G. John Ikenberry
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240975
- eISBN:
- 9780191598999
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240973.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Analyses democracy promotion as part of America's ‘liberal grand strategy’, i.e. the notion that the US is better able to pursue its interests, reduce security threats, and foster a stable political ...
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Analyses democracy promotion as part of America's ‘liberal grand strategy’, i.e. the notion that the US is better able to pursue its interests, reduce security threats, and foster a stable political order when other states are democracies. It provides answers to the following questions: What are the elements of the liberal grand strategy? Why has it been so persistent? Which groups support it within the foreign policy community? How significant is the liberal democratic orientation in current American foreign policy?Less
Analyses democracy promotion as part of America's ‘liberal grand strategy’, i.e. the notion that the US is better able to pursue its interests, reduce security threats, and foster a stable political order when other states are democracies. It provides answers to the following questions: What are the elements of the liberal grand strategy? Why has it been so persistent? Which groups support it within the foreign policy community? How significant is the liberal democratic orientation in current American foreign policy?
Colin S. Gray
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579662
- eISBN:
- 9780191594458
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579662.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
A theory of war, perhaps the theory, cannot suffice as a theory of strategy. Strategy is a function that needs to be conducted in peacetime as well as in wartime. Because Clausewitz adheres closely ...
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A theory of war, perhaps the theory, cannot suffice as a theory of strategy. Strategy is a function that needs to be conducted in peacetime as well as in wartime. Because Clausewitz adheres closely to his mission, narrowly defined as On War, he tells us nothing of much note about how and why peace becomes war, or how war becomes a peace worthy of the name. The strategist today, to a greater or lesser degree, must be a grand strategist. He has to approach strategy as a permanent mission, and to see war situated politically in a continuous stream of political, and strategic, history. Clausewitz theorizes as it were above the fray of the great political narrative that from time to time conducts its transactions violently. Memorably indeed, he stresses the political instrumentality of war and its warfare, but beyond that fairly obvious claim he does not provide much guidance for statecraft. One must hasten to add that he did not seek to do so; On War is narrowly about exactly what its title claims. Unfortunately, today there is extant no general theory of war in history, or, less inclusively, of war in statecraft. Strategy, especially grand strategy—the strategy that directs and employs potentially all of the resources of a security community—as contrasted with military strategy, is the dynamic and adapting product of what is known as policy, but more truly is rendered as politics. The relations of politics, war, and strategy are complex and have yet to be treated wholly convincingly by theorists. Practitioners of statecraft and strategy, if we allow a notable distinction between the two, generally are obliged to bow to the maxim that ‘contingency rules!’Less
A theory of war, perhaps the theory, cannot suffice as a theory of strategy. Strategy is a function that needs to be conducted in peacetime as well as in wartime. Because Clausewitz adheres closely to his mission, narrowly defined as On War, he tells us nothing of much note about how and why peace becomes war, or how war becomes a peace worthy of the name. The strategist today, to a greater or lesser degree, must be a grand strategist. He has to approach strategy as a permanent mission, and to see war situated politically in a continuous stream of political, and strategic, history. Clausewitz theorizes as it were above the fray of the great political narrative that from time to time conducts its transactions violently. Memorably indeed, he stresses the political instrumentality of war and its warfare, but beyond that fairly obvious claim he does not provide much guidance for statecraft. One must hasten to add that he did not seek to do so; On War is narrowly about exactly what its title claims. Unfortunately, today there is extant no general theory of war in history, or, less inclusively, of war in statecraft. Strategy, especially grand strategy—the strategy that directs and employs potentially all of the resources of a security community—as contrasted with military strategy, is the dynamic and adapting product of what is known as policy, but more truly is rendered as politics. The relations of politics, war, and strategy are complex and have yet to be treated wholly convincingly by theorists. Practitioners of statecraft and strategy, if we allow a notable distinction between the two, generally are obliged to bow to the maxim that ‘contingency rules!’
