Search Results

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities market between the two world wars. Topics covered include the securities markets during the First World War, the impact of the First World War on global securities markets, the 1920s, the Wall Street Crash, and securities markets and national governments during the 1930s.

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities market from 1970 to 1990. It shows that growth and development in the global securities market in the 1970s and 1980s were marked by two major turning points: the abolition of fixed commissions on the New York Stock Exchange in May 1975, which put pressure on stock exchanges in the US and around the world; and the Big Bang in London in October 1986, which not only transformed the British securities market but also intensified the pressure for change which had already been experienced by other stock exchanges, especially in Europe. By 1990, the effects of these twin developments were visible worldwide. The securities markets re-emerged as essential components of national financial systems whilst the global securities market once again became a key element in the financial flows that brought stability to the international monetary system.

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities market from the onset of the Second World War to 1970. Topics covered include the impact of the Second World War, the US securities market at the end of the war, securities markets outside the US, and the international securities market. It is argued that by the end of the Second World War, securities markets had become marginal appendages within financial systems, with pride of place being given to the actions of governments and banks. Government intervention was seen as the solution to all types of economic problems, whether it was a domestic shortage of finance or the stability of the international monetary system.

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities market from 1900 to the onset of the First World War. By 1914, securities markets played a key role in the financial systems of the most advanced world economies and had established a niche position within the less developed countries. Though far from being the universal means through which government and business raised funds or people employed their savings, securities had achieved a high level of penetration by the most sophisticated borrowers and investors. Internationally, securities markets were instrumental in the worldwide movement of funds that provided finance for major infrastructure projects and development of the earth's minerals and oil.

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities markets in the late 20th century. It is shown that the securities markets once again became essential components of each national financial system and provided a key element in the financial flows that redistributed savings around the world, bringing stability to the international monetary system. By 2005, a new global securities market was in full operation, which involved a degree of integration and interaction never before seen. This was the result of a culmination of technological and organizational advances during the 20th century. The securities markets had also overcome the governmental and institutional barriers that had previously restricted its development.

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities market from the mid-nineteenth century to the year 1900. During this period, stock exchanges evolved into the most important institutions of the capitalist world providing an essential interface between money and capital markets at national and international levels. In the process, they facilitated the mobilization of vast amounts of money to finance the world's railway systems and contributed significantly to stability of the world monetary system, normally associated with the gold standard.

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities market between the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 and the middle of the 19th century. Most of the developments in the global securities market were isolated responses to local conditions, though they often shared common characteristics in terms of timing and the nature of the securities traded. The mid-1840s witnessed a number of speculative booms around the world in which corporate securities, especially railways, were very much at the fore. However, unlike previous booms, a degree of market integration was possible in the 1840s because of a transformation in the world-wide system of communication. Although the railway was important in providing faster transport, the greatest influence on the operation of the securities market was the development of the telegraph.

This chapter discusses developments in the global securities market during the 18th century outlining progress made and the impact of revolution and war between 1789 and 1815. It is argued that the turmoil and disruption introduced by the French Revolution in 1789 had both negative and positive consequences for the global securities market. The negative outcome was easy to see in terms of the eclipse of Amsterdam as the premier financial centre and the collapse of the international market due to of widespread defaults. The positive outcome of the period of war and revolution between 1789 and 1815 was the establishment of the London Stock Exchange in 1801 as a closed market, with control over entry and the power to enforce rules of orderly behaviour. This produced a model that was then copied by other securities markets during the years after 1815.

This chapter argues that the relationship between energy insecurity and state weakness is real but complicated, and the link should not be exaggerated. Weak states are more vulnerable to disruptions in energy production and transit. Furthermore, high oil and gas prices tend to fuel corruption and conflict in relatively poor producers, while volatility in energy markets may further destabilize weak-state suppliers—reinforcing a vicious cycle of instability and energy insecurity. In general, however, weak states do not pose the greatest threat to US and global energy security; relatively stronger developing countries do. The chapter begins by analyzing of the growing prominence of energy issues in the US national security debate. It then explores the role of fragile states in world energy markets, and evaluates arguments about the dangers posed by these states to energy security. Next, it focuses on how the recent energy crisis—and US reliance on supplies from developing countries—may actually exacerbate state weakness and undermine US foreign policy goals. Finally, it underlines the importance of energy-rich “states to watch” for US energy security.

This chapter summarizes the preceding discussions and presents some recommendations. This book has sought to map the intersection between state weakness and particular threats, and to trace those “spillovers” to specific gaps in state capacity or will. As its findings show, the overlap between state weakness and today's most pressing transnational threats is hardly clear-cut, much less universal. It depends on the threat in question, the specific sources and manifestations of state weakness, and the will of ruling regimes to deliver effective governance and control transnational spillovers. In sum, it is a mistake to frame the world's fragile states, as a cohort, as a mortal threat to US and global security. Policymakers and analysts alike need to take a collective “time out”, and begin an honest conversation about the relative strategic importance of fragile states—as well as the alternative rationales, including alleviating poverty and human suffering, for engaging them.

