Christian fundamentalists, the Antichrist was marching right through America unopposed. As distinct from other forms of conservative religion, fundamentalism requires confrontation and opposition. The 1930s and 1940s witnessed a new intensification of efforts to name the Antichrist as Americans vented their latent fears and prejudices in relentless displays of anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-socialism. Hate mongers like Gerald L. K. Smith, Carl McIntire, Gerald Winrod, and the Ku Klux Klansmen all used apocalyptic imagery to identify the diabolic nature of the many enemies who conspired against the glorious culture forged by God-loving Protestants.Less
No form of hatred is as cruel or unmitigating as religious hate. The middle decades of the 20th century experienced more than their fair share of religious strife. The period roughly between World War I and the start of the Cold War spawned a number of pious crusades designed to exterminate the enemies of Christ. New threats to fundamentalist Christianity's claim to the nation's cultural center kept coming from every possible direction. In the eyes of Christian fundamentalists, the Antichrist was marching right through America unopposed. As distinct from other forms of conservative religion, fundamentalism requires confrontation and opposition. The 1930s and 1940s witnessed a new intensification of efforts to name the Antichrist as Americans vented their latent fears and prejudices in relentless displays of anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and anti-socialism. Hate mongers like Gerald L. K. Smith, Carl McIntire, Gerald Winrod, and the Ku Klux Klansmen all used apocalyptic imagery to identify the diabolic nature of the many enemies who conspired against the glorious culture forged by God-loving Protestants.
Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199236282
- eISBN:
- 9780191741357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236282.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter explores the nature and value of a principle of free speech. It is often argued that certain kinds of speech are harmful. But such claims give rise to several questions. First, when a ...
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This chapter explores the nature and value of a principle of free speech. It is often argued that certain kinds of speech are harmful. But such claims give rise to several questions. First, when a kind of speech is harmful, what are the harms in question? Second, how does the speech bring about these harms? Third, and perhaps most crucially, what ought to be done about these harms, in the context of a continuing commitment to free speech? The chapter surveys possible answers to each of these questions, and introduces several distinctions that are key to understanding these answers. Finally, questions about the scope of a free speech principle are motivated. Along the way, the chapters in this collection are located with respect to the debates surrounding speech and harm, and a guide to using this collection as the basis for a course is offered.Less
This chapter explores the nature and value of a principle of free speech. It is often argued that certain kinds of speech are harmful. But such claims give rise to several questions. First, when a kind of speech is harmful, what are the harms in question? Second, how does the speech bring about these harms? Third, and perhaps most crucially, what ought to be done about these harms, in the context of a continuing commitment to free speech? The chapter surveys possible answers to each of these questions, and introduces several distinctions that are key to understanding these answers. Finally, questions about the scope of a free speech principle are motivated. Along the way, the chapters in this collection are located with respect to the debates surrounding speech and harm, and a guide to using this collection as the basis for a course is offered.
Katharine Gelber
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199236282
- eISBN:
- 9780191741357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236282.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
A central idea within free speech arguments is that the most appropriate response to speech with which one disagrees, or which one finds intolerable, is to speak back. Some scholars have argued there ...
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A central idea within free speech arguments is that the most appropriate response to speech with which one disagrees, or which one finds intolerable, is to speak back. Some scholars have argued there may even be a basis for governmental or state support to assist some in speaking. This chapter develops this argument in relation to hate speech, arguing that because and to the extent to which hate speech may prevent its targets from speaking back, institutional, educational, and material support ought to be provided to enable the targets of hate speech to ‘speak back’. This would enable them both to contradict the messages contained within the hate speech and to counteract the effects of that speech on their ability to respond. The policy thus aims to ameliorate the potential effects of hate speech, and also to preserve and enhance speech opportunities. This chapter discusses the likely fortunes of a ‘speaking back’ policy in the United States and Australia; two jurisdictions with widely variant institutional mechanisms for the protection of free speech. It concludes that the speaking back policy is conceptually and practically useful in combating hate speech, and also potentially robust in differing constitutional environments.Less
A central idea within free speech arguments is that the most appropriate response to speech with which one disagrees, or which one finds intolerable, is to speak back. Some scholars have argued there may even be a basis for governmental or state support to assist some in speaking. This chapter develops this argument in relation to hate speech, arguing that because and to the extent to which hate speech may prevent its targets from speaking back, institutional, educational, and material support ought to be provided to enable the targets of hate speech to ‘speak back’. This would enable them both to contradict the messages contained within the hate speech and to counteract the effects of that speech on their ability to respond. The policy thus aims to ameliorate the potential effects of hate speech, and also to preserve and enhance speech opportunities. This chapter discusses the likely fortunes of a ‘speaking back’ policy in the United States and Australia; two jurisdictions with widely variant institutional mechanisms for the protection of free speech. It concludes that the speaking back policy is conceptually and practically useful in combating hate speech, and also potentially robust in differing constitutional environments.