John Andreas Olsen
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608638
- eISBN:
- 9780191731754
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608638.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The introduction focuses on the definition of ‘grand strategy’ and ‘military strategy’, the phenomena and logic of strategy, considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation‐state politics, ...
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The introduction focuses on the definition of ‘grand strategy’ and ‘military strategy’, the phenomena and logic of strategy, considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation‐state politics, and the relationship between the military and political levels of war. It provides a working definition of strategy as ‘the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means’, and briefly summarizes the twelve case studies, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to the contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also posits the working hypothesis of the book: that nothing essential changes in the intrinsic nature and function (or purpose) of strategy and war, in sharp contrast to the character of individual strategies that reflect the unique circumstances of each conflict.Less
The introduction focuses on the definition of ‘grand strategy’ and ‘military strategy’, the phenomena and logic of strategy, considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation‐state politics, and the relationship between the military and political levels of war. It provides a working definition of strategy as ‘the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means’, and briefly summarizes the twelve case studies, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to the contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also posits the working hypothesis of the book: that nothing essential changes in the intrinsic nature and function (or purpose) of strategy and war, in sharp contrast to the character of individual strategies that reflect the unique circumstances of each conflict.
Williamson Murray
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608638
- eISBN:
- 9780191731754
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608638.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Chapter 9 focuses on the relationship between the evolving grand strategy and military strategy in the American Civil War (1861–5). Williamson Murray emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between ...
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Chapter 9 focuses on the relationship between the evolving grand strategy and military strategy in the American Civil War (1861–5). Williamson Murray emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between Abraham Lincoln's grand strategy—aimed at the preservation of the Union with its form of government—and Ulysses S. Grant's ability to execute the military expression of that strategy through effective generalship, selection of capable subordinates, and decisive combat. Murray argues that two main factors explain why it took the North four years to defeat the Southern states. First, the vast size of the theatre of operations posed great logistical challenges. Second, enormous popular enthusiasm for their respective causes led both sides to insist on holding out to the bitter end, despite huge casualties and suffering. Ultimately, Lincoln's grand strategy succeeded because the verdict that ‘the United States is a country’, singular rather than plural, was never seriously challenged again.Less
Chapter 9 focuses on the relationship between the evolving grand strategy and military strategy in the American Civil War (1861–5). Williamson Murray emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between Abraham Lincoln's grand strategy—aimed at the preservation of the Union with its form of government—and Ulysses S. Grant's ability to execute the military expression of that strategy through effective generalship, selection of capable subordinates, and decisive combat. Murray argues that two main factors explain why it took the North four years to defeat the Southern states. First, the vast size of the theatre of operations posed great logistical challenges. Second, enormous popular enthusiasm for their respective causes led both sides to insist on holding out to the bitter end, despite huge casualties and suffering. Ultimately, Lincoln's grand strategy succeeded because the verdict that ‘the United States is a country’, singular rather than plural, was never seriously challenged again.
Colin S. Gray
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608638
- eISBN:
- 9780191731754
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608638.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
In examining the Soviet‐American Cold War of 1945–91, Colin Gray posits seven categories of context: political, sociocultural, economic, technological, geographical‐geopolitical, historical, and ...
