John Kekes
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199546923
- eISBN:
- 9780191720109
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546923.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book examines the indispensable role enjoyment plays in a good life. The key to it is the development of a style of life that combines an attitude and a manner of living and acting that jointly ...
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The book examines the indispensable role enjoyment plays in a good life. The key to it is the development of a style of life that combines an attitude and a manner of living and acting that jointly express one's deepest concerns. Since such styles vary with characters and circumstances, understanding them requires attending to the particular and concrete details of individual lives. The first half of the book explains and illustrates these components of enjoyable lives. The second half is a detailed examination of enjoyable lives of integrity, reflectiveness, and self-direction, and miserable lives of morbid romanticism, moralism, and exuberance, and explains why these styles of life are admirable or deplorable. Reflection on works of literature is a better guide to this kind of explanation than the search for general theories and principles that preoccupies much of contemporary deontological, consequentialist, and contractarian moral thought. The argument proceeds by detailed reflection on particular cases, and shows how this kind of reflection can be reasonably conducted and how the quest for universality and impartiality is misguided in this context. Central to the argument is a practical, particular, pluralistic, and yet objective conception of reason that rejects the pervasive contemporary tendency to regard reasons as good only if they are binding on all who aspire to live reasonably and morally. Reasons for living and acting in particular ways are often individually variable and none the worse for that.Less
The book examines the indispensable role enjoyment plays in a good life. The key to it is the development of a style of life that combines an attitude and a manner of living and acting that jointly express one's deepest concerns. Since such styles vary with characters and circumstances, understanding them requires attending to the particular and concrete details of individual lives. The first half of the book explains and illustrates these components of enjoyable lives. The second half is a detailed examination of enjoyable lives of integrity, reflectiveness, and self-direction, and miserable lives of morbid romanticism, moralism, and exuberance, and explains why these styles of life are admirable or deplorable. Reflection on works of literature is a better guide to this kind of explanation than the search for general theories and principles that preoccupies much of contemporary deontological, consequentialist, and contractarian moral thought. The argument proceeds by detailed reflection on particular cases, and shows how this kind of reflection can be reasonably conducted and how the quest for universality and impartiality is misguided in this context. Central to the argument is a practical, particular, pluralistic, and yet objective conception of reason that rejects the pervasive contemporary tendency to regard reasons as good only if they are binding on all who aspire to live reasonably and morally. Reasons for living and acting in particular ways are often individually variable and none the worse for that.
George E. Karamanolis
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199264568
- eISBN:
- 9780191603990
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199264562.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter begins with a discussion of Antiochus’ debate with Philo of Larissa. It then analyses Antiochus’ thesis on the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. According to Antiochus, ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of Antiochus’ debate with Philo of Larissa. It then analyses Antiochus’ thesis on the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. According to Antiochus, the most essential part of philosophy, particularly Plato’s philosophy, is ethics, and his most crucial doctrine is about how to achieve a good life. Antiochus shares the Stoic view that virtue requires secure knowledge; without such knowledge, no ethical system can exist. He is convinced that Plato has coherent and systematic ethics, which he reconstructs from that of Aristotle and Polemo. Antiochus is neither an eclectic nor a syncretist, as has often been claimed. Antiochus did not muddle various doctrines from Plato and Platonists, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Rather, he had a certain conception of Plato’s philosophy which he tried to reconstruct as faithfully as he could through the testimonies of the early Academics, Aristotle, and the Stoics, according to the degree to which they were indebted to Plato.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of Antiochus’ debate with Philo of Larissa. It then analyses Antiochus’ thesis on the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. According to Antiochus, the most essential part of philosophy, particularly Plato’s philosophy, is ethics, and his most crucial doctrine is about how to achieve a good life. Antiochus shares the Stoic view that virtue requires secure knowledge; without such knowledge, no ethical system can exist. He is convinced that Plato has coherent and systematic ethics, which he reconstructs from that of Aristotle and Polemo. Antiochus is neither an eclectic nor a syncretist, as has often been claimed. Antiochus did not muddle various doctrines from Plato and Platonists, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Rather, he had a certain conception of Plato’s philosophy which he tried to reconstruct as faithfully as he could through the testimonies of the early Academics, Aristotle, and the Stoics, according to the degree to which they were indebted to Plato.
