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Some have argued that liberalism is committed to the principle that the government should remain as neutral as possible toward conceptions of the good life. Some paternalistic prostitution laws, however, are consistent with what is right in this principle. This position is defended by reference to T. M. Scanlon's contractualist theory of morality, and also by reference to Ronald Dworkin's early work on rights. Although some might characterize as “perfectionist” the paternalistic argument for prostitution laws stated in chapter 1, the kind of perfectionism that this argument involves is morally unobjectionable and is consistent with what is right in the idea of government neutrality.

Over the last few decades, there have been three competing views of the meaning of the Establishment Clause held by members of the Supreme Court. One, favored by the liberal justices, is that the Establishment Clause should be understood as creating a wall separating church and state. An alternative view, favored by the conservative justices, is that there should be “accommodation” between religion and government. Under this view, the government violates the Establishment Clause only if it creates a church, coerces religious participation, or discriminates among religions in giving financial benefits. A third position is that the government acts unconstitutionally if it endorses religion or a specific religion. The chapter argues that separation is the best view of the Establishment Clause and applies this to prayers at government activities, religious symbols on government property, and government aid to religious institutions.

A common critique of a “separationist” position on matters of government and religion is that it represents inappropriate hostility toward religious people and practices. This chapter reviews and rebuts this critique. Most of the time, this critique is premised on the assumption that the government should be allowed to align itself with Christian or Judeo-Christian practices and symbols because they are part of our “heritage” and “traditions.” This chapter rejects this assumption as inconsistent with the Constitution’s expectation that government not formally align itself with particular religions. The separationist position ends the inherent hostility that such practices demonstrated toward historically excluded or disfavored religious traditions and consequently is more supportive of the great diversity of religious traditions and practices that characterizes 21st-century America. It also ensures that the government will not be embroiled in impossible decisions about which religious individuals deserve special accommodation from laws that bind everyone else.