Langton Rae
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199236282
- eISBN:
- 9780191741357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236282.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Pragmatics can shed light on racial hate speech and pornography, but only if we bring it down to earth. Five models for hate speech and pornography are distinguished: a conditioning model, an ...
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Pragmatics can shed light on racial hate speech and pornography, but only if we bring it down to earth. Five models for hate speech and pornography are distinguished: a conditioning model, an imitation model, an argument model, a speech act model, and its descendant, the pragmatic model. A speech act model distinguishes illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of speech: e.g. hate speech can incite, and cause, hatred and violence. The pragmatic model tries to capture these dimensions via an account of accommodation. It can indeed illuminate racial hate speech and pornography, but only with amendments that go ‘beyond belief’. Lewis and Stalnaker showed how ‘score’ or ‘common ground’ of conversation accommodates to moves speakers make, and the hearer’s belief adjusts accordingly. This picture needs extending to make sense of hate speech and pornography: we need to allow for the accommodation of other attitudes, such as desire and hate.Less
Pragmatics can shed light on racial hate speech and pornography, but only if we bring it down to earth. Five models for hate speech and pornography are distinguished: a conditioning model, an imitation model, an argument model, a speech act model, and its descendant, the pragmatic model. A speech act model distinguishes illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of speech: e.g. hate speech can incite, and cause, hatred and violence. The pragmatic model tries to capture these dimensions via an account of accommodation. It can indeed illuminate racial hate speech and pornography, but only with amendments that go ‘beyond belief’. Lewis and Stalnaker showed how ‘score’ or ‘common ground’ of conversation accommodates to moves speakers make, and the hearer’s belief adjusts accordingly. This picture needs extending to make sense of hate speech and pornography: we need to allow for the accommodation of other attitudes, such as desire and hate.
Ishani Maitra
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199236282
- eISBN:
- 9780191741357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236282.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers whether ordinary instances of racist hate speech can be authoritative, thereby constituting the subordination of people of color. It is often said that ordinary speakers cannot ...
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This chapter considers whether ordinary instances of racist hate speech can be authoritative, thereby constituting the subordination of people of color. It is often said that ordinary speakers cannot subordinate because they lack authority. Here it is argued that there are more ways in which speakers can come to have authority than have been generally recognized. In part, this is because authority has been taken to be too closely tied to social position. This chapter presents a series of examples which show that speaker authority needn’t derive from social position at all. Moreover, these examples also show that a speaker can come to have authority even when they lack it prior to speaking. After distinguishing these different ways in which speakers can come to have authority, it is argued that there is ample reason to think that even producers of ordinary instances of racist hate speech can sometimes have authority in these ways.Less
This chapter considers whether ordinary instances of racist hate speech can be authoritative, thereby constituting the subordination of people of color. It is often said that ordinary speakers cannot subordinate because they lack authority. Here it is argued that there are more ways in which speakers can come to have authority than have been generally recognized. In part, this is because authority has been taken to be too closely tied to social position. This chapter presents a series of examples which show that speaker authority needn’t derive from social position at all. Moreover, these examples also show that a speaker can come to have authority even when they lack it prior to speaking. After distinguishing these different ways in which speakers can come to have authority, it is argued that there is ample reason to think that even producers of ordinary instances of racist hate speech can sometimes have authority in these ways.