Frisbee Sheffield
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199286775
- eISBN:
- 9780191713194
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286775.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy
This book is concerned with Plato's examination of the nature and aims of human desire, and the role that it plays in our ethical lives. For Plato, analysing our desires is a way of reflecting on the ...
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This book is concerned with Plato's examination of the nature and aims of human desire, and the role that it plays in our ethical lives. For Plato, analysing our desires is a way of reflecting on the kind of people that we are, and on our prospects for a worthwhile and happy life. This assumes that desires are the sorts of thing that are amenable to such reflection. This book considers why Plato held such a view, and in what direction he thought our desires could best be shaped. The kind of relationships which typically took place at symposia was an important way in which young men learnt how to value and desire the right kinds of things, and in the appropriate manner. They were, in short, a way in which virtue was transmitted to the young. The book argues that seen in this light, the Symposium belongs amongst those dialogues concerned with moral education. The Symposium offers a distinctive approach to central Platonic themes concerning education, virtue, epistemology, and moral psychology, one that is grounded in an account of the nature and goals of a loving relationship.Less
This book is concerned with Plato's examination of the nature and aims of human desire, and the role that it plays in our ethical lives. For Plato, analysing our desires is a way of reflecting on the kind of people that we are, and on our prospects for a worthwhile and happy life. This assumes that desires are the sorts of thing that are amenable to such reflection. This book considers why Plato held such a view, and in what direction he thought our desires could best be shaped. The kind of relationships which typically took place at symposia was an important way in which young men learnt how to value and desire the right kinds of things, and in the appropriate manner. They were, in short, a way in which virtue was transmitted to the young. The book argues that seen in this light, the Symposium belongs amongst those dialogues concerned with moral education. The Symposium offers a distinctive approach to central Platonic themes concerning education, virtue, epistemology, and moral psychology, one that is grounded in an account of the nature and goals of a loving relationship.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198278641
- eISBN:
- 9780191599903
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198278640.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Liberals often claim that the state should be neutral between individual conceptions of the good life, and use this claim to defend economic markets. Neutrality can refer to the reasons offered for ...
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Liberals often claim that the state should be neutral between individual conceptions of the good life, and use this claim to defend economic markets. Neutrality can refer to the reasons offered for institutions and policies, or to their effects. The view defended here is that an institutional framework is neutral when under its auspices people's success at realizing their conceptions of the good depends only on natural factors such as their tastes and talents. Co‐operatives competing in the market with capitalist firms face difficulties in generating sufficient investment because of the incentives their members face. For neutrality to obtain, the market must be counterbalanced by public institutions that support non‐commodity‐based conceptions of the good.Less
Liberals often claim that the state should be neutral between individual conceptions of the good life, and use this claim to defend economic markets. Neutrality can refer to the reasons offered for institutions and policies, or to their effects. The view defended here is that an institutional framework is neutral when under its auspices people's success at realizing their conceptions of the good depends only on natural factors such as their tastes and talents. Co‐operatives competing in the market with capitalist firms face difficulties in generating sufficient investment because of the incentives their members face. For neutrality to obtain, the market must be counterbalanced by public institutions that support non‐commodity‐based conceptions of the good.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
This chapter provides a detailed map of the dispute regarding what role, if any, conceptions of the good should play in liberal political theory. In particular, the chapter outlines the essential ...
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This chapter provides a detailed map of the dispute regarding what role, if any, conceptions of the good should play in liberal political theory. In particular, the chapter outlines the essential tenets of liberal perfectionism and political liberalism. The chapter also provides a brief overview and critique of a third view, comprehensive antiperfectionism, which tries to ground liberal political theory in a particular view of human flourishing while insisting that the liberal state must nevertheless remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good.Less
This chapter provides a detailed map of the dispute regarding what role, if any, conceptions of the good should play in liberal political theory. In particular, the chapter outlines the essential tenets of liberal perfectionism and political liberalism. The chapter also provides a brief overview and critique of a third view, comprehensive antiperfectionism, which tries to ground liberal political theory in a particular view of human flourishing while insisting that the liberal state must nevertheless remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good.