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In examining the Soviet‐American Cold War of 1945–91, Colin Gray posits seven categories of context: political, sociocultural, economic, technological, geographical‐geopolitical, historical, and military‐strategic. He also divides the Cold War into separate periods, defined by what he considers its three strategically ‘decisive moments’: the outbreak of, and the American‐led reaction to, the war in Korea (June 1950); the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); and the fall of the Soviet Union (December 1989). His analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Cold War was a struggle that the Soviet Union was never likely to win, at least not by any reasonable definition of victory. Gray deliberately weights political over military considerations, and grand strategy over military strategy. The strategic experience of the Cold War supports his main hypothesis: namely, that strategy has eternal and universal characteristics.Less
In examining the Soviet‐American Cold War of 1945–91, Colin Gray posits seven categories of context: political, sociocultural, economic, technological, geographical‐geopolitical, historical, and military‐strategic. He also divides the Cold War into separate periods, defined by what he considers its three strategically ‘decisive moments’: the outbreak of, and the American‐led reaction to, the war in Korea (June 1950); the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); and the fall of the Soviet Union (December 1989). His analysis leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Cold War was a struggle that the Soviet Union was never likely to win, at least not by any reasonable definition of victory. Gray deliberately weights political over military considerations, and grand strategy over military strategy. The strategic experience of the Cold War supports his main hypothesis: namely, that strategy has eternal and universal characteristics.
John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608638
- eISBN:
- 9780191731754
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608638.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This book focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practised over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to ...
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This book focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practised over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter‐insurgencies in present‐day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles but also to times of peace that were overshadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation‐state policies. Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as ‘the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means’, these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence of political objectives, operational schemes of manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions, and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present. Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.Less
This book focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practised over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter‐insurgencies in present‐day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles but also to times of peace that were overshadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation‐state policies. Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as ‘the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means’, these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence of political objectives, operational schemes of manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions, and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present. Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.
Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski, and Simon Reich
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198840848
- eISBN:
- 9780191876745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, Comparative Politics
This chapter lays out the objectives of the volume, provides a new conceptual and methodological framework, and justifies case selection. It comprises three sections. The first section argues that a ...
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This chapter lays out the objectives of the volume, provides a new conceptual and methodological framework, and justifies case selection. It comprises three sections. The first section argues that a comparative approach to the study of grand strategy both highlights the constraints of contemporary single-country research and the opportunities presented by a systematic research design. The chapter’s second section evaluates the alternative definitions and competing theoretical traditions developed to study grand strategy. The authors argue in favor of an integration of these traditions within a single framework, coupled with an expanded universe of countries as viable cases. In the third section, the authors examine which systemic and domestic factors organically influence the ways in which states formulate and implement grand strategies. The chapter identifies criteria for better explanations about why individual states make specific choices, and provides threads that ensure the internal consistency of the book.Less
This chapter lays out the objectives of the volume, provides a new conceptual and methodological framework, and justifies case selection. It comprises three sections. The first section argues that a comparative approach to the study of grand strategy both highlights the constraints of contemporary single-country research and the opportunities presented by a systematic research design. The chapter’s second section evaluates the alternative definitions and competing theoretical traditions developed to study grand strategy. The authors argue in favor of an integration of these traditions within a single framework, coupled with an expanded universe of countries as viable cases. In the third section, the authors examine which systemic and domestic factors organically influence the ways in which states formulate and implement grand strategies. The chapter identifies criteria for better explanations about why individual states make specific choices, and provides threads that ensure the internal consistency of the book.
William J. Norris
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801454493
- eISBN:
- 9781501704031
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801454493.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Asian Politics
This chapter examines the role of economics in China's grand strategy as it rises to great power status in the international system. A good deal of China's post-1978 foreign policy has been focused ...
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This chapter examines the role of economics in China's grand strategy as it rises to great power status in the international system. A good deal of China's post-1978 foreign policy has been focused on facilitating the country's economic development. Increasingly, China finds itself in a position in which it may be able to leverage its growing economic power to advance its foreign policy goals. This chapter begins with an overview of grand strategy as an analytical concept in international relations. It then considers China as a strategic actor and the evolving role of economics in China's contemporary grand strategy, along with Deng Xiaoping's reassessment and strategic reorientation of China toward economic development. It also explains how much of China's modern foreign policy has been designed to serve the requirements of economic development and the international integration of a rising China. Finally, it discusses the utility of economic statecraft in pursuing China's grand strategy.Less
This chapter examines the role of economics in China's grand strategy as it rises to great power status in the international system. A good deal of China's post-1978 foreign policy has been focused on facilitating the country's economic development. Increasingly, China finds itself in a position in which it may be able to leverage its growing economic power to advance its foreign policy goals. This chapter begins with an overview of grand strategy as an analytical concept in international relations. It then considers China as a strategic actor and the evolving role of economics in China's contemporary grand strategy, along with Deng Xiaoping's reassessment and strategic reorientation of China toward economic development. It also explains how much of China's modern foreign policy has been designed to serve the requirements of economic development and the international integration of a rising China. Finally, it discusses the utility of economic statecraft in pursuing China's grand strategy.
