Rein Taagepera
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199287741
- eISBN:
- 9780191713408
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287741.003.0017
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
We now expect to be able to fine-tune simple electoral laws to effect party systems and government stability positively, but we still need to be cautious. We should not expect to be able to tailor ...
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We now expect to be able to fine-tune simple electoral laws to effect party systems and government stability positively, but we still need to be cautious. We should not expect to be able to tailor complex electoral laws to desired goals. In institutional design, we need to consider marginal adjustments rather than flipping to completely different electoral laws. We should consider keeping the same electoral laws for at least three elections before changing them. Political science has been an intellectual field separate from politics, but the two may now start to connect, thanks to advances in the study of electoral systems and party systems.Less
We now expect to be able to fine-tune simple electoral laws to effect party systems and government stability positively, but we still need to be cautious. We should not expect to be able to tailor complex electoral laws to desired goals. In institutional design, we need to consider marginal adjustments rather than flipping to completely different electoral laws. We should consider keeping the same electoral laws for at least three elections before changing them. Political science has been an intellectual field separate from politics, but the two may now start to connect, thanks to advances in the study of electoral systems and party systems.
Csaba Nikolenyi
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199675302
- eISBN:
- 9780191755323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675302.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The ten post-communist democracies vary considerably in terms of the stability and duration of their governments. In some states, such as Hungary, the government that is formed and invested in office ...
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The ten post-communist democracies vary considerably in terms of the stability and duration of their governments. In some states, such as Hungary, the government that is formed and invested in office after the election tends to last for the entire or nearly the entire term of the legislature. Elsewhere, such as Latvia, post-elections governments never last for a long time. This chapter examines how the set of political institutions that disperse or concentrate political power in the electoral, legislative and executive arenas of party competition affect government duration. The central finding of this chapter is the several institutions that disperse political power also reduce cabinet duration: specifically, bicameralism, a more powerful presidency, and negative government formation rules. In addition, government stability inversely varies with the fragmentation of the legislative party system, and both majority and post-election governments are more stable than minority and later mid-term cabinets.Less
The ten post-communist democracies vary considerably in terms of the stability and duration of their governments. In some states, such as Hungary, the government that is formed and invested in office after the election tends to last for the entire or nearly the entire term of the legislature. Elsewhere, such as Latvia, post-elections governments never last for a long time. This chapter examines how the set of political institutions that disperse or concentrate political power in the electoral, legislative and executive arenas of party competition affect government duration. The central finding of this chapter is the several institutions that disperse political power also reduce cabinet duration: specifically, bicameralism, a more powerful presidency, and negative government formation rules. In addition, government stability inversely varies with the fragmentation of the legislative party system, and both majority and post-election governments are more stable than minority and later mid-term cabinets.
Csaba Nikolenyi
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199675302
- eISBN:
- 9780191755323
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675302.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This book examines the institutional foundations of coalition government in the ten post-communist democracies of Eastern and Central Europe for the 1990-2010 period: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, ...
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This book examines the institutional foundations of coalition government in the ten post-communist democracies of Eastern and Central Europe for the 1990-2010 period: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Its central argument is that differences in the arrangement of political institutions systematically explain variations in patterns of multi-party government across these states. The book starts with the premise that electoral systems and constitutional provisions on the powers, the structure, and the relationship between parliament and the presidency determine the degree to which political power is dispersed or concentrated in the political system. On the basis of these institutional features, three groups of states are distinguished with regard to their degree of power concentration; the substantive chapters of the book demonstrate how these institutional combinations and differences shape three specific facets of party government which capture the main stages of the lifecycle of coalitions governments: the formation of electoral coalitions, government formation and government duration. Specifically, three comparative chapters assess the impact of institutional power concentration on the size of electoral coalitions; the likelihood that political parties form a minority government; and the number of days that a government lasts in office. The main finding of the book is that power concentration matters: political parties in those democracies where institutions are designed to concentrate political power tend to form large electoral coalitions, they tend to form majority rather than undersized governments, and they build more durable cabinets. In addition, the book contains a detailed case study of government formation in Hungary and a previously unstudied comparison of indirect presidential elections in four states: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia.Less
This book examines the institutional foundations of coalition government in the ten post-communist democracies of Eastern and Central Europe for the 1990-2010 period: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Its central argument is that differences in the arrangement of political institutions systematically explain variations in patterns of multi-party government across these states. The book starts with the premise that electoral systems and constitutional provisions on the powers, the structure, and the relationship between parliament and the presidency determine the degree to which political power is dispersed or concentrated in the political system. On the basis of these institutional features, three groups of states are distinguished with regard to their degree of power concentration; the substantive chapters of the book demonstrate how these institutional combinations and differences shape three specific facets of party government which capture the main stages of the lifecycle of coalitions governments: the formation of electoral coalitions, government formation and government duration. Specifically, three comparative chapters assess the impact of institutional power concentration on the size of electoral coalitions; the likelihood that political parties form a minority government; and the number of days that a government lasts in office. The main finding of the book is that power concentration matters: political parties in those democracies where institutions are designed to concentrate political power tend to form large electoral coalitions, they tend to form majority rather than undersized governments, and they build more durable cabinets. In addition, the book contains a detailed case study of government formation in Hungary and a previously unstudied comparison of indirect presidential elections in four states: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia.