Jonathan Quong
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199594870
- eISBN:
- 9780191723513
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594870.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
Reasonable people, critics of political liberalism point out, disagree about justice every bit as much as they do about the good life, so why does political liberalism permit the state to enforce ...
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Reasonable people, critics of political liberalism point out, disagree about justice every bit as much as they do about the good life, so why does political liberalism permit the state to enforce controversial conceptions of justice when it will not allow the state to act on the basis of controversial conceptions of the good? The author calls this the asymmetry objection, and this chapter shows how political liberals can rebut the objection. There are, the author shows, at least two kinds of disagreements that can occur between reasonable people: justificatory and foundational. The former disagreements are framed by common premises or assumptions, whereas the latter disagreements go ‘all the way down’. With this distinction in hand, the author shows why political liberalism's asymmetric treatment of disagreements about justice and disagreements about the good is defensible and desirable.Less
Reasonable people, critics of political liberalism point out, disagree about justice every bit as much as they do about the good life, so why does political liberalism permit the state to enforce controversial conceptions of justice when it will not allow the state to act on the basis of controversial conceptions of the good? The author calls this the asymmetry objection, and this chapter shows how political liberals can rebut the objection. There are, the author shows, at least two kinds of disagreements that can occur between reasonable people: justificatory and foundational. The former disagreements are framed by common premises or assumptions, whereas the latter disagreements go ‘all the way down’. With this distinction in hand, the author shows why political liberalism's asymmetric treatment of disagreements about justice and disagreements about the good is defensible and desirable.
George Anastaplo
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780813125336
- eISBN:
- 9780813135243
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University Press of Kentucky
- DOI:
- 10.5810/kentucky/9780813125336.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, American Politics
This chapter examines Shakespeare's Hamlet and seeks to understand the Good life. It notes that Prince Hamlet naturally preferred a private life, subordinating himself to the rule of others, and even ...
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This chapter examines Shakespeare's Hamlet and seeks to understand the Good life. It notes that Prince Hamlet naturally preferred a private life, subordinating himself to the rule of others, and even courted Ophelia, which suggests an opening to domesticity on his part. It further seeks to explore the ultimate dependency of Good on understanding. It notes that in order to be able to conclude that the Good is elusive; one must have a reliable sense of what is truly good. It points out that whatever openness Hamlet had had toward domesticity seems to have been seriously disturbed by what happened to what may have been his model of a good marriage. It notes that his mother need not be considered to have been aware of the murder of her first husband, but her hasty remarriage can arouse suspicions that Gertrude and Claudius had had some “understanding” while King Hamlet was still alive.Less
This chapter examines Shakespeare's Hamlet and seeks to understand the Good life. It notes that Prince Hamlet naturally preferred a private life, subordinating himself to the rule of others, and even courted Ophelia, which suggests an opening to domesticity on his part. It further seeks to explore the ultimate dependency of Good on understanding. It notes that in order to be able to conclude that the Good is elusive; one must have a reliable sense of what is truly good. It points out that whatever openness Hamlet had had toward domesticity seems to have been seriously disturbed by what happened to what may have been his model of a good marriage. It notes that his mother need not be considered to have been aware of the murder of her first husband, but her hasty remarriage can arouse suspicions that Gertrude and Claudius had had some “understanding” while King Hamlet was still alive.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199265169
- eISBN:
- 9780191601385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926516X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible ...
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Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.Less
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.
Alan H. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576906
- eISBN:
- 9780191722288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576906.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Objective values need not be ‘queer’ or intrinsically motivating, but they would require motivation from us. This chapter argues first that we are not typically motivated in that way and that it ...