Martin van Creveld
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199608638
- eISBN:
- 9780191731754
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608638.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
In Chapter 10, Martin van Creveld focuses on grand strategy and military strategy in the First and Second World Wars. He first examines the similarities between the two wars at the highest level: ‘to ...
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In Chapter 10, Martin van Creveld focuses on grand strategy and military strategy in the First and Second World Wars. He first examines the similarities between the two wars at the highest level: ‘to wit, the one where national policy and politics, strategy, diplomacy, economics and mobilization meet and interact’. The second part of the chapter discusses the military strategy of the principal belligerents. The author highlights the differences between the two wars, the role of armoured formations on the ground, naval warfare, and the extensive use of air power. He maintains that, in reality, these two total wars should be seen as parts of a single protracted struggle of attrition, with victory ultimately gained by the side with greater resources in terms of bigger military forces (army, navy, and air force), backed by larger populations, a stronger military‐industrial base for scientific research and production, and greater economic leverage.Less
In Chapter 10, Martin van Creveld focuses on grand strategy and military strategy in the First and Second World Wars. He first examines the similarities between the two wars at the highest level: ‘to wit, the one where national policy and politics, strategy, diplomacy, economics and mobilization meet and interact’. The second part of the chapter discusses the military strategy of the principal belligerents. The author highlights the differences between the two wars, the role of armoured formations on the ground, naval warfare, and the extensive use of air power. He maintains that, in reality, these two total wars should be seen as parts of a single protracted struggle of attrition, with victory ultimately gained by the side with greater resources in terms of bigger military forces (army, navy, and air force), backed by larger populations, a stronger military‐industrial base for scientific research and production, and greater economic leverage.
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781501714627
- eISBN:
- 9781501714641
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501714627.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
Policy makers and pundits debate the utility and desirability of various forms of grand strategy. They advocate one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to ...
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Policy makers and pundits debate the utility and desirability of various forms of grand strategy. They advocate one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism. These strategies generally share three features: first, a nostalgia for the Cold War, when America’s grand strategy was clear and consistent. Second, a common belief that the United States can shape the global system according to its values and need if only the country has the right leadership and strategy. Third, a propensity to prescribe instead of explaining American strategy. In The End of Grand Strategy: Maritime Operations in the 21st Century, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge this common view. They eschew prescription in favor of describing and explaining what America’s military actually does. They argue that each presidental administration inevitably resorts to each of the six variant of grand strategy that they implement simultaneously as a result of a series of fundamental recent changes – what they term ‘calibrated strategies.’ Reich and Dombrowski support their controversial argument by examining six major maritime operations, stretching from America’s shores to every region of the globe. Each of these operations reflects one major variant of strategy. They conclude that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead.Less
Policy makers and pundits debate the utility and desirability of various forms of grand strategy. They advocate one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism. These strategies generally share three features: first, a nostalgia for the Cold War, when America’s grand strategy was clear and consistent. Second, a common belief that the United States can shape the global system according to its values and need if only the country has the right leadership and strategy. Third, a propensity to prescribe instead of explaining American strategy. In The End of Grand Strategy: Maritime Operations in the 21st Century, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge this common view. They eschew prescription in favor of describing and explaining what America’s military actually does. They argue that each presidental administration inevitably resorts to each of the six variant of grand strategy that they implement simultaneously as a result of a series of fundamental recent changes – what they term ‘calibrated strategies.’ Reich and Dombrowski support their controversial argument by examining six major maritime operations, stretching from America’s shores to every region of the globe. Each of these operations reflects one major variant of strategy. They conclude that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead.