This concluding chapter presents a summation of the topics discussed in the preceding chapters. It discusses the six distinct periods in the history of the global securities market. It then considers advances and reversals in the development of the global securities market, and the inherent conflicts in interest in the more sophisticated securities markets.

This chapter discusses the origins of the global securities market. The origins of the modern global securities market lie in medieval Italy, where in the city states of Venice, Genoa, and Florence new financial arrangements emerged out of a growing trade between East and West. Early modern advances and the first speculative bubble are described. It is argued that the most remarkable thing about the early development of the securities market is the role played by governments and their need for finance due to the turbulent nature of the economics of medieval and early modern Europe. Through the creation of transferable long-term debt upon which interest was paid, governments could access funds that would, in all probability, otherwise lie idle.

This chapter illustrates that illegal immigrants in India, Malaysia, and Pakistan are traveling abroad under their assumed identities. It poses a direct challenge to sovereignty and global security. Specifically, some of the ways that documented illegal immigrants in India, Malaysia, and Pakistan threaten the security of these states are reported. The processes arising from the civil society, such as illegal immigration and documentary citizenship, have undermined states' sovereignty. Confronting the challenges of illegal immigration to sovereignty and security involves a large global enterprise. It also requires the centralization and standardization of entire civil registration systems so that identity and membership are no longer blurred in the developing states which send illegal immigrants to Western states. Moreover, it involves the monitoring and surveillance of already existing ethnic immigrant communities so that ethnic-kinship networks do not trump receiving states' control by providing instant membership through documentation. Finally, it entails eliminating all corruption, bribery, and political or ethnic sympathy as a result of which complicity may happen within states.

Politics aside, the question of whether the EU should create an SEC is about the trade-offs between scale and accountability. This chapter considers that trade-off in the US context, with specific attention the SEC's apparent role as a ‘global’ securities regulator on matters relating to issuer disclosure. The principal claim is that in making enforcement decisions, there will likely be a ‘home bias’ toward domestic enforcement actions that makes extraterritorial actions less likely, thus reducing the incentives to comply. To the extent that this is typical of regulatory behaviour, then there may be lessons for Europeans considering the question of institutional design. More broadly, the chapter also considers some of the institutional features that make SEC enforcement policy what it is, which may or may not be exportable (or which policy makers in Europe may not want to import) to the European context.

This chapter considers the role of the United States in the global security system. First, it looks at the changing character of America's security environment, suggesting that the fundamental driver of change is a profound deepening of “security interdependence.” Second, it examines the various forms of security cooperation needed in this complex environment of shifting, diffuse, and uncertain threats. It argues that the most important way to pursue security in this environment is to focus on building cooperative security institutions. Rather than direct attention to one threat or one enemy, the United States needs to pursue a “milieu-oriented” security strategy. Finally, it looks at the underlying principles and norms of a twenty-first century global security system. Notions of “national” security will need to yield to notions of “comprehensive” and “cooperative” security. Importantly, the United States will need to lead the way in bringing other states into a global system of security cooperation that fashions bargains and institutions to a new reality with both great promise and great peril.

International armed interventions in intrastate conflicts are planned with the expectation that order will be restored through the controlled application of limited military force. This persuasive orthodoxy, Paul Battersby argues in his Chapter Changing Patterns of Social Connection across Interventions: Unravelling Aberrant Globalisation, endures despite the erratic course of foreign interventions in the Middle East over the past two decades. Notions of order, equilibrium or stasis imply systemic balances that, where disturbed, can be restored through counteraction. Yet, while we can gather abundant conflict data, observe events from different vantage points, correlate variables and calibrate possibilities, the calculation of future trajectories of conflict events remains an imprecise and hazardous exercise. Thus, to anticipate only positive change from the rapid assertion of overwhelming military power into faraway places is to downplay the threads of happenings, decisions, ideas and beliefs that shape the subjective realities of global security. Globalisation is aberrant in its complexity, and global dynamics do not yield simple choices between binary opposites of order and disorder, control or chaos. The search for a more nuanced understanding of security leads inescapably towards the analysis of global patterns of connection and organisation that generate and sustain multiscalar supply chains of violence.

The war in Iraq of spring 2003 is a major crisis, and one that continues to affect global security dynamics. The USA invaded Iraq, using as its key argument that rogue states with links to terrorism demand forceful action. According to the 2002 version of the US National Security Strategy, the USA would defend itself not only in a reactive way, but also in a proactive way—invoking self-defence in order to act pre-emptively against terrorists. This chapter scrutinises the leaders' framing of the Iraq crisis from the build-up to the war from 1 December 2002 until its official end on 1 May 2003.

This chapter evaluates the EU's internal cohesion by extrapolating the findings from the case studies into three major ‘gaps’ in reasoning on security. The gaps revolve, to a significant extent, around the role of norms in international affairs, around the governments' favoured methods of preserving stability, and around the issue of the role of the USA in global security. The chapter extends the analysis by analysing a number of more recent EU documents. It ends by elaborating on the consequences for practical cooperation.