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Objective values need not be ‘queer’ or intrinsically motivating, but they would require motivation from us. This chapter argues first that we are not typically motivated in that way and that it makes no sense to demand that all our motivations be other than they are. Second, there is no way to measure degrees of supposed objective values in objects or lives, or states such as pleasure and pain. Third, when we abstract from our actual personal concerns and adopt the point of view of the objective universe, values disappear. Finally, we need not appeal to objective values in order to explain how we can lead good and meaningful lives. Our lives are good when we are satisfying our deepest concerns; and they are meaningful when the events within them form intelligible narratives.Less
Objective values need not be ‘queer’ or intrinsically motivating, but they would require motivation from us. This chapter argues first that we are not typically motivated in that way and that it makes no sense to demand that all our motivations be other than they are. Second, there is no way to measure degrees of supposed objective values in objects or lives, or states such as pleasure and pain. Third, when we abstract from our actual personal concerns and adopt the point of view of the objective universe, values disappear. Finally, we need not appeal to objective values in order to explain how we can lead good and meaningful lives. Our lives are good when we are satisfying our deepest concerns; and they are meaningful when the events within them form intelligible narratives.
Garrett Cullity
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199258116
- eISBN:
- 9780191602221
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258112.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
How far can the argument against the Extreme Demand be extended? If living one kind of life, or pursuing one kind of good, is better than the alternatives in a significant enough way to ground ...
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How far can the argument against the Extreme Demand be extended? If living one kind of life, or pursuing one kind of good, is better than the alternatives in a significant enough way to ground requirements of beneficence on others to help me, it cannot be wrong for me to refuse to forgo it to help others. Moreover, there are some kinds of lives, and some kinds of goods (‘commitment goods’), that are morally defensible even when there are alternatives that would be no worse for me. This generates neither an ultra-permissive nor an ultra-ascetic view.Less
How far can the argument against the Extreme Demand be extended? If living one kind of life, or pursuing one kind of good, is better than the alternatives in a significant enough way to ground requirements of beneficence on others to help me, it cannot be wrong for me to refuse to forgo it to help others. Moreover, there are some kinds of lives, and some kinds of goods (‘commitment goods’), that are morally defensible even when there are alternatives that would be no worse for me. This generates neither an ultra-permissive nor an ultra-ascetic view.
Christian Smith
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199828029
- eISBN:
- 9780199919475
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199828029.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
This chapter explores the place of mass consumerism and materialistic visions of the good life among emerging adults. After a brief view of some survey statistics, it explores in some depth today’s ...
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This chapter explores the place of mass consumerism and materialistic visions of the good life among emerging adults. After a brief view of some survey statistics, it explores in some depth today’s emerging adults’ views of mass consumerism. The discussion focuses on how critical or uncritical they are of the culture of material consumption. The chapter then shifts to examining emerging adults’ outlooks on what makes for a good human life, and how material consumption fits into that vision.Less
This chapter explores the place of mass consumerism and materialistic visions of the good life among emerging adults. After a brief view of some survey statistics, it explores in some depth today’s emerging adults’ views of mass consumerism. The discussion focuses on how critical or uncritical they are of the culture of material consumption. The chapter then shifts to examining emerging adults’ outlooks on what makes for a good human life, and how material consumption fits into that vision.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Spinoza, more concerned than Hobbes with the ancient conception of the role of philosophy in delineating the Good Life, made Substance, God, and Nature into synonyms. God is eternal, free, and ...