Lukas Milevski
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198779773
- eISBN:
- 9780191825125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779773.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Changing intellectual and geopolitical conditions by the early 1970s led to the re-emergence of grand strategy, among others, as a popular concept. John Collins authored the first entire book on ...
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Changing intellectual and geopolitical conditions by the early 1970s led to the re-emergence of grand strategy, among others, as a popular concept. John Collins authored the first entire book on grand strategy to be published in the United States, although today it is largely unremembered. A number of prominent authors began or made their careers writing about and developing their own idiosyncratic ideas of grand strategy, including Edward Luttwak (who defined grand strategy as military statecraft), Barry Posen (grand strategy as a cause-and-effect chain to produce security), and to some extent Paul Kennedy (defining grand strategy as very-long-term strategy). Each of these newly evolved concepts differed from its contemporaries, and each remains popular in its own way to the present day.Less
Changing intellectual and geopolitical conditions by the early 1970s led to the re-emergence of grand strategy, among others, as a popular concept. John Collins authored the first entire book on grand strategy to be published in the United States, although today it is largely unremembered. A number of prominent authors began or made their careers writing about and developing their own idiosyncratic ideas of grand strategy, including Edward Luttwak (who defined grand strategy as military statecraft), Barry Posen (grand strategy as a cause-and-effect chain to produce security), and to some extent Paul Kennedy (defining grand strategy as very-long-term strategy). Each of these newly evolved concepts differed from its contemporaries, and each remains popular in its own way to the present day.
Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198840848
- eISBN:
- 9780191876745
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198840848.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, Comparative Politics
The study of American grand strategy is dominated by historians who describe former grand strategies, and international relations scholars who prescribe what it should be. In contrast to either ...
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The study of American grand strategy is dominated by historians who describe former grand strategies, and international relations scholars who prescribe what it should be. In contrast to either approach, this chapter has three components: First, it identifies the national cultural influences, the key elements of the mythic “American Creed,” that provide the emblematic foundations of contemporary American grand strategy. Second, it describes the historical evolution of the institutional mechanisms that both formulate and implement American grand strategy, and how those institutions actually operate in the modern era. And third, relating these elements, it explains the parameters of American grand strategic planning—how it operates in practice. This includes an overt reliance on military instruments and a conscious sensitivity to field conditions in implementation that may undermine the most grand strategic designs. The chapter concludes by contemplating the prospects for continuity and change in American grand strategy.Less
The study of American grand strategy is dominated by historians who describe former grand strategies, and international relations scholars who prescribe what it should be. In contrast to either approach, this chapter has three components: First, it identifies the national cultural influences, the key elements of the mythic “American Creed,” that provide the emblematic foundations of contemporary American grand strategy. Second, it describes the historical evolution of the institutional mechanisms that both formulate and implement American grand strategy, and how those institutions actually operate in the modern era. And third, relating these elements, it explains the parameters of American grand strategic planning—how it operates in practice. This includes an overt reliance on military instruments and a conscious sensitivity to field conditions in implementation that may undermine the most grand strategic designs. The chapter concludes by contemplating the prospects for continuity and change in American grand strategy.
Lukas Milevski
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198779773
- eISBN:
- 9780191825125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779773.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
With the end of the Cold War, grand strategic thought again entered a new era—one not comfortably defined by a single enemy. In response much of the grand strategic literature turned away from its ...