Mary Kate McGowan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199236282
- eISBN:
- 9780191741357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236282.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In this chapter, it is argued that some instances of racist hate speech are speech acts that constitute illegal acts of racial discrimination. By identifying a previously overlooked mechanism by ...
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In this chapter, it is argued that some instances of racist hate speech are speech acts that constitute illegal acts of racial discrimination. By identifying a previously overlooked mechanism by which utterances enact norms (the covert exercitive), one comes to see that some racist hate speech enacts discriminatory norms in public places. Such speech thus acts very similarly to ‘Whites Only’ signs. This result has two important consequences. First, it affords at least a prima facie case for the regulation of this subset of racist hate speech. Second, it disproves a certain naive conception of so-called political speech. Although both racist hate speech and ‘Whites Only’ signs express political messages, they do not and should not count as political speech for the purposes of a free speech principle. Thus, expressing a political opinion is insufficient for being political speech (in the relevant sense).Less
In this chapter, it is argued that some instances of racist hate speech are speech acts that constitute illegal acts of racial discrimination. By identifying a previously overlooked mechanism by which utterances enact norms (the covert exercitive), one comes to see that some racist hate speech enacts discriminatory norms in public places. Such speech thus acts very similarly to ‘Whites Only’ signs. This result has two important consequences. First, it affords at least a prima facie case for the regulation of this subset of racist hate speech. Second, it disproves a certain naive conception of so-called political speech. Although both racist hate speech and ‘Whites Only’ signs express political messages, they do not and should not count as political speech for the purposes of a free speech principle. Thus, expressing a political opinion is insufficient for being political speech (in the relevant sense).
Caroline West
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199236282
- eISBN:
- 9780191741357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199236282.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter examines the prevailing assumption that the value of freedom of speech itself is necessarily only or best served by permitting racist hate speech. It is argued that anything worthy of ...
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This chapter examines the prevailing assumption that the value of freedom of speech itself is necessarily only or best served by permitting racist hate speech. It is argued that anything worthy of the label ‘freedom of speech’ must satisfy three relatively minimal conditions, namely, minimal distribution, minimal comprehension, and minimal consideration. If racist hate speech silences other speech by interfering with its production/distribution, comprehension, or consideration, then racist hate speech may function to undermine, rather than exemplify or enhance, freedom of speech. If so, there might be a free speech argument against permitting racist hate speech. The chapter provides a novel framework within which such claims can be evaluated.Less
This chapter examines the prevailing assumption that the value of freedom of speech itself is necessarily only or best served by permitting racist hate speech. It is argued that anything worthy of the label ‘freedom of speech’ must satisfy three relatively minimal conditions, namely, minimal distribution, minimal comprehension, and minimal consideration. If racist hate speech silences other speech by interfering with its production/distribution, comprehension, or consideration, then racist hate speech may function to undermine, rather than exemplify or enhance, freedom of speech. If so, there might be a free speech argument against permitting racist hate speech. The chapter provides a novel framework within which such claims can be evaluated.
Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548781
- eISBN:
- 9780191720673
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548781.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
A commitment to free speech is a fundamental precept of all liberal democracies. However, democracies differ significantly when addressing the permissibility of laws regulating certain kinds of ...
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A commitment to free speech is a fundamental precept of all liberal democracies. However, democracies differ significantly when addressing the permissibility of laws regulating certain kinds of speech, especially extreme speech. In the United States, for instance, the commitment to free speech has been held by the Supreme Court to protect the public expression of even the most noxious racist ideology. In contrast, in almost every other democracy governments enjoy considerable leeway to restrict racist and other types of extreme expression. What accounts for the marked differences in attitude towards the constitutionality of hate speech regulation? Does hate speech regulation violate the core free speech principle constitutive of democracy? Or do values such as the commitment to equality or individual dignity legitimately override the right to free speech in some circumstances? In attempting to answer these and other questions, this book focuses on highly topical issues such as homophobic speech, Holocaust denial, incitement to terrorism, veiling controversies, and the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. It includes interdisciplinary perspectives from law, philosophy, history, psychology, and literature, and provides comparative perspectives from experts in various countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, and Israel, as well as from the United States and the United Kingdom.Less
A commitment to free speech is a fundamental precept of all liberal democracies. However, democracies differ significantly when addressing the permissibility of laws regulating certain kinds of speech, especially extreme speech. In the United States, for instance, the commitment to free speech has been held by the Supreme Court to protect the public expression of even the most noxious racist ideology. In contrast, in almost every other democracy governments enjoy considerable leeway to restrict racist and other types of extreme expression. What accounts for the marked differences in attitude towards the constitutionality of hate speech regulation? Does hate speech regulation violate the core free speech principle constitutive of democracy? Or do values such as the commitment to equality or individual dignity legitimately override the right to free speech in some circumstances? In attempting to answer these and other questions, this book focuses on highly topical issues such as homophobic speech, Holocaust denial, incitement to terrorism, veiling controversies, and the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. It includes interdisciplinary perspectives from law, philosophy, history, psychology, and literature, and provides comparative perspectives from experts in various countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, and Israel, as well as from the United States and the United Kingdom.