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Spinoza, more concerned than Hobbes with the ancient conception of the role of philosophy in delineating the Good Life, made Substance, God, and Nature into synonyms. God is eternal, free, and all-powerful, but in no way personal, operating for no end, but from the necessity of its nature. Nothing is contingent. This entity, of whose infinite Attributes we know two, Thought and Extension, and whose Modes are the particular things (including us) of our experience, is all there is. Mind and Body are “the same thing, expressed in two ways.” A particular mind is composed of Ideas –beliefs, active entities, not the “dumb pictures on a tablet” of Descartes. Some ideas are adequate, others are inadequate, “confused and fragmentary.” The more we replace our inadequate ideas by adequate ones, the closer we attain to blessedness, and indeed share in the eternity of God.Less
Spinoza, more concerned than Hobbes with the ancient conception of the role of philosophy in delineating the Good Life, made Substance, God, and Nature into synonyms. God is eternal, free, and all-powerful, but in no way personal, operating for no end, but from the necessity of its nature. Nothing is contingent. This entity, of whose infinite Attributes we know two, Thought and Extension, and whose Modes are the particular things (including us) of our experience, is all there is. Mind and Body are “the same thing, expressed in two ways.” A particular mind is composed of Ideas –beliefs, active entities, not the “dumb pictures on a tablet” of Descartes. Some ideas are adequate, others are inadequate, “confused and fragmentary.” The more we replace our inadequate ideas by adequate ones, the closer we attain to blessedness, and indeed share in the eternity of God.
Daniel Russell
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282845
- eISBN:
- 9780191602931
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282846.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter begins with a discussion of the view that Plato defends asceticism in the Phaedo. It argues that this view rests on the mistaken assumption that, for Plato, pleasure is bad in its own ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the view that Plato defends asceticism in the Phaedo. It argues that this view rests on the mistaken assumption that, for Plato, pleasure is bad in its own right, and not in virtue of one's giving it the wrong place in one's life. It is also argued that in the Phaedo, Plato also rejects the hedonist view that pleasure is the good, since taking pleasure to be the good is incompatible with the sorts of priorities one needs in order to make any kind of good out of pleasure in the first place. The chapter concludes by showing how the notion of a conditional good affords a new and richer understanding of Plato's discussion of pleasure and value in the Phaedo.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the view that Plato defends asceticism in the Phaedo. It argues that this view rests on the mistaken assumption that, for Plato, pleasure is bad in its own right, and not in virtue of one's giving it the wrong place in one's life. It is also argued that in the Phaedo, Plato also rejects the hedonist view that pleasure is the good, since taking pleasure to be the good is incompatible with the sorts of priorities one needs in order to make any kind of good out of pleasure in the first place. The chapter concludes by showing how the notion of a conditional good affords a new and richer understanding of Plato's discussion of pleasure and value in the Phaedo.
Yuriko Saito
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199278350
- eISBN:
- 9780191707001
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278350.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Our aesthetic judgments in everyday life are often intertwined with moral judgments, such as personal appearance, condition of one's possessions, and environmental eyesores. We also make ...
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Our aesthetic judgments in everyday life are often intertwined with moral judgments, such as personal appearance, condition of one's possessions, and environmental eyesores. We also make moral-aesthetic judgments on artifacts by considering how user-friendly artifacts and environments respond to the specific needs of the intended users with care, respect, and consideration through their sensuous surface and design features. Less obvious are the designed objects and environments that enrich the content of the users' experiences through sensitivity to their bodily engagement and the temporal dimension of the experience, typically embodied in green buildings, as well as gardens, the tea ceremony, food serving, and packaging in the Japanese tradition. These aesthetic manifestations of moral values indicate the significance of the aesthetic in everyday life in promoting a good life, and how sensitively and caringly designed environments and artifacts must be an essential ingredient of a good society.Less
Our aesthetic judgments in everyday life are often intertwined with moral judgments, such as personal appearance, condition of one's possessions, and environmental eyesores. We also make moral-aesthetic judgments on artifacts by considering how user-friendly artifacts and environments respond to the specific needs of the intended users with care, respect, and consideration through their sensuous surface and design features. Less obvious are the designed objects and environments that enrich the content of the users' experiences through sensitivity to their bodily engagement and the temporal dimension of the experience, typically embodied in green buildings, as well as gardens, the tea ceremony, food serving, and packaging in the Japanese tradition. These aesthetic manifestations of moral values indicate the significance of the aesthetic in everyday life in promoting a good life, and how sensitively and caringly designed environments and artifacts must be an essential ingredient of a good society.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195381245
- eISBN:
- 9780199869213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381245.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Mill used his inaugural address as rector of St. Andrew's University to reflect on the university curriculum. This chapter uses this address as a basis for considering Mill's conception of the good ...