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With the end of the Cold War, grand strategic thought again entered a new era—one not comfortably defined by a single enemy. In response much of the grand strategic literature turned away from its military roots, which had still been respected during the last years of the Cold War. The new grand strategic literature expanded into multiple different academic fields largely to generate prescriptions of new foreign policies for interacting with an apparently new world. New but generic definitions of grand strategy continued to emerge, such as that by John Lewis Gaddis (the relationship of means to large ends). Since 2014, yet another new type of interpretation of grand strategy has emerged in the writings of Hal Brands and some others, which treated grand strategy as a particular type of decision-making process.Less
With the end of the Cold War, grand strategic thought again entered a new era—one not comfortably defined by a single enemy. In response much of the grand strategic literature turned away from its military roots, which had still been respected during the last years of the Cold War. The new grand strategic literature expanded into multiple different academic fields largely to generate prescriptions of new foreign policies for interacting with an apparently new world. New but generic definitions of grand strategy continued to emerge, such as that by John Lewis Gaddis (the relationship of means to large ends). Since 2014, yet another new type of interpretation of grand strategy has emerged in the writings of Hal Brands and some others, which treated grand strategy as a particular type of decision-making process.
Georg Löfflmann
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781474419765
- eISBN:
- 9781474435192
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474419765.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter highlights the conflict of competing grand strategy discourses under the Obama presidency, which are identified as hegemony, engagement and restraint. It provides an overview of the ...
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This chapter highlights the conflict of competing grand strategy discourses under the Obama presidency, which are identified as hegemony, engagement and restraint. It provides an overview of the political significance of grand strategy and its treatment in the academic literature. The chapter describes the political and expert debate of American grand strategy under the Obama presidency and briefly introduces the theoretical-methodological framework that has guided the research into competing discourses of American grand strategy under Obama. The chapter offers an alternative definition of grand strategy from the conventional literature, identifying it as discursive link between geopolitical identity and national security.Less
This chapter highlights the conflict of competing grand strategy discourses under the Obama presidency, which are identified as hegemony, engagement and restraint. It provides an overview of the political significance of grand strategy and its treatment in the academic literature. The chapter describes the political and expert debate of American grand strategy under the Obama presidency and briefly introduces the theoretical-methodological framework that has guided the research into competing discourses of American grand strategy under Obama. The chapter offers an alternative definition of grand strategy from the conventional literature, identifying it as discursive link between geopolitical identity and national security.
Feng Zhang
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780804793896
- eISBN:
- 9780804795043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804793896.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Drawing on distinguished relational traditions in both China and the West, this chapter develops a relational theory to explain a distinct set of grand strategies that imperial China and its ...
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Drawing on distinguished relational traditions in both China and the West, this chapter develops a relational theory to explain a distinct set of grand strategies that imperial China and its neighbors may adopt in their interactions. The theory provides a new framework for understanding the strategic dynamics of regional politics under the condition of Chinese hegemony. It also affords a new perspective on the role of Confucianism in Chinese foreign policy: constraining in the grand strategy of instrumental hierarchy but causal and constitutive in the grand strategy of expressive hierarchy. Equally important, it uncovers an expressive dimension of regional politics that is almost universally ignored in the existing literature. The theory also posits a major facilitating condition of rationality and strategy: They are both relational outcomes conditioned by the degree of the conflict of interest in particular relationships.Less
Drawing on distinguished relational traditions in both China and the West, this chapter develops a relational theory to explain a distinct set of grand strategies that imperial China and its neighbors may adopt in their interactions. The theory provides a new framework for understanding the strategic dynamics of regional politics under the condition of Chinese hegemony. It also affords a new perspective on the role of Confucianism in Chinese foreign policy: constraining in the grand strategy of instrumental hierarchy but causal and constitutive in the grand strategy of expressive hierarchy. Equally important, it uncovers an expressive dimension of regional politics that is almost universally ignored in the existing literature. The theory also posits a major facilitating condition of rationality and strategy: They are both relational outcomes conditioned by the degree of the conflict of interest in particular relationships.