West Stevens Joyce
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195121643
- eISBN:
- 9780199865383
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195121643.003.0001
- Subject:
- Social Work, Children and Families
This chapter explicates the construct of resilience within historical social contexts to illuminate an evolutionary perspective of contextual stresses and the ways in which they are negotiated and ...
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This chapter explicates the construct of resilience within historical social contexts to illuminate an evolutionary perspective of contextual stresses and the ways in which they are negotiated and managed over time. Strengths and social supports are used interchangeably with resilience and protective factors. Various risk models are explained. Both risk and resilience are defined. Race and ethnicity for Blacks is viewed as a form of social stigma and a risk factor. The notion of internalized racial self-hatred is rejected. Racial stigma need not be attributed as self-blame. A strengths perspective is defined.Less
This chapter explicates the construct of resilience within historical social contexts to illuminate an evolutionary perspective of contextual stresses and the ways in which they are negotiated and managed over time. Strengths and social supports are used interchangeably with resilience and protective factors. Various risk models are explained. Both risk and resilience are defined. Race and ethnicity for Blacks is viewed as a form of social stigma and a risk factor. The notion of internalized racial self-hatred is rejected. Racial stigma need not be attributed as self-blame. A strengths perspective is defined.
James Weinstein
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548781
- eISBN:
- 9780191720673
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548781.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
This chapter describes the basic features of the American free speech doctrine and then considers its application to various forms of extreme speech. This analysis reveals that most of the speech ...
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This chapter describes the basic features of the American free speech doctrine and then considers its application to various forms of extreme speech. This analysis reveals that most of the speech restrictions considered in this book, while consistent with the constitutional norms of other democracies, would be unconstitutional in the U.S. The leitmotif of contemporary American free speech doctrine is its intense hostility to content regulation of public discourse, particularly viewpoint regulation. In addition, Brandenburg v. Ohio narrowly confines governmental power to punish the advocacy of law violation. Hate speech bans, whether in the form of public order regulations, prohibitions against group defamation, or bans on Holocaust denial, would be deemed unconstitutional. Under Brandenburg, laws that prohibit mere advocacy of terrorism would also be held to violate the First Amendment. The chapter concludes that much of the explanation for American free speech exceptionalism lies in the U.S. Supreme Court's extensive experience with free speech issues, particularly the lessons it learned from its failure to protect adequately dissent in the early part of the 20th century.Less
This chapter describes the basic features of the American free speech doctrine and then considers its application to various forms of extreme speech. This analysis reveals that most of the speech restrictions considered in this book, while consistent with the constitutional norms of other democracies, would be unconstitutional in the U.S. The leitmotif of contemporary American free speech doctrine is its intense hostility to content regulation of public discourse, particularly viewpoint regulation. In addition, Brandenburg v. Ohio narrowly confines governmental power to punish the advocacy of law violation. Hate speech bans, whether in the form of public order regulations, prohibitions against group defamation, or bans on Holocaust denial, would be deemed unconstitutional. Under Brandenburg, laws that prohibit mere advocacy of terrorism would also be held to violate the First Amendment. The chapter concludes that much of the explanation for American free speech exceptionalism lies in the U.S. Supreme Court's extensive experience with free speech issues, particularly the lessons it learned from its failure to protect adequately dissent in the early part of the 20th century.
