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How could we move closer to achieving global justice? In chapters 5 through 9 the case against the feasibility skeptic builds, as we see that there is much we can do that would constitute real progress toward global justice. This chapter discusses global poverty, global public goods, and taxation reform. At least 25% of the world's population is currently unable to meet their basic needs. Our neglect of various global public goods means that this situation is likely to deteriorate in the future. The chapter discusses how we can make genuine progress with respect to global poverty and the protection of global public goods by presenting considerations in favor of major taxation and accounting reform, which would enable developing countries better to help themselves. The chapter includes critical discussion of some well‐known taxes such as Thomas Pogge's Global Resource Tax, a Carbon Tax, and the Tobin Tax.

This chapter uses game theoretic models to examine scope for international cooperation for reducing CO₂ emissions. Though the collective benefits of reduced emissions may be significant, it is in no country's self-interest to make significant sacrifices through a reduction in emissions. In the absence of cooperation, the total quantity of emissions will be in excess of the social optimum, that allocation of emissions which maximizes the total income of all countries minus the environmental costs. However, not all kinds of international agreements lead to a social optimum. A more common type of agreement is one where all countries are required to make uniform percentage reduction in emissions. The cost difference between these two types of agreements may be quite large. This chapter explores two other types of environmental agreements, namely, an international CO₂ tax and tradable CO₂ permits. Disregarding the size of a country, it is seen that both of these systems are equivalent. With a CO₂ tax, setting the tax level can be an issue and it may take a few iterations to reach the desired level of tax.

This chapter looks at how the international tax norm-setting mechanism may positively or negatively affect attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals and the achievement of human rights. It is important to recognize that there is a great deal of concern expressed by many developing countries about their lack of real participation in the development of what are being promoted as global tax norms or standards. The OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project has brought some of these issues to the forefront. Nevertheless, there is much that is useful to developing countries in the BEPS outcomes, especially in combatting what is commonly regarded by both developing and developed countries as tax avoidance or evasion, such as through international profit-shifting.

This chapter explores tax transparency in the context of previous governmental, private, and civil society initiatives about transparency of the last thirty years. There has been a particular focus on transparency as a mechanism to enforce taxation of large multinational enterprises (MNEs) and to ensure tax compliance by high wealth individuals, with a specific goal of addressing tax avoidance and evasion especially through the hiding by such taxpayers of income and assets in tax havens. In addition to the promotion of transparency as a key strategy for global tax enforcement, transparency has also been aimed variously at ending corruption and abuse of power by private and public agents or entities; disciplining the fiscal actions and processes of governments by constraining spending or reducing taxes; strengthening financial and other markets; building participatory democracy; protecting human rights; supporting economic development and good governance in general; and ensuring compliance with environmental and other global policies.

In recent decades various developments have made it more difficult for countries to raise higher taxes or to maintain their current tax levels. These developments have also made it easier for corporations and high-income individuals to evade or avoid taxes on global activities. There is no institution charged with monitoring these tax developments. The chapter argues that the time may have come to create such an institution—a World Tax Authority. It discusses the various roles that such an institution should play in order to make coherent the tax policies of different countries, especially to those that have cross-country implications.

Recent debates about global justice have featured various proposals to make the world more just by means of transferring money. Their assumption is that just purposes may be achieved by applying, in a global context, the kind of redistributive fiscal policy that has proven capable of supporting social justice within the context of a welfare state. In global or international contexts, however, that assumption may not be warranted. In the absence of global political institutions and a single global currency, it would be premature to make policy commendations whose effectiveness would presuppose their existence. Additionally, there is a problem that the value of taxes, even if successfully raised and transmitted, can be subject to volatilities in financial markets. Attention should be directed to the institutional conditions required for global taxation as well as for the governance of global finance more generally to ensure it is in the public interest.

Instead of summarizing, the conclusion highlights five central insights of the book. First, while the author argues for an effective right of states to tax capital, his argument abstains from recommending any particular rate of capital taxation. Second, the ethics of tax competition defended in the book emphasizes the importance of just institutions rather than appealing to the motivations of individual persons or corporations. Third, parallel to the fiscal context discussed here, the economic interdependence between states arguably creates forms of normative interdependence in other policy fields such as monetary or trade policy. Fourth, of the principles of global tax justice defended in the book, the fiscal policy constraint is likely to be more controversial than the membership principle. Finally, regulating tax competition is not only a requirement of justice but also a matter of sound economic policy.

Originally, radical economics was based on the economics of Marx. Inequality of incomes and wealth are seen as the sources of disequilibria in market economies. According to Marx, the growth of the capital coefficient is higher than the growth of labour productivity. This means that the rate of return on capital decreases over time—until the system collapses. Under the influence of neo-Marxian sociology radical economics paid increasing attention to social, political, and moral aspects of the capitalist system. Bowles and Gintis stress the interest of cooperation rather than competition, and Cohen discusses the undemocratic and immoral aspects of capitalism. Sheehan sees the growth of the institutions of marketing as an important phenomenon, which explains why capitalism is still alive. Piketty looks at an incredible number of statistics, arguing that low growth and strong inequality go hand in hand. He advocates a global wealth tax to stimulate economic growth.