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781501714627
- eISBN:
- 9781501714641
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501714627.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This chapter is divided into three components:
1. A review of the (lack of) utility of the concept of grand strategy in view of the prior chapters
2. A discussion of the theoretical and policy ...
More
This chapter is divided into three components:
1. A review of the (lack of) utility of the concept of grand strategy in view of the prior chapters
2. A discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of our alternative formulation which we characterize as “calibrated strategies” in an evolving strategic environment (see chapter 2) where there are proliferating demands made on the military.
3. The implications of our findings for the future of the military, particularly the Navy (as the central branch of the military services in most grand strategic theorizing).
Our overall assessment is that academics have to reappraise and focus on explanation, not prescription, and that an adaptive approach is required by policymakers in recognizing contingencies rather than strategizing in terms of generalities. Naval officials, however, will seek to avoid certain kinds of MOOTW whenever possible, preferring to pursue traditional naval functions, playing “away games” in the places like the South China Sea rather than “home games” guarding America’s shores from illicit flows.Less
This chapter is divided into three components:
1. A review of the (lack of) utility of the concept of grand strategy in view of the prior chapters
2. A discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of our alternative formulation which we characterize as “calibrated strategies” in an evolving strategic environment (see chapter 2) where there are proliferating demands made on the military.
3. The implications of our findings for the future of the military, particularly the Navy (as the central branch of the military services in most grand strategic theorizing).
Our overall assessment is that academics have to reappraise and focus on explanation, not prescription, and that an adaptive approach is required by policymakers in recognizing contingencies rather than strategizing in terms of generalities. Naval officials, however, will seek to avoid certain kinds of MOOTW whenever possible, preferring to pursue traditional naval functions, playing “away games” in the places like the South China Sea rather than “home games” guarding America’s shores from illicit flows.
Lukas Milevski
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198779773
- eISBN:
- 9780191825125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779773.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The introductory chapter ascertains the present-day confused status of grand strategic thought by comparing and contrasting popular contemporary definitions. It identifies the source of this ...
More
The introductory chapter ascertains the present-day confused status of grand strategic thought by comparing and contrasting popular contemporary definitions. It identifies the source of this confusion in the incomplete history of grand strategic thought. This is a gap which tends to be obscured by commonly accepted but largely incorrect and mutually conflicting tropes and assumptions: that Basil Liddell Hart invented grand strategy, or at least its modern form; that grand strategy as presently understood is a recent invention; that there is only one historical tradition of grand strategic thought; and that the evolution of grand strategic thought has taken a teleological course. The chapter then outlines how this incomplete history of grand strategic thought will be filled in and made more accurate through the use of conceptual history.Less
The introductory chapter ascertains the present-day confused status of grand strategic thought by comparing and contrasting popular contemporary definitions. It identifies the source of this confusion in the incomplete history of grand strategic thought. This is a gap which tends to be obscured by commonly accepted but largely incorrect and mutually conflicting tropes and assumptions: that Basil Liddell Hart invented grand strategy, or at least its modern form; that grand strategy as presently understood is a recent invention; that there is only one historical tradition of grand strategic thought; and that the evolution of grand strategic thought has taken a teleological course. The chapter then outlines how this incomplete history of grand strategic thought will be filled in and made more accurate through the use of conceptual history.
Lukas Milevski
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198779773
- eISBN:
- 9780191825125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779773.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Ideas of grand strategy in the United States changed due to the experience of two World Wars, but the overall pattern of thought remained asfractured as it had been during thr previous century. Some ...