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Mill used his inaugural address as rector of St. Andrew's University to reflect on the university curriculum. This chapter uses this address as a basis for considering Mill's conception of the good life and of the kinds of education that enhance young people's chances of achieving it. On the interpretation of Mill that this chapter advances, his sensitivity to a variety of human possibilities and a diversity of worthwhile “experiments of living” inclines him to a very wide-ranging perspective on the good life.Less
Mill used his inaugural address as rector of St. Andrew's University to reflect on the university curriculum. This chapter uses this address as a basis for considering Mill's conception of the good life and of the kinds of education that enhance young people's chances of achieving it. On the interpretation of Mill that this chapter advances, his sensitivity to a variety of human possibilities and a diversity of worthwhile “experiments of living” inclines him to a very wide-ranging perspective on the good life.
Garrett Cullity
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199258116
- eISBN:
- 9780191602221
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258112.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We have an argument for rejecting an iterative but not an aggregative approach to the life-saving analogy. This means that, while Chs 7–9 show that certain forms of personal spending are morally ...
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We have an argument for rejecting an iterative but not an aggregative approach to the life-saving analogy. This means that, while Chs 7–9 show that certain forms of personal spending are morally defensible, the life-saving analogy still supplies us with grounds for thinking that other forms of personal spending are not. Some of the main practical implications of the resulting view are spelled out. The resulting view is not puritanical, but is still demanding in the constraints it places on living a morally good life.Less
We have an argument for rejecting an iterative but not an aggregative approach to the life-saving analogy. This means that, while Chs 7–9 show that certain forms of personal spending are morally defensible, the life-saving analogy still supplies us with grounds for thinking that other forms of personal spending are not. Some of the main practical implications of the resulting view are spelled out. The resulting view is not puritanical, but is still demanding in the constraints it places on living a morally good life.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199265169
- eISBN:
- 9780191601385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926516X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Attempts to explain more exactly how the author understands the question about ‘the Good Life’. Interprets this to mean something like ‘the life that is good in itself for the one who lives it’ or ...
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Attempts to explain more exactly how the author understands the question about ‘the Good Life’. Interprets this to mean something like ‘the life that is good in itself for the one who lives it’ or ‘the life high in individual welfare’. So the question is: what feature (or features) ultimately make a person's life go well for that person? Some popular views about the Good Life are discussed. These include eudaimonism, preferentism, perfectionism, and pluralism. Sketches these views and briefly indicates why he think they are unsatisfactory. This leaves hedonism.Less
Attempts to explain more exactly how the author understands the question about ‘the Good Life’. Interprets this to mean something like ‘the life that is good in itself for the one who lives it’ or ‘the life high in individual welfare’. So the question is: what feature (or features) ultimately make a person's life go well for that person? Some popular views about the Good Life are discussed. These include eudaimonism, preferentism, perfectionism, and pluralism. Sketches these views and briefly indicates why he think they are unsatisfactory. This leaves hedonism.
Michael Parker
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199590704
- eISBN:
- 9780191595547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590704.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The decision to have a child is one of the most morally significant choices we make. Recent advances in reproductive medicine have increased the moral complexity of reproductive decision‐making ...
