Search Results

This chapter considers several objections—some empirical, some theoretical—to the claim that deliberation has positive epistemic properties. It uses a theory recently developed in evolutionary psychology—the argumentative theory of reasoning—to refute at a theoretical level two classical objections to deliberation. The first objection is that, far from leading to any individual or collective epistemic improvements, deliberation with others does not do much to change minds. The other objection is the so-called law of group polarization according to which deliberating groups of like-minded people will systematically polarize. The chapter argues that where the normal conditions of reasoning are satisfied, dialogical deliberation of the kind favored by most deliberative democrats is likely to have the predicted transformative epistemic properties.

Depending on the degree of goal uncertainty and procedural uncertainty, organizational decision making may follow the bounded rationality model, process model, political model, or anarchic model. Individual decision making relies on heuristics that can lead to biases. Group decision making is vulnerable to the tendencies for groupthink, group polarization, and an escalation of commitment. In an attempt to reduce decision uncertainty and complexity, organizations control the creation and use of information by establishing decision premises, rules, and routines for different types of decision situations.

Insofar as the reason ‘why’ we want deliberative democracy is just to pool information, what justifies so much emphasis among deliberative democrats on talking face-to-face to the exclusion of other equally good ways of pooling information? This chapter develops a contrast between two ways of pooling information: mechanically (through vote counting) and discursively (through talking together). It goes on to canvass five ways in which pooling information discursively might capture information that would have been lost had the information-pooling been done by more purely mechanical means.

This chapter has a wide focus, covering many of the cognitive problems that are secondary to chronic organizational stress. Stress interferes with organizational learning, organizational memory is lost, organizational amnesia affects function, and service delivery becomes increasingly fragmented. The organization has developed learning disabilities. Decision-making becomes compromised and reactive so that short-sighted policy decisions are made that appear to compound existing problems. Stressed groups are frequently unwilling to perceive and discuss problems that the group denies and are more likely to actively and dangerously silence dissent.

This chapter grapples with the nature of group hate and collective hate. Group hate is hate targeted at groups or individuals because of their group membership. Collective hate is hate that a group has toward a common target or that group members have toward a target on behalf of their group. Collective hate is a special case of collective intentionality, the capacity of minds to be jointly directed toward objects, people, values, or goals. Collective hatred requires a joint commitment to hate or to act as if one hates a person or group. After fleshing out the concepts of group hate and collective hate, the chapter looks at the role of propaganda, fake news, and group polarization in securing a joint commitment to hate certain groups or people who belong to those groups.

This chapter presents some consequentialist considerations against moral grandstanding. Grandstanding contributes to group polarization. Relatedly, grandstanding leads people to hold false beliefs, and to be overconfident about their beliefs. Grandstanding also threatens to undercut the effectiveness of moral talk. It makes people increasingly cynical about moral discourse, and it may cause outrage exhaustion—an insensitivity to expressions of outrage by others, and an inability to muster outrage oneself. When grandstanding becomes too common in public discourse, moderates avoid discussions of morality and politics. In spite of these costs, the possibility that grandstanding may be socially beneficial is also considered.

Joseph P. Forgas reflects on his most underappreciated work: his doctoral research on group polarization. He first discusses the “crisis” in social psychology during the mid-1970s, mainly stemming from three factors: uncertainties in what to do and how to do it, the rejection of the experimental method, and the shifting paradigm. He then explains his use of individual differences multidimensional scaling to analyze and represent mental representations of social episodes that occur in people's daily lives.

How and why does a martyr story spread beyond individuals to larger groups, permeating a cultural landscape? What are the social psychological mechanisms that make people want to share the story with others? This chapter will trace the effects of martyrdom beyond individual followers, to groups of sympathizers and opponents of the martyr’s cause. The authors suggest that a martyrdom story endows those who tell it with social status, creates a sense of community among those who agree with the martyr’s cause, and establishes a common value system. Martyrdom stories change people, sometimes for the better, sometimes for worse.