More
Ideas of grand strategy in the United States changed due to the experience of two World Wars, but the overall pattern of thought remained asfractured as it had been during thr previous century. Some concepts emphasized employing all means to win wars, others on deterring war in peace and mobilizing to win during war, and others on the conditional or contingent nature of grand strategy as an applicable idea in practice. Most of the literature stemmed from military practitioners of all services. A rare but prominent civilian, Edward Mead Earle emphasized grand strategy as a fusion of military strategy, international statecraft, and armaments policy, and remains the best remembered American writer on grand strategy during this period.Less
Ideas of grand strategy in the United States changed due to the experience of two World Wars, but the overall pattern of thought remained asfractured as it had been during thr previous century. Some concepts emphasized employing all means to win wars, others on deterring war in peace and mobilizing to win during war, and others on the conditional or contingent nature of grand strategy as an applicable idea in practice. Most of the literature stemmed from military practitioners of all services. A rare but prominent civilian, Edward Mead Earle emphasized grand strategy as a fusion of military strategy, international statecraft, and armaments policy, and remains the best remembered American writer on grand strategy during this period.
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9781501714627
- eISBN:
- 9781501714641
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501714627.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Security Studies
This introductory chapter lays out the central puzzle of the book: why do so many academics and policymakers advocate a specific form of grand strategy when the evidence drawn from military ...
More
This introductory chapter lays out the central puzzle of the book: why do so many academics and policymakers advocate a specific form of grand strategy when the evidence drawn from military operations suggest that it is impossible to pursue a ‘one-size fits all’ strategy? We use a personal example, drawing on the experience of one of the authors (Dombrowski) to illustrate operational limitations. We argue that America faces a novel geostrategic environment, with notably new threats, actors, and forms of conflict. When these are combined with the more traditional problems inherent in the design and implementation of policy, outcomes are often unanticipated and sometimes perverse – ensuring that American grand strategy is less than the sum of its parts. In response, America pursues all six major variants of grand strategy simultaneously. We justify the selection of the US Navy and sea services in the book.Less
This introductory chapter lays out the central puzzle of the book: why do so many academics and policymakers advocate a specific form of grand strategy when the evidence drawn from military operations suggest that it is impossible to pursue a ‘one-size fits all’ strategy? We use a personal example, drawing on the experience of one of the authors (Dombrowski) to illustrate operational limitations. We argue that America faces a novel geostrategic environment, with notably new threats, actors, and forms of conflict. When these are combined with the more traditional problems inherent in the design and implementation of policy, outcomes are often unanticipated and sometimes perverse – ensuring that American grand strategy is less than the sum of its parts. In response, America pursues all six major variants of grand strategy simultaneously. We justify the selection of the US Navy and sea services in the book.
Lukas Milevski
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198779773
- eISBN:
- 9780191825125
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779773.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The concluding chapter considers the evolutionary path of grand strategy from a conceptual and theoretical perspective. What significance did that evolution hold, what can it reveal about the nature ...
More
The concluding chapter considers the evolutionary path of grand strategy from a conceptual and theoretical perspective. What significance did that evolution hold, what can it reveal about the nature of grand strategy as a concept, a phenomenon, an activity? The history of grand strategic thought has been one of unexamined assumptions, which in turn led to a diverse set of meanings and definitions which span multiple disciplines and thereby confound comprehension of grand strategy as a concept and a term. As a by-product of this confusion, the logic of strategy in ‘grand strategy’ has been diluted by this diversity, weakening general understanding of strategy itself. It is unclear how this currently inchoate concept may be usefully applied, particularly as much of the conceptual span of what is considered grand strategy is often ignored despite the frequency with which it is invoked.Less
The concluding chapter considers the evolutionary path of grand strategy from a conceptual and theoretical perspective. What significance did that evolution hold, what can it reveal about the nature of grand strategy as a concept, a phenomenon, an activity? The history of grand strategic thought has been one of unexamined assumptions, which in turn led to a diverse set of meanings and definitions which span multiple disciplines and thereby confound comprehension of grand strategy as a concept and a term. As a by-product of this confusion, the logic of strategy in ‘grand strategy’ has been diluted by this diversity, weakening general understanding of strategy itself. It is unclear how this currently inchoate concept may be usefully applied, particularly as much of the conceptual span of what is considered grand strategy is often ignored despite the frequency with which it is invoked.