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The decision to have a child is one of the most morally significant choices we make. Recent advances in reproductive medicine have increased the moral complexity of reproductive decision‐making dramatically by introducing the possibility of choosing the biological characteristics of future children. This chapter argues for a principle of ‘procreative beneficence’ which requires of parents that they ensure when making such choices, insofar as this is possible, that any child they have has at least a reasonable chance of a good life. The chapter goes on to argue that procreative beneficence on this interpretation places important obligations on potential parents and on third parties, such as fertility clinics, ruling out, for example, the deliberate decision to have a child with a very severe disability. Whilst arguing that those involved in reproductive decision‐making have important obligations in relation to the lives they are considering bringing about, the chapter rejects the version of the principle of procreative beneficence supported by Julian Savulescu who argues that parents have an obligation to have the child with the ‘best opportunity of the best life’. The chapter argues that the principle of procreative beneficence on this interpretation is underdetermining, paradoxical, and self‐defeating, and should be rejected.Less
The decision to have a child is one of the most morally significant choices we make. Recent advances in reproductive medicine have increased the moral complexity of reproductive decision‐making dramatically by introducing the possibility of choosing the biological characteristics of future children. This chapter argues for a principle of ‘procreative beneficence’ which requires of parents that they ensure when making such choices, insofar as this is possible, that any child they have has at least a reasonable chance of a good life. The chapter goes on to argue that procreative beneficence on this interpretation places important obligations on potential parents and on third parties, such as fertility clinics, ruling out, for example, the deliberate decision to have a child with a very severe disability. Whilst arguing that those involved in reproductive decision‐making have important obligations in relation to the lives they are considering bringing about, the chapter rejects the version of the principle of procreative beneficence supported by Julian Savulescu who argues that parents have an obligation to have the child with the ‘best opportunity of the best life’. The chapter argues that the principle of procreative beneficence on this interpretation is underdetermining, paradoxical, and self‐defeating, and should be rejected.
Cheris Shun-ching Chan
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195394078
- eISBN:
- 9780199951154
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195394078.003.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
This chapter provides a context for the ethnographic stories that unfold in subsequent chapters. It begins with a brief historical background of commercial life insurance in China, dating back to the ...
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This chapter provides a context for the ethnographic stories that unfold in subsequent chapters. It begins with a brief historical background of commercial life insurance in China, dating back to the early nineteenth century through the end of the Maoist regime. Then, it details the economic, institutional, and cultural conditions in urban China in the late 1980s to the 1990s, and assesses each of these conditions’ possible impacts on the development of commercial life insurance, both favourable and unfavourable. In particular, the chapter details how major cultural barriers to life insurance, including the Chinese cultural taboo on death, are rooted in Chinese philosophical and folk religious traditions. Finally, it relates these institutional and cultural conditions to the theoretical questions of the book. It presents the characteristics of the emergent Chinese market, namely its uneven growth pattern, the dominance of domestic insurers, and its disproportionate focus on money management, and argues that neither the cultural value nor the cultural tool-kit model alone is sufficient to explain these characteristics.Less
This chapter provides a context for the ethnographic stories that unfold in subsequent chapters. It begins with a brief historical background of commercial life insurance in China, dating back to the early nineteenth century through the end of the Maoist regime. Then, it details the economic, institutional, and cultural conditions in urban China in the late 1980s to the 1990s, and assesses each of these conditions’ possible impacts on the development of commercial life insurance, both favourable and unfavourable. In particular, the chapter details how major cultural barriers to life insurance, including the Chinese cultural taboo on death, are rooted in Chinese philosophical and folk religious traditions. Finally, it relates these institutional and cultural conditions to the theoretical questions of the book. It presents the characteristics of the emergent Chinese market, namely its uneven growth pattern, the dominance of domestic insurers, and its disproportionate focus on money management, and argues that neither the cultural value nor the cultural tool-kit model alone is sufficient to explain these characteristics.
Daniel Russell
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199282845
- eISBN:
- 9780191602931
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199282846.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This introductory chapter begins by exploring the nature of pleasure at a common-sense level. It then shows what sorts of questions we need a more theoretically complete and rigorous account of ...
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This introductory chapter begins by exploring the nature of pleasure at a common-sense level. It then shows what sorts of questions we need a more theoretically complete and rigorous account of pleasure to answer, and provides a brief overview of how Plato addresses them.Less
This introductory chapter begins by exploring the nature of pleasure at a common-sense level. It then shows what sorts of questions we need a more theoretically complete and rigorous account of pleasure to answer, and provides a brief overview of how Plato addresses them.
